ColdWarContainment
The Cold War
Political Map in the Cold War Era (Encarta)
Cold War is the term used to describe the various political, social and military clashes between the United States and Soviet Union from 1945 to 1991. In the aftermath of World War II, a polarization existed between the worlds preeminent superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Differences in ideology created a rift between the capitalist, democratic West and the communist East. The defeat of Germany and Japan and the devastation of continental Europe created an environment in which Soviet and American influence struggled for supremacy. In addition, the destabilization of traditional European powers led to decolonization and the creation of a new Third World, leading to the formation of potential allies and enemies for both sides.
American Policy and Ideology
The Iron Curtain: Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchills The Sinews of Peace speech was delivered in Fulton, Missouri in March 1946. "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an 'iron curtain' has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe...all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow," said Churchill. [1] Churchill's allusions created a strong image of a European continent polarized between East and West, with the former dominated by the Soviet Union. In some areas, most notably Germany, a physical barrier did exist, but the strength of the metaphor expanded the concept into ideological terms. Churchill urged for Anglo-American cooperation to combat this threat, and particularly the expansion of the Eastern territory.
Truman Doctrine: When a civil war erupted in Greece in 1947 (a client government of Great Britain), Truman articulated the reasoning behind U.S. intervention: I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. [2] Truman utilized this doctrine by equating these "outside pressures" with the Soviet forces, and immediately sent aid to Greece.
Containment: George Kennan is credited with the introduction of the term containment in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs, in which he stated that American counterforce in the face of Soviet expansion would bring about a mellowing in Soviet policy. [2] Journalist Walter Lippmann rejected the practice (a strategic monstrosity) in his book The Cold War, as it did not distinguish vital areas from those on the periphery of U.S. interests, essentially making the entire world a viable environment for the policy. However, the idea of containment remained at the forefront of U.S. policy during the Cold War, and Kennan himself used it as a motivation for the Marshall Plan.
Marshall Plan: From 1948 1951, the U.S. sent $12.4 billion to Western Europe in an effort to create economic stability in the region. This massive effort emphasized the importance of the region, as it contained Americas most powerful allies (Britain, France) and initially, Europe remained the forefront of the Cold War. While countries that participated in the program had no financial obligations to the U.S., they had to be members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, which erased tariffs and other trade barriers in the regions that participated. While the Soviet Bloc was offered the same aid in return for political reform and some economic control, this compromise clashed with Soviet policy. Stalin responded by forbidding Eastern European satellites from accepting aid, and created Cominform, an international communist agency, reinforcing the image of a monolithic Soviet region.
National Security Act: In July 1947, the Office of Secretary of Defense (eventually renamed the Department of Defense in 1949) was created by President Truman, overseeing the armed forces, National Security Council, and Central Intelligence Agency.
This office expanded executive power, and alongside the CIA, a precedent for covert, unpublicized diplomacy and military efforts was established.
Nuclear Proliferation: Following the atomic (fission) bombings of Japan at the end of World War II, the U.S. was the only atomic superpower. However, in September 1949, the Soviet Union successfully detonated an atomic bomb. In April 1950, a secret document entitled NSC-68 was issued by a study group chaired by Paul Nitze, which recommended an enlarged military budget. This lead to a massive stockpile of bombs, both atomic and conventional, by both the American and Soviet governments. In 1950, Truman began production of a hydrogen (fusion) bomb, the first of which, based on a design by Edward Teller and Stanislaw Ulam, was successfully detonated in 1952. The Soviets used a fusion design developed by Andrei Sakharov and Vitaly Ginzburg, first tested in 1953.
Brinksmanship: Einsenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, advocated the policy of brinksmanship, which he described in an article published in Life Magazine as "the ability to get to the verge without getting into the war." [2] Coupled with the existing arms buildup, the Eisenhower administration suggested a willingness to bring the nation to the verge of virtually suicidal nuclear war in a crisis, while still citing that "mutual assured destruction" would prove a strong enough deterrent. Critics blame this policy as another factor that promoted continued hostile relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Domino Theory: Popularized by Eisenhower, domino theory was an extension of containment policy, proposing that that a nation that fell to communism would lead to destabilization in the region, particularly without United States intervention. This would theoretically lead to the spread of communism surrounding nations. While the trend was initially focused on Europe, it soon formed the basis of U.S. strategy in Asia.
Korean War (1950 - 1953)
Military Map of Korea
Origins
1949 saw a drastic change in the balance of power in Asia, leading to newfound U.S. scrutiny in the region. In September, Chinese communist forces, led by Mao Zedong, swiftly defeated nationalist forces, led by the U.S.-backed Jiang Jieshi, who fled to Taiwan. Although the connection between Beijing and Moscow was tentative, the U.S. refused to diplomatically acknowledge the new Chinese government until 1979, believing it to be a part of an international communist force. This development also prompted the rhetoric Who lost China? leading to U.S. foreign policy to focus on Asia, particularly Indochina. [2]
On June 25th, 1950 North Korean troops moved into South Korea, beginning a conflict that would last until 1953. The two nations had been divided after Japan, which had colonized the nation beginning in 1910, was defeated in World War II. While the Americans had armed the South and the Soviets had armed the north, North Koreas leader Kim Il Sung had only minor support for the attack from Stalin. However, the United States passed a U.N. resolution to deploy troops in response to the perceived act of Soviet-sponsored aggression.
American Action
Truman did not seek congressional approval for a declaration of war, and the Korean War remains classified as police action. General Douglas MacArthur commanded U.N. coalition forces, 40% of whom were South Koreans and 50% of whom were Americans. Initially, these forces were defeated and pushed to the southern Pusan perimeter. However, an amphibious landing at Inchon on September 15, 1950 pushed North Korean troops back to the 38th parallel. An invasion against North Korea began in October, transforming the conflict from a reiteration of containment into a U.S. offensive. While the Soviets did not respond to the attack, the Chinese assaulted coalition forces on October 25th near the Yalu River, driving the Americans back. A stalemate set in, and MacArthur's vocal support for an invasion of China led to his dismissal.
Conclusion
Armistice talks began in July 1951, but disagreements over the return of prisoners of war prevented a settlement for two years. The question of where prisoners would be sent was particularly controversial, especially when both sides used "re-education" and brainwashing techniques on such individuals. A lack of success in resolving the conflict was one of the factors leading to the 1952 election of Eisenhower as president, who fulfilled a campaign promise to visit Korea in an attempt to end the conflict on November 29, 1952.
Eventually, neutral nations mediated the return of POWs, who were given the choice between remaining in their country of their captivity or returning home. An armistice was signed on July 27, 1953. A demilitarized zone was established along the 38th parallel, and Korea remains divided to this day. The war cost 54,246 American lives and almost 5 million Asian lives, along with a $69.5 billion American bill, making it one of the costliest wars in modern history. [2] However, the Korean War is occasionally called the "forgotten war," and the ability of the executive to wage an undeclared war was undiminished.
Vietnam War (1959 - 1975)
Military Map of Vietnam
Origins
Vietnam was a French colony until Japans control during World War II. Following Japanese defeat, the French attempted to recolonize the country, opposing indigenous nationalist forces, the most prominent being the Viet Minh, headed by Ho Chi Minh, who had spent time in Moscow and had ties to Cominterm. The United States initially remained neutral, seeing the conflict as a war of decolonization, but the outbreak of the Korean War changed their position. The U.S. began publicly aiding France in 1950, avoiding direct U.S. troop involvement, but granting financial and logistical support to its ally. France was seen as a vital stabilizing force on the European continent, and thus the U.S. was obliged to lend some aid. Vietnam was also seen as a new environment for containment, as it was feared that a Viet Minh victory would lead to communist, and therefore Soviet, dominance of Southeast Asia.
Despite these efforts, the Viet Minh succeeded in expelling the French in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, in which the U.S. refused to provide aid. By contrast, the Viet Minh soldiers were equipped with heavy artillery of Russian and Chinese origin, which enabled them to destroy much of the fort. In the subsequent Geneva Conference of 1954, Vietnam was partitioned into a socialist North Vietnam, headed by the Viet Minh, and a nominally Republican South Vietnam, ruled by Bao Dai. The 17th parallel was developed as a demilitarized buffer zone, which divided the two nations. However, this division was temporal, and the Geneva Accords promised free elections in 1956 to establish a united Vietnam. Thus, the potential for a communist government with authority over the entire country was not completely diminished, unlike the more permanent schism in Korea.
Ngo Dinh Diem
The Self-Immolation of Thich Quang Duc
Ngo Dinh Diem was prime minister under Bao Dai, who soon abdicated his throne. Diem became the established leader of South Vietnam from 1955-1963 following a rigged election with results that were mathematically impossible. Diem rejected the democratic elections promised by the Geneva Accords in 1956, reasoning that South Vietnam had never ratified the agreement. While Diem's active anti-Communism made him a strong U.S. ally, his regime was marked by internal strife and corruption. As both a Roman Catholic and authoritarian leader, Diem alienated the Buddhists, who made up approximately 90% of the population. This opposition coalesced in 1963 when Buddhist flags were prohibited from display, culminating in June with the self-immolation of a Buddhist monk, Thich Quang Duc. Another contentious issue was the actions of Diems younger brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, head of the secret police and a controversial figure. These harsh policies led to the popularization of the National Liberation Front in 1960, a group of guerrilla fighters that became one of the major sources of insurgency, later known as the Viet Cong.
Although the U.S. began to have doubts in the face of mounting opposition and lack of political progress, they continued supporting Diem until 1963, when U.S. officials communicated that they would not oppose a change in regime. A military coup headed by General Duong Van Minh succeeded in 1963, assassinating Diem and Nhu on November 2. This further destabilized South Vietnam, as the various military juntas that followed were unsucessful at maintaining authority. The assassination of President Kennedy in November 22, 1963 led to an American transition of power, with Lyndon B. Johnson becoming president. [3]
The Gulf of Tonkin and U.S. Entanglement
Johnson continued the middle ground policy of supporting the South Vietnam financially but avoiding direct military involvement. But in 1964, a U.S. destroyer was involved in an engagement with three North Vietnamese torpedo ships, and a second attack was later reported, although never substantiated. "[Officials] did not knowingly lie about the alleged attacks, but they were obviously in a mood to retaliate and they seem to have selected from the evidence available to them those parts that confirmed what they wanted to believe," writes George Herring. [3] This led to an escalation of the war, as Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in the wake of the attack, granting authority to the president authority to use military force in the area, despite the absence of a formal declaration of war. The House voting unanimously in favor of the measure, and the Senate passed the resolution in a vote of 88-2. One dissenter, Senator Ernest Gruening of Alaska, articulated an early example of the anti-war position, saying, We have been supporting corrupt and unpopular dictatorships which owe their temporary sojourn in power to our massive support, picking up the burden abandoned by France instead of embracing anti-imperialism. Gruening saw no threat to our national security...Vietnam is not worth the life of a single American boy, echoing the thoughts of historical anti-imperialists.
Despite these misgivings, commitment of U.S. troops and wholesale bombing engagements began, and escalation of the conflict began in full force. Although very destructive, these efforts were not particularly effective in breaking the Viet Cong, who proved to be very resilient, relying on tactics of guerrilla warfare and the Ho Chi Minh Trail to relay supplies. Meanwhile, Johnson still relied on a middle ground, favoring increased bombings over raising U.S. troop levels (and therefore potential for casualties). Furthermore, he often obscured the extent of U.S. involvement to the American public, believing that domestic opposition would be an obstacle for his Great Society programs.
H.W. Brands denounces this practice: Johnsons war was Vietnam, and because he approached it like a legislator he fumbled it terribly. He split the difference between those...that demanded rapid withdrawal, and those that insisted on unleashing the military to get the job done. The via media, that golden rule of legislative success, ran straight into the quagmire that eventually consumed Johnsons presidency.
Nguyen Van Thieu came into power in 1967, establishing executive stability. A lull in the fighting was broken by the Tet Offensive of 1968, in which the major cities of South Vietnam were assaulted. While the insurgents were all eventually repulsed, the concentration of the attacks hurt morale and public opinion, reinforcing the perception that progress was not occurring. Although tentative peace talks began, they did not progress until an exhausted Johnson, who rejected a nomination for a second term, was succeeded by Richard Nixon in office in 1969. [3]
Nixon, Kissinger and Vietnamization
Upon assuming power, Nixon promised peace with honor, a vague term that encompassed a desire to end the Vietnam conflict while preserving U.S. interests and prestige. Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger also faced mounting domestic opposition from the American public and the Democrat-controlled Congress, adopting ethically questionable practices that included wiretaps. [4]
Nixon eventually popularized the practice of Vietnamization, in which the South Vietnamese were trained to stand on their own, along with the gradual reduction in U.S. forces. Although a seemingly fresh approach, Nixon was merely continuing much of the same middle ground policy of his predecessors. Furthermore, Nixon expanded the conflict by bombing Cambodia in April 1970, and an investigation of the Symington subcommittee into U.S. military assistance to Laos revealed more evidence of clandestine action. These findings transformed the attitude of Congress towards presidential authority, culminating in the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1971, and the passage of the War Powers Act of 1973, which limited the ability of the executive to wage war.
Yet the Vietnam War dragged onwards. Ironically, Nixon enjoyed some of his greatest foreign policy triumphs by pursuing détente with the Soviet Union and opening relations with China, despite continuing what was a nominally anti-communist conflict in Vietnam. On the strength of these diplomatic victories, as well as reduced U.S. troop levels and a cessation of the draft, Nixon won a landslide victory against anti-war presidential challenger George McGovern in 1972.
The Paris Peace Accords were signed on January 23, 1973, putting an official end to the conflict. A cease-fire was declared, but North Vietnam forces were allowed to remain in the South, with the expectation of national elections. American POWs were returned and forces withdrew. It became quickly apparent that U.S. support was essential to the survival of the Southern regime, and the complete withdrawal of U.S. ground troops lead to the rapid collapse of the Saigon government, with Saigon itself falling on April 30, 1975. It was the first conclusive defeat in American military history.
Civilians Evacuate Saigon
Aftermath
The Vietnam War remains a bitterly controversial and divisive conflict. Following the collapse of South Vietnam, neighboring countries did not fall to communism, essentially disproving the Domino Theory. The conflict can be seen as one of the remnants of Cold War policy that subsequently fell into disfavor, particularly as relations with the Soviet Union and China improved. The role of the U.S. during the conflict can also be aligned with previous acts of imperialism, particularly in its support of what was a client (if not outright puppet) government. The war proved that even the worlds greatest superpower has its political, military and economic limits: Congress and the American people publicly opposed the war effort, the superiority of the U.S. army and air force did not lead to victory, and the financial cost of the war lead to a great deficit.
While the wars justification remains ambiguous, its lessons are abundantly clear.
The Vietnam Memorial, Washington D.C.
