chalo ab kafi bs nikal li dil kii now relax karo ziada tension na lay jana ......
Oh come on! I was hoping you could explain me all this, since you have a morbid fear of USSR.
In 1971, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto succeeded to bring full-scale Soviet investment in this project, and laid the foundations of the steel mills in 1972 with the help of Soviet Union.[4] In 1980-85, the Soviet direct investment increased from 10% to 15% after officially signing an economic cooperation agreement in 1985.[5] The overall 1.6% of all Pakistan's exports were accounted in 1981, which increased to 2.5% in 1985.[5] Particularly, the Soviet material exports exceeded the imports in three-fold method in early 1980.[5] In April 1981, Pakistan and Soviet Union formed a joint private company to start the manufacture of the agriculture tractors, for which Soviet Union offered $20 million US dollars.[5] In November 1981, the Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, V.S. Smirnov, publicly announced that the USSR was ready to provide the financial and technical assistance to set up the export-oriented industries.[5] In November 1981, the USSR financially funded and solely establishing the Guddo Thermal Power Station, and surprise Pakistan by offering to build a second nuclear power plant in May 1981.[5] In 1983, the USSR agreeably sold components of oil-drilled equipments for the construction of the Multan Heavy Water Reactor (Multan-I).[5] In 1985, with Soviet presence, President Zia-ul-Haq inaugurated the vertically integrated and the largest Steel Mill in the South Asia, the Pakistan Steel Mills in Karachi, on 15 January 1985.[4] This project was completed at a capital cost of Rs.24,700 million; and even as today, the Steel Mills maintains a respected history and great symbol for the relations of USSR and Pakistan.[4]
Source:
Multiple Terrorist groups claim Wagah Border attack, 55 people killed. | Page 55
When you are done, I shall present you with declassified documents from the Kremlin, explaining the mood inside Moscow, before the start of the Afghan war. Later, you can explain me if destroying our own country to further U.S. interests was as fine an idea, as you think it to be.
The opposition for " entering forces in Afghanistan " came from the top brass itself . " We believe it would be a fatal mistake to commit ground troops. If our troops went in, the situation in your country would not improve. On the contrary, it would get worse. Our troops would have to struggle not only with an external aggressor, but with a significant part of your own people. And the people would never forgive such things; Alexei Kosygin, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers .[33]
Similar concerns would be raised by other Soviet leaders that " full Soviet intervention "would only play into the hands of our enemies; both yours and ours " - Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet head of state warned . [34]
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov sent a letter to the Soviet embassy in Kabul noting that "to fight in Afghanistan with the basmachi [armed Muslim guerrillas who fled from Soviet Central Asia] and the White Guard would mean provoking a war in Central Asia, which would be to the advantage of Germany and Japan. It would undercut our prestige in the East and destabilize the territories behind the Red Army's front lines. Therefore, neutralization of Afghanistan and cooperation with Iraq and Saudi Arabia, along with strengthening relations with Yemen are the main tasks of our policy in this region." [35]
On March 17-19, 1979 - The Soviet Politburo met in three extended sessions during the height of the Herat crisis to discuss pleas from Taraki and Amin to send troops. The next day, however, even though the situation in Herat has worsened, Kosygin, Andropov and others still advocated staying away from a commitment of troops. Gromyko delivered a detailed rundown of the reasons why such a commitment would be a mistake . He also pointed out that the conflict is an internal Afghan affair. A verbatim transcript of the politburo discussion has become available in the public domain .
Yuri Andropov : Comrades , I have thought this issue over very thoroughly since yesterday and have concluded that we should consider very, very seriously whether it would make sense to send troops into Afghanistan . The economy is backward , the Islamic religion predominates , and nearly all of the rural population is illiterate . I do not think we can uphold the revolution in Afghanistan with the help of our bayonets. The idea is intolerable and we can not risk it.
Andrei Gromyko in the Politburo told the committee " I fully support Comrade Andropov’s view that we should exclude the dispatch of troops to Afghanistan . The Afghan army is unreliable and our army would become an aggressor. With whom will it fight? With the Afghan people! Our Army would have to shoot them! To be blunt, the Afghan [communist] leaders have made many mistakes and haven't got the support of their own people . "
Andrei Kirilenko : Tanks and armored vehicles cannot rescue them [the PDPA]. I think that we must frankly tell them that. We must say that we will support them to the hilt, we shall give them all of the aid that we have promised to give , but we cannot send troops [37][38]
In Late September 1979 - The Politburo commission on Afghanistan summoned the chief of the military advisory group, Gorelov, and KGB representative Ivanov to Moscow on short notice. Questioned separately, Gorelov again strongly contended that it would not be a good idea to increase the Soviet military presence in the country .[39]
Contrary to the popular belief , even for the Soviets , the Afghanistan wasn't the much hyped strategic prize , it was always thought to be . This is reinforced by the Soviet General Secretary in his initial encounter with Afghan President Babrak Karmal, where Gorbachev made clear his determination to end the war: Karmal would have to defend his own country, Gorbachev told him in no uncertain terms, by the summer of 1986.
According to recently disclosed Russian documents, Gorbachev said that Karmal was shocked by this news. "[He] was dumbfounded, in no way expected such a turn, was sure that we needed Afghanistan more than he did, and was clearly expecting that we will be there for a long time, if not forever,"[40]
Source:
The War That Never Was .
No one line BS, this time, take your time and do answer me, all of this.