The Tejas Reportcard.
This post is not mine but from a user named "Teer" from the key Publishing forum. The post is comprehensive and almost a report card on the Tejas. Enjoy...
Key Publishing Ltd Aviation Forums - View Single Post - what's the Tejas' fundamental problem?
What this thread started from are the usual rubbish from media reports which couldn't tell a difference from a LCA or a MiG if both were given to them on a tray...and then there are the copy-paste sites like IDRW which either cook up stuff or plagiarize without an ounce of sense.
So you have the claim in this IDRW "report" of Tejas prototypes not being the same as each other. Common sense would have told these experts that the Tejas is WIP, with the MK1's still receiving improvements - heck, a dedicated local AFCS was just developed & fielded last year! So how would one prototype be the same as a LSP, and even the LSPs will vary from type to type, till the MK1 configuration is frozen!
Net - to take a proper look at where Tejas is today, as versus the same old, same old of buying a Swedish or Rwandan or Martian fighter (which does nothing for India), we have to look at what the actual challenges are!!
So..
Quote:
Originally Posted by Spitfire9 View Post
I would include inadequate and incompetent project management. For example appraisal and monitoring of Kaveri progress should have resulted in the project being frozen years earlier and outside expertise being sought IMO. When Tejas missed development time lines action should have been taken to investigate the reasons and measures taken to get the project back on schedule. Instead the project appeared to stagger on from missed target to missed target without anything being done to get a grip on the situation.
I hope the management of Mk2 will be better than that of Mk1.
These should also address your statements about project management! Unless you understand what the Tejas team faces in terms of challenges, you will not get where the program is.
First - the Tejas today!
There were several areas where the Tejas team had to develop world class capabilities from scratch.
- Airframe with highest/high portion of composites vis a vis even most contemporaries. Status? Achieved - and further improvements underway
- Complete glass cockpit with HOTAS/HUD etc- status? Achieved, and even IAF late requirements of HMDS incorporated. Please check the F-22 and other programs to see how much delay these can cause
- Radar: IAF initially asked for a simple AI radar with limited BVR capability; moved to significant BVR with SARH homers; moved to full MMR with significant A2G capability; Upgraded MMR requirement to include SAR! The previous configuration only had DBS and A2G ranging.
This is one of the key challenges for the Tejas because as late as a few years back, a combination of funding challenges & sanctions (post India's nuclear test) meant that the flawed decision to assign the MMR to HAL (a firm with very limited focus on radar development) meant that they could not handle the subsystem challenges (signal processor mismatch) or develop the software to maturity! The radar itself was sanctioned more than a decade after the LCA program was launched!
So, only some 2-3 years back, did Elta get roped in to tackle the issue to utilize the tech India had already developed for the radar. Pretty much all the hardware, from the high gain antenna, to the rotational scanner (developed by BARC, a nuclear agency with experience in high speed motors), to the TWT and power units! Elta is basically taking the Indian components, adding its own signal processor (with a specific focus on A2G) and porting its Elta 2032/M software to this hybrid radar, for the first 40 MK1s.
The easy approach would have been to just ditch all the Indian radar subsystems (though they work and work well) and replace with an Elta 2032/M as on the DARIN-3 Jaguars and Sea Harriers. India is NOT taking this approach because the radar, remains in ADA control and can be customized further locally.
Furthermore, the MK2 is to have an AESA system, for which development has been shifted from HAL to LRDE, which is DRDO's own radar specialist & which, by now, has significant experience with radars. Recognizing the challenges involving in producing compact fire control radar Tx/Rx modules, plus certifying the software, they will probably take consultancy. Again, this time around, the funding has been made available.
- Next: Avionics. Status, achieved, though the IAF will continue to ask for more & more as is usual ..so this is always a moving target. One of the core requirements of the LCA was that almost all the core items should be Indian, at the system/module integration level. This was achieved by the time of the TDs itself! But the IAF asked for a complete revamp to incorporate newer processors & architecture, to match what they saw on the Rafale/EF etc on the WW market. This too was done within 3 years. For instance, on the original LCA - you had dedicated mission computers, display processors, video switching units, digital map generators. Each with separate modules & processor units, all as separate boxed LRUs. In the current LCA, all these functions are now handled by a single OAC (Open Architecture Computer) running on high power processor cards, with another OAC on hot standby!
Next - late into the program, the IAF asked for the LCA to have an
internal EW capability! Note - NO OTHER IAF aircraft - till date has had an internal EW capability from its procurement. The LCA team has certified both standard jammers & DARE (DRDO) has also developed a state of the art EW suite (high sensitivity multiple receivers connected to a matrix with multiple transmitters).
- Engineering Development: High level of maturity. As can be seen with the F-35, concurrent engineering is a big challenge for a densely packed platform. The LCA's dense package comes from the IAF requirement that the LCA be small enough to fit into the MiG-21 footprint. Yet, it should have the performance of the Mirage 2000 and MiG-29, which were then the IAF's best fighter class platforms.
As such Mirage 2000 and MiG-29 pilots were deputed to the ADA for both specifications & later on, for many other configuration decisions. This means that ADA has had to take far harder decisions than those with larger platforms. Small changes in the LCA mean complex changes throughout. To ADA/HAL's credit, they have been managed inhouse. For instance, they redesigned/rerouted entire parts of the fuel system to avoid risk.
- Flight Control & Certification: WIP. This is the area where India had the least experience - remember, we just license built other folks aircraft, let alone build something as complex as a FBW system. So help was sought from the US for both the FCS hardware (actuators & flight control computer from MM and then LM), software (Martin Marietta then LM) and certification (BAE).
Lets take a look at what happened here. First, funding issues, slowing down the program at the beginning. When things picked up, by 1998, the sanctions stopped ALL consultancy with US vendors. The LCA team even so, did not stop the program - they actually indigenized the DFCC, replacing all the US systems with a new scratch built prototype (the US one was impounded by LM), set up a new control law team locally to develop the FBW software, and even traded actuator shipsets between both ground based rigs & flying aircraft, to keep the test program running. India lost a good 3 years here, but did not stop the program, as was the intent of the sanctions, to cancel the LCA for good!
BAE by the way, stopped their assistance, citing manpower issues for the EF program.
Effectively, this remains the LCA's final hurdle, which is why the delays have come in. The delays were baked into the program at the time of the sanction and have just carried over.
Now - a WW RFP was sent out for consultancy to speed up testing & EADS has been signed up. Boeing which gave a presentation to India for being the chosen vendor, never responded to the RFP as they did not get clearance from the State Dept.
By 2008, as I recall, 85% of the flight envelope had been opened up by India alone, and AoA had approached the 20-22 deg mark.
Now, to get to the final 10-15% PLUS weapons configurations, EADS should be helping out.
Testing & certification with a FBW aircraft is NOT the same as with older aircraft. In those, you took them up, tested them (as long as structural limits held) and came back. With the LCA, each time they take any prototype up, the software is first reviewed multiple times, then run multiple times on the ground rig, finally put onto the test article (and remember, weights on these vary from other configurations) & flown. They are doing this with each & every test point on the chart. This is where EADS/BAE would help with "tribal knowledge", i.e. you don't need to test this "entire zone" because these "five test points" cover that sector.
This is the IOC requirement summed up, and with weapons involved - which again involve iterative additions to the radar & FCS code (to handle different configurations), the LCA MK1 will get FOC.
Right now, the pilots love the FBW and handling. Its all about opening the envelope, and not about any critical issues with the system itself.
- The engine! Contrary to belief here, the Kaveri program is no cause for delay now! Its been delinked from the program quite some time back, once funding was made available to order enough Ge404IN20s for the MK1 and enough have been ordered (as a first tranche) for the MK2 as well (99 engines, easily enough to cover 4 squadrons, spares plus those for prototypes).
As to why the program was linked heavily to the LCA, first- its a strategic program with no parallel elsewhere in the Indian MIC. No redundancy. If the LCA MMR was not sanctioned, there were always the naval airborne radars and later the CABS AEW&C to continue to build competence.
No such option exists for the Kaveri. But when funding became available, and the MOD saw the MOF would give it, they delinked the program to proceed on its own.
Net, to summarize!
The three key issues which the LCA team is working on (and will complete) are the Flight Envelope validation (fully opened up), and the weapons integration. For the first, including FBW tweaking to handle fuel/weight shifts- EADS has been hired as a consultant. India will do the work, but EADS basically is to tell them not to run after test points where time is wasted.
For the second, Elta is to ensure the radar works. For weapons integration - India now has three programs to draw on, the MiG-27, Jaguar and Shar upgrades. This is not going to be a showstopper.
Engineering development challenges can be handled locally.
Net - there is nothing now in the LCA program that is anywhere near the quantum of challenges that the ADA/HAL faced when starting this, or even when they were midway into the program in the early 2000's. Right now, its just a matter of putting the nose to the grindstone, and completing the job.
The media is going to continue to carp and attack the program, copy paste sites like IDRW will then take that and run with it, but its come too far now to be stopped by any of this.
Last but not least - all those claims of LCA MK1 not meeting ASRs/IAF unhappy are just overwrought.. the LCA MK1 as it stands will handily outperform the bulk of the IAF fleet of MiG-21s and Jaguars in A2A and strike.
If it didn't meet the overambitious requirements set out in the first tranche, that's still ok. The LCA of the 80's had to be as maneuverable as the MiG-29 with high ITRs of the Mirage 2000, and it had no HOBS missiles nor did it have a HMS.
The LCA of today has HOBs missiles (R-73E confirmed, Python reported) and an Elbit DASH HMDS. A couple of degrees in marginal STR is not a showstopper. Similarly, 8G versus 9G in its MK1 - especially given the kind of platforms the IAF is facing, the JF-17 which too has a 8G limitation, is again not an issue.
Are these my views alone? No. They are first hand from the test pilots whom I (and many others) met at a public industry event sometime back. They have no qualms about the combat performance of the LCA MK1 whatsoever.
Yes, the IAF HQ wants a perfect fighter. It has the world's best toys available via import, and will not compromise. Thats tough for the developer, but still achievable. Because all said & done, the program is now a certainty, with 6 squadrons indented for (those 99 engines make the MK2 a reality as well) and funding for both MK1 and MK2 committed for by the GOI. Now, its just a matter of patience.
A lot of the stuff developed for the LCA is going to find its way onto the AMCA and before that, other IAF fighter programs as well as upgrades. There are folks who will get that done as well.
The biggest advantage for the AMCA will basically be all the lessons learnt in certification & having an ecosystem of developers who built 2Gen of products for the LCA. That is stuff India could not have ever achieved via buying a third party design.
When LCA started, India did not even have 1 MC of its own design. Today several firms can build Mission Computers for ADA (having worked on the LCA) and can code entire modules for subsystems. There are many software and hardware companies that have built stuff for the LCA, and then kept busy with upgrades.
Three years back, even Digital Map Generators - hitherto being imported from Israel as separate LRUs - were having a competition underway with 2 firms competed. With the missile program, India even has a local RLG-INS for serial production to replace the Sagem unit..
Right now, there is also talk of a LCA MK3. Apparently the IAF wants to really strengthen up against the PLAAF/PAF (hi-lo combo) and the LCA is its most cost effective choice.
However, one of the key advantages of the 5G program with Russia is the testing & certification part. Right now, India is at the test each & everything mode. Once experience builds up, and both databases and tribal knowledge exists - testing & certification will speed up. These can easily take off years off of a program.
That is going to be a key lesson learnt for the AMCA or whatever the IAF calls it..
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