BATMAN
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Energon
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Actually this is crap, Indian technocrats seem to be doing more than fine based on their performance in the private sector and the demand they have in international job markets (for more than just "cyber slavery").
The failure is that of inefficient state run enterprises of yesteryear. The solution is simple; turn the job over to the private sector where the real talent lies.
By the looks of what they have done with other dud industries like steel, automotive, IT/software, ship building etc. over the last decade and a half makes it fairly easy to predict what a privatized military industrial complex has in store for India.
ejaz007
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Indian Army Rejects Competitive Trials of Arjun Main Battle Tank
Dated 22/7/2008
In a desperate bid to save the main battle tank (MBT) Arjun it has developed, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) had suggested a joint assessment of the vehicle with the Indian Army to keep the project alive but this has been summarily rejected by the army.
The army is also ambiguous on a suggestion by the DRDO that the tank be assessed head-to-head with the T-90 MBTs the army currently operates. Following the armys adverse report on the tanks after winter trials last year, the DRDO had suggested a joint assessment be conducted but the army refused this outright, a defence ministry official told IANS.
On its part, the Indian Army has made it clear that it will buy no more than the 124 Arjuns it has contracted for because it is unhappy with the tank on various counts. This apart, the army says the Arjun can at best remain in service for 5 to 10 years while it is looking 20 years ahead and needs a futuristic MBT. The army had told a key parliamentary panel earlier this year that the Arjun, which has been in development for the last 36 years, failed to deliver at the winter trials conducted in the Rajasthan desert last year. The army said that many improvements would have to be carried out before it was satisfied with the tank.
Fourteen Arjun tanks were handed over to the Indian Army for user trials last year but were returned to the manufacturer - the Combat Vehicles Development Establishment - with a list of defects. These included a deficient engine and fire control system, inaccuracy of its guns, low speeds in tactical areas - principally the desert - and the tanks inability to operate in temperatures above 50 degrees Celsius. Allegations of sabotage had surfaced after the winter trials.
Following these reports, the DRDO sought a joint trial of Arjun and the T-90, but the army has not taken a clear stand on this, the official said. Drawing a comparison between the two tanks, DRDO says Arjun has a greater power-to-weight ratio, a hydro-pneumatic suspension for a more comfortable ride, a stable platform to fire on the move, and a superior fire control system.
The Arjun costs Rs.168 million while the T-90 costs around Rs.120 million. But then, the Arjun compares favourably with contemporary western MBTs of its class that cost in the range of Rs.170 to 240 million, a DRDO official said. Minister of State for Defence Production Rao Inderjit Singh has also hinted at a conspiracy to sabotage the Arjun tank. The possibility of sabotage needs to be examined. The German engines fitted in the tanks were performing well for the past 15 years. I wonder what has happened to them overnight, Singh had said in April, while commenting on the armys assessment after the tanks winter trials.
On its part, the army has rejected any suggestions of sabotage. Arjun was meant to supplement and eventually replace the Soviet-era T-72 MBTs that were first inducted in the early 1980s.
However, delays in the Arjun project and Pakistans decision to purchase the T-80 from Ukraine prompted India to order 310 T-90s, an upgraded version of the T-72, in 2001. Of these, 186 were assembled from kits at the Heavy Vehicles Factory at Avadi, near Chennai. An agreement was also signed for the licensed production of another 1,000 T-90s.
With the development of the Arjun delayed further, India last year signed a fresh contract with Russia to buy 330 more T-90s
Indian Army Rejects Competitive Trials of Arjun Main Battle Tank | India Defence
Dated 22/7/2008
In a desperate bid to save the main battle tank (MBT) Arjun it has developed, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) had suggested a joint assessment of the vehicle with the Indian Army to keep the project alive but this has been summarily rejected by the army.
The army is also ambiguous on a suggestion by the DRDO that the tank be assessed head-to-head with the T-90 MBTs the army currently operates. Following the armys adverse report on the tanks after winter trials last year, the DRDO had suggested a joint assessment be conducted but the army refused this outright, a defence ministry official told IANS.
On its part, the Indian Army has made it clear that it will buy no more than the 124 Arjuns it has contracted for because it is unhappy with the tank on various counts. This apart, the army says the Arjun can at best remain in service for 5 to 10 years while it is looking 20 years ahead and needs a futuristic MBT. The army had told a key parliamentary panel earlier this year that the Arjun, which has been in development for the last 36 years, failed to deliver at the winter trials conducted in the Rajasthan desert last year. The army said that many improvements would have to be carried out before it was satisfied with the tank.
Fourteen Arjun tanks were handed over to the Indian Army for user trials last year but were returned to the manufacturer - the Combat Vehicles Development Establishment - with a list of defects. These included a deficient engine and fire control system, inaccuracy of its guns, low speeds in tactical areas - principally the desert - and the tanks inability to operate in temperatures above 50 degrees Celsius. Allegations of sabotage had surfaced after the winter trials.
Following these reports, the DRDO sought a joint trial of Arjun and the T-90, but the army has not taken a clear stand on this, the official said. Drawing a comparison between the two tanks, DRDO says Arjun has a greater power-to-weight ratio, a hydro-pneumatic suspension for a more comfortable ride, a stable platform to fire on the move, and a superior fire control system.
The Arjun costs Rs.168 million while the T-90 costs around Rs.120 million. But then, the Arjun compares favourably with contemporary western MBTs of its class that cost in the range of Rs.170 to 240 million, a DRDO official said. Minister of State for Defence Production Rao Inderjit Singh has also hinted at a conspiracy to sabotage the Arjun tank. The possibility of sabotage needs to be examined. The German engines fitted in the tanks were performing well for the past 15 years. I wonder what has happened to them overnight, Singh had said in April, while commenting on the armys assessment after the tanks winter trials.
On its part, the army has rejected any suggestions of sabotage. Arjun was meant to supplement and eventually replace the Soviet-era T-72 MBTs that were first inducted in the early 1980s.
However, delays in the Arjun project and Pakistans decision to purchase the T-80 from Ukraine prompted India to order 310 T-90s, an upgraded version of the T-72, in 2001. Of these, 186 were assembled from kits at the Heavy Vehicles Factory at Avadi, near Chennai. An agreement was also signed for the licensed production of another 1,000 T-90s.
With the development of the Arjun delayed further, India last year signed a fresh contract with Russia to buy 330 more T-90s
Indian Army Rejects Competitive Trials of Arjun Main Battle Tank | India Defence
nitesh
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The Hindu Business Line : Give Arjun a fighting chance
Give Arjun a fighting chance
Those of us who want to see India emerge as a nation that produces its own weapons to contemporary standards would be dismayed and even perturbed at reports that Arjun, the Main Battle Tank developed after three decades of sweat and toil, will be taken off production even before it started rolling out in decent numbers. Apparently, this proposal is because Arjun has failed to meet the expectations — never mind the moving goal posts were set by the Army itself all alo ng; and the Army is now looking for state-of-the-art requirements 20 years hence. This is a legitimate desire if there is no urgent need to replace the ageing fleet of T-55s and T-72s.
Going by past experience, even advanced countries take a decade or more to bring about truly path-breaking improvements in weapon platforms. After 13 years, T-95 is still a work in progress in Russia. If one has a measure of what is being attempted in shaping futuristic tanks, there are several areas — electro magnetic armour, unmanned turret, use of composites and lighter chassis, total missile launching facility and, more importantly, choosing invisibility over invincibility, all in their infancy in development.
Therefore, even those who are called upon to draw RFPs (Request For Proposal) will only be able to put together, as in old times, a mélange of promised and mostly untested systems, cut and pasted from glossy brochures from the aggressive arms merchants or a mere wish-list. We must consider our terrain and battle conditions and not opt for tanks just because they are from Russia or the US or appear exciting in a demo DVD.
Anyone who has followed the chequered history of Arjun’s development would most certainly confirm that the Army has been less than fair in its handling of issues arising out of inducting indigenous tanks and deploying them.
Under the teeth of opposition from the Army, though unarticulated in public, the then Defence Minister, Mr George Fernandes, authorised production of 124 numbers in March 2000 after satisfying himself that all production issues were settled and this batch of 124 could be delivered by 2003-2004, according to his statement in Parliament then.
Army’s Involvement In Development
(Thumbnail is attached below)
Army, as is its wont, was not impressed with Arjun even at this stage although on all parameters such as horse power, speed, suspension, mobility, rifled barrel, imagers and communication sets, it was way ahead of the Soviet tanks that the Army is besotted with. The irony is that, through the years, in the development era of Arjun, Generals of the calibre of Gen Shankar Roy Choudhuri, who later went on to become Rajya Sabha MP, were involved as Project Heads, Chairmen and Members of Steering Committees. The Vice-Chief of Army staff was always associated with every step of the decision-making.
Yet, after ostensibly being satisfied according to averments made in public at the highest levels of Chief Of Staff, the Army insisted on testing the equipment repeatedly almost every winter and every summer, in every desert and every mountain, making each piece produced a prototype. The DRDO was will-nilly forced to commit itself to such procedures as would have been unimaginable to be imposed on any foreign supplier.
Contrast this with the case of the T-72 or T-90. The Soviets or Russians sent a few tanks for testing and the Army made up its mind in a matter of less than two or three years on quantity and variants, convinced the civilian bureaucracy and ordered hundreds of them at one go. It is not that T-72s or T-90s functioned without any technical glitches in operation and maintenance. Even now, T90s are reportedly yet to overcome the problem of losing accuracy due to overheating, although they were cleared after due desert trials.
T72s have had their share of snags such as bursting of barrels, inconsistent accuracy, heating of engines, faulty ammunition loading and so on. Their communication sets are still primitive.
The laser range finders had to be sent back to the manufacturer in bulk for rectification. Overall, all problems were satisfactorily resolved as everyone involved climbed the learning curve.
Parliamentary Committee Report
It was only a year ago, the 14th parliamentary report by the Ministry of Defence stated that, Arjun Tank Mark-II production will be taken up after the successful completion of the first order of 124 Arjun tanks. The same report stated that, “MBT Arjun is a 60-tonne class battle tank with state of the art opto-electronic power-packed control system, weapon management system and high performance suspension. It is a product unique in its class, specifically configured for the requirements of the Indian Army.
Unlike the T-90 tank, which was primarily built for Russian Armed Forces, adapted by the Indian Army for certain specific roles, this T-90 is a 50-tonne class vehicle which does not have some of the advanced features of MBT Arjun. But it is an improved system over T-72 tank.
However, it is important to know that MBT Arjun costs Rs 17.20 crore per system from the production line and is Rs 6-8 crore cheaper than its contemporary system in the West. It is understood that T-90 tank costs approximately Rs 12 crore and is yet to be indigenised.
MBT Arjun’s firing accuracy is far superior to the other two tanks. It has a second generation thermal imager and can engage targets at 2,500 meters. Its 1,400 hp engine ensures excellent mobility performance. It has capability to fire Laser Homing Anti Tank (LAHAT) missile from the barrel of the gun. Only T-90 tank has such capability. MBT Arjun has good export potential in the African countries due to its superior features vis-a-vis contemporary MBTs. (Table)
Arjun’s Woes
However, in May this year, in reply to a Parliament question, the Defence Minister informed that Arjun was found to have low accuracy, frequent break-down of power packs and problems with its gun barrel in the recent accelerated user-cum-reliability trials. The tanks also had problems of consistency, recorded failure of hydro-pneumatic suspension units and shearing of top rolls.
All Arjun’s problems except engine failure, were reported to have been resolved promptly. However, for engine failure, the Army field teams also have to bear some accountability as they are known to flog the vehicle at top speeds for long periods as the rides are smooth with superior hydro-pneumatic suspension compared to T-72s. This, in fact, prompted the suppliers Powerpack to install data loggers and automatic computer controls to prevent overheating.
This like the black box of an aircraft gave the complete log of the use of the vehicle but also regulated the speed on sensing overheating. It is learnt that results of close monitoring are being analysed and the engineers are confident that the problem can be fixed soon.
Continued lack Of Synergy
However, despite lofty exhortations from the Prime Minister downwards, what has been most difficult to achieve and standing in the way of making Arjun, a success is the lack of synergy between the user, on the one side, and the developer on the other.
Arjun is not treated with the same deference as other Russian tanks, either because there is reluctance to study and follow the manual of operations and maintenance provided by the producer or because they find it difficult to switch from the T-72 mode.
Although several recommendations of Dr Rama Rao Committee for revamping Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) are under serious consideration for implementation, the immediate need in the case of Arjun is to thwart any misguided attempts by the Army to throw the baby with the bath water. The time, effort and money spent on development of indigenous fighting equipment, including Arjun, should not be squandered away in pursuit of pipe-dreams on technology or mindless fascination for foreign equipment.
(The author is former Member, Ordnance Factories.)
Give Arjun a fighting chance
Those of us who want to see India emerge as a nation that produces its own weapons to contemporary standards would be dismayed and even perturbed at reports that Arjun, the Main Battle Tank developed after three decades of sweat and toil, will be taken off production even before it started rolling out in decent numbers. Apparently, this proposal is because Arjun has failed to meet the expectations — never mind the moving goal posts were set by the Army itself all alo ng; and the Army is now looking for state-of-the-art requirements 20 years hence. This is a legitimate desire if there is no urgent need to replace the ageing fleet of T-55s and T-72s.
Going by past experience, even advanced countries take a decade or more to bring about truly path-breaking improvements in weapon platforms. After 13 years, T-95 is still a work in progress in Russia. If one has a measure of what is being attempted in shaping futuristic tanks, there are several areas — electro magnetic armour, unmanned turret, use of composites and lighter chassis, total missile launching facility and, more importantly, choosing invisibility over invincibility, all in their infancy in development.
Therefore, even those who are called upon to draw RFPs (Request For Proposal) will only be able to put together, as in old times, a mélange of promised and mostly untested systems, cut and pasted from glossy brochures from the aggressive arms merchants or a mere wish-list. We must consider our terrain and battle conditions and not opt for tanks just because they are from Russia or the US or appear exciting in a demo DVD.
Anyone who has followed the chequered history of Arjun’s development would most certainly confirm that the Army has been less than fair in its handling of issues arising out of inducting indigenous tanks and deploying them.
Under the teeth of opposition from the Army, though unarticulated in public, the then Defence Minister, Mr George Fernandes, authorised production of 124 numbers in March 2000 after satisfying himself that all production issues were settled and this batch of 124 could be delivered by 2003-2004, according to his statement in Parliament then.
Army’s Involvement In Development
(Thumbnail is attached below)
Army, as is its wont, was not impressed with Arjun even at this stage although on all parameters such as horse power, speed, suspension, mobility, rifled barrel, imagers and communication sets, it was way ahead of the Soviet tanks that the Army is besotted with. The irony is that, through the years, in the development era of Arjun, Generals of the calibre of Gen Shankar Roy Choudhuri, who later went on to become Rajya Sabha MP, were involved as Project Heads, Chairmen and Members of Steering Committees. The Vice-Chief of Army staff was always associated with every step of the decision-making.
Yet, after ostensibly being satisfied according to averments made in public at the highest levels of Chief Of Staff, the Army insisted on testing the equipment repeatedly almost every winter and every summer, in every desert and every mountain, making each piece produced a prototype. The DRDO was will-nilly forced to commit itself to such procedures as would have been unimaginable to be imposed on any foreign supplier.
Contrast this with the case of the T-72 or T-90. The Soviets or Russians sent a few tanks for testing and the Army made up its mind in a matter of less than two or three years on quantity and variants, convinced the civilian bureaucracy and ordered hundreds of them at one go. It is not that T-72s or T-90s functioned without any technical glitches in operation and maintenance. Even now, T90s are reportedly yet to overcome the problem of losing accuracy due to overheating, although they were cleared after due desert trials.
T72s have had their share of snags such as bursting of barrels, inconsistent accuracy, heating of engines, faulty ammunition loading and so on. Their communication sets are still primitive.
The laser range finders had to be sent back to the manufacturer in bulk for rectification. Overall, all problems were satisfactorily resolved as everyone involved climbed the learning curve.
Parliamentary Committee Report
It was only a year ago, the 14th parliamentary report by the Ministry of Defence stated that, Arjun Tank Mark-II production will be taken up after the successful completion of the first order of 124 Arjun tanks. The same report stated that, “MBT Arjun is a 60-tonne class battle tank with state of the art opto-electronic power-packed control system, weapon management system and high performance suspension. It is a product unique in its class, specifically configured for the requirements of the Indian Army.
Unlike the T-90 tank, which was primarily built for Russian Armed Forces, adapted by the Indian Army for certain specific roles, this T-90 is a 50-tonne class vehicle which does not have some of the advanced features of MBT Arjun. But it is an improved system over T-72 tank.
However, it is important to know that MBT Arjun costs Rs 17.20 crore per system from the production line and is Rs 6-8 crore cheaper than its contemporary system in the West. It is understood that T-90 tank costs approximately Rs 12 crore and is yet to be indigenised.
MBT Arjun’s firing accuracy is far superior to the other two tanks. It has a second generation thermal imager and can engage targets at 2,500 meters. Its 1,400 hp engine ensures excellent mobility performance. It has capability to fire Laser Homing Anti Tank (LAHAT) missile from the barrel of the gun. Only T-90 tank has such capability. MBT Arjun has good export potential in the African countries due to its superior features vis-a-vis contemporary MBTs. (Table)
Arjun’s Woes
However, in May this year, in reply to a Parliament question, the Defence Minister informed that Arjun was found to have low accuracy, frequent break-down of power packs and problems with its gun barrel in the recent accelerated user-cum-reliability trials. The tanks also had problems of consistency, recorded failure of hydro-pneumatic suspension units and shearing of top rolls.
All Arjun’s problems except engine failure, were reported to have been resolved promptly. However, for engine failure, the Army field teams also have to bear some accountability as they are known to flog the vehicle at top speeds for long periods as the rides are smooth with superior hydro-pneumatic suspension compared to T-72s. This, in fact, prompted the suppliers Powerpack to install data loggers and automatic computer controls to prevent overheating.
This like the black box of an aircraft gave the complete log of the use of the vehicle but also regulated the speed on sensing overheating. It is learnt that results of close monitoring are being analysed and the engineers are confident that the problem can be fixed soon.
Continued lack Of Synergy
However, despite lofty exhortations from the Prime Minister downwards, what has been most difficult to achieve and standing in the way of making Arjun, a success is the lack of synergy between the user, on the one side, and the developer on the other.
Arjun is not treated with the same deference as other Russian tanks, either because there is reluctance to study and follow the manual of operations and maintenance provided by the producer or because they find it difficult to switch from the T-72 mode.
Although several recommendations of Dr Rama Rao Committee for revamping Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) are under serious consideration for implementation, the immediate need in the case of Arjun is to thwart any misguided attempts by the Army to throw the baby with the bath water. The time, effort and money spent on development of indigenous fighting equipment, including Arjun, should not be squandered away in pursuit of pipe-dreams on technology or mindless fascination for foreign equipment.
(The author is former Member, Ordnance Factories.)
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nitesh
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some new twist in arjun saga:
LiveFist: FORCE Mag's Prasun K Sengupta working on in-depth evolutionary analysis of India's MBT requirements
LiveFist: FORCE Mag's Prasun K Sengupta working on in-depth evolutionary analysis of India's MBT requirements
nitesh
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Ajay sahab is becoming a boxer or what?
check this guys:
Broadsword: It’s War! And you can win it for the Arjun…
check this guys:
Broadsword: It’s War! And you can win it for the Arjun…
jaison
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abhay is just a technology demo ,more ahead
Future ICV should ideally be wheeled and not tracked
A FORCE Report July (2008)
Feature / Report
Modest Presence
Snipers Beware!
Fired up
Amphibious Operations
War Within
The emphasis of the Defence Procurement Procedures — 2008 (DPP-2008), released on August 1, is on ‘speedy procurements and speedy indigenisation without compromising on transparency,’ according to the defence minister, A.K. Antony. Speaking at the recently held ‘international seminar on Future Infantry Combat Vehicle and Future Main Battle Tank (FICV & FMBT)’ organised jointly by the Confederation of Indian Industries and the army’s directorate of mechanised forces, he said that, “The new DPP will bring maximum synergy between the user, the public and private sector in the country.” The minister added that the new purchase policy would promote indigenisation and encourage wider participation on panels doing technical evaluation of indigenously designed military platforms.
According to Antony, the collaborative and networked defence R&D can go a long way in enabling the nation address technology gaps, match global standards and promote indigenisation. The defence minister was reacting to issues raised earlier by the chairman, CII’s National Committee on Defence, Atul Kirloskar. In a spirited speech, reflecting the exasperation of the private sector, Kirloskar made four points. One, the identification of Raksha Udyog Ratna (RUR) should be done soon. This will help the private industry play a meaningful role in the design and development as well as in the production of products. This will also assist the medium and small scale industry participation in defence production. Two, as mentioned in the Kelkar committee report, the private sector should be involved alongside the public sector right from the conceptualisation state as this will provide a level playing field to the former. Three, as the private industry is willing to invest in the defence sector, this is only possible if the Defence Acquisition Board allows it the opportunities to do so. And lastly, the government should involve both the public and private sector in product development strategies that has a long gestation period. The need is to identify and focus on key technologies that a country does not get from outside and has to develop on its own. All in all, the underlying message in all the issues raised by Kirloskar was that the private sector was ready, has the expertise, is willing to invest, and instead of a competitor it ought to be recognised as a complementing partner to the public sector. For this reason, the naming of the RUR companies in the private sector is an essential requirement that should not be delayed further.
As if seconding what Kirloskar had said, the chief of army staff, General Deepak Kapoor, who was the guest of honour at the function, dwelled upon the importance of new technologies. “Future wars, whether conventional or sub-conventional and held under the nuclear weapons shadow, will be technology driven,” he said, adding that, “the long gestation period of weapons’ development would need to be curtailed, and given the short shelf life of emerging technologies, the industry will be called upon to provide the needed edge.” Specifically on the FICV & FMBT, the army chief listed the requirements of ‘firepower, survivability, situational awareness, and mobility’ as the essence of the new platforms. He made it clear that land-based forces will remain the primary elements for guarding India’s national interests, and thus the need for mechanised forces cannot be undermined.
In his address, the Director General, Mechanised Forces, Lt Gen. Dalip Bhardwaj while agreeing with the army chief’s observation, said that at times the user is not aware of the fast changing technologies, and hence is unable to firm up the General Staff Qualitative Requirement (GSQR). It is the scientist (Defence Research and Development Organisation) that ‘should not give the user what he wants, but what he needs.’ He emphasised on the joint facilitation approach between the DRDO and the user right from the GSQR stage. According to him, three technologies that will impact upon deciding the FICV & FMBT are: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities for full situation awareness; Command, Control, Computers, Co-ordination and Intelligence (C4I) for real time engagement of targets; and precision firepower. In short, the FICV & FBMT will need to be ‘agile, fully networked and capable for conventional warfare.’ And, this is what the mechanised forces are looking for in its ‘threat cum capability’ based force level requirement. The DG added that few new MBTs and ICVs have been made globally since 1990, as after that the emphasis has been on upgrades. This is also the case with India, and like elsewhere, India will be seriously looking for the FICV & FMBT to serve it beyond 2020.
Future ICV should ideally be wheeled and not tracked
A FORCE Report July (2008)
Feature / Report
Modest Presence
Snipers Beware!
Fired up
Amphibious Operations
War Within
The emphasis of the Defence Procurement Procedures — 2008 (DPP-2008), released on August 1, is on ‘speedy procurements and speedy indigenisation without compromising on transparency,’ according to the defence minister, A.K. Antony. Speaking at the recently held ‘international seminar on Future Infantry Combat Vehicle and Future Main Battle Tank (FICV & FMBT)’ organised jointly by the Confederation of Indian Industries and the army’s directorate of mechanised forces, he said that, “The new DPP will bring maximum synergy between the user, the public and private sector in the country.” The minister added that the new purchase policy would promote indigenisation and encourage wider participation on panels doing technical evaluation of indigenously designed military platforms.
According to Antony, the collaborative and networked defence R&D can go a long way in enabling the nation address technology gaps, match global standards and promote indigenisation. The defence minister was reacting to issues raised earlier by the chairman, CII’s National Committee on Defence, Atul Kirloskar. In a spirited speech, reflecting the exasperation of the private sector, Kirloskar made four points. One, the identification of Raksha Udyog Ratna (RUR) should be done soon. This will help the private industry play a meaningful role in the design and development as well as in the production of products. This will also assist the medium and small scale industry participation in defence production. Two, as mentioned in the Kelkar committee report, the private sector should be involved alongside the public sector right from the conceptualisation state as this will provide a level playing field to the former. Three, as the private industry is willing to invest in the defence sector, this is only possible if the Defence Acquisition Board allows it the opportunities to do so. And lastly, the government should involve both the public and private sector in product development strategies that has a long gestation period. The need is to identify and focus on key technologies that a country does not get from outside and has to develop on its own. All in all, the underlying message in all the issues raised by Kirloskar was that the private sector was ready, has the expertise, is willing to invest, and instead of a competitor it ought to be recognised as a complementing partner to the public sector. For this reason, the naming of the RUR companies in the private sector is an essential requirement that should not be delayed further.
As if seconding what Kirloskar had said, the chief of army staff, General Deepak Kapoor, who was the guest of honour at the function, dwelled upon the importance of new technologies. “Future wars, whether conventional or sub-conventional and held under the nuclear weapons shadow, will be technology driven,” he said, adding that, “the long gestation period of weapons’ development would need to be curtailed, and given the short shelf life of emerging technologies, the industry will be called upon to provide the needed edge.” Specifically on the FICV & FMBT, the army chief listed the requirements of ‘firepower, survivability, situational awareness, and mobility’ as the essence of the new platforms. He made it clear that land-based forces will remain the primary elements for guarding India’s national interests, and thus the need for mechanised forces cannot be undermined.
In his address, the Director General, Mechanised Forces, Lt Gen. Dalip Bhardwaj while agreeing with the army chief’s observation, said that at times the user is not aware of the fast changing technologies, and hence is unable to firm up the General Staff Qualitative Requirement (GSQR). It is the scientist (Defence Research and Development Organisation) that ‘should not give the user what he wants, but what he needs.’ He emphasised on the joint facilitation approach between the DRDO and the user right from the GSQR stage. According to him, three technologies that will impact upon deciding the FICV & FMBT are: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities for full situation awareness; Command, Control, Computers, Co-ordination and Intelligence (C4I) for real time engagement of targets; and precision firepower. In short, the FICV & FBMT will need to be ‘agile, fully networked and capable for conventional warfare.’ And, this is what the mechanised forces are looking for in its ‘threat cum capability’ based force level requirement. The DG added that few new MBTs and ICVs have been made globally since 1990, as after that the emphasis has been on upgrades. This is also the case with India, and like elsewhere, India will be seriously looking for the FICV & FMBT to serve it beyond 2020.
nitesh
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RIA Novosti - World - India eyes new-generation Russian tank
India eyes new-generation Russian tank
16:06 | 19/ 08/ 2008
MOSCOW, August 19 (RIA Novosti) - India could consider plans to produce a new-generation tank jointly with Russia, the managing director of the BrahMos Aerospace joint venture said on Tuesday.
Sivathanu Pillai said that while the new tank had yet to be developed, it could be built in Russia. He offered no indication of when the project could be launched, however.
Russian experts earlier said Russia and India could launch production of a new tank in the near future.
India currently assembles T-90S main battle tanks under a Russian license.
The T-90S version is in service with the Indian Army, and the local production of T-90S Bhishma tanks started recently in India.
In 2001, India bought 310 T-90S tanks from Russia.
Established in 1998, BrahMos Aerospace designs, produces and markets supersonic missiles, whose sea-based and land-based versions have been successfully tested and put into service with the Indian army and navy.
India eyes new-generation Russian tank
16:06 | 19/ 08/ 2008
MOSCOW, August 19 (RIA Novosti) - India could consider plans to produce a new-generation tank jointly with Russia, the managing director of the BrahMos Aerospace joint venture said on Tuesday.
Sivathanu Pillai said that while the new tank had yet to be developed, it could be built in Russia. He offered no indication of when the project could be launched, however.
Russian experts earlier said Russia and India could launch production of a new tank in the near future.
India currently assembles T-90S main battle tanks under a Russian license.
The T-90S version is in service with the Indian Army, and the local production of T-90S Bhishma tanks started recently in India.
In 2001, India bought 310 T-90S tanks from Russia.
Established in 1998, BrahMos Aerospace designs, produces and markets supersonic missiles, whose sea-based and land-based versions have been successfully tested and put into service with the Indian army and navy.
nitesh
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Russia agrees to transfer key technology for T-90 tanks - Howrah News Service - Latest news and headlines on Howrah and West Bengal
Russia agrees to transfer key technology for T-90 tanks
After months of acrimony, Russia has finally agreed to transfer key technology for the frontline T-90 tanks enabling Indian armament factories to now go ahead full steam to produce these weapon platforms indigenously.
"Russians have finally agreed to supply specifications of the T-90 tank barrels by end of this year," a top Defence ministry official said here today after the two-day long intensive deliberations between the two countries.
The delay in providing the specifications had held up the indigenous production of the T-90 tanks at the Avadi Heavy Vehicles Factory.
India and Russia have signed agreements for delivery of almost 1,200 T-90 tanks at a cost of a staggering $ 1.2 billion.
The deal, concluded in three tranches over the past five years, also specifies transfer of technology for production of another 1,000 to 1,500 tanks in India.
At the 8th meeting of the Indo-Russian working group on shipbuilding, aviation and land systems, Moscow also agreed to full product support for indigenous production of these tanks.
"The Russian side have agreed that the delivery schedule mutually accepted by the two countries in June this year would be maintained," the official said.
With this crucial agreement, it has become apparent that the Indian army would continue to rely on the Russian tanks as its main battle tanks. This is significant as the indigenous Arjun tanks have yet to pass the crucial induction trials.
Russia agrees to transfer key technology for T-90 tanks
After months of acrimony, Russia has finally agreed to transfer key technology for the frontline T-90 tanks enabling Indian armament factories to now go ahead full steam to produce these weapon platforms indigenously.
"Russians have finally agreed to supply specifications of the T-90 tank barrels by end of this year," a top Defence ministry official said here today after the two-day long intensive deliberations between the two countries.
The delay in providing the specifications had held up the indigenous production of the T-90 tanks at the Avadi Heavy Vehicles Factory.
India and Russia have signed agreements for delivery of almost 1,200 T-90 tanks at a cost of a staggering $ 1.2 billion.
The deal, concluded in three tranches over the past five years, also specifies transfer of technology for production of another 1,000 to 1,500 tanks in India.
At the 8th meeting of the Indo-Russian working group on shipbuilding, aviation and land systems, Moscow also agreed to full product support for indigenous production of these tanks.
"The Russian side have agreed that the delivery schedule mutually accepted by the two countries in June this year would be maintained," the official said.
With this crucial agreement, it has become apparent that the Indian army would continue to rely on the Russian tanks as its main battle tanks. This is significant as the indigenous Arjun tanks have yet to pass the crucial induction trials.
Interceptor
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If Indian Army rejects the Arjun for argument sake what kind of lost is that for India, is India really dependent on Arjun as I can see most of the work force is made from T-90s.
And who will take the for the blame for it?
And who will take the for the blame for it?
Contrarian
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If IA rejects Arjun, the loss would be practically unfathomable. Apart from the millions or billions sunk in it, the loss of experience would hurt the most. The reason why Arjun took or is taking so long to materialize, is that India did not have prior experience of building tanks, or the technology or the industrial base. From building armour like Kanchan, etc to even the body. The amount of research that has gone into Arjun is mind boggling and it will all be lost.
And if for arguments sake, India decides to build a tank again in the future, it would have to go through with the learning curve AGAIN, it would again take 15 years to develop the tank as the contemporary tank technologies of that time would not be present.
The best way forward would have been to induct say 300 tanks, signifcant enough in number that the army still wants it to get better, and not so high that if the product does not perform to the required level, the OR of the Army is not compromised if the need arises suddenly. Just like the Israeli's did it with Merkava. Induct it even if it is bad, then make incremental changes/block upgrades, whatever.
However with recent news reports suggesting that India and Russia would collaborate on the next generation tank, maybe, with the experience that India has with Arjun would actually mean that the product is actually co-developed in the true sense and India is not merely funding it. And frankly, as of now, it seems that the Arjun is a far better tank than what Russia has ever produced and that includes their best tank right now-the T-90M. So im guessing it will be something of this case.
And if for arguments sake, India decides to build a tank again in the future, it would have to go through with the learning curve AGAIN, it would again take 15 years to develop the tank as the contemporary tank technologies of that time would not be present.
The best way forward would have been to induct say 300 tanks, signifcant enough in number that the army still wants it to get better, and not so high that if the product does not perform to the required level, the OR of the Army is not compromised if the need arises suddenly. Just like the Israeli's did it with Merkava. Induct it even if it is bad, then make incremental changes/block upgrades, whatever.
However with recent news reports suggesting that India and Russia would collaborate on the next generation tank, maybe, with the experience that India has with Arjun would actually mean that the product is actually co-developed in the true sense and India is not merely funding it. And frankly, as of now, it seems that the Arjun is a far better tank than what Russia has ever produced and that includes their best tank right now-the T-90M. So im guessing it will be something of this case.
nitesh
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Same as above but it says something more
Zee News - T-90 tanks, Russia
Russia agrees to transfer key technology for T-90 tanks
New Delhi, Aug 19: After months of acrimony, Russia has finally agreed to transfer key technology for the frontline T-90 tanks enabling Indian armament factories to now go ahead full steam to produce these weapon platforms indigenously.
"Russians have finally agreed to supply specifications of the T-90 tank barrels by end of this year," a top Defence ministry official said here today after the two-day long intensive deliberations between the two countries.
The delay in providing the specifications had held up the indigenous production of the T-90 tanks at the Avadi Heavy Vehicles Factory.
India and Russia have signed agreements for delivery of almost 1,200 T-90 tanks at a cost of a staggering US 1.2 billion dollars.
The deal, concluded in three tranches over the past five years, also specifies transfer of technology for production of another 1,000 to 1,500 tanks in India.
At the 8th meeting of the Indo-Russian working group on shipbuilding, aviation and land systems, Moscow also agreed to full product support for indigenous production of these tanks.
"The Russian side have agreed that the delivery schedule mutually accepted by the two countries in June this year would be maintained," the official said.
With this crucial agreement, it has become apparent that the Indian army would continue to rely on the Russian tanks as its main battle tanks. This is significant as the indigenous Arjun tanks have yet to pass the crucial induction trials.
Though the Ordnance Factories Board had concluded the technology transfer agreement with Russia way back in 2001, Moscow's reluctance to part with key barrel specifications had held up the indigenous production of the tanks.
At the meeting co-chaired by Ajay Acharya, Additional Secretary, Defence Production, and his Russian counterpart Karavaev Igor Evgeniyevich, New Delhi also submitted its technical requirements for the joint development of a futuristic 5th generation fighter aircraft.
Though the aircraft design is yet to be finalised, the two countries have agreed to step up efforts to ensure that the new fighter enters flying service by 2015.
The key working group met within the framework of the Indo-Russian intergovernmental commission military technical cooperation and also took up issues for supply of Russian sub-systems for India's new range of P-17A warships.
"The talks were held in a highly professional manner. Sides expressed their readiness to take all the necessary measures to further develop cooperation on a mutually beneficial basis," Defence Ministry spokesman Sitanshu Kar said.
Russia has also agreed to open cooperation with the bluechip public sector undertaking Hindustan Aeronautics Limited as an offset partner for future programmes.
Bureau Report
Zee News - T-90 tanks, Russia
Russia agrees to transfer key technology for T-90 tanks
New Delhi, Aug 19: After months of acrimony, Russia has finally agreed to transfer key technology for the frontline T-90 tanks enabling Indian armament factories to now go ahead full steam to produce these weapon platforms indigenously.
"Russians have finally agreed to supply specifications of the T-90 tank barrels by end of this year," a top Defence ministry official said here today after the two-day long intensive deliberations between the two countries.
The delay in providing the specifications had held up the indigenous production of the T-90 tanks at the Avadi Heavy Vehicles Factory.
India and Russia have signed agreements for delivery of almost 1,200 T-90 tanks at a cost of a staggering US 1.2 billion dollars.
The deal, concluded in three tranches over the past five years, also specifies transfer of technology for production of another 1,000 to 1,500 tanks in India.
At the 8th meeting of the Indo-Russian working group on shipbuilding, aviation and land systems, Moscow also agreed to full product support for indigenous production of these tanks.
"The Russian side have agreed that the delivery schedule mutually accepted by the two countries in June this year would be maintained," the official said.
With this crucial agreement, it has become apparent that the Indian army would continue to rely on the Russian tanks as its main battle tanks. This is significant as the indigenous Arjun tanks have yet to pass the crucial induction trials.
Though the Ordnance Factories Board had concluded the technology transfer agreement with Russia way back in 2001, Moscow's reluctance to part with key barrel specifications had held up the indigenous production of the tanks.
At the meeting co-chaired by Ajay Acharya, Additional Secretary, Defence Production, and his Russian counterpart Karavaev Igor Evgeniyevich, New Delhi also submitted its technical requirements for the joint development of a futuristic 5th generation fighter aircraft.
Though the aircraft design is yet to be finalised, the two countries have agreed to step up efforts to ensure that the new fighter enters flying service by 2015.
The key working group met within the framework of the Indo-Russian intergovernmental commission military technical cooperation and also took up issues for supply of Russian sub-systems for India's new range of P-17A warships.
"The talks were held in a highly professional manner. Sides expressed their readiness to take all the necessary measures to further develop cooperation on a mutually beneficial basis," Defence Ministry spokesman Sitanshu Kar said.
Russia has also agreed to open cooperation with the bluechip public sector undertaking Hindustan Aeronautics Limited as an offset partner for future programmes.
Bureau Report
Interceptor
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That might be due to the lack of involvement I would say isn't the Arjun made for the Army upcoming needs? Why would the Army not be interested unless they were not made part of the Project unless it does not meet the Indian Army requirements?
When I look at the specs of the Arjun it is just over gadgeted and its not really specifically addressing a specific purpose, is it a force multiplier is it a front line weapon, whats its main purpose other than it is MBT but what was its main use for.
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