What is absolutely essential given a review of the threats Pakistan faces in 2020 is a massive investment in FC which must be increasd in manpower and equipped with assets commensurate with threats. The Turkish Jandarma shopuld be used as a template. The FC needs -
- probably 50% increase in manpower.
- a dedicated helicopter wing or air wing with close support aircraft like Tucanos and or drones for air recons.
- MRAPS in the range of 600 plus
- improved firepower
- a intelligence wing
- improved communications
All the above done already (plus a SF wing while helis were sent back to US) except MRAPs.
Has Ijaz Shah requested MRAPs for FC from EME wksps and depots?
The problem is FC is is not a "show off" outfit and fighting insurgents in wilds of Balochistan not exactly romantic compared to naval bases with star studed admirals living in their naval contonments. Instead some poor boy sat in bak of a Toyota gets shot like as if he is a clay pigeon quickly forgotten the next day by the media but cried over by his his family for decades. As there are plenty of poor boys ready to don the uniform for paltry rupees to get shot it the powers that be don't give a flying frigg.
That is sad.
There is an atmosphere of desperation already here, itching to point fingers towards Pakistani Military's top brass to blame for this loss. However that desperation or hatred is so blind and uncanny that members don't even know what to blame else than DHA plots, bullet proof cars and like you said flashy Naval boats. I can reply in detail about Navy VS FC procurements but I have discussed FC and such incidents so many times and this issue just keeps going in circles.
Look at the incident rationally. Those are desperate to blame "Army Top brass" or Army officers know by now that FC is commanded by Army officers and drawbacks can be identified so this is where fingers can be pointed towards the Army officers serving in FC. This incident is a failure in intelligence and planning. Forget the drones. There was no under cover advance party - whether travelling in a 1990s indus corolla or a public transport bus. Call it recon on the route. Troops in plain clothes on ground inter mixed with public or undercover intel agents watching the routes could have spotted the movement of insurgents taking positions.
Next, during convoy movement, the areas for potential ambushes are marked on the map. These are usually turns, such as in this incident. The ambush was set up after the turn. Tight spots like bridges or where road narrows or where convoy has to slow down. The vehicle slows down on the turn and then attains speed again. So although the spot was not perfect yet the gamble paid off. Convoy speed used be 65 Kmph in early 2000's which changed to firstly 80kmph and then to 100 Kmph and some even to 120 kmph.
Another thing is spotters in convoy, usually the soldier manning LMG or officer with binoculars checking hill tops, trees, sides of roads, behaviour of traffic ahead of them like sudden brakes or driving pattern, basically looking for signs of trouble on the road and off the road.
Then seating position of the troops. In the Military escort vehs, the soldiers sit with their guns ready, looking outwards, covering almost 360 deg of vehs. This position helps in firing with in 3 seconds after the attackers are spotted and bringing down the first attacker in next 2 seconds and so on. Thats a response time of 5 seconds to kill the first attacker expected from SSG. This was FC so could have gone upto 7 or 10 secs but seating position should have been concise. Its seen that one of the Hilux was carrying supplies, which is again debatable that why should escort vehicle carry supplies. It not only adds to weight but also compromises seating positions for firing.
There are other planning and technical flaws too for this convoy preparation, i have just mentioned a few. This is where the responsible officer is taken at task. Not DHA plots or other crap of accusing top brass seen in all the pages. OGDCL provided own security guards so the company was serious about safety of its employees.
The insurgents took their leisure time to set up and position themselves. They had prioritised targets from the time the convoy left from premises. Its like they had an insider or at least spotters at different locations updating them of movement. They knew which vehicle to hit to set the trap, its the first and last usually. Their targets were not company employees, their targets was the security contingent. Silver pickup could have been targeted also after the first white hilux crashed. When a vehicle crashes, it will become immobile and unmounted troops are sitting ducks, therefore next target is chosen and taken out, but they didnt. This is an intelligence failure of the FC wing. The intelligence reports are another story where agencies have their own sources and contacts and reporting system. You never know if one of the agencies might have reported to FC about potential threat or activity but proper measures were not taken.
Everybody can cry and scream and curse here, but will someone pick up a pen and write to MOI ? No. All these sympathisers of FC in this thread will not take practical step whatsoever. If somebody has taken any practical step then please come forward as it will be inspirational.
But inshAllah you'll see new platforms VERY shortly.
Will you give a tutorial on convoy movement especially the changes which take place when its a mix of heavier (MRAPs) vehs and light vehs (pick ups/SUVs). Also the planning, intelligence, movement orders and firing orders etc ?
