Adding relavent data to the question of mig-experience by western pilots.From the link I posted before.
In April 1991, LtGen. Jörg Kuebart, became the Chief of Staff of the new post-Cold War consolidated German Air Force (Luftwaffe) after serving two years as the Deputy Commander and Chief AAFCE. His initial description of the MiG-29 was that it was "...a good fighter airplane, and it is relatively easy to maintain. But it carries one very big disadvantage - depending upon the Soviets for industrial support. At present our flying rate is going down, because we lack spare parts. We have been involved in extensive talks with the Soviets, but as of today I haven't received any spare parts (Armed Forces Journal International, Dec91, pg 49)."
"We intend to make only minimum modifications necessary to be able to fly the aircraft safely in Western air space....... TACAN, IFF, and a second emergency horizon. In addition, the instruments and panels must be inscribed in English."
Chief Mikoyan Designer Rotislav Belyakov, and his deputy, Mikhail Waldenberg, always tried to out do each other on the marketing circuit with the "tactical" exploits of the MiG-29. We have to examine this because MAPO has deliberately mislead potential customers with "data" they say was officially generated by their MiG-29's serving with the German "Luftwaffe" in NATO. Data that is sometimes not there or taken far out of context.
After the 1994 Farnborough Air Show there was one such description of how the MiG-29 was performing in the new Germany. Belyakov and Waldenberg gave Luftwaffe MiG-29's credit for winning "BVR duels" against USAF F-15's and F-16's despite their use of ECM. They praised the MiG-29's well maintained radar, powerful transmitter, and "long range target detection capability" with a very small radar cross section, high ECCM hardening, and more capable BVR missiles. They did admit, however, that the MiG-29 reaches a 9G capability only after the fuel volume is internal. It was also assumed, by them in their calculations, that the Sparrow missile did not get a radar semi-active midcourse update against a maneuvering target, which is wrong. In reality, the German Air Force MiG-29 experience against other NATO aircraft has been only allowed in deliberately controlled training situations, more to educate pilots then to assess superiority. The Luftwaffe feels caught between intense political pressure by the Russians to validate the MiG-29 in a NATO environment, as well as the natural desire by the NATO pilots to "fight" the Fulcrum flown by better trained pilots.
Initially the newly assimilated East German MiG-29 Wing (JG.3 changed later to JG.73), at Preschen still manned by its original cadre, proved unsatisfactory according to NATO standards, in both airmanship and tactical know-how. Only after existing Luftwaffe F-4, Tornado, and F-15 exchange pilots re-built the squadron, did a more realistic use of the MiG-29 occur.
To say that the communist trained East Germans were innovatively hampered by their own dielectric approach to training and operationally shackled by Russian authority as to "when" and "how much" to fly, would be a gross understatement. NATO pilots were quite amazed and confused over the fact that most of these East German "elite" pilots appeared not "care" about flying and had little interest in doing anything innovative with their training once they did get a chance to fly.
At the NATO F-16 Fighter Weapons Instructor's (FWIT-89) symposium, with a select gathering of Instructor Pilots (IP's), not just from NATO, but all over the world, the first face-to-face discussions were made with the Commander and tactical flight leaders of the Preschen Wing. The results were heart-breaking for those US & European trained pilots who sacrificed so much to stay on the razor's edge, although it was a relief to realize that clearly the Western approach to training was far superior. The average NATO pilot in that room had a far greater comprehension of the MiG-29's capabilities than did any of the MiG pilot's themselves. Almost all of the visitors spoke German and more than half Russian. There were no communication gaps, it was a straight forward pilot-to-pilot talk. The results were simple, the MiG pilot's perceived their flying tasks as a second or third priority to their personal agendas, which were first and foremost.
This must have impressed the Luftwaffe enough to be concerned about their security reliability. Soon after that, the decision was made to release almost all of the ex-East German pilots from the service and the units were re-organized or disbanded. But once the political decision was made to keep the MiG-29's in the German Air Force, the pressure from the Russian military and aerospace industry became intense as they tried to find any data that would support their claims of parallel or better suitability of the MiG-29 to NATO aircraft. In fact, what they are trying to do, was to take western experience with the MiG-29 and leverage it in the export marketplace. Fortunately, but not surprisingly, it has not been believed.
