CTC Sentinel July 2009 - Attacks on Pak Nuclear Sites?

[S-2]

Latest issue of CTC Sentinel. I'm including it here as three of the articles directly relate to Pakistan in this issue-

CTC Sentinel- July 2009

The Combating Terrorism Center is a privately-funded research organization located on the U.S.M.A. campus at West Point, N.Y. and has been responsible for some amazing projects and articles over the last three years.

Enjoy.

 

[Zulfiqar]

The very first error on first page:

Moreover, militants have recently attacked a number of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities, including an August 20, 2008 incident at the Wah cantonment, widely understood to be one of Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons assembly sites

The factory made explosives and was not an assembly site. I have been living near wah for 8 years and i have spent two years in high school just two kilometers from that site.I regularly passed by the gate when i had to go to the market near it some years ago. You don't build a nuclear weapon assembly plant near a market and a big population.

Second error:

With respect to personnel reliability, the Pakistan Army conducts a tight selection process drawing almost exclusively on officers from Punjab Province who are considered to have fewer links with religious extremism or with the Pashtun areas of Pakistan from which groups such as the Pakistani Taliban mainly garner their support.

BS. I am a pushtun myself with many members in such facilities and this is just plain BS. BTW punjab also has its fair share of extremists based near jhang (lashkar-e-jhangvi and many others).

3rd Error:

“The concern, however, is that most of Pakistan’s nuclear sites are close to or even within areas dominated by Pakistani Taliban militants and home to al-Qa`ida.”

Pakistan lacks strategic depth so this point is invalid.

4th

an attack on Pakistan’s nuclear airbase at Kamra by a suicide bomber on December 10, 2007,13 and perhaps most significantly the August 20, 2008 attack when Pakistani Taliban suicide bombers blew up several entry points to one of the armament complexes at the Wah cantonment, considered one of Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons assembly sites

Nuclear weapons facilities are separate than the airbase. Kamra airbase was attacked which houses Pakistan aeronautical complex.As mentioned above wah facility was an explosive facility and only one gate was attacked. None of the above are directly related to nuclear weapons facility.

5th

It is widely accepted that there is a strong element within the Pakistan Army and within the lead intelligence agency, the ISI, that is anti-Western, particularly anti-U.S., and that there also exists an overlapping pro-Islamist strand.

What is wrong with being islamic.After all we are all muslims(Being a practicing muslim has nothing to do with being an al-qaeda supporters.Its like saying that all the southern states/bible belt support KKK).I can also summarize the "friendship" with my signature which has been slightly modified.

6th

One argument for this, described in Philip Bobbitt’s Terror and Consent,21 is that states can become pressurized or incentivized to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorist groups because they are responding to threats from an external power but fear the consequences of being identified as the origin of a nuclear strike. In the context of severe international pressure on the Pakistan Army—particularly by India or the United States

Nuclear weapons origin can be identified by the uranium/plutonium fuel used.


This whole article is BS, written just to create more fears and is full of misinformation.He generalizes the information as he does not know the exact location of the facilities.He just knows the names of the cities.

 

[S-2]

"The factory made explosives and was not an assembly site... You don't build a nuclear weapon assembly plant near a market and a big population."

But you do build an explosives plant near such? Short of Baluchistan, any nuclear manufacturing, assembly, or storage location will be within the downwind drift hazard zone of some goodly portion of Pakistan's population.

My suspicion is that you don't really know all that goes on inside this rather large and complex facility.

"BS. I am a pushtun myself with many members in such facilities and this is just plain BS. BTW punjab also has its fair share of extremists based near jhang (lashkar-e-jhangvi and many others)."

No. There's no B.S. here. Punjabi pre-eminence in nearly all aspects of Pakistani society and institutions is an accomplished and sometimes uncomfortable fact. Why would it be any different WRT your nuclear security forces? Note, please, the difference between "members in such facilities" and nuclear security forces. Mr. Gregory makes clear he's referring to the Pakistani army, not civilian employees of any plant or facility.

Including such is dissemblance- intentional or otherwise.

Short of you being a serving officer assigned to your nuclear security forces, I'm not comfortable with the basis for your comments here as they contradict a known dominance in nearly all institutional spheres of the Pakistani state by punjabis.

Secondly, you fail to separate eastern extremists with Indian objectives and tight, disciplined state affiliations from your western "bad" taliban who have no such controls and every objective of bringing the Pakistani state to its knees. That seems critical to the objectivity of your assessment and is missing.

"Pakistan lacks strategic depth so this point is invalid."

Hardly. Read closely-

"When Pakistan was developing its nuclear weapons infrastructure in the 1970s and 1980s, its principal concern was the risk that India would overrun its nuclear weapons facilities in an armored offensive if the facilities were placed close to the long Pakistan-India border. As a result, Pakistan, with a few exceptions, chose to locate much of its nuclear weapons infrastructure to the north and west of the country and to the region around Islamabad and Rawalpindi—sites such as Wah, Fatehjang, Golra Sharif, Kahuta, Sihala, Isa Khel Charma, Tarwanah, and Taxila.11"

Ah, risk mitigation gone awry. Who could, then, predict now? "Strategic depth"? This was the answer at the time- those areas around Rawapindi/Islamabad. It remains the only suitable answer given the subsequent investment in such infrastructure and the continuing absence of better, more viable alternatives. None of that, however, ameliorates the threat from your "bad taliban". They live uncomfortably close to these locations and possess deep enmity for your state.

"Nuclear weapons facilities are separate than the airbase. Kamra airbase was attacked which houses Pakistan aeronautical complex."

And you are confident that no special ammunition supply points exist at this AFB? How, sir, do you know this with such certitude?

"As mentioned above wah facility was an explosive facility and only one gate was attacked. None of the above are directly related to nuclear weapons facility."

Actually, there was a second attack shortly thereafter in a market very near a separate second gate. You miss Gregory's point about the evolution of taliban/insurgent forced entry techniques at controlled access locations. It is ongoing and growing in capability.

Secondly, again, I'm not comfortable that you know with complete accuracy what actually occurs within this munitions complex. If so, then you'd know of the long association that this facility has with Muhammad Hafeez Quereshi and the "WAH Group" and the importance of such to the development of your nuclear weapons capability.

If so, is it o.k. to co-locate a nuclear weapons research facility in close proximity to a large civil population? It would seem this wasn't a concern in 1974.

"What is wrong with being islamic..."

Red herring. Any member of al Qaeda will swear he's a muslim. I see a difference. Hopefully you do too.

Gregory is referencing the religious radicalization of your military at the hands of Muhammad Zia ul Hag and its continuing legacy. How deeply this radicalization has penetrated your ISI and nuclear security forces is the question posed by Mr. Gregory.

"Nuclear weapons origin can be identified by the uranium/plutonium fuel used."

You miss the larger point-what follows after doing so? The moral dilemma for those attacked is whether to hold an entire national population culpable for the actions of a few. That, of course, pre-supposes that the means to retaliate in like manner even exists. That remains unknown until such an attack occurs. Until then, we won't know if the victim possesses the means to retaliate with nuclear weapons nor if they'll even cross the aforementioned moral rubicon.

"This whole article is BS, written just to create more fears..."

Can't create more fear than has already existed for some time in the minds of policy-makers and pundits world-wide.

"...and is full of misinformation.He generalizes the information as he does not know the exact location of the facilities.He just knows the names of the cities."

I disagree. There's no requirement to provide street addresses to these facilities and you don't actually seem to fully understand the history of these facilities yourself. If so, you'd have known of the long association of the WAH Ordnance complex with the development of your own nuclear weapons.

 

[Bill Longley]

Ignorance and arogance are the trade mark of.....

 

[waraich66]

"The factory made explosives and was not an assembly site... You don't build a nuclear weapon assembly plant near a market and a big population."

But you do build an explosives plant near such? Short of Baluchistan, any nuclear manufacturing, assembly, or storage location will be within the downwind drift hazard zone of some goodly portion of Pakistan's population.

My suspicion is that you don't really know all that goes on inside this rather large and complex facility.

"BS. I am a pushtun myself with many members in such facilities and this is just plain BS. BTW punjab also has its fair share of extremists based near jhang (lashkar-e-jhangvi and many others)."

No. There's no B.S. here. Punjabi pre-eminence in nearly all aspects of Pakistani society and institutions is an accomplished and sometimes uncomfortable fact. Why would it be any different WRT your nuclear security forces? Note, please, the difference between "members in such facilities" and nuclear security forces. Mr. Gregory makes clear he's referring to the Pakistani army, not civilian employees of any plant or facility.

Including such is dissemblance- intentional or otherwise.

Short of you being a serving officer assigned to your nuclear security forces, I'm not comfortable with the basis for your comments here as they contradict a known dominance in nearly all institutional spheres of the Pakistani state by punjabis.

Secondly, you fail to separate eastern extremists with Indian objectives and tight, disciplined state affiliations from your western "bad" taliban who have no such controls and every objective of bringing the Pakistani state to its knees. That seems critical to the objectivity of your assessment and is missing.

"Pakistan lacks strategic depth so this point is invalid."

Hardly. Read closely-

"When Pakistan was developing its nuclear weapons infrastructure in the 1970s and 1980s, its principal concern was the risk that India would overrun its nuclear weapons facilities in an armored offensive if the facilities were placed close to the long Pakistan-India border. As a result, Pakistan, with a few exceptions, chose to locate much of its nuclear weapons infrastructure to the north and west of the country and to the region around Islamabad and Rawalpindi—sites such as Wah, Fatehjang, Golra Sharif, Kahuta, Sihala, Isa Khel Charma, Tarwanah, and Taxila.11"

Ah, risk mitigation gone awry. Who could, then, predict now? "Strategic depth"? This was the answer at the time- those areas around Rawapindi/Islamabad. It remains the only suitable answer given the subsequent investment in such infrastructure and the continuing absence of better, more viable alternatives. None of that, however, ameliorates the threat from your "bad taliban". They live uncomfortably close to these locations and possess deep enmity for your state.

"Nuclear weapons facilities are separate than the airbase. Kamra airbase was attacked which houses Pakistan aeronautical complex."

And you are confident that no special ammunition supply points exist at this AFB? How, sir, do you know this with such certitude?

"As mentioned above wah facility was an explosive facility and only one gate was attacked. None of the above are directly related to nuclear weapons facility."

Actually, there was a second attack shortly thereafter in a market very near a separate second gate. You miss Gregory's point about the evolution of taliban/insurgent forced entry techniques at controlled access locations. It is ongoing and growing in capability.

Secondly, again, I'm not comfortable that you know with complete accuracy what actually occurs within this munitions complex. If so, then you'd know of the long association that this facility has with Muhammad Hafeez Quereshi and the "WAH Group" and the importance of such to the development of your nuclear weapons capability.

If so, is it o.k. to co-locate a nuclear weapons research facility in close proximity to a large civil population? It would seem this wasn't a concern in 1974.

"What is wrong with being islamic..."

Red herring. Any member of al Qaeda will swear he's a muslim. I see a difference. Hopefully you do too.

Gregory is referencing the religious radicalization of your military at the hands of Muhammad Zia ul Hag and its continuing legacy. How deeply this radicalization has penetrated your ISI and nuclear security forces is the question posed by Mr. Gregory.

"Nuclear weapons origin can be identified by the uranium/plutonium fuel used."

You miss the larger point-what follows after doing so? The moral dilemma for those attacked is whether to hold an entire national population culpable for the actions of a few. That, of course, pre-supposes that the means to retaliate in like manner even exists. That remains unknown until such an attack occurs. Until then, we won't know if the victim possesses the means to retaliate with nuclear weapons nor if they'll even cross the aforementioned moral rubicon.

"This whole article is BS, written just to create more fears..."

Can't create more fear than has already existed for some time in the minds of policy-makers and pundits world-wide.

"...and is full of misinformation.He generalizes the information as he does not know the exact location of the facilities.He just knows the names of the cities."

I disagree. There's no requirement to provide street addresses to these facilities and you don't actually seem to fully understand the history of these facilities yourself. If so, you'd have known of the long association of the WAH Ordnance complex with the development of your own nuclear weapons.

S2,

Mian Asad is right, Pakistan nukes facilities are not located in Wah or in Kamra, I lived in that area for 19 years .

Khuta is just a research lab , there is no dangrous material in these labs.

All nuke facilities are scattered all over the Pakistan and out of reach of enemy.

Who ever think Al Qaida may get access or control of our nukes is biggest fool of world.

ISI is very strong organisation , they change their prioirities as per need of defence .

 

[S-2]

"Mian Asad is right, Pakistan nukes facilities are not located in Wah or in Kamra, I live in that area for 19 years .

Khuta is just lab , there is no dangrous material in these labs."

Why didn't Mian Asad mention that your nuclear weapons were developed in Wah by Muhammad Hafeez Quareshi and the WAH group? Is that a lie?

Mr. Asad asserts that no reasonable soul would place a nuclear weapons facility near markets and a big population. Yet there in Wah we have a massive munitions factory...and a long history of developing your islamic nuclear warhead.

Odd.

Anyway, please write Shaun Gregory with your complaints and be sure to post both those complaints and his replies here. Perhaps even write CTC Sentinel and ask for corrections/retractions.

For myself, I've been assigned as a nuclear weapons custodian, trained on dual control procedures and PAL unlock devices, decoded nuclear authorization and targeting messages, and possessed a TS (Special Background Investigation) clearance but don't know half about America's nuclear arsenal that you guys appear to know about your own.

Impressive.

I'll look forward to your comments and Gregory's replies. He's easily tracked down. Please do so as it'll be interesting to read his replies to your assertions.

Thanks.

 

[Zulfiqar]

My suspicion is that you don't really know all that goes on inside this rather large and complex facility.

My father and many of my relatives are in military with some of those having served/presently serving in such installations.

I know of wah group and what it does but it is different. Wah has many facilities and the one getting bombed at the front gate produced explosives.It did not assemble nukes. Wah group was tasked to develop the trigger mechanism, high-speed electronics, high-explosive lenses, ultra-high precision chemical and mechanical components used in the manufacture of atomic bombs. Producing mechanical components and assembling nukes are two different things.

The author is confusing wah group(operating under PAEC) with this

Your Company Website.

This is the one whose manufacturing facility's gate was attacked.There are even foreigners in this company's board of directors.


Another thing that you fail to understand is that Pakistan has a majority population of punjabis. SO obviously the army has a punjabi majority but it does not mean that PA prefers punjabi officers for such facilities.

A close army relative of mine was posted twice in such facilities.

There are three security checks done.

1st is done by ISI.

2nd by Police.

3rd by IB (intelligence bureau).

It takes 4-6 months for the initial checks and information is updated yearly.The closer you are to weapons,the shorter the time between updates.

What you also don't know that the ratio of army guys is small in such facilities( except for ASFC which is a complete army organization).Army guys are for security,admin work and some R&D work but its mostly the civilians.

Muneer Ahmad Khan,Dr. Samar Mubarakmund and others were civilians.

NCA also has a significant part of civilian scientists in decision making authority.

You miss the larger point-what follows after doing so? The moral dilemma for those attacked is whether to hold an entire national population culpable for the actions of a few.

That still does not give the right to the author to blame the whole army by presenting a scenario(page 4) in which the army itself gives nukes to terrorists.Army would be mad enough to do it when it knows that the nukes can be traced back. The scenario is plain stupid.


The attack was done on a PAF bus(transporting officers and airmen), when it was going from the air base to kirana central depot. Kirana central depot is different from the air base. It is based in the kirana hills and kirana hills is the place which is one of the strategic locations. Why would someone put special weapons in an airbase when those weapons can be stored in ASFC guarded facilities in sargodha that has bunkers especially made to protect against any sort of attacks. Any thing more on sargodha and i may danger myself so i will not discuss sargodha.

Such storage facilities are under Army strategic force command while SPD guards other facilities.

Just to let you know, POF is guarded by DSG battalions.They are a paramilitary force but unlike FC they are almost army like(in command structure and uniform) with adequate equipment.

Wah group is obviously located in wah cantt but its not the one that was attacked.

I will love to tell you more about the difference between the both but i can't as this would damage the career of many that i know and will affect me to.

In short the author is implying that our nukes are left wide open for anyone to take over.

Heck even our prime minister or president can't visit such facilities if the decision making authority does not approve so.

 

[waraich66]

"Mian Asad is right, Pakistan nukes facilities are not located in Wah or in Kamra, I live in that area for 19 years .

Khuta is just lab , there is no dangrous material in these labs."

Why didn't Mian Asad mention that your nuclear weapons were developed in Wah by Muhammad Hafeez Quareshi and the WAH group? Is that a lie?

Mr. Asad asserts that no reasonable soul would place a nuclear weapons facility near markets and a big population. Yet there in Wah we have a massive munitions factory...and a long history of developing your islamic nuclear warhead.

Odd.

Anyway, please write Shaun Gregory with your complaints and be sure to post both those complaints and his replies here. Perhaps even write CTC Sentinel and ask for corrections/retractions.

For myself, I've been assigned as a nuclear weapons custodian, trained on dual control procedures and PAL unlock devices, decoded nuclear authorization and targeting messages, and possessed a TS (Special Background Investigation) clearance but don't know half about America's nuclear arsenal that you guys appear to know about your own.

Impressive.

I'll look forward to your comments and Gregory's replies. He's easily tracked down. Please do so as it'll be interesting to read his replies to your assertions.

Thanks.

Writer dont have basic knowledge of nuke facility and requirements, AWC or NDC can be developed at any place due to security reasons.All below major systems of nuke/missile facility can be manufactured at different place and can be assembled at any time and place so it is impossible for enemy to get control of all system/facilities or target all places with accuracy and also neither be detected by arial photo graphy.

Missile Systems
Launchers
Area Denial Bomb PSD-1
Fuel-Air Explosive Bomb FAE-1
Warheads For Anti-Armour & Tactical Applications
Energetic Materials & Propellants
Military Fuses
Power Sources
Defence-Electronics

 

[Zulfiqar]

Why didn't Mian Asad mention that your nuclear weapons were developed in Wah by Muhammad Hafeez Quareshi and the WAH group? Is that a lie?

Because there was no need for it.Why would i spill out secrets when there is no need for it.It is an open secret but it is still taboo to discuss the location of the facilities.


I will provide a map shortly.

 

[Zulfiqar]

Here is the image:

as you can see the gate(the yellow thin arrow point) is nearly thousand feet away from the nearest factory building. The gates are guarded by DSG soldiers with G-3s,MG-3s.

This is one of many factories with many factories on the side many kilometers away and away from population(see the gadwal road and what it leads to).

How does the author know that the factory near the gate is the one assembling nukes? I used to pass by that gate when i went to the nearby market. You don't build a nuke assembling facility near the gate. Munitions are a different thing.

Strategic facilities are secluded in order to keep them away from ground photo reconnaissance.
Take a look at the map and the google link and identify the nuke assembling facility if you can.


The map:

zSHARE - untitled.JPG

The google link


http://maps.google.com/maps?q=http://bbs.keyhole.com/ubb/download.php?Number=587685&t=k&om=1

 

[arslan_treen]

"Mian Asad is right, Pakistan nukes facilities are not located in Wah or in Kamra, I live in that area for 19 years .

Khuta is just lab , there is no dangrous material in these labs."

Why didn't Mian Asad mention that your nuclear weapons were developed in Wah by Muhammad Hafeez Quareshi and the WAH group? Is that a lie?

Mr. Asad asserts that no reasonable soul would place a nuclear weapons facility near markets and a big population. Yet there in Wah we have a massive munitions factory...and a long history of developing your islamic nuclear warhead.

Odd.

Anyway, please write Shaun Gregory with your complaints and be sure to post both those complaints and his replies here. Perhaps even write CTC Sentinel and ask for corrections/retractions.

For myself, I've been assigned as a nuclear weapons custodian, trained on dual control procedures and PAL unlock devices, decoded nuclear authorization and targeting messages, and possessed a TS (Special Background Investigation) clearance but don't know half about America's nuclear arsenal that you guys appear to know about your own.

Impressive.

I'll look forward to your comments and Gregory's replies. He's easily tracked down. Please do so as it'll be interesting to read his replies to your assertions.

Thanks.

sir as this article lost its credibility in the first paragraph to me as my uncle was the DG operations in wah cant and i can 1000 % assure it has nothing to do with pakistan nuclear programme it is own and run by POF and nukes are made and control by KRL NDL and NmF and other orgnisations like that so as the author dont even have a basic knowledge of the subject he is writing about so i dont have to belive to read to belive a single word he says .!!

 

[S-2]

First, it's argued that a nuclear facility wouldn't be co-located near a big population and market...

...but evidently a VERY large munitions facility has been and operates there today.

Then you admit that, yes, it WAS where your warheads were designed and developed.

B.S.? It seems not so afterall.

Next it's suggested that your absolutely egalitarian society openly embraces pashtus in many of your key nuclear security positions as, I assume from the vehemence of such defense, all your other nat'l institutions.

Then I'm reminded that Punjabis make up the bulk of your population-as though I needed reminding. Hmmm...

Then I'm reminded, rhetorically, that Islamic extremists exist in the east amidst Punjab.

Ah, but they aren't engaged in attempting to dismantle Pakistan. They are directed by your state against India and appear quite disciplined to do so. OTOH, those in the west, as Mr. Gregory suggests, are engaged in exactly such and likely possess an interest-thus a threat- to these facilities located away from India many years ago before such a militant threat emerged.

No comment.

Fundamentalist asserts that the writer doesn't know about basic component separation. Not so. Gregory clearly mentions separation of components in the article as a defensive precaution by your security procedures.

Mian Asad suggests that the gate attack couldn't possibly have been directed at a nuclear facility within the Wah complex as it's quite large and likely very far from the gate. Thus you don't build nuclear components, etc. right near the gate. Too accessible.

Fair enough. Where does the author suggest that the target of this attack was, specifically, the nuclear elements of the facility? Thanks, btw, for implying in your comments that SOMEWHERE inside this facility such related work is going on.

More relevant was the fact that this overall facility had been selected for attack. Clearly the forces committed to such were in no way capable of over-running, securing, clearing, seizing, and transporting away whatever might be found there...

...this time. Gregory's interest was in merely noting that this facility had, indeed, been recently targeted and, therefore, might be again with a more determined purpose in mind.

The author makes clear the concerns about rogue elements within your military or intelligence services that MIGHT be prepared to assist an extremist seizure of such weaponry. Nowhere does he assert that such is likely nor reflective of your institutions in their entirety.

Still, to suggest that these elements don't exist either in an active or retired capacity would be arrogant. We know of the arrest last April of a former army major who was caught on a motorway in Islamabad attempting to transport a kidnapped individual to the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan on behalf of, IIRC, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.

I'll look forward to the transcripts of your conversations with Mr. Gregory...if you've the guts to challenge his assertions. He's easily found and can be reached by e-mail here-

mailto:s.r.gregory@bradford.ac.uk.

Please do so that we may read his thoughts.

I hope you prepare your arguments better with him than here. Far too much back-tracking on the facts for my tastes. His too, I suspect.

Good luck.

Meanwhile, let's not forget the other two articles about Pakistan included in this issue.

Thanks.

 

[Patriot]

Our first 2 Chief of Army Staff who ruled Pakistan for more then 10 years were Pushtuns themselves (General Ayub Khan, General Yahya Khan) then our ISI Chief during General Zia was a Pushtun who served as DG ISI for several years (General Akthar Abdur Rehman)...There are huge number of Pushtuns in our security establishment and it would be stupid to say that they're all extremists.Yes, they might be Islamic so what?What's wrong with being a good muslim...?Arrogant bastards..I can't wait to see the day US Army returns to US with a huge defeat..(Will probably be blamed on Pakistan)...As far as Punjabi Domination is concerned..well, Punjabis are 70% of total Pakistan's Population yet Pushtuns reached top slots in Pakistan Security Establishment.
Here's the exact date
Ayub Khan (Pushtun)
In office
27 October 1958 – 25 March 1969 President as well as Pakistan Chief of Army Staff
Yahya KHan
In office
25 March 1969 – 20 December 1971 Ruled President as well as Pakistan Army COAS
General Akther Abdur Rehman (Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence
1980 – 1987 AND Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee
1987 – 1988) Another Pushtun
AQ Khan (Pakistan Top Nuclear Scientist and another Pushtun.
General Rahimuddin Khan- Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee
1984 - 1988 Martial Law Administrator of Balochistan
1977 - 1984

There are a lot more examples but i think these are enough.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

I'll look forward to the transcripts of your conversations with Mr. Gregory...if you've the guts to challenge his assertions. He's easily found and can be reached by e-mail here-

No need to flame.

Some of Gregory's assertions can be challenged based on what he has written, and correlated with known facts, and have been here.

 

[Zulfiqar]

First, it's argued that a nuclear facility wouldn't be co-located near a big population and market...

...but evidently a VERY large munitions facility has been and operates there today.

Then you admit that, yes, it WAS where your warheads were designed and developed.

Munitions factory is different then a nuke assembly plant. I agree that we have a munitions factory,so what.Do you expect us to move a population of 500,000(the population of wah cantt is 500,000 including families e.t.c e.t.c).

Wah Group obviously exists in wah but as you have now seen the map.It can be any where in wah.Much security is in place in order to protect such facilities. The whole wah is surrounded by anti-tank barricades(those pyramid like structures) so vehicles can pass through only three main points into wah.Large scale attack is impossible.The militants really don't know where the weapons are being produced and wah group mainly produces mechanical components. What proof does he have that nukes are assembled there? Making some components and assembling nukes are two different things.

The last thing that the militants want is to attack a strategic facility surrounded by an ordinance factory with help from nearby taxila(tanks anyone), and rawalpindi (home of 10 corp). PA finished the operation in manawan lahore in less than eight hours( a police academy).Do you really think that the army will not protect such important facilities.

Fair enough. Where does the author suggest that the target of this attack was, specifically, the nuclear elements of the facility?

The very first error.

Next it's suggested that your absolutely egalitarian society openly embraces pashtus in many of your key nuclear security positions as, I assume from the vehemence of such defense, all your other nat'l institutions.

Then I'm reminded that Punjabis make up the bulk of your population-as though I needed reminding. Hmmm...

Your argument does not make sense.Punjabis make up the bulk of population so naturally they are in majority in the army.As you can see the list of the generals,many are pushtuns.I can quote many more.

The author makes clear the concerns about rogue elements within your military or intelligence services that MIGHT be prepared to assist an extremist seizure of such weaponry. Nowhere does he assert that such is likely nor reflective of your institutions in their entirety.

Page 4.Read this paragraph.

The final risk, and one that is usually overlooked, is that the Pakistan Army could itself decide to transfer nuclear weapons to a terrorist group. One argument for this, described in Philip Bobbitt’s Terror and Consent is that states can become pressurized or incentivized to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorist groups because they are responding to threats from an external power but fear the consequences of being identified as the origin of a nuclear strike. In

BTW the attack on Kamra was on a children school bus belonging to PAC( which manufactures aircrafts).


The author should first see how secure US nuclear facilities are.Last time i checked a couple of cruise missiles with nuclear warhead were unaccounted for 36 hours.


And i don't support lashker-e-jhangvi or others.I am just trying to say that groups of extremists are every where.We can't just dismantle all of our program and install it at the very end of Pakistan.