Fear of buying
Defence deals create controversy because they are small, piecemeal, with many vendors. India must get over its post-Bofors paranoia
Shekhar Gupta | | April 16, 2015 | UPDATED 10:35 IST
Prime Minister
Narendra Modi's dramatic purchase of 36 Rafale jets has drawn extreme comments.
One, that this is a bold, gutsy decision of a leader who is not afraid to break the multiple logjams in defence acquisitions. Two, that it is a panicky decision to fill a crucial gap in a fast-depleting Indian Air Force Order of Battle (ORBAT) with obsolescence of the entire MiG series (MiG-29 apart), and is typical of our bandaid-tourniquet doctrine of defence purchases.
There's truth in both arguments, though I am more inclined to the first view. This is a gutsy decision which breaks a stalemate and ends, at least for the moment, the vicious lobbying, leak-versus-leak battles in New Delhi. But there is also merit to the second view. How did India paint itself into such a corner, weakening its strategic posture? The result was it ended up making possibly a $5 billion purchase off-the-shelf in a wartime-like haste, embarrassing for the aspiring globaliser fielding the world's fourth largest army and listed, traditionally, as the top military importer in the world.
Stockholm-based SIPRI, which estimates import data in terms of constant 1990 value dollars, puts the value of India's total arms imports in five years (2010-14) at a little over $21 billion, and about three times the second largest, Saudi Arabia. Pakistan is a little bit behind, with just over a fourth of India's arms import bill, although that figure could need some correction for the complexities of putting a realistic value of imports from the US and China, both "special relationship" suppliers. The SIPRI figures look accurate if we compare them with the only reliable rupee data available with us, in the form of answers to Parliament questions:
Arun Jaitley said India's arms imports were around Rs.83,000 crore in the past three years, and
Manohar Parrikar saidRs.1,03,000 crore in five years, or $16 billion. But if you think 1990 rupee-dollar, SIPRI' s $21 billion would be in the ballpark.
Two points arise from this. First, that Modi's decision to order these Rafale jets off-the-shelf was wise and brave, like a senior doctor risking immediate surgery to save a deteriorating patient. The second is a question. How did the fourth largest military machine in the world get itself in the ICU in the middle of the night over a weekend needing emergency surgery?
Or, to make it inconvenient for this columnist, you could summarise and reword the same questions as something like: Mr so-and-so, go get your head examined, how can you accuse a country importing more armaments than the next three countries in rankings together of suffering from a fear of buying? How can this country then be perpetually short of crucial weaponry? Aren't you a jumble of contradictions?
These are perfectly valid questions and I have no defence except to say that
this reflects the multiple paradoxes and contradictions of India's defence planning. You want to appreciate this better, read this dubious honour of being the top importer along with the statements of successive service chiefs on crucial shortfalls. For me, the most telling statement of all came from General V.P. Malik, in the early days of Kargil in 1999 when he said in frustration: "We will fight with what we have." He was the chief of one of the world's largest and finest armies.
To delve into this maze of contradictions, you need to write a couple of tomes. Some have been written too. My favourite is Arming Without Aiming, jointly written by the foremost expert on South Asian militaries, Stephen P. Cohen, and Sunil Dasgupta (who worked with me in this magazine two decades ago as a young reporter learning to cover defence). Both are based at Brookings in Washington now and bemoan lack of a culture of strategic thinking and planning in India.
The Indian doctrine, they imply, is purely tactical, episodic, immediate-need-based, and conforms to the basic Indian approach to all infrastructure: create shortages and then keep planning to deal with them. My own most telling insight on this sits in my rather flimsy personal archives. It is a handwritten note scribbled with a pencil on a scrap from Jaswant Singh. He slipped it to me with a smile at a strategic affairs brainstorm at Schloss Leopoldskron, Salzburg, in the summer of 1994, as General Sundarji held forth on the weaknesses in India's strategic doctrine. "I headed the parliamentary committee to examine India's military-strategic doctrine," wrote Jaswant Singh. "We concluded there was no strategy and no doctrine."
There is zero evidence this has changed. Because if it had, we would not be buying frontline fighters off-the-shelf as if picking groceries at a supermarket after 17 years of debates, controversies and near-scandals. This has been the consistent history of our defence purchases except, say, a remarkable 1985-89 phase under Rajiv Gandhi which, sadly, became a problem and made our fear of buying an incurable virus. The result of this piecemeal approach is that our armed forces are under a constant stress with shortages. The same disease had plagued us during, and in the course of, every war, even if we leave out 1962 as an exception. We believe in 1971 Indira Gandhi and Jagjivan Ram gave the armed forces a free hand and time to build up fully before going to war. This included emergency, bulk import of used Soviet-made T-55 tanks from Poland, induction of heavy, but short-legged Sukhoi-7s for close support (it ended up with the highest attrition rate). And now, scholar Srinath Raghavan tells us in his wonderfully researched and written
1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh that on the eve of 1971 the government of our greatest anti-Zionist, pro-Palestinian leader ever, Indira Gandhi, secretly pleaded with the Israelis for crucial weaponry, including long-range mortars, though we did not have diplomatic relations with them. Of course, the Israelis helped as they had done twice in the past.
Remember the initial setbacks IAF suffered in Kargil, when two MiGs and a Mi-17 attack helicopter were lost and all crew were killed, except one taken POW? A fourth, a sturdy photo-reconnaissance Canberra (since retired), was nursed back to base by a deft crew. All were hit by shoulder-fired missiles. It needs to be said that it was because IAF commanders were still operating in old derring-do, precise, daylight, low-level strike missions of the pre-missile age. The result was losses while very little was achieved with old-fashioned bombs, rockets and strafing. Once again, tactics changed after setbacks (recall the loss of all four obsolete Vampires sent out over Chamb in the first air battle of 1965, not to be used again in that war).
Again in 1999, the IAF suffered no casualty in nearly 50 days of more effective operations after the first few. It not only changed tactics, but also imported-again from Israel in an emergency-laser pods to rig on Mirage-2000s to carry out precision bombing of Pakistani positions at night. If you scratch your memory, or look at archives, those are the videos the IAF displayed at one of the press conferences in the decisive phase of that war and when the tide turned.
This isn't meant to be a comprehensive litany of our short-termism. It is to explore a limited question, with apologies to Erica Jong: Why this fear of buying? Since 1987, one reason is the Bofors syndrome. Every defence purchase is fraught, delayed or "thrown in orbit" as Lutyens description goes for sending a file into a permanent spiral of indecision. This makes New Delhi the easiest playground for arms dealers, middlemen (by whatever name you call them) and a new phenomenon, the dedicated, B-to-B, arms bazaar media. Public is confused between negotiations, shifting requirements, a constant whiff of scandal and a belief that the system is owned by this massive, evil arms trade. At the same time, we continue importing more than any other nation in the world. You want a paradox: A.K. Antony, our most risk-averse, most anti-US defence minister since 1991, ended up buying more from the US, and directly, on government-to-government basis and off-the-shelf (C-130s, C-17s, P-8Is) than in our entire independent history. Modi has resumed that de-risked, emergency buying tradition, though with great dash.
The only way to fight phobias is to face them. It is fashionable to curse Rajiv for Bofors and more, but the truth is, 1985-89 was the only period in our history that weapon acquisitions were proactive, futuristic and redefined the largely defensive tactical doctrines until then. Sundarji's Brasstacks and Checkerboard were aggressive and aimed at delivering crushing blows in enemy territory than merely protecting your own. The fear of Bofors has blighted South Block since. But think. In a war even today, bulk of the hardware the three forces will field was ordered by Rajiv, from Mirages to T-72 tanks to new series MiGs, BMP armoured fighting vehicles and, of course, Bofors artillery. In these years our defence budget crossed that Lakshman
Rekha of 4 per cent of GDP.
Today it is well below 2 per cent of a growing GDP, and quite adequate. For a reality check, our five years' defence imports are two-thirds of our gold imports in a year and, more tellingly, less than a tenth of the import bill of Reliance Industries and about a seventh of Indian Oil Corporation, a PSU. But controversy dogs only defence imports not because they are huge, but because they are small, piecemeal, with many vendors, and the "system", wrapped-in-latex post-Bofors, is petrified of handling it. If you give up that fear, you can embark on another systematic modernisation as in 1985-89.
If you don't, you will again land up in the ICU over a weekend needing emergency transfusion, if not surgery, soon enough.
Defence deals create controversy because they are small, piecemeal, with many vendors. India must get over its post-Bofors paranoia : National Interest - India Today
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Another View
RAFALE DEAL
In-A-Jam Solution
How game changed, calling for new plan
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to France was not entirely negative for sure. But many are looking at the two major deals announced—outright purchase of 36 Rafale fighter jets, and the l&t-Areva agreement for constructing the epr nuclear reactors at Jaitapur in Maharashtra—as unmitigated disasters.
The IAF has been thrown a juicy bone with the government-to-government acquisition of 36 Rafale jets. But this will materialise only two years down the line even if India is quick to sign the contract. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s much-vaunted ‘Make in India’ policy, however, suffers a major setback. For Dassault Aviation, though, it’s a thumping victory.
For over three years, the contract for buying 126 Rafale jets had been foundering. In France, the reputation of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) is rock-bottom. French defence majors who have worked with HAL describe it as “unprofessional and unreliable in the extreme”. The original plan was to buy 18 aircraft in ready-to-fly condition. HAL was to produce 108 more under licence in India. But Dassault refused to take responsibility for planes manufactured by HAL.
Besides, there were disputes over pricing: an off-the-shelf purchase will cost India much more per aircraft than if the original deal had gone through. The actual transfer of technology will be limited and the outright purchase lets Dassault off the hook on that score. French sources place the value of this purchase at over Euro 5.5 billion. Dassault CEO Eric Trappier and his colleagues will be laughing their way to the bank.
Modi’s much-vaunted ‘Make in India’ policy suffers a huge setback. Dassault, however, strikes a Rs 50,000-crore deal.
At one time, India had the French aviation giant in a squeeze. The French defence ministry had curtailed its order for Rafales from 11 aircraft per year to just 26 over the next six years. Dassault badly needed the oxygen of foreign sales. India thought it could press the company for an even better deal: but there comes a point beyond which negotiations stall. The IAF badly needs the fighters: the government should have been careful not to push to the brink. On February 12, France announced the sale of 24 Rafales to Egypt, to be bankrolled by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Now, Dassault was in a dramatically better bargaining position. No longer did it have to accommodate New Delhi’s manoeuvring over prices or over manufacturing by HAL. Dassault could afford to drag out the negotiations.
In India, pressure was building up. Paris told New Delhi that failure of the Rafale contract could seriously dent Indo-French relations. The IAF, realising the deal could collapse, raised the ante. And French defence minister Jean-Yves Le Drian made three trips to Delhi between December and March. In December, the India defence minister had told Le Drian he would accelerate the process. By February, the tide turned against India. In March, New Delhi told Paris that in the face of Dassault’s newfound intransigence, another urgent solution had to be found—outright purchase. On April 7, French President Francois Hollande and Le Drian discussed and finalised their response to New Delhi. It was kept secret: even HAL chairman and CEO T. Suvarna Raju learnt of the purchase from the newspapers while in Paris.
Insiders in the defence industry say other producers and suppliers would also have been reluctant to accept the global tender route, especially if HAL conditionality was retained. Also, they said, the Indian private sector is not yet equipped to collaborate on high-tech projects such as making sophisticated fighter jets. A specialist defence journalist says, in the short run, Modi’s ‘Make in India’ ambitions are unrealistic.
For India, the relationship with France is crucial. Though a middle-level power, France is a defence major, and can provide high-tech products and services in infrastructure, transport and waste disposal and in the fields of nano, nuclear and space technologies. France is also a permanent member of the un Security Council; New Delhi is counting on French support for its membership bid. But that’s another matter. Many political observers are of the opinion that, given the nature of Paris’s own vested interest in the status quo on UNSC membership and its close ties with Germany, it’s doubtful if France will go the extra mile for India.
In-A-Jam Solution | Vaiju Naravane
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Another view
Nitin Gokhle (The one who too DM M Parrikar's interview in DD)
A Bold Political Decision for a Crucial Defence Need
Nitin A Gokhale, Editor & Senior Fellow, VIF
The saga for procurement of 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (M-MRCA) for the Indian Air Force (IAF) actually began in 2001, gathered steam in 2007 and was stuck in price negotiations for the past three years. Meanwhile, the IAF's combat fighter jet strength was depleting fast. Over the past couple of years, the Air Force top brass was alarmed enough to tell the government that its conventional combat edge even against Pakistan was in danger of being lost.
So last week, hours before Prime Minister Narendra Modi embarked on his three-nation tour, a political decision was taken to explore the option of buying Rafale jets through a government-to-government (G-to-G) contract with France. The breakthrough will now allow the IAF to induct Rafale fighter jets in a two year time frame and at least partially make up for its depleting combat jet strength.
However, it is the next step in aircraft procurement that will be watched intently. Will this decision of going for G-to-G mean that all future purchases of this magnitude will be handled in this manner? If so, what happens to the much-touted Make in India programme? The roadmap is not clear but Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar gave enough hints about what the government is thinking in an interview that this writer co-hosted on Monday for Doordarshan (
Rafel Vaayusena Ki Jaroorat, Sawal Bemani: Parrikar - YouTube).
Not surprisingly, skeptics have hit out at the decision. The criticism has ranged from "it's too little too late," to "it goes against the Make in India concept." But both Modi and Parrikar were clear that they had to put the interest of the IAF above everything else and which what they have done. Mind you, procuring 36 Rafales is just a stop-gap arrangement to arrest the rapidly falling numbers in IAF's combat fleet.
Lauding the Prime Minister for taking a bold decision in breaking the Rafale deadlock, Parrikar said future large procurements for the IAF and indeed for the armed forces at large, will have to be G-2-G but Make in India will also get a look in for other projects. For instance,
IF more Rafales, were to be bought--over and above 36 decided now--Dassault could be asked to manufacture them in India. Even if any other lighter aircraft was to be selected, the pre-condition will be a tie-up with an Indian company or consortium.
It is to Parrikar's credit that he decided to think differently on a knotty issue and suggested a way out to the Prime Minister. In fact, in less than six months after taking over, Parrikar has studied various complex issues dogging the defence ministry and has come to his own conclusions on what needs to be done. By his own admission, Parrikar spent the first four months as defence minister in taking inputs from a range of experts both within and outside the MoD before making up his mind.
In his review, Parrikar also found that the bureaucracy in the ministry—both civil and military--was sitting on some 400-odd big and small projects that are critical to the three armed forces. Without getting into details, he said: “The first thing I did was to look at projects that are stuck at various stages of clearances since the most common complaint across the board was ‘nothing moves’ in the MoD.” A thorough review revealed that nearly one-third of the 400-odd projects were now irrelevant. So they were discarded. About 50 projects were accelerated since they were of critical importance.
A decade-long impasse in defence acquisitions has been broken with the decision on Rafale, raising renewed hope in the sector. Parrikar has brought in a sense of purpose in the notoriously obdurate MoD bureaucracy. “
There was no control over the system. There were no reviews, no feedback and there was no fear of punishment for non-performance. An important ministry like Defence cannot run like this,” Parrikar said in an interview. So he has now instututed a time-bound performance review system aimed at speedy clearances and implementation of projects.
Hopefully, the new measures will revitalise the functioning of the crucial arm of the government in coming months.
A Bold Political Decision for a Crucial Defence Need | Vivekananda International Foundation
Patrice Caine @Patrice_Caine 
