What's new

China-Russia Strategic Partnership: News and Analyses

Russia-China ties beyond "strategic partnership": Putin

(Xinhua) December 24, 2016

MOSCOW, Dec. 23 (Xinhua) -- Russia and China have established in recent years a relationship that is more than a simple strategic partnership, which will be further promoted, Russian President Vladimir Putin said Friday at his annual year-end press conference.

China is our biggest trade and economic partner, even though there has been some decline caused in part by objective circumstances, primarily lower energy product prices, he said.

Moreover, the two sides have made joint efforts to diversify their cooperation, with major projects launched in the fields of aviation, infrastructure, space and atomic energy.

He congratulate China on its currency yuan joining the International Monetary Fund's basket of reserve currencies, which he said would benefit bilateral economic relations.

As Russia and China share common positions on many issues at the global arena, Putin believed that the two countries will continue to be serious stabilizing elements on all international affairs.
 
The following is from the Russian side. It basically confirmed what Xinhua has said.

========
‘More Than a Simple Strategic Partnership’: Putin Hails Relations With China
15:11 24.12.2016 (updated 15:14 24.12.2016)

During his end-of-the-year press conference on Friday, President Putin described Russia’s relations with China as more than just a strategic partnership. In an interview with Sputnik China, Moscow-based political analyst Alexander Lomanov took a closer look at the relations between the two countries.

“China maintains strategic partnerships with many countries, but President Putin wanted to underscore China’s very special relationship with Russia, which is more close and constructive than what it has with other countries,” Alexander Lomanov told Sputnik China.

He described this strategic partnership as one of mutual trust, all-embracing and looking to the future. “Relations between our countries have gone far beyond the one [Presidents] Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin agreed on 20 years ago.” During Friday’s press conference Vladimir Putin congratulated Russia’s “Chinese friends” with the yuan now being used by the IMF as a reserve currency. In an interview with Sputnik China, Alexander Larin, an expert at the Institute of the Far East in Moscow, hailed China’s success is reshaping the global financial system and implementing economic reforms.

“Economic growth is a major priority for China. Despite a recent slowdown, the Chinese government’s economic strategy, based on the profound knowledge of how the economy works, has yielded good results increasing the country’s prestige and global interest in its economic model,” he said.

He mentioned the Silk Road Economic Belt and other major economic projects now being implemented by the People’s Republic, and the yuan’s new status of a global exchange currency as graphic proof of China’s economic progress.

This has a big impact on the global financial system, which begs to be reformed, and the IMF’s decision to include the yuan in its currency basket is a quantum leap forward,” Alexander Larin noted.

President Putin described the two countries’ shared views on global affairs as a major stabilizing factor and held out hope for closer mutually-beneficial cooperation between Moscow and Beijing.

Alexei Mukhin, director of the Center of Political Information in Moscow, mentioned Barack Obama’s onetime idea to set up a G2 – a proposed informal special relationship between the US and China.

Russia has de-facto replaced the US in this informal G2 by establishing a strategic political and economic alliance with Beijing. I think that this is exactly what Putin had in mind when speaking about Russian-Chinese relations,” Mukhin said.

“What he also had in mind is our countries’ coordinated position at the UN Security Council, on the situation in the Middle East, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was aimed against China — a threat our two countries managed to avert by acting together,” Alexei Mukhin added.

Feng Shaolei, director of the Academy of International Relations and Regional Development at Guangdong University, China, said that Putin’s attention to socioeconomic issues during his press conference meant that Russia will stick to a cool-headed policy to ensure Russia’s consistent economic and social progress.

“Putin made clear his intention to build up Russian nuclear deterrent. He also seems to expect that Donald Trump’s arrival at the White House will help mend fences with Washington,” Feng Shaolei said.

He added that despite his stated desire to seek negotiated solutions to existing problems, Putin would stick to a consistent and principled position on such sensitive issues as the Ukrainian crisis and relations with Georgia.

“My overall impression from the four-hour press conference is that the Russia is emerging from the crisis and is now toeing a balanced and careful line in domestic and foreign policy,” Feng Shaolei noted.

He also mentioned Vladimir Putin’s praise for China’s economic growth and the yuan’s new status of a global reserve currency.

“President Putin spoke about our joint design and construction of long- and medium-range airliners and the high degree of interaction now existing between our countries, which he said ‘we value and hope to continue developing,’” Feng Shaolei said.

In a marathon press conference on Friday that lasted for almost four hours, President Vladimir Putin covered a wide range of issues, including the state of the Russian economy, the modernization of the country's military, its defense spending, sanctions, the new arms race, as well as the country's foreign policy.

Read more: https://sputniknews.com/asia/201612241048958405-putin-china-experts/
 
China Russia’s Main Partner, Level of Trust Between Beijing, Moscow High
1048487641.jpg


https://sputniknews.com/politics/201612131048487583-china-russia-partnership-putin/
 
China welcomes Putin's comment on bilateral ties
Source: Xinhua 2016-12-26 18:50:38

BEIJING, Dec. 26 (Xinhua) -- China on Monday welcomed Russian President Vladimir Putin's comment on the two countries' relations at his annual year-end press conference.

Russia and China have a relationship that is more than a simple strategic partnership, which will be further promoted, Putin said during his annual press conference.

"China highly appreciates the positive attitude in developing bilateral ties by the Russian side," spokesperson Hua Chunying said Monday at a daily press briefing.

Currently, the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination is at a historic high, she said, adding that the two countries' all-round cooperation not only brings benefits to the two countries and two peoples, but also contributes to world prosperity and stability.

"Strategic coordination between China and Russia, which goes beyond bilateral level, serves as the ballast to safeguarding world peace and stability," she said.

China stands ready to work with Russia to continue consolidating and developing their comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination, so as to safeguard regional and world peace, security and stability, Hua said.
 
People say Sino-US relation is the most important one in the world, i say Sino-Russia is a hidden gem that these people tend to overlook :D Besides we know that the diablo is targeting both China and Russia. A common enemy threatening us will only drive us closer. The diablo should keep it up :enjoy:
 
Xi, Putin exchange New Year greetings
(Xinhua) 15:53, December 31, 2016

BEIJING, Dec. 31 (Xinhua) -- Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on Saturday exchanged congratulatory messages on the coming New Year.

On behalf of the Chinese government and the Chinese people, Xi extended sincere greetings and good wishes to President Putin and the Russian people.

The two countries marked the 15th anniversary of the China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation and the 20th anniversary of the China-Russia strategic partnership of coordination in 2016.

Taking the anniversaries as an opportunity, Xi said China and Russia have carried forward the concept of friendship between the two peoples from generation to generation, enhanced communication and cooperation in various fields and coordination in international affairs, thus led the development of bilateral ties with new fruitful results.

Xi pointed out that the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination has been an important force in promoting peace, development and stability in the region and the world.

In the new year, the Chinese president said he is willing to continue to make joint efforts with Putin in maintaining close high-level bilateral exchanges, consolidating strategic and mutual trust, promoting the Belt and Road construction and alignment with the Eurasian Economic Union, deepening practical cooperation and successfully holding the media exchange year.

China will also work with Russia to strengthen strategic coordination in international affairs and keep the stable, sustained and high-level development of their comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination, so as to bring benefits to the two peoples, Xi said.

Putin congratulated President Xi on the coming New Year and the Spring Festival in his message, and wished the Chinese people happiness and health.

In 2016, the president said, Russia and China have carried out effective collaboration as always.

The two sides successfully implemented the third program under the Russia-China Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, and effectively pushed for resolving major global and regional issues with coordination and collaboration, Putin said.

The president said he believes that in the coming New Year, the Russia-China comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination will further flourish, which will benefit the two peoples and contribute to strengthening international security and stability.
 
Opinion from the Strategic Culture Foundation (Russian language think tank) about Eurasian integration and a multi-polar world order. While not solely about China-Russia's partnership, I think its nonetheless relevant as it forms the basis for the shared geopolitical vision of Russia (EEU) and China (OBOR).

How a United Iran, Russia and China are Changing The World - For the Better

FEDERICO PIERACCINI | 01.01.2017 | WORLD

The two previous articles have focused on the various geopolitical theories, their translations into modern concepts, and practical actions that the United States has taken in recent decades to aspire to global dominance. This segment will describe how Iran, China and Russia have over the years adopted a variety of economic and military actions to repel the continual assault on their sovereignty by the West; in particular, how the American drive for global hegemony has actually accelerated the end of the 'unipolar moment' thanks to the emergence of a multipolar world.

From the moment the Berlin Wall fell, the United States saw a unique opportunity to pursue the goal of being the sole global hegemon. With the end of the Soviet Union, Washington could undoubtedly aspire to planetary domination paying little heed to the threat of competition and especially of any consequences. America found herself the one and only global superpower, faced with the prospect of extending cultural and economic model around the planet, where necessary by military means.

Over the past 25 years there have been numerous examples demonstrating how Washington has had little hesitation in bombing nations reluctant to kowtow to Western wishes. In other examples, an economic battering ram, based on predatory capitalism and financial speculation, has literally destroyed sovereign nations, further enriching the US and European financial elite in the process.

Alliances to Resist

In the course of the last two decades, the relationship between the three major powers of the Heartland, the heart of the Earth, changed radically.

Iran, Russia and China have fully understood that union and cooperation are the only means for mutual reinforcement. The need to fight a common problem, represented by a growing American influence in domestic affairs, has forced Tehran, Beijing and Moscow to resolve their differences and embrace a unified strategy in the common interest of defending their sovereignty.

Events such as the war in Syria, the bombing of Libya, the overthrowing of the democratic order in Ukraine, sanctions against Iran, and the direct pressure applied to Beijing in the South China Sea, have accelerated integration among nations that in the early 1990s had very little in common.

Economic Integration

Analyzing US economic power it is clear that supranational organizations like the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank guarantee Washington’s role as the economic leader. The pillars that support the centrality of the United States in the world economy can be attributed to the monetary policy of the Fed and the function of the dollar as a global reserve currency.

The Fed has unlimited ability to print money to finance further economic power of the private and public sector as well as to pay the bill due for very costly wars. The US dollar plays a central role as the global reserve currency as well as being used as currency for trade. This virtually obliges each central bank to own reserves in US currency, continuing to perpetuate the importance of Washington in the global economic system.

The introduction of the yuan into the international basket of the IMF, global agreements for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and Beijing’s protests against its treatment by the World Trade Organization (WTO) are all alarm bells for American strategists who see the role of the American currency eroding. In Russia, the central bank decided not to accumulate dollar reserves, favoring instead foreign currency like the Indian rupee and the Chinese yuan. The rating agencies - western financial-oligarchy tools -have diminishing credibility, having become means to manipulate markets to favor specific US interests. Chinese and Russian independent rating agencies are further confirmation of Beijing and Moscow’s strategy to undermine America’s role in western economics.

De-dollarization is occurring and proceeding rapidly, especially in areas of mutual business interest. In what is becoming increasingly routine, nations are dealing in commodities by negotiating in currencies other than the dollar. The benefit is twofold: a reduction in the role of the dollar in their sovereign affairs, and an increase in synergies between allied nations. Iran and India exchanged oil in rupees, and China and Russia trade in yuan.

Another advantage enjoyed by the United States, intrinsically linked to the banking private sector, is the political pressure that Americans can apply through financial and banking institutions. The most striking example is seen in the exclusion of Iran from the SWIFT international system of payments, as well as the extension of sanctions, including the freezing of Tehran's assets (about 150 billion US dollars) in foreign bank deposits. While the US is trying to crack down on independent economic initiatives, nations like Iran, Russia and China are increasing their synergies. During the period of sanctions against Iran, the Russian Federation has traded with the Islamic Republic in primary commodities. China has supported Iran with the export of oil purchased in yuan. More generally, Moscow has proposed the creation of an alternative banking system to the SWIFT system.

Private Banks, central banks, ratings agencies and supranational organizations depend in large part on the role played by the dollar and the Fed. The first goal of Iran, Russia and China is of course to make these international bodies less influential. Economic multipolarity is the first as well as the most incisive way to expand the free choice before each nation to pursue its own interests, thereby retaining its national sovereignty.

This fictitious and corrupt financial system led to the financial crisis of 2008. Tools to accumulate wealth by the elite, artificially maintaining a zombie system (turbo capitalism) have served to cause havoc in the private and public sectors, such as with the collapse of Lehman Brothers or the crisis in the Asian markets in the late 1990s.

The need for Russia, China and Iran to find an alternative economic system is also necessary to secure vital aspects of the domestic economy. The stock-market crash in China, the depreciation of the ruble in Russia, and the illegal sanctions imposed on Iran have played a profound role in concentrating the minds of Moscow, Tehran and Beijing. Ignoring the problem borne of the centrality of the dollar would have only increased the influence and role of Washington. Finding points of convergence instead of being divided was an absolute must and not an option.

A perfect example, explaining the failed American economic approach, can be seen in recent years with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), two commercial agreements that were supposed to seal the economic trade supremacy of the US. The growing economic alternatives proposed by the union of intent between Russia, China and Iran has enabled smaller nations to reject the US proposals to seek better trade deals elsewhere. In this sense, the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) proposed by Beijing is increasingly appreciated in Asia as an alternative to the TPP.

In the same way, the Eurasian Union (EAEU) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have always been key components for Moscow. The function these institutions play was noticeably accelerated following the coup in Ukraine and the resulting need for Russia to turn east in search of new business partners. Finally, Iran, chosen by Beijing as the crossroad of land and sea transit, is a prime example of integration between powers geographically distant but with great intentions to integrate vital structures of commerce.

The Chinese model of development, called Silk Road 2.0, poses a serious threat to American global hegemonic processes. The goal for Beijing is to reach full integration between the countries of the Heartland and Rimland, utilizing the concept of sea power and land power. With an investment of 1,000 billion US dollars over ten years, China itself becomes a link between the west, represented by Europe; the east, represented by China itself; the north, with the Eurasian economic space; the south, with India; Southeast Asia; the Persian Gulf and Middle East. The hope is that economic cooperation will lead to the resolution of discrepancies and strategic differences between countries thanks to trade agreements that are beneficiary to all sides.

The role of Washington continues to be that of destruction rather than construction. Instead of playing the role of a global superpower that is interested in business and trade with other nations, the United States continues to consider any foreign decision in matters of integration, finance, economy and development to lie within its exclusive domain. The primary purpose of the United States is simply to exploit every economic and cultural instrument available to prevent cohesion and coexistence between nations. The military component is usually the trump card, historically used to impose this vision on the rest of the world. In recent years, thanks to de-dollarization and military integration, nations like Iran, Russia and China are less subject to Washington's unilateral decisions.

Military deterrence

Accompanying the important economic integration is strong military-strategic cooperation, which is much less publicized. Events such as the Middle East wars, the coup in Ukraine, and the pressure exerted in the South China Sea have forced Tehran, Moscow and Beijing to conclude that the United States represents an existential threat.

In each of the above scenarios, China, Russia and Iran have had to make decisions by weighing the pros and cons of an opposition to the American model. The Ukraine coup d’état brought NATO to the borders of the Russian Federation, representing an existential threat to the Russia, threatening as it does its nuclear deterrent. In the Middle East, the destruction of Iraq, Libya and Syria has obliged Tehran to react against the alliance formed between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United States. In China, the constant pressure on South China Sea poses a serious problem in case of a trade blockade during a conflict. In all these scenarios, American imperialism has created existential threats. It is for this reason natural that cooperation and technological development, even in the military area, have received a major boost in recent years.

In the event of an American attack on Russia, China and Iran, it is important to focus on what weapon systems would be used and how the attacked nations could respond.

Maritime Strategy and Deterrence

Certainly, US naval force place a serious question mark over the defense capabilities of nations like Russia, China and Iran, which strongly depend on transit via sea routes. Let us take, for example, Russia and the Arctic transit route, of great interest not only for defense purposes but also being a quick passage for transit goods. The Black Sea for these reasons has received special attention from the United States due to its strategic location. In any case, the responses have been proportional to the threat.

Iran has significantly developed maritime capabilities in the Persian Gulf, often closely marking ships of the US Navy located in the area for the purposes of deterrence. China's strategy has been even more refined, with the use of dozens, if not hundreds, of fishing boats and ships of the Coast Guard to ensure safety and strengthen the naval presence in the South and East China Sea. This is all without forgetting the maritime strategy outlined by the PLA Navy to become a regional naval power over the next few years. Similar strategic decisions have been taken by the navy of the Russian Federation. In addition to having taken over ship production as in Soviet times, it has opted for the development of ships that cost less but nevertheless boast equivalent weapons systems to the Americans carrier groups.

Iran, China and Russia make efficiency and cost containment a tactic to balance the growing aggressiveness of the Americans and the attendant cost of such a military strategy.

The fundamental difference between the naval approach of these countries in contrast to that of the US is paramount. Washington needs to use its naval power for offensive purposes, whereas Tehran, Moscow and Beijing need naval power exclusively for defensive purposes.

In this sense, among the greatest weapons these three recalcitrant countries possess are anti-ship, anti-aircraft and anti-ballistic systems. To put things simply, it is enough to note that Russian weapons systems such as the S-300 and S-400 air-defense systems (the S-500 will be operational in 2017) are now being adopted by China and Iran with variations developed locally. Increasingly we are witnessing an open transfer of technology to continue the work of denying (A2/AD) physical and cyberspace freedom to the United States. Stealth aircraft, carrier strike groups, ICBMs and cruise missiles are experiencing a difficult time in such an environment, finding themselves opposed by the formidable defense systems the Russians, Iranians and Chinese are presenting. The cost of an anti-ship missile fired from the Chinese coast is considerably lower than the tens of billions of dollars needed to build an aircraft carrier. This paradigm of cost and efficiency is what has shaped the military spending of China, Russia and Iran. Going toe to toe with the United States without being forced to close a huge military gap is the only viable way to achieve immediate tangible benefits of deterrence and thereby block American expansionist ambitions.

A clear example of where the Americans have encountered military opposition at an advanced level has been in Syria. The systems deployed by Iran and Russia to protect the Syrian government presented the Americans with the prospect of facing heavy losses in the event of an attack on Damascus. The same also holds for the anti-Iranian rhetoric of certain American politicians and Israeli leaders. The only reason why Syria and Iran remain sovereign nations is because of the military cost that an invasion or bombing would have brought to their invaders. This is the essence of deterrence. Of course, this argument only takes into partial account the nuclear aspect that this author has extensively discussed in a previous article.

The Union of the nations of the Heartland and Rimland will make the United States irrelevant

The future for the most important area of the planet is already sealed. The overall integration of Beijing, Moscow and Tehran provides the necessary antibodies to foreign aggression in military and economic form. De-dollarization, coupled with an infrastructure roadmap such as the Chinese Silk Road 2.0 and the maritime trade route, offer important opportunities for developing nations that occupy the geographical space between Portugal and China. Dozens of nations have all it takes to integrate for mutually beneficial gains without having to worry too much about American threats. The economic alternative offered from Beijing provides a fairly wide safety net for resisting American assaults in the same way that the military umbrella offered by these three military powers, such as with the the SCO for example, serves to guarantee the necessary independence and strategic autonomy. More and more nations are clearly rejecting American interference, favoring instead a dialogue with Beijing, Moscow and Tehran. Duterte in the Philippines is just the latest example of this trend.

The multipolar future has gradually reduced the role of the United States in the world, primarily in reaction to her aggression seeking to achieve global domination. The constant quest for planetary hegemony has pushed nations who were initially western partners to reassess their role in the international order, passing slowly but progressively into the opposite camp to that of Washington.

The consequences of this process have sealed the destiny of the United States, not only as a response to her quest for supremacy but also because of her efforts to maintain her role as the sole global superpower. As noted in previous articles, during the Cold War the aim for Washington was to prevent the formation of a union between the nations of the Heartland, who could then exclude the US from the most important area of the globe. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, sights were set on an improbable quest to conquer the Heartland nations with the intent of dominating the whole world. The consequences of this miscalculation have led the United States to being relegated to the role of mere observer, watching the unions and integrations occurring that will revolutionize the Eurasian zone and the planet over the next 50 years. The desperate search to extend Washington's unipolar moment has paradoxically accelerated the rise of a multipolar world.

In the next and final article, I will throw a light on what is likely to be a change in the American approach to foreign policy. Keeping in mind the first two articles that examined the approach by land theorized by MacKinder as opposed to the Maritime Mahan, we will try and outline how Trump intends to adopt a containment approach to the Rimland, limiting the damage to the US caused by a complete integration between nations such as Russia, China, Iran and India.
 
Last edited:
China, Russia agree to further respond to THAAD deployment
Xinhua, January 13, 2017

China and Russia have agreed to take further countermeasures in response to the proposed deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD), officials from both countries said Thursday.

The countermeasures will be aimed at safeguarding interests of China and Russia and the strategic balance in the region, said a statement released after the sixth China-Russia consultation on security situation in the Northeast Asia.

The two countries reiterated their serious concerns about and firm opposition to Washington and Seoul's constant attempts to deploy THAAD anti-missile system in South Korea, according to the statement.

China and Russia urged the United States and South Korea to address their security concerns and stop the deployment of THAAD on the Korean Peninsula, it said.

Seoul and Washington abruptly announced a decision in July last year to deploy one THAAD battery by the end of this year, triggering strong opposition from China and Russia as the U.S. missile defense system's X-band radar can peer into territories of the two countries.

The United States and South Korea claim that THAAD will be used to neutralize missile threats from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, while China and Russia believe the powerful system will harm their strategic interests.

Both China and Russia believe the current situation in the Korean Peninsula and in the Northeast Asia is complicated and sensitive, the statement said.

The two countries urged all relevant parties to exercise restraint to prevent activities which could aggravate tensions, it added.

They also reaffirmed their insistence on the goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, safeguarding peace and stability of the peninsula, and searching for solutions through dialogue and consultation.

The two countries also agreed to strengthen communication and coordination to jointly cope with the situation in the Northeast Asia.

Thursday's meeting was co-chaired by China's Assistant Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou and Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov.
 
January 13, 2017 1:25 pm JST

Russia picks China's Huawei for telecom project on Japan-claimed isles

VLADIVOSTOK, Russia (Kyodo) -- A Russian government-affiliated telecommunications company has announced it has selected China's Huawei Technologies to undertake survey and design work for laying a submarine fiber optic cable linking communities on Sakhalin and islands controlled by Russia but claimed by Japan.

The Japanese government has been wary of companies from China, South Korea and other third countries doing business on the four islands called the Northern Territories in Japan and the Southern Kurils in Russia. They were seized by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II.

The business deal could overshadow talks between Tokyo and Moscow toward realizing joint economic activities in the region agreed late last year at a meeting of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Rostelecom PSJC has picked the Chinese telecom technology company for the project to build a 940-kilometer undersea cable linking the city of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and major towns on three of the four islands -- Etorofu, Kunashiri and Shikotan.

The Russian government has been pushing for fiber optic infrastructure on the islands as Russian residents there had to cope with slow Internet connections.

Huawei was chosen for the new project after having built another submarine fiber optic cable for Rostelecom in Russia's Far East. Huawei could play a central role in laying a cable for the disputed islands.

An official at Huawei's Russian unit said the project will help improve the livelihood of residents and narrow information gaps.

http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Eco...ei-for-telecom-project-on-Japan-claimed-isles
 
January 13, 2017 1:25 pm JST

Russia picks China's Huawei for telecom project on Japan-claimed isles

VLADIVOSTOK, Russia (Kyodo) -- A Russian government-affiliated telecommunications company has announced it has selected China's Huawei Technologies to undertake survey and design work for laying a submarine fiber optic cable linking communities on Sakhalin and islands controlled by Russia but claimed by Japan.

The Japanese government has been wary of companies from China, South Korea and other third countries doing business on the four islands called the Northern Territories in Japan and the Southern Kurils in Russia. They were seized by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II.

The business deal could overshadow talks between Tokyo and Moscow toward realizing joint economic activities in the region agreed late last year at a meeting of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Rostelecom PSJC has picked the Chinese telecom technology company for the project to build a 940-kilometer undersea cable linking the city of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and major towns on three of the four islands -- Etorofu, Kunashiri and Shikotan.

The Russian government has been pushing for fiber optic infrastructure on the islands as Russian residents there had to cope with slow Internet connections.

Huawei was chosen for the new project after having built another submarine fiber optic cable for Rostelecom in Russia's Far East. Huawei could play a central role in laying a cable for the disputed islands.

An official at Huawei's Russian unit said the project will help improve the livelihood of residents and narrow information gaps.

http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Eco...ei-for-telecom-project-on-Japan-claimed-isles

Mr. Abe's charm offensive seems not be working as planned.

Huawei already has immense experience in undersea cable laying. They are currently working with Greenland government for another project in the Arctic Circle.
 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/russia-china-nato_us_5873a07ce4b02b5f8589eb03

Brzezinski repeats the well-worn notion that Beijing has nefarious designs in Russia’s Far Eastern territories. It is an open secret that many in China consider the 19th-century border treaties with Russia unfair and unequal. But that doesn’t mean that China is likely to claim back these territories. In fact, that’s just about as likely as it is that Mexico would attempt to retake Texas and other areas that the U.S. forced it to cede.

Brzezinski also claims that Russia’s eastern provinces are “being overwhelmed by a steady influx” of Chinese. As someone who lives in the Far East, I can say this is far from reality. According to research I and my colleagues have done, there are no more than around 40,000 Chinese settled in the vast region, from Chita and Vladivostok to the Chukotka Peninsula, and this number has not increased in recent years. The only influx we have seen so far is that of Chinese tourists who are flocking across the border in growing numbers for shopping and entertainment. There is, of course, a possibility that China will geo-economically overtake the Russian Far East and turn the region into a neocolonial periphery. However, Japan is still far ahead of China in terms of foreign direct investment stock in eastern Russia.



Russia’s Far East Transborder Pains: China Threat Syndrome and the Tragedy of the Anticommons


The Russian Far East (RFE) has come a long way in the last fifteen years. The signature image of the region’s largest city of Vladivostok is no longer that of a quaint, late-nineteenth century railway station, but that of a daringly aerodynamic, cable-stayed bridge built over a mile long and two hundred feet tall to the nearby Russky Island for the 2012 APEC summit. The buildings erected for the summit are now home to the Federal Far Eastern State University. My memories of struggling through a chaotic crowd of passengers cramped onboard a gritty, smoke-belching, raucous ferry back in 1999—the only way to get to what was then a desolate island—have receded. Since then, Russia and China signed a friendship treaty (2001) and a border settlement agreement (2004)—the latter concluding 40 years of negotiations that were interrupted by armed border clashes around 1969.1 Russia’s trade with China spiked from USD 6bn when I took that rumbling ferry to USD 88bn at the time of the 2012 Vladivostok APEC summit. The increase in bilateral trade remains impressive despite dropping to about USD 68bn in 2015.2 After Beijing and Moscow signed 30-year energy contracts worth nearly half a trillion dollars in late 2014, transcontinental oil and gas pipelines are expected to stretch even further from deep in Siberia toward Vladivostok and the Russia-China borderlands. Moscow Exchange saw a rapid rise in the yuan-ruble trade.3 Several transborder, special trade zones and infrastructure projects got underway in Russia’s provinces along the China border. These projects have fed an upbeat narrative.

Also gone are the days when a governor of Primorskii krai—the most populous and economically advanced province of the Russian Far East that includes Vladivostok—could thrive in power on public warnings that cross-border Chinese migration would turn the RFE into a messy and violent “Asian Balkans.”4 In a 2000 survey of 1,010 Primorskii krai residents—that I commissioned from the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of History, Ethnography, and Anthropology of the Peoples of the Russian Far East—82 percent were convinced China would eventually take over their province, while 46 percent feared the takeover would happen through “peaceful infiltration” of Chinese traders and laborers. Since then, these alarmist views have mellowed markedly. When the same institute interviewed 650 Primorskii residents for me in November 2005—including 387 who were the same people interviewed in 2000—the number of respondents fearing Chinese claims on their territory fell by 10 percent, and of those fearing “peaceful infiltration” fell by seven percent. In a 2013 Vladivostok survey (N=680), conducted by a reputed Moscow-based ROMIR agency as part of Norway’s Social Science Research Council project on “New Russian Nationalism” (NEORUSS), 20 percent fewer respondents than in 2000 believed Primorskii would lose territory to China. Only 24 percent in 2013 feared loss of sovereignty through “peaceful infiltration” of Chinese migrants. In an opinion sea change, respondents who saw China’s land grab in Primorskii as unlikely were now in a minority.5

Figure 1. Fear of Chinese Migration and China’s Territorial Claims Declines Among Primorskii Krai Residents, 2000-2013 (% respondents)

Note: Based on opinion surveys in Primorskii krai using multistage probability samples of local adult population in 2000 (N=1,010), 2005 (N=650), and 2013 (N=680). This table shows percentage of respondents excluding the missing data (“don’t knows” and refusals to answer) for each question in each survey. The missing data accounts for 15 to 20 percent of the total number of responses per question in 2005 and 2013 and 23-25 percent in 2000.

Local Pains

The border provinces of the Russian Far East—including areas outside Vladivostok—would seem to be in an excellent position to gain from these developments. And yet, barriers to cross-border trade and economic development in the region have been yielding to the new opportunities of the last two decades at best slowly and torturously and in certain respects these barriers may have become more daunting. According to a 2015 assessment of Russia’s Far East Development Ministryset up in 2012 to spearhead regional economic growth—, the problem is similar to the one observers pointed out repeatedly over the last century. “Despite its tremendous…potential, the [Far East and Baikal] macroregion’s role in Russia’s economy must be characterized as insignificant. The macroregion’s role in the Asia-Pacific regional economy is even smaller.”6While comprising 7.5 percent of Russia’s population and 45.5 percent of its territory, noted the ministry, the Far Eastern provinces generated just 3 percent of Russia’s manufacturing output in 2012 and had lower labor productivity than Russia’s average. Outmigration continued to deplete the already sparse (1.4 people per square kilometer) regional population, with the net outflow of 177,000 people and a workforce reduction of 75,000 from 2008 through 2012.7 Yet, as we see in greater detail below, the ministry’s own program for economic and social development of the Far East and Lake Baikal region through 2025 skips over the fundamental problems that prop up the barriers to regional growth. Also symptomatically, the draft law on transborder trade with input from borderland governments hoping to boost local economic growth has been in limbo at Russia’s Federation Council for about six years as of 2016.

Rapid economic rise in the last two decades of the adjacent Chinese borderlands is a telling counterpoint to the developmental sluggishness in the Russian Far East. Exhibit A is the town of Nizhneleninskoe in the Jewish Autonomous District on the Amur River, where economic prospects dimmed since the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Far East development subsidies, and population shrank from 30,000 in 1991 to 18,000 at present.

Visiting the town in mid-July 2016, Andrew Higgins of The New York Times, wrote: “…the huge steel bridge thrusts out from the Chinese side of the Amur River, stretching more than a mile across the turbid waters that divide the world’s most populous nation from its biggest. Then something strange happens: The bridge abruptly stops, hanging in the air high above the river just short of the Russian shore.”8 If completed, the bridge would shorten the route for shipping the Russian iron ore to a local Chinese steel mill from 646 to 145 miles. The bridge project has enjoyed high-level support from Moscow. But while the Chinese construction companies completed their two-kilometer portion of the bridge in 2014, the Russian companies were yet to start work on 309 meters of their portion of the bridge in mid-2016. The regional government promised at the time the bridge would be completed by June 2018 at the cost of about USD 140mn. Expressing his frustration over this and other construction delays on the Russian side—including the stalling of the Power of Siberia gas pipeline construction—, China’s former ambassador to Russia, Li Fenglin, admonished Russian officials at a May 2016 conference in Moscow: “Don’t just drag your feet. You should start working energetically.”9

Exhibit B is the Transborder Trade and Economic Complex (PTEK) at the juncture of Pogranichnyi and Suifenhe in Primorskii krai. When I interviewed former vice-governor Vladimir Stegnii in October 2005 he showed me the drawings and blueprints for this PTEK and explained how the Chinese and Russian citizens would be able to drive in there without visas—effectively gaining access to each country’s territory visa- and hassle-free. He saw the reduction in transaction costs as a boost to joint business ventures, shopping, recreation, and education. The complex, he explained, would mutually acculturate the residents of China and Russia’s borderlands and galvanize the expansion of bilateral social and economic relations throughout the Far East and beyond. In June 2015, the officials from China and Russia held an opening ceremony of Phase One of the complex. Yet, as late as October 28, 2016, Vladivostok News was still lamenting that PTEK remained in limbo: “The ribbon-cutting and the festive fanfares did not resolve anything: without changes in rules and regulations [in Moscow], for which political will is needed, this PTEK remains the graveyard of good intentions.”10 Still being required to secure a visa or the services of a tour agency that had a license to operate visa-free, the Russian residents have little rationale to favor PTEK over other locations in China. At the time of this writing, the decision to allow Russians visa-free travel to PTEK was still making its way through a special working group of the Federation Council. This sort of red tape would also explain the stunning cross-border asymmetry of the PTEK—a shopping center in what looks like an office building plus a wooden Orthodox chapel on the Russian side versus on the China side slick shopping streets, high rises, and a palatial 354-guestroom Holiday Inn Suifenhe with a huge artificial lake that could give top Las Vegas properties a run for their money.11

Exhibit C of this developmental lopsidedness is the railroad crossing the border between Zabaikal’sk and Manzhouli. The cities have been developing a joint transborder trade and economic zone, their own PTEK. But the Welcome to China gate now looms about ten times larger than the Welcome to Russia gate across the border. Manzhouli also built a vast Russian-themed shopping and recreation area with а (smaller) replica of St. Basil’s Cathedral, fountains, and ponds, whereas Zabaikal’sk can boast nothing of the kind.

Behind the Thwarted Hopes: The Securitized Tragedy of the Anticommons

Specialists on the region have advanced two principal explanations of the Russian Far East borderland development failures. While they appear to belong in separate compartments, this article argues they are mutually reinforcing. In fact, they expose a negative synergy between theoretical perspectives known as “the tragedy of the anticommons” and the immigration security dilemma.

The Anticommons

The tragedy of the anticommons occurs when numerous rights holders claim a single asset or resource, but none of them has an effective privilege of use. As a result, lucrative resources remain underused, and opportunities are missed. In landmark studies, Michael Heller showed how this logic explained patent thickets blocking innovation, robber barons charging river tolls in medieval Germany, and storefronts staying empty amidst bustling street kiosk trade in early post-communist Moscow. “Once an anticommons emerges,” Heller warned, “collecting rights into useful private property bundles can be brutal and slow.” Moreover, the anticommons logic posits that the problem will persist even if “property rights were clearly defined, corruption held in check, and the rule of law respected.”12 In other words, this would explain why economic development of Russia’s Far East borderlands is likely to be “brutal and slow” even if the Kremlin’s “power vertical” system of center-periphery governance worked according to its stated ideal goals.

In a sophisticated analysis of regional economies in the Russian Far East, Ryzhova, who is based in Blagoveshchensk on the Russia-China border, presents significant evidence that demonstrates the anticommons logic at work (even though she is not using or referring to this conceptual framework). Ryzhova’s study finds the region trapped in a vicious circle of mutually exclusive incentives of key stakeholders tasked with its development. The crux of the matter is excessive central control combined with a multiplicity of federal and local actors. On the one hand, the proximity to Chinese markets raises incentives for Russian businesses to relocate to the border regions. On the other hand, as expectations of benefits from transborder exchanges rise, federal and local government agencies become more interested in extracting rent. This leads to the proliferation of what Ryzhova calls “official robbers,” “unofficial robbers,” as well as decoy traders and smugglers to circumvent them.13 Transaction costs mount and discourage suppliers and traders. Using granular regional economic data focusing, in particular, on interactions between Blagoveshchensk and Heihe, Ryzhova estimated that from 1987 to 2000, traders remained the central actors in transborder exchanges—suggesting that market forces were still dominant in shaping local economic futures. However, the growing centralization under Putin first resulted in the proliferation of decoy traders and then, after 2006, in the rise of “official robbers” to the position at least as lucrative as that of bona fide traders. The proliferation of “official robbers,” however, creates multiple rights claimants—a recipe for the tragedy of the anticommons. On the totality of evidence, Ryzhova found this vicious circle so entrenched that she refrained from any policy recommendations on how to dismantle them.

It is also likely that Moscow’s practice of dispersing investment to satisfy the interests of multiple federal and local stakeholders in the Far East has historically contributed to the anticommons effect. Minakir and Prokapalo identified the “diffuseness” or “atomism” of financial resource allocation as the main cause of failure of every long-term, economic development program in the Russian Far East that the Soviet and Russian governments undertook since the 1930s.14 In January 2016, Minakir warned the Khabarovsk krai legislature that their region’s development strategy through 2030 inherited the problem of earlier federal programs.15

The China Threat Syndrome

Survey data from Primorskii krai indicate that the immigration security dilemma—disproportionally strong fears of migrants arising form the sense of uncertainty about host government capacity to contain, restrain, or manage migration—has remained a potent factor shaping regional mentality and views on interactions with China.16 The resulting threat syndrome manifests itself in two principal ways. First, even though fears of Chinese migration challenging Russia’s sovereignty in the Far East have eased (Figure 1), significant other fears were as strong or stronger in 2013 polling data than in 2000 and 2005:

  • Chinese migration scale has remained highly exaggerated. In 2000 and 2005, most Primorskii residents believed the share of Chinese migrants in the local population was about 20 percent; and in 2013, about 30 percent. Primorskii Migration Service data I reviewed from 1999 to 2005 and Russia’s 2002 and 2010 census data suggest these perceptions exaggerate migration scale into Primorskii krai more than tenfold. (In fact, in 2010 census enumerators identified fewer than 3,000 local residents present in Primorskii krai at the time of the census as ethnic Chinese, or about 0.15 percent of the krai population). Fears of living under China’s “demographic overhang”—a metaphor that Russian analysts coined to warn of the negative consequences of fewer than seven million Russians facing more than 100 million Chinese across the interstate border—appear to have endured.17
  • Concerns over China’s rising military might and armed border clashes with China have become stronger. The military balance has been seen to move irrevocably in China’s favor, and this perception increased more from 2005 to 2013 than from 2000 to 2005. (Figure 2). The number of Primorskii respondents who saw as likely the replay in ten years of violent military conflict such as the one that occurred in 1969 over Zhenbao (Damanskii) Island on the Ussuri River was 38 percent in 2013—a twofold increase from 2005 and about 3 percent more than in 2000.
  • Xenophobic and ethnic prejudice has persisted. According to the 2005 and 2013 polls, about 54 percent of Primorskii residents supported the idea of deporting all migrants—whether legal or illegal—as well as their children. About one half of those respondents said they supported the idea strongly.18 And whereas the number of respondents who completely opposed granting residency rights to the Chinese in Primorskii dropped from 49 percent in 2000 to 29 percent in 2005, it rebounded to 46 percent in 2013. Rejection of ethnic Chinese as marriage partners—with a prompt that they have the same socioeconomic status as respondents—went up from 80 percent in 2005 to 90 percent in 2013.19 Support for the slogan “Russia for ethnic Russians!” increased from 65 percent to 77 percent.
  • The sense of relative economic loss to China has kept rising. The number of respondents who believed the Chinese benefited more than the Russians from cross-border interactions exceeded the number of respondents who believed the Russians benefited more than the Chinese—by 43 percent in 2000, by 59 percent in 2005, and by 69 percent in 2013.
  • Social contact between the Russians and the Chinese, for the most part, declined. The number of respondents reporting some regular contact with migrants was 84 percent in 2005, but only 61 percent in 2013. This was probably due to fewer respondents buying food or consumer goods from Chinese vendors (reflecting the transition of street markets into shopping malls and hiring local residents as vendors)—close to 80 percent of Primorskii respondents reported buying from the Chinese in 2000, but only 49 percent in 2013. On another important measure of social contact, the polls saw a decline of the number of Primorskii residents who said they had helped migrants in any form—from 68 percent in 2005 to 72 percent in 2013.
Figure 2. Balance of Military Power Seen as Shifting in China’s Favor (% respondents)

Note: Percentage estimated excluding the missing data.

Second, the reduction in perceived threat with China’s territorial expansion and migration as its tool had a lot to do with a stronger sense of central authority under Putin and the delinking of economic from security aspects of cross-border interactions:

  • While the sense that the Russian government abandoned them declined among Primorskii residents from 2000 to 2013, more of them reported visiting China (see Figure 3 below).
  • Primorskii residents reported rising incomes—enhancing the sense of economic security strongly associated with confidence in central authority (among other things, the 2013 poll showed a strong relationship between respondents’ income and support for Putin). The respondents’ median household income per capita adjusted for inflation went up from 5,750 rubles in 2005 to 17,500 rubles in 2013.20
  • Regression analysis—controlling for perceptions of military balance, migration scale, ethnic distance, relative economic gains, age, gender, and education—showed that the above three factors significantly affected the perceptions of China threat until the positive shifts took place. The sense of isolation from Moscow, frequency of cross-border visits, and family income related to China threats in 2005, but practically not at all in 2013. Travel, in particular, may have calmed perceived migration threats not because travel opened the mind, but as people traveled more frequently, travel came to be viewed as a routine and predominantly socioeconomic issue rather than a security issue. In the 2005 poll, Primorskii residents who reported traveling to China more often than others during the ten years before the survey were more likely to see in Chinese migration a sinister “peaceful infiltration.” As travel to China became widespread by 2013, this relationship disappeared. In 2013, travel had no significant association with any of the three indicators of threat shown above in Figure 1. Neither did income. The sense of isolation related only to perceived intent of the Chinese to colonize Primorskii krai.
Figure 3. Fear of Isolation from Moscow Declines in Primorskii, While More Local Residents Visit China (% respondents)

Note: Percentage estimated excluding the missing data.

These regression results suggest, however, that despite certain positive changes from 2000 to 2013 the China threat syndrome remains tenacious. In particular, the perceived strength of central authority and income mattered in a negative way (when they declined in a society overall, individual fears of China increased)—but not in a positive way (when they improved in a society overall, individual fears of China were not necessarily assuaged). In particular, given the deterioration of economic conditions in Russia in 2014-2016, one would expect alarmist perceptions of China to harden.

Threat and Anticommons: Interaction and Reinforcement

Microcase #1: Territories of Accelerated Socioeconomic Development (TOSER)

In 2015, Russia’s Far East Development Ministry adopted a Federal Target Program for the Economic and Social Development of the Far East and the Lake Baikal Region through 2025. The program—worth about 3.6 trillion rubles (about 60bn US dollars at the November 20, 2016 exchange rate)—set as its number one priority making operational by 2020 16 Territories of Accelerated Socioeconomic Development (TOSER). The program promises significant tax breaks, simplified land use licensing, custom inspection waivers, and other incentives to develop petrochemical industries, construction materials, and food and timber processing industries in the RFE as well as to develop high-tech services.21 This, in theory, addresses precisely the impediments to regional economic development identified by government officials in Primorskii krai and Sakhalin oblast’ whom I interviewed around 1999-2005. Media reports now indicate considerable activity across the RFE in designing TOSER regions, most upbeat and forward looking.

However, two elements embedded in the proposed TOSER initiative—but not addressed in the 2025 development document—have drawn the most criticism as the first TOSERs began to be implemented in the RFE. They cast doubt over the planned outcomes. The first one concerns the anticommons problem, and the second the security threat syndrome.

The source of the anticommons problem is that pushing through TOSER required changes in the Civil, Urban Development, Labor, Land, and Forest Codes of the Russian Federation—which meant raising the incentive to claim a role in any specific TOSER among multiple federal agencies and their local branches. The source of the threat syndrome is the program’s mention of unspecified incentives for bringing in migrant labor and schools for the children of foreign nationals, which resonated with the security threat syndrome. The latter opens the doors for the security establishment—particularly the FSB and the Migration Service—to seek rights in TOSER implementation and oversight. Local media—less censored by Moscow due to its limited reach—offers several telling insights on how a combination of these inputs could frustrate project development.

Kamchatka Express online news and discussion portal, for example, reported Putin’s special envoy to the Far East Federal District, Yuri Trutnev, complaining of what amounts to a textbook manifestation of the anticommons problem in setting up regulations for the Kamchatka TOSER—that includes tourism and the port. “The federal ministries of economics and finance have done a poor job. They deformed the president’s assignment. They thought up a complex mechanism for acquiring the status of a regional investment project and slapped on additional requirements. For one, they set up a term limit for land leasing—and for some unknown reason it is January 1, 2024. Then there is the demand that an investment zone should have… no buildings belonging to any other agency. But what if such a building is there? Should it be knocked down?”22 The insertion of the buildings rule gives the owner agencies a strong incentive to resist takeover, while those interested in developing a territory would have to resolve complex coordination problems—a textbook case of the anticommons.

The Kamchatka governor, Vladimir Ilyukhin, adamantly complained about another problem showing that the anticommons may emerge even when there is no physical object of interagency contention. Agencies seeking to maximize gains from the assets they control may introduce rules “on spec”—just in case something gets developed nearby and they are able to extract rent. Thus, building a highway from Tilichki to Kamenskoe in northern Kamchatka not only faced steep funding challenges, but also a requirement that it should run within a certain distance of a railroad: “Except,” Ilyukhin quipped, “we don’t have railroads here.”23

Local media reports also offer a glimpse on how the threat syndrome reinforces the anticommons problem in Kamchatka. The main port city on the peninsula, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky is home to the region’s largest stakeholder in security—the East Arctic Borderguards Directorate of Russia’s Federal Security Service (former KGB) that oversees ships serving all the way in the Chukotka, East Siberian, and Laptev Seas. It is hard to imagine how the proposed enlargement and rebuilding of the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky port could proceed without getting clearances from the FSB agencies. In fact, the development of cruise ship tourism in Kamchatka—one of the Kamchatka TOSER objectives—gives a preview of these impediments. In an interview with a local online service, Korabel.ru, Nikolay Pegin, head of the Kamchatka Krai Development Corporation—one of numerous government controlled agencies set up to leverage state and private funding and manage the TOSER initiatives—revealed that out of the planned 19 cruise ship visits to Petropavlovsk in 2015 only 13 materialized. Getting border service clearances and related interagency coordination resulted in a loss of about one third of prospective cruise business.24 The Kamchatka Express discussion forums on TOSER were bluntly and vehemently pessimistic. In the most frequently cited comment on the port issue, user “strix” wrote: “You say, build a large beautiful port… well, we have already seen many posts here telling you that as long as all kinds of borderguards, the FSBniks, and the customs wield their laws and regulations our ports are not going to be attractive. You can build all you want, build another port of Rotterdam, but who will come here? Plus don’t forget service costs, electricity costs, etc. The Kamchatka port is doomed to stay uncompetitive.”25

Responses to TOSER showed that the threat-animated, general public could also claim exclusive rights to a resource—particularly if it is viewed as valuable and vulnerable. Nationalist writers warned that TOSER-related changes to the federal codes de facto enabled Chinese land ownership and unlimited importation of Chinese migrant labor in the RFE.26 Public protests across the RFE in 2015 disrupted plans to lease 285,000 unused acres of land to a Chinese grain producer.27 An Oscar-winning Russian filmmaker, Nikita Mikhalkov, weighed in with a warning that migration into Russia, if unchecked, would pave the way for a military invasion.28

Microcase #2: The Bridge Over the Amur

The New York Times report on the unfinished Nizneleninskoe bridge across the Amur River revealed telltale signs of the tragedy of the anticommons: “Even the seemingly simple issue of where the bridge’s pillars would stand… stirred a hornet’s nest of arguments between three state landowners in Nizhneleninskoye—the Federal Security Service, the state forestry fund and municipal authorities.” In fact, in describing the “competing bureaucratic, security and financial interests…stalling even strategic projects backed by the Kremlin” as “a thicket,”29the reporter used the same language as the anticommons scholars do when they refer to patent thickets impeding innovation. Echoing Ryzhova’s analysis, the verdict on the Amur River bridge emphasized the perverse effects of multiple rights holders claiming stakes in developing a valuable resource: “Mr. Putin has strengthened and empowered the Russian state and disciplined it to speak with one voice in public. But its various agencies rarely move in lock step or swiftly, particularly when large sums of money are at stake for well-connected insiders.”30

Explaining the debacle, Viktor Larin highlighted the contribution of “the China threat syndrome” to the anticommons on the Amur. Larin said that critical elites “have not made the turn psychologically” and continued to see China as a potential enemy rather than as a reliable economic partner. “So while the Kremlin has endorsed the bridge, others lower in the Russian government ranks, Mr. Larin said, have stalled, with finance officials in Moscow complaining about the cost and military officers asking, ‘Why build a bridge over which Chinese tanks can come?’”31

Microcase #3: The Far Eastern Hectare

Uncertainty-based fears are part and parcel of the anticommons. If rights holders see a resource as lucrative in the long term but lack funds to develop it, they would be apprehensive that better-endowed actors could emerge and claim the resource. This is very much the story of Moscow’s perennial fears of Chinese landownership in the RFE. As Primorskii governor general (1888-1898) Pavel Untenberger stated: “I prefer this land to be a Russian desert rather than a Chinese oasis.” As Russia’s then first deputy prime minister Dmitry Medvedev warned in 2005: “If we do not develop toward the East, there will be no united Russia… cold and devastation will rule our Far East. Or, it will be developed by someone other than us.”32

A most telling recent manifestation of Moscow’s efforts to solve this dilemma is its “Far Eastern Hectare” program to hand out 100 square yards a person in designated Far Eastern counties to would-be pioneers. Local residents could apply since June 1, 2016. All Russian citizens are eligible starting February 1, 2017.33 Yet, while conceived as a demographic and economic bulwark to putative Chinese settlement, the program ran into the anticommons trap from the outset. Diagnostic evidence came from Primorskii krai, where the Khankaisk county executive, Vladimir Mishchenko, told The New York Times in mid-2016 that “while the area might look empty…nearly all the land is already owned or at least claimed by somebody.” Mishchenko’s list of those “somebodies” reveals powerful rights claimants: the water authority, municipal governments, the border service (part of the FSB), the Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance, and the forest service.34

A posting on Republic.ru (formerly Slon.ru)—a popular Russian analytic website for the most part editorially independent from the Kremlin—represented a widespread concern: “Owning land sounds good in theory, but in practice without roads and utilities…land is a worthless asset in the modern world. Instead of happy life, the owners of those free acres will be treading on the doormats of government agencies begging them to at least put through the power lines to their places…Granted, it is possible that in a couple of years we will be shown an idyllic commune of the Far Eastern Robinson Crusoes, but the whole point of its existence—as is the whole point of the free hectares initiative—will be to give the media something the authorities could brag about.”35

In sum, rather than solving the anticommons problem, the Kremlin outsourced it to individuals and framed this outsourcing as a patriotic act to rise up to the China threat.

Conclusions

The Russian Far East is in a double bind. First, uprooting the anticommons problem would require stripping multiple and powerful federal agencies of their turf claims. But because such restrictions stand to weaken the Kremlin’s power vertical—while the China threat syndrome makes political decentralization look risky—, the Kremlin is unlikely to undertake major institutional reform. Second, while the anticommons mechanisms are, thus, likely to remain in place—at least for the duration of the current leadership—the continuation of economic investment from Moscow into RFE development cannot be taken for granted. Larin in a 2013 study presents convincing evidence that since the middle of the 19th century the Kremlin would only make a push to develop the Russian Far East “when one or several events came to be perceived in Moscow as a threat to its territorial possessions on the Pacific.”36 Larin documented each major push, occurring every 25-30 years and lasting about 8-10 years.37

When one considers the RFE’s economic development prospects, the realistic choice is between the Amur anticommons with major investment from Moscow and the Amur anticommons without investment from Moscow. The former is likely to be wasteful but generate some growth in certain sectors and locations in the RFE. The second is likely to engender developmental stagnation and decline. Meanwhile, with the current policies in place, the success of RFE development will continue to depend on how much time and reputational capital Putin will devote to micromanaging regional issues in such a way as to reduce the turf-guarding behavior in the RFE of the very institutions—Russia’s “new nobility”—that have sustained his hold on power over the last sixteen years.38











I've always thought that the Northeast has to be recovered somehow- not the entire area lost, since the Russkies will never part with such an extensive area(even though it was never theirs to begin with)- but at least just the area south of the Heilongjiang river(treaty of Aihui) from Boli all the way to the mouth facing Kuye island. WIthout the coast, the 'Rusty Northeast Belt' will never be revitalised. They are 'rusty' to this day due to the lack of nearby sovereign ocean-accessing ports(with the nearest one much further south at Yingkou) to export goods and materials, of which Jilin and Heilongjiang are very rich in. Regain the Northeastern coast and bam(!) up goes all the infrastructure and ports = the fortunes of Jilin and Heilognjiang would be changed.

Serious thoughts on this guys? Very keen on your input

@TaiShang @Shotgunner51 @ahojunk @AndrewJin @Beast @beijingwalker
 
Last edited:
Rapid economic rise in the last two decades of the adjacent Chinese borderlands is a telling counterpoint to the developmental sluggishness in the Russian Far East. Exhibit A is the town of Nizhneleninskoe in the Jewish Autonomous District on the Amur River, where economic prospects dimmed since the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Far East development subsidies, and population shrank from 30,000 in 1991 to 18,000 at present.

Visiting the town in mid-July 2016, Andrew Higgins of The New York Times, wrote: “…the huge steel bridge thrusts out from the Chinese side of the Amur River, stretching more than a mile across the turbid waters that divide the world’s most populous nation from its biggest. Then something strange happens: The bridge abruptly stops, hanging in the air high above the river just short of the Russian shore.”8 If completed, the bridge would shorten the route for shipping the Russian iron ore to a local Chinese steel mill from 646 to 145 miles. The bridge project has enjoyed high-level support from Moscow. But while the Chinese construction companies completed their two-kilometer portion of the bridge in 2014, the Russian companies were yet to start work on 309 meters of their portion of the bridge in mid-2016. The regional government promised at the time the bridge would be completed by June 2018 at the cost of about USD 140mn. Expressing his frustration over this and other construction delays on the Russian side—including the stalling of the Power of Siberia gas pipeline construction—, China’s former ambassador to Russia, Li Fenglin, admonished Russian officials at a May 2016 conference in Moscow: “Don’t just drag your feet. You should start working energetically.”9

Exhibit B is the Transborder Trade and Economic Complex (PTEK) at the juncture of Pogranichnyi and Suifenhe in Primorskii krai. When I interviewed former vice-governor Vladimir Stegnii in October 2005 he showed me the drawings and blueprints for this PTEK and explained how the Chinese and Russian citizens would be able to drive in there without visas—effectively gaining access to each country’s territory visa- and hassle-free. He saw the reduction in transaction costs as a boost to joint business ventures, shopping, recreation, and education. The complex, he explained, would mutually acculturate the residents of China and Russia’s borderlands and galvanize the expansion of bilateral social and economic relations throughout the Far East and beyond. In June 2015, the officials from China and Russia held an opening ceremony of Phase One of the complex. Yet, as late as October 28, 2016, Vladivostok News was still lamenting that PTEK remained in limbo: “The ribbon-cutting and the festive fanfares did not resolve anything: without changes in rules and regulations [in Moscow], for which political will is needed, this PTEK remains the graveyard of good intentions.”10 Still being required to secure a visa or the services of a tour agency that had a license to operate visa-free, the Russian residents have little rationale to favor PTEK over other locations in China. At the time of this writing, the decision to allow Russians visa-free travel to PTEK was still making its way through a special working group of the Federation Council. This sort of red tape would also explain the stunning cross-border asymmetry of the PTEK—a shopping center in what looks like an office building plus a wooden Orthodox chapel on the Russian side versus on the China side slick shopping streets, high rises, and a palatial 354-guestroom Holiday Inn Suifenhe with a huge artificial lake that could give top Las Vegas properties a run for their money.11

Exhibit C of this developmental lopsidedness is the railroad crossing the border between Zabaikal’sk and Manzhouli. The cities have been developing a joint transborder trade and economic zone, their own PTEK. But the Welcome to China gate now looms about ten times larger than the Welcome to Russia gate across the border. Manzhouli also built a vast Russian-themed shopping and recreation area with а (smaller) replica of St. Basil’s Cathedral, fountains, and ponds, whereas Zabaikal’sk can boast nothing of the kind.




Russian partnership in infrastructure-building with china and any countries is always delayed on the former's side- especially when crossborderland areas are always the most developed of any 2 countries in order to facilitate international land trade.

How can this kinda strategic partnership be acceptable? it's always the Russians f**king up. In this aspect, they are of no difference with certain South asian country- if not worse.
 
Last edited:
Peaceful and friendly China Russia border . sports events on the frozen border river
 

Latest posts

Back
Top Bottom