Akinci & Aksungur and Turkish Unmanned Fighter Aircraft Program

[polanski]

Turkey became the second country to destroy Buk-M and Pantsir ADS after Israel: https://www.globaldefensecorp.com/2020/03/03/turkey-showcases-drone-capability/

 

[like_a_boss]

hello turkish friends. can u translate this video for us. who was mesut mevlevi? what was his role in turkish uav program and why he got assassinated? thanks

 

[Hakikat ve Hikmet]

hello turkish friends. can u translate this video for us. who was mesut mevlevi? what was his role in turkish uav program and why he got assassinated? thanks

Looks like a conspiracy theory. An Iranian folk had been working with Bayraktar, the manufacturer of TB2, but was later assassinated...

Anyway, lots of Iranians live, work, do business etc. in Turkey...

 

[golgelerprensi]

DUYDUK Kİ BİR ANKAMIZ VURULMUŞ !!!

 

[LuCiFeR_DeCoY]

Battle for Idlib: Turkey's drones and a new way of war
What gives drones an edge over manned aircraft in certain missions and why is Turkey suddenly excelling at them?

A Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drone is seen shortly after its landing at an airport in Gecitkala, Cyprus
Recent Turkish air raids have destroyed dozens of Syrian government tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and air defence systems sharply halting Syria's advance towards Idlib.

Allegedly launched in retaliation for an attack that killed 34 Turkish soldiers, the Turkish air offensive over Syria did not use manned aircraft but fleets of unmanned aerial vehicles, more commonly known as UAVs or drones.

Military drones have been used for decades as ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and assassination tools, but this is the first major large-scale offensive by one military against another military in an operational-level conflict.

What is their origin? What gives drones the edge over manned aircraft in certain types of missions, and why is Turkey suddenly excelling at them?

Why are they useful?
UAV designs have rapidly multiplied and matured as developments in technology allow militaries and intelligence agencies around the world think up new ways to use them. However, the designs share some basic similarities.

They are essentially CCTV cameras in the sky, crammed with high-resolution optics, data links, radars and laser-guidance systems.

Slow flying, their lack of speed is an advantage as they are able to loiter, often at high altitude over a target, watching it ceaselessly for hours, if not days.

This is especially effective in remote areas where noisy jet aircraft or the sudden appearance of strangers would be quickly noticed.

Turkish-backed fighters fly a drone in the northern Afrin countryside in Syria [File: Khalil Ashawi/Reuters]
The remote operators, piloting the drones from a distance, can be swapped out when fatigued. Military and intelligence personnel, senior politicians, and legal advisors can gather in the same room as the pilot, debating and deciding whether to destroy the observed target.

This is a far different decision-making process from the snap judgement of a conventional pilot flying at several hundred kilometres an hour in hostile territory on a combat mission.

There is also a logical progression to arming drones. Often, targets would be spotted by surveillance UAVs but by the time the information was fed back, a decision made and another asset, say a jet or cruise missile launched, the opportunity was lost.

In 2000, the US military spotted Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan but was unable to kill him as the drone, an early version of the Predator, was unarmed. Very quickly, it was realised that an armed UAV could not only survey and help find a potential enemy - but also destroy them.

Turkey's case
Turkey's long-standing campaign against the Kurdish PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) has mainly operated in the sort of remote mountainous terrain that insurgents tend to favour, with middling results.

Having watched the US run its air campaign over Pakistan, effectively targeting fighters in just that kind of terrain with some degree of success, Turkey's military could easily see how this technology could be applied to their use.

The US, hesitant to share or sell cutting edge technology even to its allies, demurred, offering only basic unarmed drones and Turkey began to look elsewhere.

Israel, with its drone industry maturing rapidly, was an initial option and a small number of its Heron UAVs were bought but Turkey realised that if it wanted to maintain control both of technology and the intelligence it produced it was going to have to manufacture them.

Unmanned aerial vehicle stationed at Dalaman Naval Air Base Command is seen before take off to fly to Gecitkale Airport of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, on December 16, 2019, in Mugla, Turkey [File: Evren Atalay/Anadolu]
Enter Selcuk Bayraktar, considered by many in Turkey to be the grandfather of Turkish drone technology.

Already a successful postgraduate student at the University of Pennsylvania, in 2004 Barayktar co-wrote a paper on how to control and group multiple drones and how they would act operating together.

He abandoned his PhD thesis in the US, preferring to return to Turkey to set up his own company, Baykar Technologies, manufacturing drones for the Turkish military.

Although initially unsuccessful, several factors helped him.

Turkey was looking to develop its own UAV programme, the US was reticent about selling their own technology to Turkey and Turkey's campaign against the Kurds had reached an impasse.

This gave Bayraktar the opportunity to pitch for domestically made armed drones that could eventually be decisive in the conflict with Kurdish armed groups.

The Bayraktar TB2 UAV, armed with a range of some 150 kilometres, was ideally suited for the Turkish military and rapidly gained prominence in successful counterinsurgency operations against the PKK.

More importantly, the Turkish military was able to test combined, UAV/artillery tactics later in Syria against the Kurdish YPG, or People's Protection Units, in Afrin near the Turkish border. These tactics would later be used in the skies over Idlib.

Battle for Idlib
Responding sharply to an air raid on a Turkish mechanised unit near Idlib city that killed 34 Turkish soldiers, the Turkish military deployed dozens of drones in a coordinated series of attacks on Syrian vehicles and positions.

Not only the Barayktar TB-2s were used but also the newer UCAV (or unmanned combat aerial vehicle). The heavier, armed, satellite-linked ANKA-S saw its operational debut in the battle over Idlib. Both drones were used in several ways:

• As spotters for long-range rapid-firing artillery, identifying Syrian government armoured columns and relaying their position Turkis self-propelled guns and multiple rocket launchers, which destroy them before they could seek shelter.
  
  
• The drones themselves targeted enemy positions and vehicles with a variety of munitions, all locally made and therefore easier to integrate with the drones.
  
  
• They were able to engage enemy aircraft when equipped with the right armament and for the first time over a conventional battlefield, they flew in squadrons, able to "swarm" or overwhelm Syrian air defence systems, quickly knocking them out.
  

These tactics devastated Syrian government forces as they tried in vain to concentrate their firepower and advance, giving the relatively lightly armed Turkish-backed rebels on the ground a significant advantage.

Drone war in Libya
While these weapons have been used in innovative ways over Idlib, they're not invulnerable. They are relatively slow moving and can be shot down by a well-armed opponent as they have been in Syria, when three ANKA-S drones were downed by Syrian air defence and shoulder-launched weapons.

Turkey is also not the only country fielding armed drones. China has been producing its relatively cheap (one million dollars) armed UCAV, the Wing Loong 2, which has seen service in Libya, operated by allies of the Libyan National Army, commanded by renegade general Khalifa Haftar.

So far, the Chinese drone has outperformed its Turkish rival the TB-2, the latter being destroyed on the ground as Chinese drones, operated by the UAE and Saudi Arabia, attack airfields controlled by the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA).

Despite some inevitable reverses, Turkey's drone industry is rapidly expanding with new orders of the ANKA-S being readied as the Turkish Air force seeks to replace its losses.

Success in war is usually good for business and proven systems are always popular. Twelve TB-2s have been sold to Ukraine and a further six were purchased by Qatar.

Both the Baraytar and ANKA-S have proven themselves in combat, ranging from counterinsurgency to industrial warfare on the conventional battlefield, with other models ranging from supersonic UCAVs to smaller "kamikaze" drones being developed.

What has enhanced these cheap, efficient UCAVs are the innovative tactics being used and perfected by the Turkish armed forces - in the age-old race to use new weapons in new ways - maximising their potential to apply decisive force on the modern battlefield.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/battle-idlib-turkey-drones-war-200303170724302.html

 

[turkaholic]

Battle for Idlib: Turkey's drones and a new way of war
What gives drones an edge over manned aircraft in certain missions and why is Turkey suddenly excelling at them?

A Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drone is seen shortly after its landing at an airport in Gecitkala, Cyprus
Recent Turkish air raids have destroyed dozens of Syrian government tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and air defence systems sharply halting Syria's advance towards Idlib.

Allegedly launched in retaliation for an attack that killed 34 Turkish soldiers, the Turkish air offensive over Syria did not use manned aircraft but fleets of unmanned aerial vehicles, more commonly known as UAVs or drones.

Military drones have been used for decades as ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and assassination tools, but this is the first major large-scale offensive by one military against another military in an operational-level conflict.

What is their origin? What gives drones the edge over manned aircraft in certain types of missions, and why is Turkey suddenly excelling at them?

Why are they useful?
UAV designs have rapidly multiplied and matured as developments in technology allow militaries and intelligence agencies around the world think up new ways to use them. However, the designs share some basic similarities.

They are essentially CCTV cameras in the sky, crammed with high-resolution optics, data links, radars and laser-guidance systems.

Slow flying, their lack of speed is an advantage as they are able to loiter, often at high altitude over a target, watching it ceaselessly for hours, if not days.

This is especially effective in remote areas where noisy jet aircraft or the sudden appearance of strangers would be quickly noticed.

Turkish-backed fighters fly a drone in the northern Afrin countryside in Syria [File: Khalil Ashawi/Reuters]
The remote operators, piloting the drones from a distance, can be swapped out when fatigued. Military and intelligence personnel, senior politicians, and legal advisors can gather in the same room as the pilot, debating and deciding whether to destroy the observed target.

This is a far different decision-making process from the snap judgement of a conventional pilot flying at several hundred kilometres an hour in hostile territory on a combat mission.

There is also a logical progression to arming drones. Often, targets would be spotted by surveillance UAVs but by the time the information was fed back, a decision made and another asset, say a jet or cruise missile launched, the opportunity was lost.

In 2000, the US military spotted Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan but was unable to kill him as the drone, an early version of the Predator, was unarmed. Very quickly, it was realised that an armed UAV could not only survey and help find a potential enemy - but also destroy them.

Turkey's case
Turkey's long-standing campaign against the Kurdish PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) has mainly operated in the sort of remote mountainous terrain that insurgents tend to favour, with middling results.

Having watched the US run its air campaign over Pakistan, effectively targeting fighters in just that kind of terrain with some degree of success, Turkey's military could easily see how this technology could be applied to their use.

The US, hesitant to share or sell cutting edge technology even to its allies, demurred, offering only basic unarmed drones and Turkey began to look elsewhere.

Israel, with its drone industry maturing rapidly, was an initial option and a small number of its Heron UAVs were bought but Turkey realised that if it wanted to maintain control both of technology and the intelligence it produced it was going to have to manufacture them.

Unmanned aerial vehicle stationed at Dalaman Naval Air Base Command is seen before take off to fly to Gecitkale Airport of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, on December 16, 2019, in Mugla, Turkey [File: Evren Atalay/Anadolu]
Enter Selcuk Bayraktar, considered by many in Turkey to be the grandfather of Turkish drone technology.

Already a successful postgraduate student at the University of Pennsylvania, in 2004 Barayktar co-wrote a paper on how to control and group multiple drones and how they would act operating together.

He abandoned his PhD thesis in the US, preferring to return to Turkey to set up his own company, Baykar Technologies, manufacturing drones for the Turkish military.

Although initially unsuccessful, several factors helped him.

Turkey was looking to develop its own UAV programme, the US was reticent about selling their own technology to Turkey and Turkey's campaign against the Kurds had reached an impasse.

This gave Bayraktar the opportunity to pitch for domestically made armed drones that could eventually be decisive in the conflict with Kurdish armed groups.

The Bayraktar TB2 UAV, armed with a range of some 150 kilometres, was ideally suited for the Turkish military and rapidly gained prominence in successful counterinsurgency operations against the PKK.

More importantly, the Turkish military was able to test combined, UAV/artillery tactics later in Syria against the Kurdish YPG, or People's Protection Units, in Afrin near the Turkish border. These tactics would later be used in the skies over Idlib.

Battle for Idlib
Responding sharply to an air raid on a Turkish mechanised unit near Idlib city that killed 34 Turkish soldiers, the Turkish military deployed dozens of drones in a coordinated series of attacks on Syrian vehicles and positions.

Not only the Barayktar TB-2s were used but also the newer UCAV (or unmanned combat aerial vehicle). The heavier, armed, satellite-linked ANKA-S saw its operational debut in the battle over Idlib. Both drones were used in several ways:

• As spotters for long-range rapid-firing artillery, identifying Syrian government armoured columns and relaying their position Turkis self-propelled guns and multiple rocket launchers, which destroy them before they could seek shelter.
  
  
• The drones themselves targeted enemy positions and vehicles with a variety of munitions, all locally made and therefore easier to integrate with the drones.
  
  
• They were able to engage enemy aircraft when equipped with the right armament and for the first time over a conventional battlefield, they flew in squadrons, able to "swarm" or overwhelm Syrian air defence systems, quickly knocking them out.

These tactics devastated Syrian government forces as they tried in vain to concentrate their firepower and advance, giving the relatively lightly armed Turkish-backed rebels on the ground a significant advantage.

Drone war in Libya
While these weapons have been used in innovative ways over Idlib, they're not invulnerable. They are relatively slow moving and can be shot down by a well-armed opponent as they have been in Syria, when three ANKA-S drones were downed by Syrian air defence and shoulder-launched weapons.

Turkey is also not the only country fielding armed drones. China has been producing its relatively cheap (one million dollars) armed UCAV, the Wing Loong 2, which has seen service in Libya, operated by allies of the Libyan National Army, commanded by renegade general Khalifa Haftar.

So far, the Chinese drone has outperformed its Turkish rival the TB-2, the latter being destroyed on the ground as Chinese drones, operated by the UAE and Saudi Arabia, attack airfields controlled by the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA).

Despite some inevitable reverses, Turkey's drone industry is rapidly expanding with new orders of the ANKA-S being readied as the Turkish Air force seeks to replace its losses.

Success in war is usually good for business and proven systems are always popular. Twelve TB-2s have been sold to Ukraine and a further six were purchased by Qatar.

Both the Baraytar and ANKA-S have proven themselves in combat, ranging from counterinsurgency to industrial warfare on the conventional battlefield, with other models ranging from supersonic UCAVs to smaller "kamikaze" drones being developed.

What has enhanced these cheap, efficient UCAVs are the innovative tactics being used and perfected by the Turkish armed forces - in the age-old race to use new weapons in new ways - maximising their potential to apply decisive force on the modern battlefield.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/battle-idlib-turkey-drones-war-200303170724302.html

Good read but how exactly did the Chinese drones outperform the Turkish ones in Libya?

 

[Ansu fati]

What is our deadliest drone? Which of them is the best?

In terms of capabilities Anka-S(MALE DRONE) is the most powerful turkish drone there are several Anka versions for different roles while TB2(TACTICAL DRONE) is only for strike or feeding coordinates to F-16
If we speak about strike missions then it is TB2 the most deadly yet much cheaper than Anka-s for replacement
Both of them fulfill the TAF’s various needs
Turkey was the first country to introduce large scale drone attacks in war and Turkey will be the first country to introduce drone(Akinci) jet-style air to ground strikes
Until now most of turkish airstrikes against pkk rats in northern iraq were done by f-16 with TB2 providing image intelligence(coordinates) soon these airstikes will be done completely by drones which is actually new war concept that would be closely followed/studied by other world armies

Battle for Idlib: Turkey's drones and a new way of war
What gives drones an edge over manned aircraft in certain missions and why is Turkey suddenly excelling at them?

A Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drone is seen shortly after its landing at an airport in Gecitkala, Cyprus
Recent Turkish air raids have destroyed dozens of Syrian government tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and air defence systems sharply halting Syria's advance towards Idlib.

Allegedly launched in retaliation for an attack that killed 34 Turkish soldiers, the Turkish air offensive over Syria did not use manned aircraft but fleets of unmanned aerial vehicles, more commonly known as UAVs or drones.

Military drones have been used for decades as ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and assassination tools, but this is the first major large-scale offensive by one military against another military in an operational-level conflict.

What is their origin? What gives drones the edge over manned aircraft in certain types of missions, and why is Turkey suddenly excelling at them?

Why are they useful?
UAV designs have rapidly multiplied and matured as developments in technology allow militaries and intelligence agencies around the world think up new ways to use them. However, the designs share some basic similarities.

They are essentially CCTV cameras in the sky, crammed with high-resolution optics, data links, radars and laser-guidance systems.

Slow flying, their lack of speed is an advantage as they are able to loiter, often at high altitude over a target, watching it ceaselessly for hours, if not days.

This is especially effective in remote areas where noisy jet aircraft or the sudden appearance of strangers would be quickly noticed.

Turkish-backed fighters fly a drone in the northern Afrin countryside in Syria [File: Khalil Ashawi/Reuters]
The remote operators, piloting the drones from a distance, can be swapped out when fatigued. Military and intelligence personnel, senior politicians, and legal advisors can gather in the same room as the pilot, debating and deciding whether to destroy the observed target.

This is a far different decision-making process from the snap judgement of a conventional pilot flying at several hundred kilometres an hour in hostile territory on a combat mission.

There is also a logical progression to arming drones. Often, targets would be spotted by surveillance UAVs but by the time the information was fed back, a decision made and another asset, say a jet or cruise missile launched, the opportunity was lost.

In 2000, the US military spotted Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan but was unable to kill him as the drone, an early version of the Predator, was unarmed. Very quickly, it was realised that an armed UAV could not only survey and help find a potential enemy - but also destroy them.

Turkey's case
Turkey's long-standing campaign against the Kurdish PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) has mainly operated in the sort of remote mountainous terrain that insurgents tend to favour, with middling results.

Having watched the US run its air campaign over Pakistan, effectively targeting fighters in just that kind of terrain with some degree of success, Turkey's military could easily see how this technology could be applied to their use.

The US, hesitant to share or sell cutting edge technology even to its allies, demurred, offering only basic unarmed drones and Turkey began to look elsewhere.

Israel, with its drone industry maturing rapidly, was an initial option and a small number of its Heron UAVs were bought but Turkey realised that if it wanted to maintain control both of technology and the intelligence it produced it was going to have to manufacture them.

Unmanned aerial vehicle stationed at Dalaman Naval Air Base Command is seen before take off to fly to Gecitkale Airport of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, on December 16, 2019, in Mugla, Turkey [File: Evren Atalay/Anadolu]
Enter Selcuk Bayraktar, considered by many in Turkey to be the grandfather of Turkish drone technology.

Already a successful postgraduate student at the University of Pennsylvania, in 2004 Barayktar co-wrote a paper on how to control and group multiple drones and how they would act operating together.

He abandoned his PhD thesis in the US, preferring to return to Turkey to set up his own company, Baykar Technologies, manufacturing drones for the Turkish military.

Although initially unsuccessful, several factors helped him.

Turkey was looking to develop its own UAV programme, the US was reticent about selling their own technology to Turkey and Turkey's campaign against the Kurds had reached an impasse.

This gave Bayraktar the opportunity to pitch for domestically made armed drones that could eventually be decisive in the conflict with Kurdish armed groups.

The Bayraktar TB2 UAV, armed with a range of some 150 kilometres, was ideally suited for the Turkish military and rapidly gained prominence in successful counterinsurgency operations against the PKK.

More importantly, the Turkish military was able to test combined, UAV/artillery tactics later in Syria against the Kurdish YPG, or People's Protection Units, in Afrin near the Turkish border. These tactics would later be used in the skies over Idlib.

Battle for Idlib
Responding sharply to an air raid on a Turkish mechanised unit near Idlib city that killed 34 Turkish soldiers, the Turkish military deployed dozens of drones in a coordinated series of attacks on Syrian vehicles and positions.

Not only the Barayktar TB-2s were used but also the newer UCAV (or unmanned combat aerial vehicle). The heavier, armed, satellite-linked ANKA-S saw its operational debut in the battle over Idlib. Both drones were used in several ways:

• As spotters for long-range rapid-firing artillery, identifying Syrian government armoured columns and relaying their position Turkis self-propelled guns and multiple rocket launchers, which destroy them before they could seek shelter.
  
  
• The drones themselves targeted enemy positions and vehicles with a variety of munitions, all locally made and therefore easier to integrate with the drones.
  
  
• They were able to engage enemy aircraft when equipped with the right armament and for the first time over a conventional battlefield, they flew in squadrons, able to "swarm" or overwhelm Syrian air defence systems, quickly knocking them out.

These tactics devastated Syrian government forces as they tried in vain to concentrate their firepower and advance, giving the relatively lightly armed Turkish-backed rebels on the ground a significant advantage.

Drone war in Libya
While these weapons have been used in innovative ways over Idlib, they're not invulnerable. They are relatively slow moving and can be shot down by a well-armed opponent as they have been in Syria, when three ANKA-S drones were downed by Syrian air defence and shoulder-launched weapons.

Turkey is also not the only country fielding armed drones. China has been producing its relatively cheap (one million dollars) armed UCAV, the Wing Loong 2, which has seen service in Libya, operated by allies of the Libyan National Army, commanded by renegade general Khalifa Haftar.

So far, the Chinese drone has outperformed its Turkish rival the TB-2, the latter being destroyed on the ground as Chinese drones, operated by the UAE and Saudi Arabia, attack airfields controlled by the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA).

Despite some inevitable reverses, Turkey's drone industry is rapidly expanding with new orders of the ANKA-S being readied as the Turkish Air force seeks to replace its losses.

Success in war is usually good for business and proven systems are always popular. Twelve TB-2s have been sold to Ukraine and a further six were purchased by Qatar.

Both the Baraytar and ANKA-S have proven themselves in combat, ranging from counterinsurgency to industrial warfare on the conventional battlefield, with other models ranging from supersonic UCAVs to smaller "kamikaze" drones being developed.

What has enhanced these cheap, efficient UCAVs are the innovative tactics being used and perfected by the Turkish armed forces - in the age-old race to use new weapons in new ways - maximising their potential to apply decisive force on the modern battlefield.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/battle-idlib-turkey-drones-war-200303170724302.html

Bayraktar is tactical drone without satcom support with much smaller payload than chinese wing loong II which is actually MALE drone and it is Anka’s counterpart
You can’t compare drones who aren’t in the same class but you can compare them in terms of effectiveness
Speaking about effectiveness one tactical small drone like TB2 has killed also PANTSIR S1 in LIBYA plus has literally destroyed any air supremacy which haftar had before summer 2019 eventually idiot haftar had to call UAE and Egypt’s F-16 to gain again momentum but his sponsors although fulfilled his wish they did very rarely F-16 attacks

 

[Indos]

In terms of capabilities Anka-S(MALE DRONE) is the most powerful turkish drone there are several Anka versions for different roles while TB2(TACTICAL DRONE) is only for strike or feeding coordinates to F-16
If we speak about strike missions then it is TB2 the most deadly yet much cheaper than Anka-s for replacement
Both of them fulfill the TAF’s various needs
Turkey was the first country to introduce large scale drone attacks in war and Turkey will be the first country to introduce drone(Akinci) jet-style air to ground strikes
Until now most of turkish airstrikes against pkk rats in northern iraq were done by f-16 with TB2 providing image intelligence(coordinates) soon these airstikes will be done completely by drones which is actually new war concept that would be closely followed/studied by other world armies


Bayraktar is tactical drone without satcom support with much smaller payload than chinese wing loong II which is actually MALE drone and it is Anka’s counterpart
You can’t compare drones who aren’t in the same class but you can compare them in terms of effectiveness
Speaking about effectiveness one tactical small drone like TB2 has killed also PANTSIR S1 in LIBYA plus has literally destroyed any air supremacy which haftar had before summer 2019 eventually idiot haftar had to call UAE and Egypt’s F-16 to gain again momentum but his sponsors although fulfilled his wish they did very rarely F-16 attacks

Why not use Anka instead of Bayraktar for striking in Libya and Syria ? It has had maiden flight since 2010, about 10 years ago. It should have already been mature and capable for striking mission by now.

 

[Ansu fati]

Why not use Anka instead of Bayraktar for striking in Libya and Syria ? It has had maiden flight since 2010, about 10 years ago. It should have already been mature and capable for striking mission by now.

It is used in syria&northern iraq(2010-16 and 2016-present) but most of the drone strikes are conducted by TB2(from 2016-present)
My guess/opinion is that TB2 is much cheaper versus Anka so downing/crushing is not a big deal
And maybe the most important reason is that TB2 is used extensively because it serves as test platform for the new strategic big drone called Akinci produced by the same company
Since we are talking about the same ecosystem turkish soldiers/drone operators would be much easier and quicker adapted to Akinci which is intended to be main strike option for air to ground strikes against pkk terrorists assad militia haftar gang or any other terror organization

 

[xbat]

most critical missions achieved by ANKA not Bayraktar. Ruskie Krasukha4 system jams all RF signals over North Syria. Bayraktar cant be controlled via data link, there is only option for that situation "SATCOM controled Anka S"

 

[Ansu fati]

most critical missions achieved by ANKA not Bayraktar. Ruskie Krasukha4 system jams all RF signals over North Syria. Bayraktar cant be controlled via data link, there is only option for that situation "SATCOM controled Anka S"

https://twitter.com/x/status/1235186770540711937

@Indos

 

[LuCiFeR_DeCoY]

Good read but how exactly did the Chinese drones outperform the Turkish ones in Libya?

I am not related to military therefore I should not make a comment on the issue. I read the article and thought those were some important points. I am sorry if that offended you

In terms of capabilities Anka-S(MALE DRONE) is the most powerful turkish drone there are several Anka versions for different roles while TB2(TACTICAL DRONE) is only for strike or feeding coordinates to F-16
If we speak about strike missions then it is TB2 the most deadly yet much cheaper than Anka-s for replacement
Both of them fulfill the TAF’s various needs
Turkey was the first country to introduce large scale drone attacks in war and Turkey will be the first country to introduce drone(Akinci) jet-style air to ground strikes
Until now most of turkish airstrikes against pkk rats in northern iraq were done by f-16 with TB2 providing image intelligence(coordinates) soon these airstikes will be done completely by drones which is actually new war concept that would be closely followed/studied by other world armies


Bayraktar is tactical drone without satcom support with much smaller payload than chinese wing loong II which is actually MALE drone and it is Anka’s counterpart
You can’t compare drones who aren’t in the same class but you can compare them in terms of effectiveness
Speaking about effectiveness one tactical small drone like TB2 has killed also PANTSIR S1 in LIBYA plus has literally destroyed any air supremacy which haftar had before summer 2019 eventually idiot haftar had to call UAE and Egypt’s F-16 to gain again momentum but his sponsors although fulfilled his wish they did very rarely F-16 attacks

Noted, thanks for the information. I am going through all the Turkish section for hours, learned a lot. All the subcontinent Muslims cheer for Turkey

 

[himate]

In terms of capabilities Anka-S(MALE DRONE) is the most powerful turkish drone there are several Anka versions for different roles while TB2(TACTICAL DRONE) is only for strike or feeding coordinates to F-16
If we speak about strike missions then it is TB2 the most deadly yet much cheaper than Anka-s for replacement
Both of them fulfill the TAF’s various needs
Turkey was the first country to introduce large scale drone attacks in war and Turkey will be the first country to introduce drone(Akinci) jet-style air to ground strikes
Until now most of turkish airstrikes against pkk rats in northern iraq were done by f-16 with TB2 providing image intelligence(coordinates) soon these airstikes will be done completely by drones which is actually new war concept that would be closely followed/studied by other world armies


Bayraktar is tactical drone without satcom support with much smaller payload than chinese wing loong II which is actually MALE drone and it is Anka’s counterpart
You can’t compare drones who aren’t in the same class but you can compare them in terms of effectiveness
Speaking about effectiveness one tactical small drone like TB2 has killed also PANTSIR S1 in LIBYA plus has literally destroyed any air supremacy which haftar had before summer 2019 eventually idiot haftar had to call UAE and Egypt’s F-16 to gain again momentum but his sponsors although fulfilled his wish they did very rarely F-16 attacks

Actually Turkey hasn't started the game in libya yet. Success in Idlib is very important now as it will also determine the fate of haftar and his henchmen

 

[turkaholic]

I am not related to military therefore I should not make a comment on the issue. I read the article and thought those were some important points. I am sorry if that offended you

No no you did not offend me at all. It was not directed at you, just a general question actually. All good.

 

[Hexciter]

Turkey’s drones are battle tested and ready for export
By: Kelsey D. Atherton
Turkey launched a coordinated mass of drone strikes March 1 against a Syrian military convoy and base. Nineteen people were killed in the attack. It was, at once, a debut moment for a long-in-the-works drone capability and another day of violence as the Syrian civil war enters its 10th year.

The attack, which featured multiple remotely piloted drones pursuing the same objectives, is a reminder that the capacity to launch drone strikes is hardly limited to superpowers. Turkey’s drone program has developed, over years, several armed drones that are rough analogs to American-operated models like the Reaper, Predator and Shadow.

“This was a mass coordinated attack, not a ‘swarm’ — ‘swarm’ implies autonomous capabilities and UAVs coordinating among themselves,” said Samuel Bendett, an adviser at the Center for Naval Analyses.

While swarming autonomy remains a research project for nations, even such a labor-intensive operation as the mass use of remotely piloted drones offers advantages over flying human-occupied vehicles on the same missions.

“Given a very complicated battleground in Syria — where Syrian and Russian air defenses protect key assets, and where Iranian forces operate alongside their Assad allies — Turkey’s decision to send a mass coordinated UAV attack points to its availability of options,” said Bendett. “Rather than send a piloted aircraft that could be lost, with the pilot killed, Turkey sent unmanned systems, whose loss is less profound and does not ultimately impact Turkish military capability. Turkey is also able to gather key intel on Syrian air defenses, especially those that managed to down Turkish UAVs.”
Those Syrian air defenses were about to shoot down at least seven drones, including at least one Anka-S, priced at tens of millions of dollars. The attack was not without cost to Turkey, but despite the damage inflicted by anti-air defenses, the drones were still able to hit their targets. Defending against drone operations may mean adopting different tools than those used to deter human incursions.

Turkey stood up its drone industry in light of a [URL='https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/turkey-has-drone-air-force-and-it-just-went-war-syria-128752']prohibition from the United States on purchasing armed drones, and since then has also developed those military drones for export. Those drones, like the Bayraktar, have been explored to Ukraine and Libya. Turkey has even reached out to Ukraine for engines to power a long-range drone.

With the capabilities of its drones proven in combat, Turkey joins the United States, United Kingdom, France, Israel, China and Iran as drone-armed nations. A swarm the recent strike was not, but for the people targeted on the ground, a remotely piloted salvo is just as deadly a proposition.
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