TO PLUG THE GAP IN THE SKY MODI AND PARRIKAR PUT THE INTEREST OF THE IAF ABOVE EVERYTHING ELSE
RAFALE - The fighter IAF was pushing for all along
by Nitin A Gokhale
When Manohar Parrikar took over as India’s defence minister late last year, many defence pundits sniggered. What will a provincial politician from Goa know about the complex issues in the defence ministry, felt the high and mighty denizens of Lutyens’ Dilli. Those who have their fingers in the defence pie rubbed their hands in glee: here’s a tyro, an outsider to Delhi’s power corridors who would be easy to manipulate, they might have been thinking. Less than six months on, the smiling, not-so-articulate Parrikar has set the cat among the pigeons by breaking the nearly decade-long logjam in the procurement of crucial fighter jets for the Indian Air Force (IAF) and demonstrating the kind of quick decision-making many thought beyond him. The decision to buy 36 Rafale combat aircraft from the French company Dassault Aviation in ready-to-fly condition, announced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Paris, was a classic example of the political leadership taking a bold, unconventional decision to meet an urgent operational necessity of the armed forces. In this case, a government-to-government deal was found as the means to breaking the logjam that had been standing in the way of the Indian Air Force (IAF).
Parrikar convinced Modi on the need to find an solution. He then kept to the sidelines loyally.
In an interview to Doordarshan, Parrikar gave cent per cent marks to the prime minister for effecting the deal, thereby underplaying his own role in reaching this out-of-the-box decision. As he reviewed crucial projects and issues pending in the defence ministry after taking over, Parrikar quickly realised that the mega MMRCA (Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft) contract was going nowhere despite three years of negotiations between the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Dassault Aviation, which had emerged as L-1 (the lowest bidder) in a competition that had begun in 2007. The issues were too complex. The cost of buying 126 fighter jets was too massive—anywhere between $ 16-18 billion—for any bureaucrat to take a final call under the current Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). The IAF, on the other hand, was pressing hard for a quick decision: it was worried about the rapidly falling strength of its combat fleet.
Parrikar, an IIT-Powai product, grasped the nettle, took the issue to the prime minister and made him understand the urgency for breaking the deadlock. Hours before Modi took off for Paris, the duo arrived at a pro tem solution: buy Rafale directly under a government-to-government contract, even if it meant ignoring for once the ‘Make in India’ concept. The prime minister—despite being the author of ‘Make in India’—backed Parrikar to the hilt. And true to his promise, told the French of India’s intention.
It’s no surprise that sceptics have criticised the decision. The carping has ranged from “It’s too little, too late” to “It goes against the ‘Make in India’ concept”. There are whispers that the Ambani brothers might have made a backdoor entry. But Modi and Parrikar put the interest of the IAF above everything else. It must be borne in mind that procuring 36 Rafales is a stop-gap arrangement. It is meant to arrest, only if temporarily, the rapidly falling numbers of aircraft in the IAF’s combat fleet. The government will have to work out a detailed plan to replace over 200 fighter jets that will retire in the next four years. Parrikar has already hinted in one of his interviews how he plans to overcome the shortage, but all that will come in the near future. At the moment, he has demonstrated a rare decisiveness in the defence ministry. Under A.K. Antony of the UPA, India’s longest serving Raksha Mantri, the ministry had come to epitomise procrastination.
To Plug The Gap In The Sky | Nitin A. Gokhale
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INDIA’S RAFALE DEAL: WHY THE OUTRIGHT PURCHASE WAS A BALANCING STEP
by Prashant Dikshit
The Indian government’s decision to purchase 36 Rafale MMRCA aircraft from France outright, as against the original 18, with a direct government to government deal with France could be the best option. This is because the issues were no longer merely commercial in nature; there were strategic reasons to be considered.
The most apparent and crucial matter of the rapidly decreasing combat punch of the Indian Air Force (IAF) was not the only issue at hand. The decision to select the Rafale at the outset was already made with the conscious view that it was the best buy. It not only satisfied the operational framework of the IAF, but also ensured that with its acquisition India will put the eggs in the correct basket.
India has invested more than adequate material resources in the burgeoning strategic equation with the US and has acquired maritime and heavy-lift transport aircraft, among other weapon systems. Deeply emboldened by the mutual India-US wooing syndrome, the US administration is leaving no stone unturned to participate in the India’s aircraft carrier industry. On the MMRCA front however, there were disappointments in the US industry circles that India had found the F-16 aircraft somewhat outmoded and the F-18, too heavy and alien for its systemic construct.
But it had obviated Indian policy planners’ deeply embedded fears that the complex structure of the US regime – that consists its presidency, the senate and the congress – could place embargoes on technical and material support in the future for such a crucial combat ingredient; just because some law-wielding segment US did not see, eye to eye, with Indian policies elsewhere. There was precedence on this score in the past and the Indian establishment has institutional memory of having encountered such impediments; and the development of India’s Light Combat Aircraft is one of the many examples.
As for Russia, India is already acquiring over 250 Su-30 MKI air superiority fighters and most importantly, is developing Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft plus a Medium Transport Aircraft along with other weapon platforms such as the BrahMos in collaboration with Russian majors.
Although, the all-weather relationship with the erstwhile USSR and now Russia has stood the test of time and India availed of Russian support on not only the Arihant nuclear submarine but also substantially for the operation of nuclear power plants, uncertainties and irritants faced by India’s defence establishment for provision of spares for military hardware after the breakup of the USSR and again, before the eventual induction of the aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya, could not be ignored. Additionally, there is an emerging perception that with the rising clamour for enhanced price structures by Russian companies, the mutuality of equations is tilting towards greater commercial gains and the tenor of the relationship may have come to a saturation point. The Indian endeavour would rather be to sustain than to increase.
India had already procured adequate materials from UK during its post-independence relationship. The British-made Jaguar joined the IAF fleet with over 150 aircraft to fulfil the IAF’s requirement for Deep Penetration Strike Aircraft; over 120 of the British Aerospace built Advanced Jet Trainer, the Hawk, have been inducted in the IAF and the India Navy with an Indian government investment of nearly $ 2 billion. These purchases had set up a pipeline for infusion of spares periodically from aviation majors in UK. The British industry had nothing more to offer.
With France the story is different and the developments had to be placed on an even keel. First, the uncertainties in nurturing the contract with the French aviation major Dassault, the producer of the Rafale, had emerged because the manufacturer had declined to accept responsibilities for the 108 machines that were to be assembled by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. There is a strong view that some in the South Block had persuaded Dassault to accept this clause against the manufacturer’s judgment and these doubts could not be kept under wraps beyond a point.
Eventually, the whole deal was falling through due to procedural impositions of the treatment of “Request for proposals.” There was an emerging perception that at risk was the equation with France – whose support in operating their Mirage 2000 with the IAF was pivotal in countering the aggression during the Kargil war. France is going to be a supplier of nuclear materials to India, and with whom India is pursuing several space ventures through its Department of Space. However, the most crucial of all reasons why this is strategically important is due to France’s unstinted support for India’s membership in the UN Security Council.
India's Rafale Deal: Why The Outright Purchase Was A Balancing Step - Analysis - Eurasia Review
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INTERVIEW: INDIA’S RAFALE DEAL
by Sanjay Kumar
The recent Rafale deal and its significance for India’s relations with France.
While visiting France in early April, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the acquisition of 36 French Dassault Rafale jets. The announcement capped years of sometimes contentious negotiations, which had intensified since Modi came to power last year.
The Diplomat’s Sanjay Kumar spoke with senior journalist Ingrid Therwath, South Asia editor withCourrier International, a leading French magazine, about the significance of the deal for France and its relations with India, and what might lay ahead.
How was the deal finally done? Were you aware of it?
Initially, the figure that was announced at the joint press conference between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and French President Francois Hollande was a bit of a disappointment. For three years the deal was on the table and negotiations had been going on for 126 fighter jets. I learned through an informal source 24 hours before the joint press conference that it was to be 63 Rafale jets. When Modi announced the decision to buy 36 jets there was initial shock and disappointment among the French people.
However, more than disappointment there was a sense of relief that the deal has come out of the lurch which it has been in for the last three years. Both India and France were eager to break the logjam and move ahead. Negotiations were going on and on. There is relief in France now that something has come out of the three years of negotiations.
What does it mean for France?
The French government has a target of selling 40 Rafales this year. A couple of months ago Egypt bought 24 and now India is buying 36 off the shelf. This is rather good news for Dassault, which was facing a huge financial crisis. The deal comes as a lifeline for the French defense industry.
The fighter jet deal is a big political boost for the beleaguered French President François Hollande, who has been floundering ever since he assumed office in 2012. His popularity is really low. In recent local elections his socialist party performed very badly.
Now with the defense deal the government can showcase positive figures on the economic and defense fronts. Hollande’s international stature has gone up after the agreement.
Does the deal herald the end of the negotiations and the final cap on the number of combat aircraft that India is going to buy from France? Or is the transfer of technology, India’s main demand over the years, a possibility?
There are two ways to look at the deal. Either India gets out of the Rafale deal saying that we have bought the plane and that’s it or India now goes to phase two of the negotiations which I think is likely, though I am not privy to the confidential part of the deal. The reason being that Indian military needs to renew its equipment; its fleet is aging. The Rafale is a true multi-role combat aircraft. Though it is expensive, it is efficient. India has varied terrain and a location in a complex geopolitical neighborhood – the Rafale suits its requirements.
If there is a phase two of the negotiations it would be centered around the transfer of technology. France understands that for New Delhi, the Make in India concept is important.
In the French media there has been discussion as to the recipient of any technology transfer. Can you shed some light on that?
The question is who would build the new lot of Rafale jets if the transfer of technology takes place. Would it be state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) or some private player. That is the issue both in France and India. What I gather from my sources is that Indian industrialist Mukesh Ambani’s company is really keen to do a technology transfer in the defense sector. Ambani is a big contender. With India’s biggest industrial house a very close friend of Modi, Ambani coming into the picture is a real possibility. Dassault is also not keen on HAL. It seems that the government-owned company is not a reliable partner. It does not subscribe to strict quality standards.
Are you aware of the criticism in a section of India’s media, terming the deal too expensive and done without a proper bidding process.
The French general public are not really aware of the debate going on in India. I don’t think there was any irregularity in the deal. There were six contenders initially so it was a fair game. What is happening in India between HAL and Ambani, the French press is not bothered about that. Its an internal issue for India. But France is happy that the deal got unstuck and came to be signed .
How do see Indo-French relations after Modi’s visit?
I think the relationship has always been very good. France and India really like each other. For the French, India is a wonderful country, and the majority [of the French people] have a very positive image of the South Asian nation. France would like to do business with China but they have a very negative image of the communist regime. India has soft power. France has always been a consistent ally of New Delhi. If you had noticed, France raised concerns over the release of the 2008 Mumbai attack mastermind Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi recently. This deal deepens that bond.
What other agreements were inked during Modi’s visit to France?
There were number of other deals that were signed between France and India. They signed agreement on water, sanitation, waste management, transport and metros, roads and infrastructure. One important deal was on the European Nuclear Reactor, built by AREVA in Jaitapur in the western Indian state of Maharashtra. The negotiations with AREVA were very difficult because of local resistance to the nuclear plant. The deal is important for the French nuclear firm. Just as Dassault really needed the Rafale contract to boost its financial position, AREVA also needed [the Indian deal] for its survival. So the Indian PM’s visit has been oxygen for these companies.
Interview: India’s Rafale Deal | The Diplomat
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