Well, in the West they are trying to sell two ideas: that Iran is trying to make nukes (false) and that countries surrounding Iran will start their own program if Iran gets the nuke.
S.Arabia already said its going to get nukes any way possible if Iran gets them. If you think we are ok with you having nukes and we don't then you are very delusional. In fact that's the only reason why the west is against Iranian nuclear bomb. They know Iran would never really get in a war with Israel let alone use nukes against them.
Why would Pakistan give or sell a "nuclear bomb" to SA? We are talking about a nuke here, not a armoured vehicle that you can trade easily
Because its part of the agreement we have with Pakistan when we financed their program. Basically its common knowledge now and every article on a Saudi nuclear program says that. Why do you think we did it? so they would say thank you
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
Iran nuclear bid tipped to provoke Saudi bomb
THE arrival yesterday of a senior United Nations team in Tehran has raised hopes that Iran may be in the mood to talk about its nuclear program. But there are growing fears that neighbouring Saudi Arabia will turn to Pakistan for its own bomb if Iran develops nuclear weapons.
The two nations' military officers train together, Saudi Arabia has reportedly bought Pakistani missiles and the Saudi air force was created using Pakistani training, aircraft and pilots.
When Pakistan tested its first nuclear device in 1998 and was placed under sanctions by an outraged US and Europe, 50,000 free barrels of oil a day from Saudi Arabia helped it survive.
Throughout the 1980s and '90s, hundreds of millions of Saudi dollars were poured into Pakistan's efforts to build nuclear weapons, funding as much as 60 per cent of the program.
That money was given, it is widely believed, on an understanding that Pakistan would offer Saudi Arabia nuclear protection, or, at some future date, the chance to buy weapons or the technology to make them.
Europe joined the US last week in imposing sanctions on Iranian oil, after an International Atomic Energy Agency report said Tehran had ''carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device''.
Specifically, Iran has begun work at a new facility - an airstrike-resistant bunker at Fordo, near the city of Qom - seen as a step towards producing weapons-grade uranium. Analysts believe Iran could have a bomb as soon as next year.
The agency's latest delegation to Iran includes two senior weapons experts - Jacques Baute, of France, and Neville Whiting, of South Africa - suggesting Iran may be prepared to address weapons allegations. Saudi Arabia has warned that if its long-standing regional rival succeeds in building a bomb, it wants one too.
Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former head of Saudi intelligence, reportedly warned US and Britain that Iran gaining nuclear arms ''would compel Saudi Arabia … to pursue policies which could lead to untold and possibly dramatic consequences''.
''If our efforts, and the efforts of the world community, fail to convince Israel to shed its weapons of mass destruction and to prevent Iran from obtaining similar weapons, we must, as a duty to our country and people, look into all options we are given, including obtaining these weapons ourselves.''
Most analysts are convinced the Saudis will turn to Pakistan.
''For all its wealth, Saudi Arabia does not have the technical and scientific base to create a nuclear infrastructure,'' Pervez Hoodbhoy, a nuclear physicist at Islamabad's Quaid-e-Azam University, told the Herald. ''Too weak to defend itself and too rich to be left alone, the country has always been surrounded by those who eye its wealth.''
But despite being ''enormously indebted'' to Saudi Arabia, Islamabad cannot simply sell bombs ''off the shelf'' to Riyadh, Professor Hoodbhoy said.
''Deterrence becomes effective once you advertise you have a weapon in hand,'' he said. ''But if a country buys weapons surreptitiously, it cannot flaunt them as a nuclear deterrent because of the obvious question, 'Where did you get them from?'''
Saudi Arabia, a close ally of the US, cannot be seen to be buying nuclear weapons from Pakistan, and Pakistan, already a nuclear pariah, cannot afford to be cast, again, as a proliferator of arms.
A secret weapons program would put Saudi Arabia in breach of a memorandum of understanding with the US that promises American assistance for a civilian nuclear program in return for the Saudis not pursuing ''sensitive nuclear technologies''.
Even with assistance, building nuclear weapons would take Saudi Arabia 10 to 15 years, Professor Hoodbhoy said.
///////////////////////////////////////////
Pakistan's bomb and Saudi Arabia
Western intelligence officials believe that Pakistan has pledged to provide nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia in a Middle East crisis, but would Islamabad keep its end of the bargain?
The great anxiety underpinning this month's NPT talks in New York, and the deepening crisis over Iranian nuclear aspirations, is the fear that if and when Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, it would trigger an arms race across the Middle East. Israel already has an arsenal of course, but over a dozen other countries in the region have recently announced plans to pursue or explore civilian nuclear energy programmes, in what is seen as a hedge against future threats. But which states, if any, would be prepared to go the whole way?
The Centre for European Studies and the German Marshall Fund of the United States has just held a small conference in Brussels called "Transatlantic test: What should the West do with Iran?" There were a bunch of Nato types there and some diplomats from Europe and the Middle East, and some very interesting talk. What struck me were the relatively sanguine views on the knock-on effect of Iran going nuclear (or achieving break-out capacity).
Putting it briefly: Turkey would not jeopardise the Nato umbrella by going nuclear unilaterally. Egypt has considered its options and decided it cannot afford to go nuclear and risk losing its annual US grant. The biggest worry is Saudi Arabia, which cannot rely on a US nuclear umbrella for reasons of domestic and regional politics.
According to western intelligence sources (the meeting was under Chatham House rules so I am not allowed to be more specific) the Saudi monarchy paid for up to 60% of the Pakistani nuclear programme, and in return has the option to buy a small nuclear arsenal ('five to six warheads) off the shelf if things got tough in the neighbourhood.
There has been much reporting about this alleged deal over recent years, notably by The Guardian back in 2003, when Ewen MacAskill and Ian Traynor wrote about a Saudi strategic review to weigh the kingdom's nuclear options.
A report by Mark Fitzpatrick at the IISS in 2008 on Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East, found the Guardian article was "an accurate representation of what had emerged from the Saudi side during discussions" at a symposium in Britain attended by several members of the Saudi royal family.
The Saudis and the Pakistanis have consistently denied any such deal, but what I heard in Brussels was billed by an official as being from intelligence sources. Whether or not anything has been signed, however, there are real questions on whether Pakistan would deliver when it came to the crunch.
There is a third partner in the relationship, the US, who might have something to say about it and the means to exert pressure to make sure it did not happen. Still, it remains one of the more likely dominoes to fall in a worst-case scenario.
Another interesting point to come out of the Brussels meeting was how difficult it is inside Nato to make policy or even to talk about policy towards Iran, because Turkey will not allow it. That makes it a bit awkward when it comes to framing the alliance's New Strategic Concept later this year.
///////////////////////////////////////////////
Saudi Arabia threatens to go nuclear if Iran does
Saudi Arabia would launch a military nuclear program immediately if Iran successfully developed atomic weapons, The Times of London reported Friday.
While Riyadh signed an agreement with the US in 2008 stating that it would only pursue nuclear power for civil purposes, the Saudi government is likely to abandon the deal if Tehran had a nuclear bomb.
"There is no intention currently to pursue a unilateral military nuclear program but the dynamics will change immediately if the Iranians develop their own nuclear capability," a senior Saudi source said.
"Politically, it would be completely unacceptable to have Iran with a nuclear capability and not the kingdom."
In such an eventuality, Saudi Arabia would start work on a new ballistic missile platform, purchase nuclear warheads from overseas and aim to source uranium to develop weapons-grade material.
Officials in the West believe Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have an understanding in which Islamabad would supply the kingdom with warheads if security in the Gulf was threatened.
A Western official told The Times that Riyadh could have the nuclear warheads in a matter of weeks of approaching Islamabad. Other vendors were also likely to enter into a bidding war if Riyadh indicated that it was seeking nuclear warheads.
Both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have denied the existence of any such agreement.
Like the US and many other countries in the West, Saudi Arabia believes that Iran is seeking to build nuclear weapons and the kingdom is preparing for a worst-case scenario, the Saudi sources said.
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////
Pakistan makes two nuclear weapons available to Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia has jumped ahead of Iran by obtaining the use of two Pakistani nuclear bombs or guided missile warheads. DEBKAfile’s Gulf sources believe the weapons are ready for delivery upon royal summons in Pakistan’s nuclear air base at Kamra in the northern district of Attock. Already delivered is a quantity of Pakistan’s Ghauri-II missile with an extended range of 2,300 kilometers. They are tucked away in silos in the underground city of Al-Sulaiyil, south of the capital Riyadh.
At least two giant Saudi transport planes sporting civilian colors and no insignia are parked permanently at Pakistan’s Kamra base with air crews on standby. They will fly the nuclear weapons home upon receipt of a double coded signal from King Abdullah and the Director of General Intelligence Prince Muqrin bin Abdel Aziz. A single signal would not be enough.
In recent weeks, Saudi officials close to their intelligence establishment have been going around security forums in the West and dropping word that the kingdom no longer needs to build its own nuclear arsenal because it has acquired a source of readymade arms to be available on demand. Partial nuclear transparency was approved by Riyadh as part of a campaign to impress on the outside world that Saudi Arabia was in control of its affairs: The succession struggle had been brought under control; the Saudi regime had set its feet on a clearly defined political and military path; and the hawks of the royal house had gained the hand and were now setting the pace.
/////////////////////////////////////////
Is Pakistan helping the Saudis with a nuclear deterrent?
Worried by Iran's nuclear ambitions, Saudi Arabia is trying to strike a secret deal with Pakistan to buy readymade nuclear weapons, says Amir Mir.
For long, Saudi Arabia has been one of the two foreign hands (the other being the United States) rocking the cradle of Pakistani politics, brokering truce among warring political leaders, providing asylum to those exiled by the military establishment and lavishing funds on a state strapped for cash. But there seems to be a role reversal now keeping in view some recent international media reports about a possible nuclear cooperation between Islamabad [ Images ] and Riyadh.
While highlighting the alleged Pakistan-Saudi nuclear collaboration, the international media has recently reported that worried by Tehran's nuclear ambitions, Riyadh is trying to strike a secret deal with Pakistan to buy readymade nuclear weapons instead of going through the lengthy process of developing its own.
These reports have appeared at a time when the Pakistan army [ Images ] and the royal Saudi land forces are holding a three week-long joint exercise -- Al-Samsaam-IV-2011 -- near the Jhelum district of Punjab [ Images ].
The Pakistan-Saudi Arabia nuclear cooperation was first reported on September 8 (external link) by haaretz.com, an Israeli Web site, followed by another report on September 15 by an American news agency, United Press International.
The haaretz.com report said that concerned by rapid progress being made by Iran towards fulfilling its nuclear ambitions, Saudi Arabia is mulling a secret nuclear cooperation with Pakistan to counter Tehran's military designs in the region.
The report said, although Riyadh has a memorandum of cooperation with the United States over building nuclear reactors for generating electricity, the Saudi royal family is divided over the issue with some heavyweights favouring a secret programme for military uses with Islamabad's help.
Being a Sunni-dominated Muslim-majority State, Pakistan has sought to develop close bilateral ties with Saudi Arabia, the largest country on the Arabian peninsula and home to the two holiest cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina. Both the Islamic countries had faced common enemies in the past successfully and are confronted with yet another common enemy even today -- Al Qaeda [ Images ].
Close geographical proximity, historic trade relations, religious affinity and complementary nature of economic needs have created a strong bondage of trust between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
As early as 1969, the Pakistan air force flew the aircraft of the royal Saudi air force to help fend off an invasion from South Yemen. In the 1970s and 1980s, about 15,000 Pakistani soldiers were stationed in Saudi Arabia to protect the country's oil fields. Against the backdrop of the recent uprisings in the Middle East and the Arab world which led to the ouster of several autocratic rulers of the Muslim world, Pakistan had played a key role in the region by supporting Saudi Arabia to preempt a possible revolt against the Saudi kingdom.
Besides placing two army divisions on standby to help Riyadh should any trouble break out, the Pakistan government helped the Saudi kingdom with the recruitment of thousands of ex-Pakistani military personnel for Bahrain's national guard.
Resultantly, Islamabad has received more financial aid from the Saudis than any other country outside the Arab world. Those in Riyadh who favour the preparation of a nuclear programme for military uses in cooperation with Pakistan include Saudi Defence Minister Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz, and its former intelligence chief, Turki Bin Faisal.
Hence, while progressing towards this end several Pakistani nuclear scientists recently visited Saudi Arabia to meet, among others, Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, the head of the Saudi national security council and former ambassador to the United States. Prince Bandar is considered among those in the Saudi royal family who are encouraging the nuclear connection with Pakistan to put his country on a secret path to becoming nuclear.
According to the UPI report, Saudi Arabia is beefing up its military links with Pakistan to counter Iran's expansionist plans which includes acquiring atomic arms from the only Muslim nuclear power or its pledge of nuclear cover.
'Pakistan has become a front-line State for Sunni Islam and is being positioned by its leaders, particularly in the powerful military and intelligence establishments, as a bulwark against Shia Iran and its proxies. Increasingly, Pakistan is rushing to the defence of Saudi Arabia, with whom it has a long had discreet security links,' the UPI report said.
The UPI report added that the concerns about Saudi plans to buy readymade nuclear weapons were raised in June 1994. A Saudi defector, Mohammed Abdalla al-Khilewi, the No 2 official in the Saudi mission to the United Nations in New York, claimed Riyadh had paid up to $5 billion to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein [ Images ] to build it a nuclear weapon.
Al-Khilewi is a former Saudi Arabian diplomat noted for his brazen May 1994 defection in which he issued a declaration on the Saudi embassy letterhead proclaiming King Fahd to be despotic and calling for a redistribution of the country's wealth and power.
An expert in nuclear proliferation, al-Khilewi had produced 13,000 documents to support his claim that Saudi Arabia was engaged in a secret 20-year effort to acquire nuclear weapons, first with Iraq, which Riyadh backed in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, and then with Pakistan.
His documents showed that Riyadh helped bankroll Pakistan's clandestine nuclear project and signed a pact that in the event Saudi Arabia was attacked with nuclear weapons, Islamabad would immediately respond against the aggressor with its own nuclear arms.
Well-informed diplomatic circles in Islamabad believe the recent media reports about a possible nuclear cooperation between Riyadh and Islamabad are credible. According to them, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have developed extensive defence and strategic ties to an extent that Riyadh is now secretly working on an alleged nuclear programme with the help of Pakistani experts.
The nuclear partnership between Riyadh and Islamabad is reportedly aimed at providing the kingdom with a nuclear deterrent on short notice if and when needed.
Determined not to fall behind in the Middle East nuclear race, Saudi Arabia has allegedly arranged to make available two Pakistani nuclear bombs or guided missile warheads which are most probably held in Pakistan's nuclear air base at Kamra in the northern district of Attock in Punjab province.
In fact, the fresh reports about the Pakistan-Saudi nuclear deal were prompted by the International Atomic Energy Agency's recent disclosure that Iran has begun to install the centrifuges in its uranium enrichment facility in Natanz.
'The transfer of centrifuges at Natanz (which is the only Iranian enrichment facility in central Iran) to Fordoo is underway, with all necessary safety measures,' said the head of Iran's nuclear weapons programme, Fereydoun Abbassi Davani, in an interview to Iranian television August 22.
The announcement was described as provocation by the United States which is much concerned at the acceleration of uranium enrichment by Tehran. The West's prime area of concern remains the production by Iran of highly enriched uranium to 20 percent, with a technique closer to Tehran's ability to produce enough enriched uranium (over 90 percent) to make a nuclear weapon.
The 2009 revelation by Western intelligence agencies about the secret construction of the Fordoo uranium enrichment plant in violation of UN resolutions had caused a serious crisis between Iran and the international community which eventually led to a strengthening of economic sanctions and Western policies against Iran in July 2010.
In fact, Saudi Arabia is not known to have a nuclear weapons programme. From an official and public standpoint, Saudi Arabia has been an opponent of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, having signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and is a member of the coalition of countries demanding a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East. However, over the years, there have been media reports of Saudi intent to purchase a nuclear weapon from an outside source.
In 2003, a leaked strategy paper laid out three possible options for the Saudi government: To acquire a nuclear deterrent, to ally with and become protected by an existing nuclear nation, or to try to reach agreement on having a nuclear-free Middle East.
International apprehensions that Saudi Arabia would seek to acquire nuclear weapons rose periodically over the last decade. Saudi Arabia's geopolitical situation gives it strong reasons to consider acquiring nuclear weapons: The current volatile security environment in the Middle East; the growing number of States (particularly Iran and Israel) with weapons of mass destruction in the region; and the Iranian ambition to dominate the region.
International concerns about Saudi nuclear ambitions intensified in 2003 in the wake of revelations about Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr A Q Khan's proliferation activities. The IAEA investigations showed that A Q Khan sold or offered nuclear weapons technology to Saudia and several Middle Eastern states, including Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria.
The unearthing of the blackmarket nuclear technology network increased international suspicions that Dr Khan had developed ties with Riyadh, which has the capability to pay for all kinds of nuclear-related services. Even before the revelations about Dr Khan's activities, concerns about Pak-Saudi nuclear cooperation persisted, largely due to strengthened cooperation between the two Islamic countries.
In particular, frequent high-level visits of Saudi and Pakistani officials over the past several years raised serious questions about the possibility of clandestine Pakistan-Saudi nuclear cooperation.
In May 1999, a Saudi Arabian team, headed by Defence Minister Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, visited Pakistan's highly restricted uranium enrichment and missile assembly factory.
The Saudi prince toured the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant and an adjacent factory with then Pakistan prime minister Nawaz Sharif [ Images ] where the Ghauri missile was being assembled and was briefed by Dr Khan.
A few months later, Khan traveled to Saudi Arabia [in November 1999] ostensibly to attend a symposium on 'Information Sources on the Islamic World'. The same month, Dr Saleh al-Athel, president, King Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology, visited Pakistan to work out details for cooperation in the fields of engineering, electronics and computer science.
In 2003, President General Pervez Musharraf [ Images ] paid a visit to Saudi Arabia, and former Pakistani prime minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali visited the kingdom twice. But the US had warned Pakistan for the first time in December 2003 against providing nuclear assistance to Riyadh.
International concerns over Pak-Saudi nuclear assistance intensified after the October 2003 visit of Saudi Arabia's then de facto ruler Crown Prince, now King, Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz to Pakistan.
During that visit, American intelligence circles alleged, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia had concluded a clandestine agreement on nuclear cooperation that was meant to provide the Saudis with nuclear-weapons technology in exchange for cheap oil.
However, in 2005, the United Stated claimed to have acquired fresh evidence, suggesting that a broader government-to-government Pakistan-Saudi atomic collaboration is still on. Subsequent news reports in American media said that a chartered Saudi C-130 Hercules plane made scores of trips between Dhahran military base and several Pakistani cities, including Lahore [ Images ] and Karachi, between October 2003 and October 2004, and thereafter, considerable contacts were reported between Pakistani and Saudi Arabian nuclear scientists.
Between October 2004 and January 2005, under the cover of Haj, several Pakistani scientists visited Riyadh, and remained missing from their designated hotels for 15 to 20 days.
The intimacy between Islamabad and Riyadh has been exceptional and it is not without significance that the first foreign tour of Musharraf, who ousted Sharif in October 1999, was to Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Sharif himself, his younger brother Shahbaz Sharif and their families took asylum in Saudi Arabia after a secret exile deal between Musharraf and Sharif, in which Riyadh had played a key role.
According to US intelligence findings, as reported by international media, during Nawaz Sharif's second prime ministerial tenure, Saudi Arabia had been involved in funding Islamabad's missile and nuclear program purchases from China, as a result of which Pakistan became a nuclear weapon-producing and proliferating State.
For decades, the Western media and their intelligence agencies have linked Pakistan's dishonoured nuclear scientist Dr Khan and the ISI, to nuclear-technology transfers, and it was hard to credit the idea that the successive governments Dr Khan served had been oblivious of these activities.
In the post-9/11 era, analysts continue to express fears about the possibility of extremist Islamic groups like Al Qaeda gaining access to Pakistan's nuclear weapons or fissile or radioactive materials.
Under these conditions, Islamabad's pursuing any clandestine nuclear deal with Riyadh can only aggravate such risks and international concerns.
////////////////////////////////////////////
Its not a secret any more.
No, None of the countries! why the land of the prophet Mohammad. Please read post #60.
