Chinese Flanker Family: J-11, J-16 ... Su-27SK/UBK, Su-30MKK
- Thread starter Max The Boss
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I actually think that based on recent exercise results, J-10 and J-11 production should cease within 5 years. The only Flanker variant worth further developing is one designed for EW (Electronic Warfare) in support of J-20 and J-31, similar to American EA-18G.
Think about it. J-20 scored at least a dozen "kills" against a mixed force of J-11B and Su-35 supported by KJ-500, while losing only a single plane. The J-20s were carrying Luneburg lens to increase their radar signature already. Anymore resources poured into a program that has already been rendered obsolete is unwise.
Think about it. J-20 scored at least a dozen "kills" against a mixed force of J-11B and Su-35 supported by KJ-500, while losing only a single plane. The J-20s were carrying Luneburg lens to increase their radar signature already. Anymore resources poured into a program that has already been rendered obsolete is unwise.
Genesis
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Well, the thing is J-20 isn't ready, would it reach full operation potential in 10 years? Very hard to say. WS-15 still not even tested on a bird. Even if WS-15 is good to go right now, I doubt 10 years is a realistic expectation, all things considered.
It's one thing for it to do well in games, which it should considering the same people that made J-20 are the same that made the J-10s. However, even America waited for F-22 to enter into any actual missions, and that too in a low intensity capacity.
America's numbers game is still significantly higher, China's J-10 and Flanker series are entering a good place right now, and an overwhelming number of them as support would give China a decisive edge in our immediate neighborhoods.
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https://weibo.com/tv/v/G5dq83frp?fid=1034:1aa015126230197abfe99a0afb1c746c
J-16s deployed in Chongqing with a PLAAF unit under the Western Theatre Command.
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siegecrossbow
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A J-20 with even interim engines is way superior than a J-10 or J-16.
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"空军发布" means PLAAF post.
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It is "雾都(Smog City)雄鹰(Eagle)", which means ChongQing's Eagle. The PLAAF 33th Air Division, 98th fighter regiment.
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How the Su-27 Became China’s Favorite Fighter Jet
The Flanker served as a test platform for later designs
WIB AIR March 12, 2018 Charlie Gao
China52
The Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker was never planned for export when it was originally developed, unlike its lighter cousin, the MiG-29. However, ever since being approved for export it has been one of the most popular fighters in the Asian region. The first customer for the Su-27 was China, which secured a procurement deal while the Soviet Union still existed. But how did Beijing accomplish this?
The beginning of the Su-27’s export success began with the Sino-Soviet thaw in 1989. During Gorbachev’s visit to China in May 1989, motions were made to reopen Sino-Soviet military trade. This was followed by an interview published in a magazine in September 1989 that stated that there would be no political obstacle to China acquiring MiG-29 fighter aircraft.
In May 1990, a Chinese delegation visited the Soviet Union to discuss the acquisition of advanced aircraft. This delegation saw demonstrations of the MiG-29, Su-27 and various helicopters.
The Soviet handlers attempted to push the MiG-29 onto the Chinese delegation, pointing at the long history of Chinese adoption and adaptation of MiG aircraft. However, after seeing the demonstrations, the Chinese delegation wanted the Su-27. Reasons cited were the larger combat radius of the Su-27, the advanced fly-by-wire system — compared to the MiG-29’s simple hydraulic controls — and the superior performance of the engines in the Su-27 in both raw power and operational life.
This would provide the best platform on which future upgrades could be built, a modern “base” on which the next generation of Chinese tactical aircraft would draw from.
Given the significant Chinese modernization and upgrade programs for the MiG-21 — or J-7 in Chinese service — that were necessitated by the long Sino-Soviet split, the Chinese industrial base has had significant experience modifying and improving Soviet designs.
Chinese leadership probably felt that the Sukhoi’s superlative aerodynamic capabilities and large airframe made it the most suitable for such experimentation and upgrades, compared to the MiG.
Above — Chinese museum MiGs in Beijing. Photo via Wikimedia. At top — a Chinese J-11. U.S. Air Force photo
While the Soviets resisted, the economic troubles of that era probably lead them to greenlight the Chinese procurement of the Su-27. Chinese sources point more to a spirit of brotherly cooperation and a need to make amends following the long period of chilly relations, but an economic incentive seems more likely.
Following negotiations in the winter of 1990, China signed an agreement to purchase 24 Su-27SK and Su-27UBK fighters — K indicating Kitai, meaning China. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, Pres. Boris Yeltsin continued to honor this arrangement, and the first fighters were delivered on June 27, 1992.
But this was not enough for China. Realizing the dire economic straits Russia faced in the 1990s, China pushed for technology transfer of the Su-27, including the full production line. This, too, was agreed on in 1995. China then began licensed production of the Su-27 as the J-11.
This strategy appears to have paid off in spades for China, as apparently one of the original goals of the Su-27 adoption was to have an advanced “chassis” on which Chinese technology could be adopted and developed.
We can see this in spades in the myriad of versions of the J-11 China has put out in recent years. The J-11B features AESA radars, composite components, Chinese glass cockpits and Chinese engines.
The J-16D represents a Chinese attempt to make an EW aircraft similar to the EA-18G “Growler.” Unlike India, which opened the MMRCA program to find a multi-role fighter aircraft because it deemed its Su-30MKIs as incapable of being true multiroles, the J-11 can employ a wide variety of Chinese ground-attack munitions, including Chinese versions of the American Small Diameter Bomb.
Russian equipment has been steadily replaced, from the oxygen generators to the radar warning receivers.
Despite these advances, China continues to acquire Russian jets, though this is largely in order to acquire technologies in the latest versions of the Flanker, the Su-35. China acquired these aircraft in December 2015. Supposedly, the primary item of interest is the improved engines in these aircraft, following China’s failure to get a license to produce that specific part and its own difficulties in producing clones of the original Su-27SK engines for the J-11.
Regardless, the reasons for China’s adoption of the Su-27 stand — Beijing wanted the top-performing fighter with the best technology from which it could learn, and got it.
This article originally appeared at The National Interest.
The Flanker served as a test platform for later designs
WIB AIR March 12, 2018 Charlie Gao
China52
The Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker was never planned for export when it was originally developed, unlike its lighter cousin, the MiG-29. However, ever since being approved for export it has been one of the most popular fighters in the Asian region. The first customer for the Su-27 was China, which secured a procurement deal while the Soviet Union still existed. But how did Beijing accomplish this?
The beginning of the Su-27’s export success began with the Sino-Soviet thaw in 1989. During Gorbachev’s visit to China in May 1989, motions were made to reopen Sino-Soviet military trade. This was followed by an interview published in a magazine in September 1989 that stated that there would be no political obstacle to China acquiring MiG-29 fighter aircraft.
In May 1990, a Chinese delegation visited the Soviet Union to discuss the acquisition of advanced aircraft. This delegation saw demonstrations of the MiG-29, Su-27 and various helicopters.
The Soviet handlers attempted to push the MiG-29 onto the Chinese delegation, pointing at the long history of Chinese adoption and adaptation of MiG aircraft. However, after seeing the demonstrations, the Chinese delegation wanted the Su-27. Reasons cited were the larger combat radius of the Su-27, the advanced fly-by-wire system — compared to the MiG-29’s simple hydraulic controls — and the superior performance of the engines in the Su-27 in both raw power and operational life.
This would provide the best platform on which future upgrades could be built, a modern “base” on which the next generation of Chinese tactical aircraft would draw from.
Given the significant Chinese modernization and upgrade programs for the MiG-21 — or J-7 in Chinese service — that were necessitated by the long Sino-Soviet split, the Chinese industrial base has had significant experience modifying and improving Soviet designs.
Chinese leadership probably felt that the Sukhoi’s superlative aerodynamic capabilities and large airframe made it the most suitable for such experimentation and upgrades, compared to the MiG.
Above — Chinese museum MiGs in Beijing. Photo via Wikimedia. At top — a Chinese J-11. U.S. Air Force photoWhile the Soviets resisted, the economic troubles of that era probably lead them to greenlight the Chinese procurement of the Su-27. Chinese sources point more to a spirit of brotherly cooperation and a need to make amends following the long period of chilly relations, but an economic incentive seems more likely.
Following negotiations in the winter of 1990, China signed an agreement to purchase 24 Su-27SK and Su-27UBK fighters — K indicating Kitai, meaning China. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, Pres. Boris Yeltsin continued to honor this arrangement, and the first fighters were delivered on June 27, 1992.
But this was not enough for China. Realizing the dire economic straits Russia faced in the 1990s, China pushed for technology transfer of the Su-27, including the full production line. This, too, was agreed on in 1995. China then began licensed production of the Su-27 as the J-11.
This strategy appears to have paid off in spades for China, as apparently one of the original goals of the Su-27 adoption was to have an advanced “chassis” on which Chinese technology could be adopted and developed.
We can see this in spades in the myriad of versions of the J-11 China has put out in recent years. The J-11B features AESA radars, composite components, Chinese glass cockpits and Chinese engines.
The J-16D represents a Chinese attempt to make an EW aircraft similar to the EA-18G “Growler.” Unlike India, which opened the MMRCA program to find a multi-role fighter aircraft because it deemed its Su-30MKIs as incapable of being true multiroles, the J-11 can employ a wide variety of Chinese ground-attack munitions, including Chinese versions of the American Small Diameter Bomb.
Russian equipment has been steadily replaced, from the oxygen generators to the radar warning receivers.
Despite these advances, China continues to acquire Russian jets, though this is largely in order to acquire technologies in the latest versions of the Flanker, the Su-35. China acquired these aircraft in December 2015. Supposedly, the primary item of interest is the improved engines in these aircraft, following China’s failure to get a license to produce that specific part and its own difficulties in producing clones of the original Su-27SK engines for the J-11.
Regardless, the reasons for China’s adoption of the Su-27 stand — Beijing wanted the top-performing fighter with the best technology from which it could learn, and got it.
This article originally appeared at The National Interest.
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