ALH Dhruv Crashes At Ecuador Military Parade

[Gideon]

Ecuador to India: Take back your choppers

Seems like HAL has to work even more harder to prove its worth...though i like this part the most in above link ..

You should have a look at the comments on the youtube video from Ecuadorians. They are not happy to say the least! Half of them think their government is taking kickback by buying substandard equipment and the other half think that it is some grand conspiracy!

The problem is in Dhruv's marketing strategy itself, I think. As soon as they say 30% cheaper, the mindset is that it is at least 50% less reliable !
However, I think HAL should try to learn as much as they can from this incident.

The accident is also surprising in some ways because the Indian military has been using them quite extensively from all the photos I've seen. Any major defect would mean a massive recall of the helicopter and that would be quite expensive for HAL.

 

[deckingraj]

You should have a look at the comments on the youtube video from Ecuadorians. They are not happy to say the least! Half of them think their government is taking kickback by buying substandard equipment and the other half think that it is some grand conspiracy!

The problem is in Dhruv's marketing strategy itself, I think. As soon as they say 30% cheaper, the mindset is that it is at least 50% less reliable !
However, I think HAL should try to learn as much as they can from this incident.

Very fair comments...but that's where HAL has to break the phyche...Cheaper doesn't necessarily means less reliable....though i agree such incidents are not going to help their cause....Also please don't write off Dhruv(i hope u r not) as the investigations of the crash is still on...

The accident is also surprising in some ways because the Indian military has been using them quite extensively from all the photos I've seen. Any major defect would mean a massive recall of the helicopter and that would be quite expensive for HAL.

I would also be surprised if there is any major defect as it is being used by IA and that too at Siachen Glacier and Dhruv's performance is better than its counterparts...So lets wait and watch if this is a technical snag or pilots error...

I am sure HAL will bounce back with flying colors...They certainly have the caliber and potential...

 

[jaunty]

Update from Livefist----

Dhruv Crash Update: Fire ruled out

According to the latest information coming in from my sources in Ecuador, there was absolutely no fire that broke out in the tail of the ALH Dhruv that crashed in the country on Tuesday. A careful study by experts, involving both visual analysis of footage as well as prima facie analysis of the wreckage, has unequivocally ruled out that there was any fire as suggested by certain eye-witness accounts. As a matter of fact, there was no post-crash fire either.

LiveFist has learnt from sources concerned with the investigation that on impact, the Dhruv's engines surged, and hence the visible flame emerging from the exhaust (see the part between the 3rd and 4th second in

this video). Soon thereafter, the engines shut down due to fuel starvation. Indeed, according to experts, the fact that there was no fire post-impact once again demonstrates and establishes the crashworthiness of the Dhruv platform, where the fuel tanks have maintained their integrity and the fuel has been shut off automatically.

Link
LiveFist - The Best of Indian Defence: DHRUV CRASH UPDATE: Fire Ruled Out

 

[sancho]

this is very embarrassing for HAL.
Their first export worthy product crashing in foreign lands and that to in a ceremonial event.
Ecuador has grounded it's entire Dhruv fleet...till further investigations.

As the Australian AF evaluated the Tiger attack helicopter, it also crashed and both pilots was able to get out without major injuries. Some reports say that this incident and the shown crashworthiness was the reason why the RAAF took Tiger over the also offered Apache.
So, if the Dhruv crash was not caused of a major technical problem, this could even boost exports of it.

 

[marcos98]

A VERY INFORMATIVE ARTICLE BY P. SENGUPTA




Here’s what we know so far by visually observing the crash of the Ecuadorian Air Force-owned Dhruv ALH at Quito on October 27: of the three Dhruv ALHs flying over an air base during celebrations to mark the 89th anniversary of the air force, one of them apparently swung 90 degrees and started losing altitude. As the video clip of the incident shows, the two-man aircrew who are in all probability highly experienced aviators, instinctively resorted to the autorotation technique (the only available option) to regain control and to their credit it must be said that they did succeed in slowing the rate of descent, although within the available 8 seconds, they could not stabilise the helicopter, which in turn led to a half-controlled descent and touchdown, with the stricken Dhruv ALH coming to rest on its portside, with the two-man aircrew managing to leave the helicopter by themselves after the crash before being taken to Quito's Military Hospital. The video clipping also showed the Dhruv ALH’s main rotor blades and tail rotor blades functioning, but not enough to indicate if the tail-rotor hub and tail-rotor shaft were in a fully functional state. Based purely on the available video clipping, it would seem that:

• The ill-fated Dhruv PROBABLY suffered from a sudden loss of power in either one of its twin Ardiden-1H (Shakti) engines, jointly built by HAL and Turbomeca. But catastrophic failure of both engines or failure of both the LH and RH sides of the main gearbox (MGB) can be ruled out. It is also PROBABLE that either one of the two fuel supply tanks (which supply fuel independently to the two engines) was starved of fuel-flow from the the Dhruv ALH’s three main fuel tanks, which house the pumps required for ensuring the fuel-flow to the fuel supply tanks.

• The above two probabilities PROBABLY contributed to the sudden reduction of supply of power to the tail-rotor gearbox via the tail-rotor drive shaft, resulting in the helicopter veering off to the left while losing altitude at the same time.

The only saving grace then, and the only available option for the aircrew then was to resort to the autorotation technique, which they did and that is probably the only reason they were fortunate enough to survive to fly again in future. Full marks to them!—Prasun K. Sengupta

I am enclosing below all the FAR Part 29standards that the Dhruv ALH complies with. FAR Part 29: Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Rotorcraft
Federal Aviation Regulations Subpart A - General
o Sec. 29.1 - Applicability.
o Sec. 29.2 - Special retroactive requirements.Subpart B - Flight
o Sec. 29.21 - Proof of compliance.
o Sec. 29.25 - Weight limits.
o Sec. 29.27 - Center of gravity limits.
o Sec. 29.29 - Empty weight and corresponding center of gravity.
o Sec. 29.31 - Removable ballast.
o Sec. 29.33 - Main rotor speed and pitch limits.
o Sec. 29.45 - General.
o Sec. 29.49 - Performance at minimum operating speed.
o Sec. 29.51 - Takeoff data: general.
o Sec. 29.53 - Takeoff: Category A.
o Sec. 29.55 - Takeoff decision point (TDP): Category A.
o Sec. 29.59 - Takeoff path: Category A.
o Sec. 29.60 - Elevated heliport takeoff path: Category A.
o Sec. 29.61 - Takeoff distance: Category A.
o Sec. 29.62 - Rejected takeoff: Category A.
o Sec. 29.63 - Takeoff: Category B.
o Sec. 29.64 - Climb: General.
o Sec. 29.65 - Climb: All engines operating.
o Sec. 29.67 - Climb: One engine inoperative (OEI).
o Sec. 29.71 - Helicopter angle of glide: Category B.
o Sec. 29.75 - Landing: General.
o Sec. 29.77 - Landing Decision Point (LDP): Category A.
o Sec. 29.79 - Landing: Category A.
o Sec. 29.81 - Landing distance: Category A.
o Sec. 29.83 - Landing: Category B.
o Sec. 29.85 - Balked landing: Category A.
o Sec. 29.87 - Height-velocity envelope.
o Sec. 29.141 - General.
o Sec. 29.143 - Controllability and maneuverability.
o Sec. 29.151 - Flight controls.
o Sec. 29.161 - Trim control.
o Sec. 29.171 - Stability: general.
o Sec. 29.173 - Static longitudinal stability.
o Sec. 29.175 - Demonstration of static longitudinal stability.
o Sec. 29.177 - Static directional stability.
o Sec. 29.181 - Dynamic stability: Category A rotorcraft.
o Sec. 29.231 - General. o Sec. 29.235 - Taxiing condition.
o Sec. 29.239 - Spray characteristics.
o Sec. 29.241 - Ground resonance.
o Sec. 29.251 - Vibration.Subpart C - Strength Requirements
o Sec. 29.301 - Loads.
o Sec. 29.303 - Factor of safety.
o Sec. 29.305 - Strength and deformation.
o Sec. 29.307 - Proof of structure.
o Sec. 29.309 - Design limitations.
o Sec. 29.321 - General.
o Sec. 29.337 - Limit maneuvering load factor.
o Sec. 29.339 - Resultant limit maneuvering loads.
o Sec. 29.341 - Gust loads.
o Sec. 29.351 - Yawing conditions.
o Sec. 29.361 - Engine torque.
o Sec. 29.391 - General.
o Sec. 29.395 - Control system.
o Sec. 29.397 - Limit pilot forces and torques.
o Sec. 29.399 - Dual control system.
o Sec. 29.411 - Ground clearance: tail rotor guard.
o Sec. 29.427 - Unsymmetrical loads.
o Sec. 29.471 - General.
o Sec. 29.473 - Ground loading conditions and assumptions.
o Sec. 29.475 - Tires and shock absorbers.
o Sec. 29.477 - Landing gear arrangement.
o Sec. 29.479 - Level landing conditions.
o Sec. 29.481 - Tail-down landing conditions.
o Sec. 29.483 - One-wheel landing conditions.
o Sec. 29.485 - Lateral drift landing conditions.
o Sec. 29.493 - Braked roll conditions.
o Sec. 29.497 - Ground loading conditions: landing gear with tail wheels.
o Sec. 29.501 - Ground loading conditions: landing gear with skids.
o Sec. 29.505 - Ski landing conditions.
o Sec. 29.511 - Ground load: unsymmetrical loads on multiple-wheel units.
o Sec. 29.519 - Hull type rotorcraft: Water-based and amphibian.
o Sec. 29.521 - Float landing conditions.
o Sec. 29.547 - Main and tail rotor structure.
o Sec. 29.549 - Fuselage and rotor pylon structures.
o Sec. 29.551 - Auxiliary lifting surfaces.
o Sec. 29.561 - General.
o Sec. 29.562 - Emergency landing dynamic conditions.
o Sec. 29.563 - Structural ditching provisions.
o Sec. 29.571 - Fatigue evaluation of structure.Subpart D - Design and Construction
o Sec. 29.601 - Design.
o Sec. 29.602 - Critical parts.
o Sec. 29.603 - Materials.
o Sec. 29.605 - Fabrication methods.
o Sec. 29.607 - Fasteners.
o Sec. 29.609 - Protection of structure.
o Sec. 29.610 - Lightning and static electricity protection.
o Sec. 29.611 - Inspection provisions.
o Sec. 29.613 - Material strength properties and design values.
o Sec. 29.619 - Special factors.
o Sec. 29.621 - Casting factors.
o Sec. 29.623 - Bearing factors.
o Sec. 29.625 - Fitting factors.
o Sec. 29.629 - Flutter and divergence.
o Sec. 29.631 - Bird strike.
o Sec. 29.653 - Pressure venting and drainage of rotor blades.
o Sec. 29.659 - Mass balance.
o Sec. 29.661 - Rotor blade clearance.
o Sec. 29.663 - Ground resonance prevention means.
o Sec. 29.671 - General.
o Sec. 29.672 - Stability augmentation, automatic, and power-operated systems.
o Sec. 29.673 - Primary flight controls.
o Sec. 29.674 - Interconnected controls.
o Sec. 29.675 - Stops.
o Sec. 29.679 - Control system locks.
o Sec. 29.681 - Limit load static tests.
o Sec. 29.683 - Operation tests.
o Sec. 29.685 - Control system details.
o Sec. 29.687 - Spring devices.
o Sec. 29.691 - Autorotation control mechanism.
o Sec. 29.695 - Power boost and power-operated control system.
o Sec. 29.723 - Shock absorption tests.
o Sec. 29.725 - Limit drop test.
o Sec. 29.727 - Reserve energy absorption drop test.
o Sec. 29.729 - Retracting mechanism.
o Sec. 29.731 - Wheels.
o Sec. 29.733 - Tires.
o Sec. 29.735 - Brakes.
o Sec. 29.737 - Skis.
o Sec. 29.751 - Main float buoyancy.
o Sec. 29.753 - Main float design.
o Sec. 29.755 - Hull buoyancy.
o Sec. 29.757 - Hull and auxiliary float strength.
o Sec. 29.771 - Pilot compartment.
o Sec. 29.773 - Pilot compartment view.
o Sec. 29.775 - Windshields and windows.
o Sec. 29.777 - Cockpit controls.
o Sec. 29.779 - Motion and effect of cockpit controls.
o Sec. 29.783 - Doors.
o Sec. 29.785 - Seats, berths, litters, safety belts, and harnesses.
o Sec. 29.787 - Cargo and baggage compartments.
o Sec. 29.801 - Ditching.
o Sec. 29.803 - Emergency evacuation.
o Sec. 29.805 - Flight crew emergency exits.
o Sec. 29.807 - Passenger emergency exits.
o Sec. 29.809 - Emergency exit arrangement.
o Sec. 29.811 - Emergency exit marking.
o Sec. 29.812 - Emergency lighting.
o Sec. 29.813 - Emergency exit access.
o Sec. 29.815 - Main aisle width.
o Sec. 29.831 - Ventilation.
o Sec. 29.833 - Heaters.
o Sec. 29.851 - Fire extinguishers.
o Sec. 29.853 - Compartment interiors.
o Sec. 29.855 - Cargo and baggage compartments.
o Sec. 29.859 - Combustion heater fire protection.
o Sec. 29.861 - Fire protection of structure, controls, and other parts.
o Sec. 29.863 - Flammable fluid fire protection.
o Sec. 29.865 - External loads.
o Sec. 29.871 - Leveling marks.
o Sec. 29.873 - Ballast provisions.Subpart E - Powerplant
o Sec. 29.901 - Installation.
o Sec. 29.903 - Engines.
o Sec. 29.907 - Engine vibration.
o Sec. 29.908 - Cooling fans.
o Sec. 29.917 - Design.
o Sec. 29.921 - Rotor brake.
o Sec. 29.923 - Rotor drive system and control mechanism tests.
o Sec. 29.927 - Additional tests.
o Sec. 29.931 - Shafting critical speed.
o Sec. 29.935 - Shafting joints.
o Sec. 29.939 - Turbine engine operating characteristics.
o Sec. 29.951 - General.
o Sec. 29.952 - Fuel system crash resistance.
o Sec. 29.953 - Fuel system independence.
o Sec. 29.954 - Fuel system lightning protection.
o Sec. 29.955 - Fuel flow.
o Sec. 29.957 - Flow between interconnected tanks.
o Sec. 29.959 - Unusable fuel supply.
o Sec. 29.961 - Fuel system hot weather operation.
o Sec. 29.963 - Fuel tanks: general.
o Sec. 29.965 - Fuel tank tests.
o Sec. 29.967 - Fuel tank installation.
o Sec. 29.969 - Fuel tank expansion space.
o Sec. 29.971 - Fuel tank sump.
o Sec. 29.973 - Fuel tank filler connection.
o Sec. 29.975 - Fuel tank vents and carburetor vapor vents.
o Sec. 29.977 - Fuel tank outlet.
o Sec. 29.979 - Pressure refueling and fueling provisions below fuel level.
o Sec. 29.991 - Fuel pumps.
o Sec. 29.993 - Fuel system lines and fittings.
o Sec. 29.995 - Fuel valves.
o Sec. 29.997 - Fuel strainer or filter.
o Sec. 29.999 - Fuel system drains.
o Sec. 29.1001 - Fuel jettisoning.
o Sec. 29.1011 - Engines: general.
o Sec. 29.1013 - Oil tanks.
o Sec. 29.1015 - Oil tank tests.
o Sec. 29.1017 - Oil lines and fittings.
o Sec. 29.1019 - Oil strainer or filter.
o Sec. 29.1021 - Oil system drains.
o Sec. 29.1023 - Oil radiators.
o Sec. 29.1025 - Oil valves.
o Sec. 29.1027 - Transmission and gearboxes: general.
o Sec. 29.1041 - General.
o Sec. 29.1043 - Cooling tests.
o Sec. 29.1045 - Climb cooling test procedures.
o Sec. 29.1047 - Takeoff cooling test procedures.
o Sec. 29.1049 - Hovering cooling test procedures.
o Sec. 29.1091 - Air induction.
o Sec. 29.1093 - Induction system icing protection.
o Sec. 29.1101 - Carburetor air preheater design.
o Sec. 29.1103 - Induction systems ducts and air duct systems.
o Sec. 29.1105 - Induction system screens.
o Sec. 29.1107 - Inter-coolers and after-coolers.
o Sec. 29.1109 - Carburetor air cooling.
o Sec. 29.1121 - General.
o Sec. 29.1123 - Exhaust piping.
o Sec. 29.1125 - Exhaust heat exchangers.
o Sec. 29.1141 - Powerplant controls: general.
o Sec. 29.1142 - Auxiliary power unit controls.
o Sec. 29.1143 - Engine controls.
o Sec. 29.1145 - Ignition switches.
o Sec. 29.1147 - Mixture controls.
o Sec. 29.1151 - Rotor brake controls.
o Sec. 29.1157 - Carburetor air temperature controls.
o Sec. 29.1159 - Supercharger controls.
o Sec. 29.1163 - Powerplant accessories.
o Sec. 29.1165 - Engine ignition systems.
o Sec. 29.1181 - Designated fire zones: regions included.
o Sec. 29.1183 - Lines, fittings, and components.
o Sec. 29.1185 - Flammable fluids.
o Sec. 29.1187 - Drainage and ventilation of fire zones.
o Sec. 29.1189 - Shutoff means.
o Sec. 29.1191 - Firewalls.
o Sec. 29.1193 - Cowling and engine compartment covering.
o Sec. 29.1194 - Other surfaces.
o Sec. 29.1195 - Fire extinguishing systems.
o Sec. 29.1197 - Fire extinguishing agents.
o Sec. 29.1199 - Extinguishing agent containers.
o Sec. 29.1201 - Fire extinguishing system materials.
o Sec. 29.1203 - Fire detector systems.Subpart F - Equipment
o Sec. 29.1301 - Function and installation.
o Sec. 29.1303 - Flight and navigation instruments.
o Sec. 29.1305 - Powerplant instruments.
o Sec. 29.1307 - Miscellaneous equipment.
o Sec. 29.1309 - Equipment, systems, and installations.
o Sec. 29.1321 - Arrangement and visibility.
o Sec. 29.1322 - Warning, caution, and advisory lights.
o Sec. 29.1323 - Airspeed indicating system.
o Sec. 29.1325 - Static pressure and pressure altimeter systems.
o Sec. 29.1327 - Magnetic direction indicator.
o Sec. 29.1329 - Automatic pilot system.
o Sec. 29.1331 - Instruments using a power supply.
o Sec. 29.1333 - Instrument systems.
o Sec. 29.1335 - Flight director systems.
o Sec. 29.1337 - Powerplant instruments.
o Sec. 29.1351 - General.
o Sec. 29.1353 - Electrical equipment and installations.
o Sec. 29.1355 - Distribution system.
o Sec. 29.1357 - Circuit protective devices.
o Sec. 29.1359 - Electrical system fire and smoke protection.
o Sec. 29.1363 - Electrical system tests.
o Sec. 29.1381 - Instrument lights.
o Sec. 29.1383 - Landing lights.
o Sec. 29.1385 - Position light system installation.
o Sec. 29.1387 - Position light system dihedral angles.
o Sec. 29.1389 - Position light distribution and intensities.
o Sec. 29.1391 - Minimum intensities in the horizontal plane of forward and rear position lights.
o Sec. 29.1393 - Minimum intensities in any vertical plane of forward and rear position lights.
o Sec. 29.1395 - Maximum intensities in overlapping beams of forward and rear position lights.
o Sec. 29.1397 - Color specifications.
o Sec. 29.1399 - Riding light.
o Sec. 29.1401 - Anticollision light system.
o Sec. 29.1411 - General.
o Sec. 29.1413 - Safety belts: passenger warning device.
o Sec. 29.1415 - Ditching equipment.
o Sec. 29.1419 - Ice protection.
o Sec. 29.1431 - Electronic equipment.
o Sec. 29.1433 - Vacuum systems.
o Sec. 29.1435 - Hydraulic systems.
o Sec. 29.1439 - Protective breathing equipment.
o Sec. 29.1457 - Cockpit voice recorders.
o Sec. 29.1459 - Flight recorders.
o Sec. 29.1461 - Equipment containing high energy rotors.Subpart G-Operating Limitations and Information
o Sec. 29.1501 - General.
o Sec. 29.1503 - Airspeed limitations: general.
o Sec. 29.1505 - Never-exceed speed.
o Sec. 29.1509 - Rotor speed.
o Sec. 29.1517 - Limiting height-speed envelope.
o Sec. 29.1519 - Weight and center of gravity.
o Sec. 29.1521 - Powerplant limitations.
o Sec. 29.1522 - Auxiliary power unit limitations.
o Sec. 29.1523 - Minimum flight crew.
o Sec. 29.1525 - Kinds of operations.
o Sec. 29.1527 - Maximum operating altitude.
o Sec. 29.1529 - Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.
o Sec. 29.1541 - General.
o Sec. 29.1543 - Instrument markings: general.
o Sec. 29.1545 - Airspeed indicator.
o Sec. 29.1547 - Magnetic direction indicator.
o Sec. 29.1549 - Powerplant instruments.
o Sec. 29.1551 - Oil quantity indicator.
o Sec. 29.1553 - Fuel quantity indicator. o Sec. 29.1555 - Control markings.
o Sec. 29.1557 - Miscellaneous markings and placards.
o Sec. 29.1559 - Limitations placard.
o Sec. 29.1561 - Safety equipment.
o Sec. 29.1565 - Tail rotor.
o Sec. 29.1581 - General.
o Sec. 29.1583 - Operating limitations.
o Sec. 29.1585 - Operating procedures. o Sec. 29.1587 - Performance information.
o Sec. 29.1589 - Loading information.Appendices• Appendix A to Part 29 - Instructions for Continued Airworthiness • Appendix B to Part 29 - Airworthiness Criteria for Helicopter Instrument Flight • Appendix C to Part 29 - Icing Certification • Appendix D to Part 29 - Criteria for Demonstration of Emergency Evacuation Procedures Under §29.803

The military variants of the Dhruv ALH adhere to the following FAR/MILSPEC standards:
US Army Aeronautical Design Standard-33E (ADS-33E)Flaw-Tolerant Rotor System: FAR/JAR 29.571,
AM 29-28Crashworthy Fuel System: FAR/JAR 29.952,
AM 29-35Flaw-Tolerant Drive Train with Over Torque Certification: FAR/JAR 29.952, AM 29-28
Turbine Burst Protection: FAR/JAR 29.901, AM 29-36
Composite Spar Main & Tail Rotor Blades with Lightning Strike Protection: FAR/JAR 1309(h), AM 29-40
Engine Compartment Fire Protection: FAR/JAR 29.1193
Redundant Hydraulics & Flaw Tolerant Flight Controls: FAR/JAR 29.571, AM 29-28
Aircraft-Wide Bird Strike Protection: FAR/JAR 29.631, AM 29-40
Crashworthiness Standard: FAR/JAR 29.561, AM 29-38
Crashworthy Seats Conforming to MIL-STD-1472B
Cockpit Instrumentation Lighting Conforming to MIL-STD-85762A
Avionics Databus: MIL-STD-1553B or ARINC-429
Autopilot Accuracy: MIL-F-9490D
Embedded MIL-STD-188-141B ALE Link Protection
Embedded MIL-STD-188-110B data modem

 

[marcos98]

UPDATE:
HAL Statement on Dhruv Crash: As a matter of principle, HAL would not like to speculate on the causes of the incident based on the media reports available in public domain. The HAL team, which was already in Ecuador providing maintenance support, is assisting the Ecuadorian Air Force in its investigations. In addition, a three member team of senior specialists including HAL’s Chief Test Pilot is reaching Ecuador to provide all necessary assistance in the investigation. Dhruv helicopter has been designed for excellent handling qualities and crash worthiness and manufactured with advanced technologies. The helicopter has several safety features such as twin engines, dual flight control, redundancy in critical systems, self sealing fuel tanks, modern fire protection devices and a structure designed to ensure crashworthiness. These features ensure safety of crew and occupants.

Dhruv has been extensively flight tested throughout its flight envelope by highly experienced HAL test pilots & has been evaluated by Customer pilots from IAF/Army prior to certification by Military & civil regulatory authorities. After certification, Dhruv has flown nearly 39,000 Hrs as a fleet, with more than 80 Dhruvs flown by various users. These flights were all flown carrying out difficult missions such as high altitude operations in Siachen glacier in extremely inhospitable weather conditions, Search & Rescue in all terrains, flood relief and casualty evacuation. As many as seven lead helicopters have flown close to 1000 Hrs each safely in similar missions.

DHRUV’s capability has been amply demonstrated in several challenging terrains and missions. The role of DHRUV in the relief missions in post Tsunami operations and during Gujarat floods and the high altitude rescue at Pin Parbati Pass stand testimony to DHRUV’s versatility of operations. “Sarang” – the Aerobatic Display team of Indian Air Force has displayed DHRUV’s capabilities in several international air shows.

Ecuadorian pilots have undergone extensive flying training on DHRUV at HAL’s facilities and had expressed happiness with the handling qualities , advanced avionics and safety features of Dhruv during interactions with HAL instructors who flew training missions with them in India and Ecuador, Ecuadorian Air Force has successfully carried out several missions in their DHRUVs in their difficult terrains and has logged 860 hours. It appears from the reported statements attributed to the top officials of the Ecuadorian Air force that the helicopter may have been maneuvered excessively. The built in safety features have ensured that both the pilots walked away to safety without any major injuries. HAL is committed to provide products of high quality & value to its customers backed up by professional and dedicated service.

---------- Post added at 11:57 PM ---------- Previous post was at 11:56 PM ----------

A day after the crash, there were certain media reports in Ecuador about the date when the Dhruv's Turbomeca engine was manufactured and delivered to HAL -- the engine was made in 2007, and the helicopter integrated in 2008 for delivery in 2009. The reports have harped on the fact that the engine was manufactured a year earlier than final integration with the helicopter.

In response to these view, here's an expert view from my sources in the investigation. For any assembly line to run the parts have to be ordered in advance. The time taken to manufacture the helicopter can be upto six months. The vendor also needs advance notice to supply the required systems and sub-systems. The "Just in Time" concept of inventory mangement is used by HAL, but such cases will always be there -- they are commonplace with system integration of helicopters and aircraft the world over. In aviation, the loss of one calendar year in the life of an engine is totally acceptable, since it is expected that the operator will use up the engine hours at a much greater rate. For example, if the life between overhaul of the engine is 1,200 hours, then at the rate of usage of 30 hours per month (a very conservative estimate) the engine life would be used up in 4 years while the calendar life is 15 years.

 

[jaunty]

From livefist----

Dhruv Crash Update--The cyclic limit theory



The three member HAL-team of experts, which includes company official KM Bhat, along with Chief Test Pilot Wg Cdr (Retd) Unnikrishna Pillai (who trained the Ecuadorian pilots in 2008) and HAL's Chief Designer of the Rotary Wing R&D Centre, Prasad Sampath, have started work alongside the Accident Investigation Board inquiring into Tuesday's Dhruv crash. Incidentally, the two pilots who miraculously survived the accident, were discharged from hospital yesterday and on the same day, also provided testimony to the Board.

Ok here's the very latest. According to my sources in Ecuador, the ill-fated helicopter is likely to have come under the air forced downward by the rotors (rotorwash) of one of the other Dhruv's flying in the formation. At this point, complications may have started when the pilots Luis Armas and Ivan Abril made an attempt to recover from the ensuing sharp left bank (this is visible in the video). In technical terms, the pilot encountered a cyclic limit to the right (saturation of cyclic - the stick for lateral movement of the helicopter), as a result of which they found they had no further cyclic available at their disposal to stabilise or roll back out of the left turn. In well-documented helicopter flight dynamics, when cyclic saturation is reached, there is an abrupt loss of available lift to counter the turn.

It is understood that the Dhruv flight manual and training programme contains a specific module on recovering from a cyclic limit situation, and the Ecuadorian pilots underwent this process as part of their training in 2008. However, considering that the Dhruvs were flying at just 70-meters above the ground -- and if this theory holds -- then the pilots would not have had a chance to recover either way.

LiveFist - The Best of Indian Defence: DHRUV CRASH UPDATE #5: The Cyclic Limit Theory

 

[jaunty]

ALH Dhruv rescue in Ecuador 25 days before crash

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100_7379.JPG (image)

 

[dbc]

As the Australian AF evaluated the Tiger attack helicopter, it also crashed and both pilots was able to get out without major injuries. Some reports say that this incident and the shown crashworthiness was the reason why the RAAF took Tiger over the also offered Apache.
So, if the Dhruv crash was not caused of a major technical problem, this could even boost exports of it.

Are you suggesting the Tiger is better than the Apache based on the above? Google “autorotation” to learn how trained helicopter pilots improve their chances of surviving mechanical failures.

 

[PAFAce]

Indeed there was no fire post-impact, which is a credit to the fail-safe design of the helicopter's exterior. However, I guarantee every engineer that worked on the project is right now scratching his head over this accident/failure. Of course, nothing major will take place (such as a design review) until after an official incident report, at which point we'll determine whether it was pilot error or machine failure. Most of the time, it is pilot error, since machines such as these are extensively tested for requirements (until failure, sometimes). Safety of the crew/cargo/payload is generally an extremely important objective during the design of any vehicle. Let's not jump down the throats of HAL.

These blogs referring to "inside sources in Ecuador" are not very reliable, and they don't prove much. If you want to rely on them for personal satisfaction, that is your prerogative. As an engineer, I'd be very concerned right now.

Also, glad that the pilots walked away from the crash scene without any injuries. What I don't understand is why this fact is repeated approximately 14 times by the same people on this thread? An accident is an accident, let the report come out before you start hooting about the success of the design. You can afford to be this "happy" because most of you are probably unaware of how seriously the Aerospace community takes accidents, particularly those that result in crashes. If you did, you would be concerned.

I am disappointed by the fact that some Pakistani members here have chosen to take this opportunity to insult Indian engineers. You can go after trolls on this forum all you want, I won't object, but don't insult hard-working engineers and other professionals from any country, show them the same respect that you show your own professionals. I also take offense to the fact that some Indian members here have proven to be equally idiotic by trying to put down Pakistani members and professionals in "tit-for-tat" retaliation, it seems that Pakistani members can't even afford to be reasonably critical without being labeled India-haters.

Go at it......
Have a field day!

Such attitude is offensive and pathetic. Not all Pakistanis are obsessed with India, and not all Pakistanis rejoice India's failures.

Fancy how many of our projects fail while the pakistanis manage to run their projects scot-free.. Not a single failure at all... Wonderful!!..
The Government of india should stop funding the IITs and the IIScs (dunno wat the americans find so brilliant bout them that the Microsofts and googles and NASAs of the world go absolutely betzerk over their grads)...World's third largest pool of Engineers and look wat we produce"Helis which crash, Missiles which fail, and aircrafts that wont fly"..
Look on the otherhand at the pakistanis... With just a handful of engineers they hav managed to make SUPER-DUPER Hi-Tech Airplanes such as JF-17 which they consider to be as gud as our Su 30mkis(sic!).. And bout their Missiles... They are far ahead of us in the race... They cant fire a rocket into outer space, but thieir missiles... Boyyyy... State of the art... Absolutely no failure... Not even the almighty U S of A nor even USSR (did i mention the next almighty nation, CHINA),can boast of such an immaculate record.. The pakistani Engineers must be extra terrestrials or progeny of one... Pity our engineers at DRDO and HAL... They are after all mere mortal earthlings... So sad for us indians, after puttin up billions of dollars into research we at times have to put up this disgrace called FAILURE... Someting the pakistanis have never experienced.... Their stuffs just work..OUT-Of-THE-BOX... Anyways, i m proud of my scientists... The fact that they fail proves that at least they work, instead of buying things off the shelf and putting on a label "Made in Pakistan"
BINGO ALH... thanks god you are an earth-tech...

Idiot Alert.

 

[xenome]

Not all Pakistanis are obsessed with India, and not all Pakistanis rejoice India's failures.

With due regards, i so wish such were the case, but the frequency with which our pakistani friends start lampooning any indian achievement, overlooking all other aspects of technologies conquered on the way, says otherwise... At least we all should understand that "Knowledge is Power".. And there is a lot more one can learn from things that go wrong than things that go right all the way along...
The fact that the pilots managed to get off from the troubled chopper without a scratch speaks volumes of work put into the safety mechanisms integrated into the craft.. No where in world will this aspect go unnoticed in the minds of the prospective buyers of this wonderful craft..

But then mosquitoes will look for blood, even at a cow's nipple... One crash, and our friends here completely discounted LAH as "Another Indian Failure".. Well...

Apart from my above reservations, for a fact, ALH is not just a helicopter.. Its a platform.. which will further evolve in future into more advanced and potent systems such as Light Observation Helicopter (LOH), and Light Combat Helicopter(LCH).. A chopper in itself is a product of bleeding edge research.. For a country with a fledgling rotary manufacturing industry, its really an achievement to be manufacturing one indigenously.. And for this i am sure our folks at the HAL deserve that unbiased appreciation which puts genuine engineering at high regards irrespective of nationality..
Then theres also a hell lot more that can be learnt from this one experience so that HAL can build itself a great heli-platform..

 

[sancho]

Ecuador may return Indian helicopters after crash

Ecuador could return six helicopters recently bought from an Indian company after one of the aircraft crashed at an air show last week, the Unverso newspaper reported.One of the seven Dhruv combat helicopters Ecuador had purchased from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited crashed during an air show in the Ecuadoran capital, Quito, last Saturday, injuring the pilot and co-pilot.

Ecuadoran Air Force chief Rodrigo Bohorquez was quoted as saying the contract allowed the return in the event of an irreparable fault.A special commission is investigating the accident.

The rearmament of the Ecuadoran Air Force was announced in August. The Latin American country's government said it was ready to buy aircraft from Brazil and South Africa. In late September, Ecuadoran President Rafael Correa said combat aircraft from any nations, be it Venezuela, Colombia, the United States or Israel, would be welcome as gifts.

Venezuela has already given Ecuador six Mirage-50 planes it had substituted with more advanced Russian Sukhoi jets. Last year, Ecuador also received three Russian Mi-17 helicopters to carry out defense and patrol missions.After Moscow talks between President Dmitry Medvedev and Correa on Thursday a contract was signed on the delivery of two Mi-171E helicopters.

ASIAN DEFENCE: Ecuador may return Indian helicopters after crash

 

[sancho]

Are you suggesting the Tiger is better than the Apache based on the above? Google “autorotation” to learn how trained helicopter pilots improve their chances of surviving mechanical failures.

Autorotation has nothing to do with the it, nor which helicopter is better, but the RAAF seems to be impressed by the crashworthy airframe and safty features of the Tiger and that could be another point why they chosed it.

 

[DaRk WaVe]

Ecuador may return Indian helicopters after crash

MOSCOW, October 29 (RIA Novosti) - Ecuador could return six helicopters recently bought from an Indian company after one of the aircraft crashed at an air show last week, the Unverso newspaper reported on Thursday.

One of the seven Dhruv combat helicopters Ecuador had purchased from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited crashed during an air show in the Ecuadoran capital, Quito, last Saturday, injuring the pilot and co-pilot.

Ecuadoran Air Force chief Rodrigo Bohorquez was quoted as saying the contract allowed the return in the event of an irreparable fault.

A special commission is investigating the accident.

The rearmament of the Ecuadoran Air Force was announced in August. The Latin American country's government said it was ready to buy aircraft from Brazil and South Africa. In late September, Ecuadoran President Rafael Correa said combat aircraft from any nations, be it Venezuela, Colombia, the United States or Israel, would be welcome as gifts.

Venezuela has already given Ecuador six Mirage-50 planes it had substituted with more advanced Russian Sukhoi jets. Last year, Ecuador also received three Russian Mi-17 helicopters to carry out defense and patrol missions.

After Moscow talks between President Dmitry Medvedev and Correa on Thursday a contract was signed on the delivery of two Mi-171E helicopters.

:: Bharat-Rakshak.com - Indian Military News Headlines ::

 

[RPK]

‘Pilot error caused Dhruv crash in Ecuador’

Link

four days after India’s Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) Dhruv crashed in Ecuador, the ministry of defence (MoD) came on record saying that it was “a pilot error that caused the crash”. Joint secretary (Aerospace), MoD, S N Misra said: “Three ALHs were on display at an altitude of 13,000 feet. The pilot at the extreme end took a sharp curve. He should have curved only at 30 feet but he curved at 60 feet. That was error of judgment. There is nothing wrong with the aircraft.’’ Admitting that the crash is a setback to India, Misra said: “The probe team will send the flight data recorder (FDR) to Bangalore. An inquiry has been ordered and the chief test pilot will speak to the two pilots who flew the ALH. Since it is proven the pilot was at fault, there may not be any analysis of FDR.’’