Ex CIA officer on IAF strike on NLI's Munto Dhalo Depot.

[Doctor Death]

Airpower at 18,000’: The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War
Benjamin Lambeth
REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2012

A Successful Endgame for India.

By the time Operation Vijay had reached full momentum in early June, the Indian Army had marshaled nearly a corps’ worth of dedicated troop strength in the Kargil area, including the Third and Eighth Mountain Divisions and a substantial number of supporting artillery units. The overriding objective of those forces was to recapture the high ground from which the intruders had a direct line of sight to highway NH1A, allowing them to lay down sustained artillery fire on it and on adjacent targets. Toward that end, after more than a week of hard fighting, units of Eighth Mountain Division recaptured the strategically important Tololing ridge complex and the adjacent Point 5203 in the Batalik sector on June 13, in what one informed account later described as “probably the turning point” in India’s land counteroffensive.67

Four days later, on June 17, another important breakthrough in the joint campaign was achieved when a formation of 7 Squadron Mirage 2000Hs struck and destroyed the enemy’s main administrative and logistics encampment at Muntho Dhalo in the Batalik sector by means of accurately placed 1,000-pound general-purpose bombs delivered in high-angle dive attacks using the aircraft’s computer-assisted weapons-aiming capability. For this pivotal attack, the IAF waited until the encampment had grown to a size that rendered it strategically ripe for such targeting. The AOC-in-C of Western Air Command at the time, Air Marshal Patney, affirmed later that the essentially total destruction by the IAF of the NLI’s rudimentary but absolutely life-sustaining infrastructure at Muntho Dhalo “paralyzed the enemy war effort, as it was their major supply depot.”68 In characterizing the attack as “perhaps the most spectacular of all the [campaign’s air] strikes,” a serving IAF air commodore reported at the end of 1999 that it resulted in as many as 300 enemy casualties within just minutes.69 Figure 3 shows pre- and post-strike aerial imagery of the enemy camp at Muntho Dhalo. In the first image, a dense array of tents and structures, as well as tracks leading up the hillside from the encampment, are clearly visible. In the second, after completion of the IAF’s attacks, all that remain are bomb craters and rubble.

A week later, on June 24, a two-ship element of Mirage 2000Hs, in the first-ever combat
use of laser-guided bombs by the IAF, struck and destroyed the NLI’s command and control bunkers on Tiger Hill, the direction center for the forward-based artillery that had
been fired against the Indian Army’s brigade headquarters at Dras. !ey used two 1,000-
pound Paveway II laser-guided munitions, with other fighters striking additional targets
with unguided bombs.
In these attacks, the target was acquired through the Litening
pod’s electro-optical imaging sensor at about 12 miles out, with weapon release occurring
at a slant range of about 5 miles and the aircraft then turning away while continuing to
mark the target with a laser spot for the weapon to guide on.

Airpower at 18,000

About the Author:

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Benjamin S. Lambeth is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a position he assumed in 2011 after a thirty-seven-year career at the RAND Corporation. A longtime specialist in international security affairs and air warfare, he holds a doctorate in political science from Harvard University and served previously in the Office of National Estimates at the Central Intelligence Agency. Also a civil-rated pilot, he has flown or flown in more than 40 different combat aircraft types with the U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight foreign air forces. In 1989, he became the first American citizen to fly the Soviet MiG-29 fighter and the first Westerner invited to fly a combat aircraft of any type inside Soviet airspace since the end of World War II.I. In 2002,
he was elected an Honorary Member of the Order of Daedalians, the national fraternity of U.S. military pilots.

 

[karan.1970]

Wow!!! 300 casualties in a single strike...

 

[Doctor Death]

Wow!!! 300 casualties in a single strike...

The bombs stuck the ammunition storages.
The boom could be seen from miles.

 

[indian_jigar]

Wow!!! 300 casualties in a single strike...

Yeah tell me about it. Usually when I order Air Strikes in Call of Duty, I would be lucky to get anything more than 2 kills

 

[Capt.Popeye]

Wow!!! 300 casualties in a single strike...

It is not the casualties in Muntho Dhalo that really mattered. It is the destruction of the supply base that really counted.

Now the unfortunate souls of the NLI and the SSG who had been turned out in 'shalwar-kameez' were doomed to either die of starvation or get blown up by a sustained artillery barrage of carpet bombing proportions. And to even add insult to injury, their own masters from GHQ had already labelled them as (unmanageable) shalwar-kameez clad "Mujaheddin". So they faced the ultimate ignominy of an unacknowledgeable Death!

Not an enviable fate for professional soldiers; and all in the "Pursuit of Glory" by a few Army Generals!
The destruction of Muntho Dhalo sealed the fate of the unfortunate PA soldiers, so to speak.

 

[Paan Singh]

This country is suicidal and poor general sent NLI and thought that indians wont bring the force and they will cut the national highway and negotiate on siachin

oops

 

[Windjammer]

Indian newspapers and their public believe--or say they believe--that the conflict in Dras-Kargil last year was a military victory for India. In fact, it was a war 'won' by briefings and a slavishly supportive media. The Indian public wanted to be assured of 'victory,' and every effort was made to provide that assurance. Kargil was disastrous for Pakistan in worldwide political terms, and was an important public relations coup for the Indian government, both internally (in the run-up to the election), and internationally. But militarily it was a shambles for India whose brave but ill-prepared soldiers suffered gravely and would have sustained even heavier casualties had the conflict continued. The prime minister of Pakistan was ordered by the president of the United States to withdraw his troops from a successful military operation and this was done in time to save the Vajpayee government from the wave of criticism that would have swamped it had the confrontation not been stopped.

Source: "War Drums are Beating" Brian Cloughley.

 

[veekysingh]

300 in one time? nice shooting IAF

 

[manojb]

WOW .. good Job by IAF. 300 dead terrorists in one shot ... :WOOT:

 

[Doctor Death]

Tne important battlefield effect achieved by the IAF’s combat air patrol operations during the campaign was their prevention of Pakistani helicopters from resupplying the NLI’s outposts and conducting reconnaissance and casualty evacuation missions, an accomplishment that a retired Indian Army major general portrayed as the IAF’s “most significant contribution” to Operation Vijay.121 Another significant IAF contribution was the successful interdiction of needed resupply to the increasingly beleaguered Pakistani intruders by destroying the NLI’s logistics base at Muntho Dhalo. By one informed assessment, hundreds of enemy troops were killed by IAF air action in such attacks, and Indian military intelligence intercepted numerous enemy radio transmissions during the campaign that attested to the effectiveness of those attacks.122 Especially during the campaign’s final days, that intercepted traffic revealed severe shortages of rations, water, medical supplies, and ammunition, as well as an inability of the occupying enemy units to evacuate their wounded.123 Yet another telling testament to the effectiveness of the IAF’s interdiction attacks came when Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, during an official visit to New Delhi on June 12 as Operation Vijay was just reaching peak intensity, implored the IAF to “stop its air strikes” as one of three specific requests that he levied on the Indian government.124

Airpower at 18,000

ne important battlefield effect achieved by the IAF’s combat air patrol operations during the campaign was their prevention of Pakistani helicopters from resupplying the NLI’s outposts and conducting reconnaissance and casualty evacuation missions, an accomplishment that a retired Indian Army major general portrayed as the IAF’s “most significant contribution” to Operation Vijay.121 Another significant IAF contribution was the successful interdiction of needed resupply to the increasingly beleaguered Pakistani intruders by destroying the NLI’s logistics base at Muntho Dhalo. By one informed assessment, hundreds of enemy troops were killed by IAF air action in such attacks, and Indian military intelligence intercepted numerous enemy radio transmissions during the campaign that attested to the effectiveness of those attacks.122 Especially during the campaign’s final days, that intercepted traffic revealed severe shortages of rations, water, medical supplies, and ammunition, as well as an inability of the occupying enemy units to evacuate their wounded.123 Yet another telling testament to the effectiveness of the IAF’s interdiction attacks came when Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, during an official visit to New Delhi on June 12 as Operation Vijay was just reaching peak intensity, implored the IAF to “stop its air strikes” as one of three specific requests that he levied on the Indian government.124

Airpower at 18,000

 

[Abingdonboy]

Indian newspapers and their public believe--or say they believe--that the conflict in Dras-Kargil last year was a military victory for India. In fact, it was a war 'won' by briefings and a slavishly supportive media. The Indian public wanted to be assured of 'victory,' and every effort was made to provide that assurance. Kargil was disastrous for Pakistan in worldwide political terms, and was an important public relations coup for the Indian government, both internally (in the run-up to the election), and internationally. But militarily it was a shambles for India whose brave but ill-prepared soldiers suffered gravely and would have sustained even heavier casualties had the conflict continued. The prime minister of Pakistan was ordered by the president of the United States to withdraw his troops from a successful military operation and this was done in time to save the Vajpayee government from the wave of criticism that would have swamped it had the confrontation not been stopped.

Source: "War Drums are Beating" Brian Cloughley.

Is this meant to be damning? In short-India won, Pakistan lost-BADLY.



Much has changed in 13 years, and the wholes exposed in the article ie poor equipment for IA will be taken care of shortly-don't you worry.

 

[Doctor Death]

Kargil a bigger disaster than East Pakistan’

ISLAMABAD: The Kargil incursion was a far bigger tragedy for Pakistan than the civil war which led to the creation of Bangladesh and damaged the country's Kashmir cause, a former general who quit army after being superseded by President Pervez Musharraf as chief of army has said.

Retired Gen Ali Kuli Khan Khattak, who quit the army after the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif appointed Musharraf as Army Chief in 1998 superseding him, said Kargil was flawed in terms of its conception, tactical planning and execution.

"It was an unprofessional decision by someone, who has served in the Pakistan Army for 40 years. As the architect of Kargil, he must answer critical questions for sacrificing so many soldiers. I am sure Kargil would continue to haunt him for the rest of his life," he said reacting to claims by Musharraf that Kargil was a successful operation.

He also challeged Musharraf's assertion that Kargil had revived the Kashmir issue. "I would say Kargil has damaged the Kashmir cause. It was a disaster bigger than the East Pakistan tragedy," he said, referring to the 1971 civil war which led to the creation of Bangladesh.

"At that time, Pakistan at least had some friends but on Kargil we were friendless. There was no way we could defend this tactless move," he said in an interview to 'The News' newspaper.

Describing Musharraf as "Mr General U-turn," Khattak said his seven-year rule has been "characterized by U-turns on policy matters. This president cannot hold on to anything. He is impulsive. He took decisions on Kargil, Waziristan, Balochistan and a host of other issues and then backtracked on most of them."

He also accused Musharraf of mishandling the situation in Waziristan and Balochistan and "ordering the bombing and killing of our own people."

He was of the view that both issues ought to have been resolved politically. "I know from my sources that five to six military officers including colonels were court-martialled for refusing to fire on our people in Waziristan."

He also disputed claims by Musharraf in his book 'In the Line of Fire,' that he (Kuli) advocated imposition of martial law when then-prime minister Nawaz Sharif forced General Jehangir Karamat, army chief at the time, to resign.

Khattak said he never made a case for military rule.

"My view was that the Army should be firm and fair in dealing with all situations. I certainly advised General Jehangir Karamat, (who quit following differences with Sharif) not to resign as Army chief but I didn't ask him to stage a coup and impose martial law," he said.

Khattak and Musharraf were batchmates, having joined the 29th Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) course in Kakul and then becoming involved in an often bitter competition.

"I can say we were friends until I was made Chief of General Staff (CGS). Musharraf was very unhappy that he couldn't make it," he recalled.

Reached in Karachi for his reaction to observations made by Musharraf about him in the book, he argued it was a one-sided version of events in which facts have been misrepresented and half-truths inserted.

 

[Rafi]

LoL - I recall the poor indian soldiers whimpering like little girls - crying out for their mothers - when we opened fire on their poorly planned frontal assaults. Some of our boys attempted to give them water, risking their own lives, the smell of a thousand latrines as the poor indians were systematically - eaten by dogs, and consumed by maggots.

The smell will never be forgotten, as the vast swarms of beetles and fly's that made it look like some sort of moving carpet, the indian officers - who's name tags could be clearly seen through the scope, who's brains were distributed over the mountain with a head shot.

We still control peaks that can shut down vital enemy highway's and we killed hundreds of soldiers.

 

[Invincible INDIAN]

Indian newspapers and their public believe--or say they believe--that the conflict in Dras-Kargil last year was a military victory for India. In fact, it was a war 'won' by briefings and a slavishly supportive media. The Indian public wanted to be assured of 'victory,' and every effort was made to provide that assurance. Kargil was disastrous for Pakistan in worldwide political terms, and was an important public relations coup for the Indian government, both internally (in the run-up to the election), and internationally. But militarily it was a shambles for India whose brave but ill-prepared soldiers suffered gravely and would have sustained even heavier casualties had the conflict continued. The prime minister of Pakistan was ordered by the president of the United States to withdraw his troops from a successful military operation and this was done in time to save the Vajpayee government from the wave of criticism that would have swamped it had the confrontation not been stopped.

Source: "War Drums are Beating" Brian Cloughley.

Your own Ex-General who had witnessed all defeats of 1965, 1971 and 1999.

Just go through in detail and have a sound sleep!!!

 

[Doctor Death]

LoL - I recall the poor indian soldiers whimpering like little girls - crying out for their mothers - when we opened fire on their poorly planned frontal assaults. Some of our boys attempted to give them water, risking their own lives, the smell of a thousand latrines as the poor indians were systematically - eaten by dogs, and consumed by maggots.

The smell will never be forgotten, as the vast swarms of beetles and fly's that made it look like some sort of moving carpet, the indian officers - who's name tags could be clearly seen through the scope, who's brains were distributed over the mountain with a head shot.

We still control peaks that can shut down vital enemy highway's and we killed hundreds of soldiers.

I too remember the the pakistani soldiers many who had all their limbs blown up,some had got shrapnel right in their eyes cursing thier army for abandoning them.