After initial balk, India reconsidering buying Iron Dome

[Secur]

@bloo

Trust me , , mate , you are now merely arguing for the sake of arguing . At least read the argument you are trying to reply to . You understand little of these military matters , but are still keen to talk , otherwise you wouldn't have said anything about no surprises even in today's warfare or even tried to equate the seventh largest army in the world with an insurgent group tactics and have difficulty understanding the fact that Israel faces nothing what India or Pakistan will . You are still having trouble understanding the intensity of the conflicts and the cost problem . I need to remind you if you didn't have rocket salvos or cruise missiles back then , neither did we , in fact we had much less , the rapid modernization drive of the Pakistan Army , you see today , only happened after Musharraf gained power . I can only laugh at ' aggressiveness ' coming with Iron Dome systems part , seriously !

Leave it , over and out .

 

[muse]

Demystifying Iron Dome
Peter Dombrowski, Catherine Kelleher, Eric Auner
June 25, 2013



BARACK OBAMA encountered an unprecedented welcome when he visited Israel in March. He was greeted at the airport not just by the usual dignitaries but also by a hot new weapon—Israel’s Iron Dome missile-defense system against short-range rockets. A battery was stationed only a few footsteps from Air Force One, so the president could walk over and congratulate his hosts on their successful use of the antimissile weapon during Israel’s Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched Operation Pillar of Defense on November 14 in response to increasing rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip as well as other actions by militant Palestinians. The seven-day operation involved Israeli air strikes against Hamas targets in Gaza, but there was no ground invasion such as the one launched in 2008–2009, called Operation Cast Lead. The IDF had four Iron Dome batteries in operation prior to Pillar of Defense and deployed a more advanced fifth battery during the operation. According to the IDF, the system, developed by Israel with joint U.S. and Israeli funding over the past decade or so, provided a sense of security to many Israelis by preventing injury, loss of life and property damage. Reports indicate that some Israelis even ignored air-raid sirens, remaining exposed in the hopes of photographing an Iron Dome interception.

Iron Dome’s scorecard will need closer scrutiny as more technical and verified evidence becomes available, but there is ample justification for praise and expectations of continued operational success. According to the IDF, some 1,500 rockets were fired on Israel during the course of Operation Pillar of Defense. Reports indicate about a third of these rockets (five hundred or so) targeted population centers; of those, 84 percent (over four hundred) were successfully intercepted by Iron Dome (though some technical experts have suggested that the actual success rate was probably significantly lower). Whatever the actual number of intercepts, enthusiasts in both the United States and Israel have viewed this as a breakthrough in the long-debated issue of missile defense. Some have argued that Iron Dome shows the way toward achieving Ronald Reagan’s transformative 1980s vision of strategic defense, a world where ballistic missiles are “impotent and obsolete.”

Moreover, American experts and political leaders have argued for years that a new, global missile age is emerging, in which a widening array of more numerous and capable short-range rockets, cruise missiles, and intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles will pose stark challenges for even the most advanced militaries. Israel faces ongoing attacks from relatively unsophisticated and inaccurate rockets today; tomorrow it may face Syrian Scuds (currently being used against rebel groups within the country) or a range of Iranian ballistic missiles. Armed conventionally or not, China, Pakistan, North Korea and, more discreetly, a few other states are developing missiles and marketing them internationally. Despite multilateral efforts to control the spread of missiles—including the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation—few expect this Pandora’s box to be shut.

Iron Dome is certainly one response to this new missile age, but much of the recent commentary on the subject overestimates the importance of recent Israeli successes. Iron Dome does represent a significant new capability that may have a positive effect on regional-security dynamics in the Middle East and perhaps beyond. Such quick-response programs developed in the United States and elsewhere can contribute to the defense of key population centers and critical infrastructure against limited attacks, and that in turn can bolster psychological resilience. Furthermore, the U.S.-Israeli effort may pave the way for greater missile-defense collaboration among like-minded nations facing similar threats.

But many thorny strategic and operational issues remain. Despite its utility in meeting Israel’s unique security challenges, Iron Dome is not a game changer, nor does it validate—at least not yet—Reagan’s vision of a global strategic-defense capability. Despite a growing (but incomplete) consensus on the need for some level of missile defense, the vision of “impotent and obsolete” ballistic missiles remains firmly out of reach for the foreseeable future.

Whatever its ultimate strategic significance, the Iron Dome technology has served to reinvigorate the American debate on the utility of missile defense. Until recently, the relatively quiet and scholarly tone surrounding U.S. missile policy has contrasted sharply with the public cries and critiques that characterized what we have labeled the “three waves” of emotional debate regarding missile defense over the past four decades. These include the debates in the 1960s over deployment of what became the limited Safeguard system; Reagan’s space-based concept of the 1980s; and George W. Bush’s plan for a ground-based system purportedly designed to protect the United States and parts of Europe from an Iranian attack. Ever since the Obama administration’s introduction of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) in 2009, there have been at most ritual acknowledgements of the “requirement” for missile defense—as in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty preamble and elsewhere. Further, in the United States and elsewhere there has been only relatively low-level expert debate, even in the face of a National Academy of Sciences report that posited significant problems with current programs.

This essay will assess Iron Dome’s potential impact on U.S. and international efforts to deploy multitiered national, regional and global missile-defense systems. We will look at the antimissile system’s history and construct a preliminary baseline evaluation of its performance last fall. Finally, we will consider the strategic implications of Iron Dome and how it or similar systems might contribute to U.S. and Israeli missile-defense efforts.

ISRAELI EFFORTS to develop a missile shield go back three decades and are intertwined with the Jewish state’s close collaboration with the United States. The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding in 1986 to develop missile defense and to facilitate Israeli participation in Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Missile defense became even more salient for Israeli leaders after Iraq fired conventionally armed Scud missiles at Israel during the Gulf War of 1991. In that episode, hastily deployed Patriot missiles helped limit civilian terror and, while their operational effects were significantly oversold in the initial reports, may have thwarted some Scuds as well. Since then, Israel and the United States have cooperated on several missile-defense programs, including joint technology development, industrial cooperation, and a program of testing and exercises in addition to shared funding, which continues to this day. Further, a sophisticated U.S. radar system in the Negev desert presently represents the only permanent U.S. ground presence in Israel.

Israel’s current missile-defense goal is to construct a layered defense against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, rockets and other air threats. Hostile or potentially hostile states surrounding Israel have emphasized rockets and missiles in their force planning over traditional war-fighting platforms and capabilities. The air forces of hostile neighbors in particular are in many cases increasingly obsolete, due in part to Western technology-denial efforts. In both the 2006 and 2008–2009 conflicts, Israel’s enemies attempted to rain rockets on Israel, forcing the IDF to initiate complicated, costly and politically problematic ground operations. Israel’s aim was to destroy missiles and launchers used against the country and to take out safe havens available for enemy missile operations.

Far more than the United States, Israel sees its adversaries’ air and missile capabilities (including conventionally armed ballistic missiles) as part of a continuous spectrum of threats to its population and forces. The basic Israeli concept is to deploy active and passive defenses as well as offensive capabilities against known and perceived threats, as was recently seen when Israel attacked targets in Syria to prevent the transfer of Iranian Fateh-110 missiles to Hezbollah. Moreover, some analysts believe that Israeli intelligence agencies will undertake phase-zero (i.e., precombat) operations against rocket and missile manufacturers, their potential launch sites and associated personnel. Active defense, as understood in Israel, involves a multitiered matrix of systems that to date are in a variety of stages of development, deployment and readiness.

Iron Dome, representing the lowest-tier system, is intended to intercept relatively unsophisticated rockets. It was designed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd., a private Israeli defense firm with very close ties to the IDF that builds high-tech defense systems for air, land, sea and space. It uses the explosive-tipped Tamir interceptor to destroy rockets at a range of four to seventy kilometers. Iron Dome relies on a widely publicized capability to almost instantly discriminate between rockets targeted against populated areas and those that will drop in uninhabited areas; thus, it seeks to intercept only the threatening rockets. According to Israeli missile expert Uzi Rubin, former head of the Israel Missile Defense Organization, this ability to discriminate contributed to an estimated exchange ratio of one interceptor fired for every three rockets fired at Israel during Operation Pillar of Defense. But perhaps its greatest technological success is its ability to detect, track, aim and explode ordinance in a very limited time window, which is particularly difficult within the short distances that characterize Israeli combat space.

An Iron Dome battery includes an ELM-2084 S-Band phased-array radar, fire-control center and typically three launchers capable of carrying twenty Tamir interceptors. The Tamir is three meters long and uses a proximity-fused explosive warhead to destroy rockets in midair. Israeli media have reported that shrapnel resulting from Iron Dome has damaged property, but there has been no in-depth public analysis of the danger posed to civilians by interception-generated shrapnel. Each battery costs approximately $50 million, while interceptors cost approximately $50,000 each. Statements from Israeli officials indicate that Israel may need up to thirteen batteries to provide full coverage to threatened areas.

But Israel’s primary missile interceptor is the Arrow system, developed by the state-owned Israel Aerospace Industries in collaboration with Boeing. It includes interceptors, radars, battle management and fire-control capabilities. The Arrow 2, which carries a fragmentation warhead, is currently in service, while the longer-range Arrow 3 is under development. Arrow 3, a two-stage, solid-propellant, hit-to-kill interceptor, has not yet completed a successful intercept test, but the Congressional Research Service says it may be deployed by 2014.

Another system called David’s Sling (sometimes known as Magic Wand) is designed to strengthen the middle tier of the Israeli defense against shorter-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and heavy rockets. A project of Rafael and Raytheon, David’s Sling completed its first successful intercept test (conducted jointly by Israel and the United States) in November 2012. Israel may deploy the system as early as next year.

THE UNITED States has not sought to make use of Israeli missile-defense systems, including those it funded and/or developed jointly. Even before Operation Pillar of Defense, some in the U.S. Congress called for the United States to coproduce the system or use it to protect U.S. deployed forces. In November, Reuters quoted an unnamed Israeli official as saying coproduction is not an option “right now.” Members of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee expressed concerns in 2012 that the United States is not benefiting as fully as it should from Israel and suggested that future U.S. funding be conditional on U.S. access to Iron Dome technologies.

Obama’s redirection of American missile-defense programs in 2009 toward regional defense partnerships offers a path of understanding on the nature and extent of U.S. interest in defensive systems, as well as about the potential impact of Iron Dome and its related systems. Obama’s policies represent what we call the “fourth wave” of U.S. efforts to protect against nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, long an aspiration among U.S. military planners and politicians, particularly among congressional Republicans. Wave I began when the United States first contemplated the Sentinel program in the 1960s and ultimately installed Safeguard, its first operational missile-defense system, in the mid-1970s following years of heated discussion on the strategic and technological merits. Perhaps the highest political endorsement came during Wave II with Reagan’s 1983 SDI speech envisioning a system, primarily space-based, that would render the use of nuclear-tipped missiles anywhere and at any stage of launch to be ineffective, if not futile. U.S. missile-defense ambitions were scaled down following the end of the Cold War, with the George H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations advocating a more limited defense of the nation against long-range missiles. However, Japan and the United States did decide in the mid-1990s to develop bilateral arrangements for a theater-level defense system in order to address Japan’s increasing sense of vulnerability to a North Korean attack.

The George W. Bush administration moved decisively toward what we see as Wave III, reinvigorating the idea of a “national” missile defense. This represented a substantial shift from the SDI, and the beginning of a new, albeit rough, consensus about the purpose of missile defenses in the twenty-first century. The administration moved forward with the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system based in Alaska and California, withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia and announced plans to create a third national missile-defense site overseas, with deployed interceptors in Poland and a radar site in the Czech Republic. The system was declared to be capable of protecting the U.S. homeland, and parts of Europe, from a potential nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat from Iran.

In reconfiguring the George W. Bush plan in 2009, the Obama administration launched Wave IV. While retaining, and in 2013 modestly expanding, the two existing “national” missile-defense sites, it is pursuing multilayered regional missile shields based largely on the seaborne Aegis air- and missile-defense system in Europe and Asia to supplement and integrate with the older, relatively successful, shorter-range Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems. The most developed and widely discussed of these is the EPAA, intended to be linked to a coordinated air- and missile-defense system within NATO. Also included in the plan are regional systems with new or additional radars in Japan, the Asia-Pacific area and the Persian Gulf.

Notably, U.S. policy makers have not clarified Israel’s role in this region-by-region approach. On the U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s website, Israel is listed as a cooperative partner in the Middle East (but not in Europe or the Asia-Pacific), even though the United States has announced no specific plans for data sharing, technology transfers or joint command-and-control efforts among the various Middle East partners, which include Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Nevertheless, the United States continues to fund Israeli missile-defense efforts.

U.S.-Israeli cooperation may serve as a model for how the United States will pursue missile-defense relationships with other allies. Indeed, missile defense likely will become an increasingly important tool for reassuring key allies and building alliances. The United States provided approximately $70 million for Iron Dome in 2012, partly to reassure Israelis facing increasing rocket attacks. This number rose to $211 million in 2013, and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency requested $220 million for 2014. Similarly, when Turkey recently felt threatened by missiles from neighboring Syria, the United States, Germany and the Netherlands provided Patriot batteries as a sign of NATO solidarity. It remains to be seen whether the United States will pursue a more robust suite of activities with new partners, such as joint testing, technology development, and software and data sharing.

Obama’s approach shares substantial continuities with that of his predecessor. Both focused primarily on the threat of small numbers of relatively unsophisticated missiles from outlier regimes such as Iran and North Korea, and both forwent efforts to intercept large numbers of more sophisticated Russian or Chinese ICBMs. The Obama administration also continued and expanded the cooperative efforts and multinational exercises (such as the Nimble Titan series) of its predecessor, including with Israel. U.S. policy makers and the public now largely see missile defense as a key element of U.S. strategy, and thus remain committed to significant investment in research and development.

Iron Dome’s effect on Israel’s security situation and the goal of a lasting Middle East peace remains an open question. Iron Dome may render Israel less vulnerable to short-range rockets as weapons of terror and coercion, but it could also spur Israel’s enemies to increase their offensive forces to counter Israel’s defensive systems, including Iron Dome.

In any case, Iron Dome is likely to have a significant effect on Israeli behavior. Like any state, it must respond to its citizens’ desire for protection. In the absence of defenses, it must rely on offensive action—including operations such as the 2008–2009 Operation Cast Lead—to demonstrate resolve against rocket attacks. A shield against such rockets could provide leeway for Israeli leaders to seek alternate means of handling conflicts, perhaps even including expanded efforts to seek diplomatic solutions. On the other hand, if Israelis feel secure behind their defensive shield, they may not feel any need to engage in talks that would require concessions.

Meanwhile, Israel’s opponents might change their own tactics in an effort to overwhelm or outflank the defensive capability represented by Iron Dome. The Arabic-language media saw Iron Dome differently from the image highlighted in the Israeli or Western media. Writers in mainstream Arabic-language outlets saw little change in the resolve of “resistance groups” to paralyze Israeli society and economic life while demonstrating an ability to resist even in the face of Israeli counterforce operations. Further, some interpreted the lack of an Israeli ground incursion as successful Hamas deterrence of Israeli forces. If these accounts significantly influence or accurately reflect the Palestinian leadership’s thinking, they cast doubt on Iron Dome’s potential impact on the behavior of Israel’s adversaries. Most tellingly, a strong majority of Palestinians interviewed in several polls saw the lack of an Israeli ground invasion (in contrast to 2008–2009) as a victory for Hamas and a way of paralyzing normal Israeli life while furthering Palestinian goals.

IRON DOME’S success fueled media reports that other states facing threats on their borders were interested in purchasing the system, perhaps including South Korea and India, which share a history of arms sales and technology exchanges with Israel. Early accounts focused on licensing, production and defense barter in which Iron Dome would be only part of the calculus. A few accounts suggested that unspecified European countries might buy Iron Dome batteries to protect forces deployed in Afghanistan. This seems unlikely, given that the Western commitment to Afghanistan is winding down and European governments are facing severe fiscal pressures. But, even before Iron Dome’s successes in late 2012, other militaries may have considered importing the Israeli system. Singapore, the city-state with a small geographic area to defend, was seen as one such possibility, although this speculation, like that involving South Korea and India, likely was stimulated in part by long-standing defense-industry relations between the parties.

The biggest marketing prize for Rafael and the Israeli government is the United States. If the U.S. Army were to purchase Iron Dome batteries, it would provide not only revenues but also, perhaps more importantly, a tighter bonding of the two nations’ security planning. American missile-defense experts had indeed pushed for U.S. adoption of the system prior to Iron Dome’s recent successes. Raytheon reportedly signed an agreement for joint marketing efforts. Yet, unless Congress pushes the matter firmly, Iron Dome isn’t likely to become part of the American inventory. American experts initially were reluctant to support Iron Dome because they thought a laser-based system was more promising for shooting down incoming rockets and artillery rounds, and some still do. American firms are developing systems similar to Iron Dome, but unlike Iron Dome these have not yet moved out of the development phase to field-testing, let alone combat use. Moreover, Iron Dome has fairly limited applicability; its value would be confined largely to enhanced point defense of American overseas bases, key allied infrastructure or population centers, or large, relatively immobile concentrations of American troops.

Thus, Iron Dome isn’t likely to be exported extensively. For one thing, it works best in a threat environment like that of Israel and its particular geography. Israel faces a unique mix of threats, especially to its population centers, in a geographically constrained space. Hostile groups are able to fire large numbers of unsophisticated rockets at close range and then melt back into a civilian population, making retaliation difficult and enhancing the value of active defenses.

Second, the system is relatively expensive, although this has been contested by government and industry officials, as well as some outside analysts. Experts estimate that Iron Dome interceptors cost between $30,000 and $100,000 apiece, while the primitive incoming mortars and rockets may cost less than $100 and longer-range rockets may go for only a few thousand dollars. Then there is the question of how many Tamirs are fired to engage one incoming missile—a matter of both shot doctrine and practical experience. Finally, the cost of Iron Dome as a system depends on how many batteries are required for full, or at least sufficient, coverage of a threatened area. For a large country such as India, for instance, the cost of obtaining sufficient batteries to protect its full expanse would likely be prohibitive. Even in a relatively small country such as Israel, full coverage may prove unaffordable, especially against the larger rocket arsenals of Hezbollah. Currently, Israel fields five Iron Dome batteries, one of which was recently deployed to the country’s northern areas, with more batteries in the works. But any full cost accounting is elusive because, as with American missile-defense programs, it is difficult to prorate the supporting military programs (sensors, satellites, communication, logistical infrastructure and even human-intelligence programs) necessary for Iron Dome to be effective, or to distinguish those endeavors from their original missions or contributions to other weapons systems. Given the recent successes, all of this may be moot, at least in Israel. What politician wants to tell his constituency that he will not support a wonder weapon that demonstrably protects civilians against a well-known and fearsome threat?

Regardless of actual costs per missile, per engagement, by conflict or any other Iron Dome calculation, any government will need to assess the relative cost of defense systems according to its own strategic and domestic political contexts. Israel faces what most of its citizens perceive as an existential threat. Three times in the last decade barrages of short-range rockets have rained on Israeli territory, and single or double shots at random intervals are common. Thus, Israel has very good domestic political reasons to bear the expenses of Iron Dome indefinitely, especially if U.S. financial support continues. For other countries, including the United States, which face less challenging or immediate threats, other comparable short-range counterrocket, artillery and mortar defense systems may be sufficient. These would include the U.S. Navy’s Phalanx system and counterbattery systems.

Thus, Iron Dome may be best perceived as a niche capability with a very unfavorable price ratio—something most governments wouldn’t likely view as worthwhile. Even Israel, after all, received substantial financial assistance from the United States in order to produce all its missile-defense systems in the current quantities. Without access to such assistance, fewer countries than some commentators have assumed are likely to view the technology as attractive on a cost-benefit basis.

The third barrier, and perhaps the largest, is that Iron Dome is a complex “system of systems” in which all elements must work in concert in order to make interceptions possible in a short time window. For Israel, this means a crucial need is access to cueing by the U.S. early-warning system, almost certainly not available to many other potential clients.

Finally, Israel may be reluctant to share all of Iron Dome’s technologies, software and processes. Major aspects of how the system functions are not publicly known—for example, the full role of the human operator in making an intercept decision. Even coproduction or licensing agreements carry risks. Would potential purchasers guard technical innovations and operational procedures as jealously as Rafael and its various subcontractors? With life-and-death stakes for Israeli citizens, officials would need to vet carefully who acquired, much less built, the system and its components.

On the more positive side, Iron Dome was developed quickly, and designers managed to circumvent major impediments in the Israeli military-acquisition system. As Israel gains experience producing the system, costs may come down to the point where exports become more feasible. Furthermore, discrete aspects of the system—for instance, the software that allows the system to quickly discriminate between threatening and nonthreatening rockets—may generate commercial opportunities for Israeli defense firms.

Leaving aside export-market considerations and operational issues, the impact of Iron Dome may be more subtle and long lasting than many people have realized. Reports of Grad and Fajr-5 missiles being shot out of the sky made news everywhere, whatever the final technical analysis may prove. Major news outlets, both print and online, prominently featured praise by Israeli officials and world leaders such as UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon. This attention came at a critical time for national-security issues in the United States and elsewhere. At the macro level, defense spending is declining in most Western countries, forcing policy makers and military leaders to take hard looks at which capabilities are essential and which are not.

At the same time, the Obama administration plans to pursue the steady growth of its multitiered “phased adaptive approaches,” consisting of successive stages of incremental and ultimately integrated improvements to U.S. and allied missile-defense radars in Europe, the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia. Most important, well-publicized reports about the growing threat of missiles from Iran, Syria and elsewhere add to the worries of national-security planners around the world. For nonspecialists, advocates of missile defense in general and politicians seeking ways to appear strong on defense, Iron Dome is nearly irresistible, an example of a program that works and thereby demonstrates the feasibility of future systems to defend all civilians. Yet, as we have seen, Iron Dome does not exactly fit that bill and may suffer the pains of media hype, just as Patriot underwent after the initial analysis during the 1991 Gulf War.

THE APPEAL of Iron Dome for Israeli policy makers and citizens is not hard to understand. After all, living with constant external threats—be it from invasion, suicide bombers or small, unguided rockets—is debilitating for a society and its citizens. Iron Dome has demonstrably reduced, at least in the short term, the threat of Hamas rockets. As one well-known Israeli journalist recounts from her personal experience:

We, the residents of southern Israel who live within a 40 kilometer radius of Gaza, were encouraged to build safe rooms in our house, seek support if we were feeling nervous and otherwise learn to adjust to a situation where we were in ultimate waiting mode—waiting for the next alarm, the next school closure, the next “episode” when an occasional missile or two might fall nearby.

And oddly enough, like good lab rats, we did just that. We learned to drive with our car windows open so that we could hear sirens while on the open road. We taught our children how to fall asleep again once they were moved into the safe room in the middle of the night. We developed a whole slew of coping mechanisms that range from “dressing for missiles”—no heels or straight skirts allowed—to black humor, acknowledging the absurdity of living in this kind of situation. A child wakes up from a crash of thunder last winter screaming, “missiles,” and we get to make jokes about how children of the Negev are more familiar with the sound of falling Grad missiles than actual rain. We became old war heroes, exchanging stories of close calls from the missiles of 2009 versus those of 2010 and 11.

But as time has gone on, our resistance has worn away.

The last line captures a fundamental ambivalence toward missile defense and, more generally, the political and strategic dynamics that place citizens at the mercy of both Iron Dome and the attacks it protects against. Does Iron Dome contribute to the existential security of the Israeli state and its citizens or is it a technological Band-Aid? The protection offered by Iron Dome and systems like it may, in the end, allow political and military leaders to avoid making the difficult political choices necessary to find longer-term solutions to the underlying conflict. And how does living in the shadow of missile interceptions wear on the body politic?

The enthusiasm of American and external experts for Iron Dome is less explicable, given the underlying realities of this defensive system explored above. There are only a handful of places in the world where Iron Dome–like systems could perform with anything like the efficiency we have seen in the Israeli case. Other comparable systems have been proposed in the past, remain in development or even have already been fielded. However dramatic its short-run results, Iron Dome is not really new or unprecedented. But it is operational, and this might be enough for those with financial stakes in demonstrating that such weapons work and that people in many countries should spend tax dollars against the horrifying, if remote, chance of attacks by short-range missiles. This argument gets stronger when Iron Dome expansion is envisioned less as a means of population protection than as point defense for valuable and vulnerable military installations or critical infrastructure. Rafael and potential licensees will make fine profits on sales motivated by such calculations.

A more critical measure of missile-defense ideology must be added to the explanatory mix, however, to understand the enthusiasm of neoconservative writer Max Boot, Kentucky senator Rand Paul and other cheerleaders for Iron Dome or any form of missile defense that promises to protect Israel, the United States, U.S. East Asian allies and other countries from the missiles that adversaries might field. Iron Dome’s clear successes in the recent conflict, then, are simply more fodder for missile-defense enthusiasts. At a time when the Obama administration’s regional missile-defense plans are promising to spread modestly capable missile defenses against limited threats to the eastern Mediterranean, Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia, critics of the administration demand still more. Members of the U.S. House of Representatives are focused less on regional arrangements than on a return to a robust national system. The wishes of these critics were partially fulfilled when Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel recently announced the deployment of additional ground-based interceptors to Alaska. Some demand an East Coast site for ground-based missile defense, regardless of whether the West Coast sites in California and Alaska are well tested and operationally effective. Moreover, American allies and potential partners in regional missile defense ask for subsidies, technology transfers and support for their own ailing defense-industry firms that might contribute to joint missile-defense efforts.

The recent demonstration of Iron Dome’s promise was a boon for missile-defense proponents across the globe, as it raised a quiescent issue to the top of the security agenda at a time when military- and political-establishment figures were looking for an impetus to push the issue. But scholars, analysts and decision makers should recognize that Iron Dome is a limited system with limited applicability to a relatively small number of unique circumstances. It no more validates Reagan’s vision than it makes a serious contribution to the larger game of preventing intermediate- and long-range attacks from those few states armed or potentially armed with such weapons. It is just another conventional weapon among many and not a magic bullet, unfortunately, for the Israelis or anyone else.

Peter Dombrowski is a professor of strategy at the Naval War College, where he serves as the chair of the Strategic Research Department. Catherine Kelleher is a senior fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University and College Park Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland. Eric Auner is a senior analyst at Guardian Six Consulting.

 

[Developereo]

Official figures from the IDF:

Total number of rockets launched from the Gaza Strip - 1,506
Open areas - 875
Urban areas - 58
'Iron Dome' Interceptions - 421
Failed launching attempts - 152

The Israeli Air Force : Pillar of Defense Ends in Ceasefire

Now ask yourself this question: is Pakistan likely to use primitive rockets which have a 70% failure rate (bad launch or aim)?

 

[Rajaraja Chola]

Official figures from the IDF:

Total number of rockets launched from the Gaza Strip - 1,506
Open areas - 875
Urban areas - 58
'Iron Dome' Interceptions - 421
Failed launching attempts - 152

The Israeli Air Force : Pillar of Defense Ends in Ceasefire

Now ask yourself this question: is Pakistan likely to use primitive rockets which have a 70% failure rate (bad launch or aim)?

Pakistan wont launch such a missile with a lower percentage of success. But still a question remains. But would Pakistan launch 100's of missiles?

 

[bloo]

@bloo

Trust me , , mate , you are now merely arguing for the sake of arguing . At least read the argument you are trying to reply to . You understand little of these military matters , but are still keen to talk , otherwise you wouldn't have said anything about no surprises even in today's warfare or even tried to equate the seventh largest army in the world with an insurgent group tactics and have difficulty understanding the fact that Israel faces nothing what India or Pakistan will . You are still having trouble understanding the intensity of the conflicts and the cost problem . I need to remind you if you didn't have rocket salvos or cruise missiles back then , neither did we , in fact we had much less , the rapid modernization drive of the Pakistan Army , you see today , only happened after Musharraf gained power . I can only laugh at ' aggressiveness ' coming with Iron Dome systems part , seriously !

Leave it , over and out .

In the end all you are seeing is how the Iron DOme was used in Israel whereas I am saying that we'll use it in a different context.
If you want a surprise then every element should be taken into consideration not just the army, that's all I am saying.
Coz as far as Iron Dome is concerned I can see them being used in only 1 context, i.e. in a tank regiment.
And what surprise is there when our numbers will already be greater in a war like situation??????????????
You are adamant to believe that an Iron Dome will have to face a barrage of artillery with a Nasr or 2, yet you won't even consider it that we are the 3rd largest army in the world and we'll have greater numbers to begin with, and that its possible that we can deal greater damage while the Iron DOme blocking just a few.
SO yes I have thought it through before talking it out, but you'll know more than me coz you are...................what..... in the Pakistan army or something????????
So in the end you just want to say that I don't know anything about "military matters" yet you don't want to explain why you think so, coz saying so is plain final for you, right?



ALAS......

You are completely right I am only arguing, & the Indian army top brass will(if) buy them only for kicks & you must know everything they have discussed so that makes the Iron Dome completely useless.
Either way, as you said, that in the theater of war any kind of surprise is possible and we should really expect the unexpected, but that's for the Indian army only, coz PA will just keep on hitting us and we'll keep on missing and an Iron DOme battery will not block a single Pakistani artillery shell.

 

[Rajaraja Chola]

We can buy ToT for the radar & software (which is the most important part of ID system), modify
it, and develop a cheaper missile to carry out the actual interception.

They would readily provide us R&D. Israelies are our trusted partners, no doubt. But still we have developed a BMD shield. My opinion is why cant we let DRDO try for once?
Moreover we have no idea if it contains US components,particularly radars, and it's cost was shared by USA. So i do have a doubt, whether it will allow Israel to have free rein to sell to India.

 

[Secur]

@bloo

I am giving much importance to how the system is used in Israel , under what circumstances , against who and with what success rate because , consider it , that is the only place where the system has been deployed and used . Now , tell me , what hope is there for a discussion when you answer my detailed painting of ' Israel vs Hamas ' scenario with ' If Israelis know , so will we ' . Just what similarity even remote , are you seeing with them ? The element of surprise is inherent even in fourth generation warfare which is further emboldened by the fact that the both sides share a long and diverse terrain-ed border . Think of how many Tamir interceptors and batteries you will have to buy for the approximately 2,900 KM long border and the prohibitive cost that come with it , making the entire acquisition unfeasible and impractical . Remember that surprises aren't only achieved by the number , even though the Indian Army cant possibly commit its entire forces on the International border , Working boundary and Line of Control . Feel free to prove me wrong . I am adamant to believe that a system like Iron Dome will always have to face a barrage of artillery fire because that is the first thing , that happens in a theater level warfare . There's a reason why I asked you , to have a look at the duels on Line of Control without making irresponsible and self-refuting comments that somehow ' you weren't aggressive back then , since you didn't have the system in question ' .

The comment about ignorance of military matters was made because , face it , you are missing the basics of warfare . I agree that the India enjoys a conventional superiority over us , it always has , but it doesn't change the levels of intensity of warfare but further enhance it . The last part about me ' underestimating the enemy and overestimating ourselves ' is untrue , nowhere have I said or indicated that .

 

[bloo]

@Secur


All these experts who say the success rate is not 90% or whatever are basically speculating. It could be 70% (as some say) or even 89% for all we know, coz they are ONLY speculating. You can check any article on the Iron Dome that denies the success rate claim it coz I too have considered everything.
What similarities?
What part of It's not Israel vs Hammas didn't you get?
But lets talk similarities just for your sake,so.
Let me remind you that these are artillery and tanks not missiles, you have to come in range to fire them, so yes we'll know, coz don't tell me an armoured corp containing a certain number of tanks, artillery guns and Nasr TEL(as per you) will not be spotted traveling, so yes we'll know.
AND PLEASE define the kind of surprises that fourth generation warfare has for tank battles.

As for the "2900km border" and "making the entire acquisition unfeasible and impractical", your statement is just begging me to say that you are the one who doesn't understand warfare.
Why will we do that? Its just not practical.
Its not Israel with its small borders, we'll look to the sufficiently larger weapons like the BrahMos for that.
How many areas alongside the 2900km border do u think is suitable for a tank battle?
You don't really think we'll worry about artillery fire along the border when we see tanks and missile TELs approaching from the Pakistani side? That's your idea of how warfare will be like? For that we have BrahMos regiments which will fire that instant like the 861st and 862nd BrahMos regiments in Rajasthan.
FOR THE LAST TIME IF WE ACQUIRE IRON DOME IT'LL NOT BE POSTED IN BORDERS, ITS NEITHER PRACTICAL OR FEASIBLE, BUT WILL BE ALONGSIDE A TANK OR ARTILLERY UNIT OR ALONGSIDE A HILL OR SUCH VANTAGE POINT FROM WHERE AN APPROACHING TANK UNIT CAN BE EASILY SPOTTED AND THE ONLY WAY TO DO AN ARTILLERY FIRE ALONGSIDE THE VANTAGE POINT WILL BE THROUGH TOWED ARTILLERY THROUGH A SPECIAL FORCES INTERVENTION OR NORMAL INFANTRY.
As for committing numbers, neither will the Pakistani army.
And again we have numbers to spare even after committing here and there.
As for "because that is the first thing , that happens in a theater level warfare"
Correction: That used to happen.

And I am adamant to believe that Iron Dome will not face such numbers to begin with, its not like a tank battle in the Smolensk during the 40s. We have gone waaaaaaay past that era during the last 10 years of advancement.
We are looking at planes with laser guided bombs and cluster munitions like the CBU-105 that India will receive, that obliterate tank regiments, and cruise missile regiments that are ready to fire off at a whiff of an artillery unit approaching anywhere near.
Will the opposing army be so confident to send many a tank at once with that kind of looming dangers.
Today we have UAVs and satellites like the Heron, Nishant, the to be launched spy satellite CCI-Sat and the already launched IRNSS-1A which will continuously monitor the border, SO DO TELL WHERE'S THE SURPRISE?????
A large and slow artillery force approaching an enemy is just not practical, and I do not believe a tank unit of more than 4-10 approaching through no matter what terrain will have any element of surprise, it'll Be even more slower if there is towed or self-propelled artillery mixed in.
So either the approaching force will be cut down or it'll have to be smaller from the very beginning.
In effect the Iron Dome faces a smaller force.
Tank battle in this day and age just doesn't sound right.
Thus here is as much inside as I can go for you, I hope it was basic warfare for you.
So please give some details rather than just statements like "The comment about ignorance of military matters was made because , face it , you are missing the basics of warfare ."


It is your continuous stream of thought that, 'since India is bringing in Iron Dome what kind of challenge can PA give that Israels Iron Dome has faced'.If u believe situation are different then why won't it be different for India too?

As for ' you weren't aggressive back then , since you didn't have the system in question ', where was I wrong, please define?

 

[Developereo]

Pakistan wont launch such a missile with a lower percentage of success. But still a question remains. But would Pakistan launch 100's of missiles?

I don't know the economics of it but, if the Pakistani missiles are as cheap as some claim, why not? The whole idea is to make India use up their stock of interceptors early in the game.

See, the primary advantage of Iron Dome over other systems is its efficiency: it doesn't waste interceptors on incoming missiles which are deemed non-threatening. That's a false advantage which is only relevant against the most primitive of adversaries.

 

[Secur]

@Secur


All these experts who say the success rate is not 90% or whatever are basically speculating. It could be 70% (as some say) or even 89% for all we know, coz they are ONLY speculating. You can check any article on the Iron Dome that denies the success rate claim it coz I too have considered everything.
What similarities?
What part of It's not Israel vs Hammas didn't you get?
But lets talk similarities just for your sake,so.
Let me remind you that these are artillery and tanks not missiles, you have to come in range to fire them, so yes we'll know, coz don't tell me an armoured corp containing a certain number of tanks, artillery guns and Nasr TEL(as per you) will not be spotted traveling, so yes we'll know.
AND PLEASE define the kind of surprises that fourth generation warfare has for tank battles.

As for the "2900km border" and "making the entire acquisition unfeasible and impractical", your statement is just begging me to say that you are the one who doesn't understand warfare.
Why will we do that? Its just not practical.
Its not Israel with its small borders, we'll look to the sufficiently larger weapons like the BrahMos for that.
How many areas alongside the 2900km border do u think is suitable for a tank battle?
You don't really think we'll worry about artillery fire along the border when we see tanks and missile TELs approaching from the Pakistani side? That's your idea of how warfare will be like? For that we have BrahMos regiments which will fire that instant like the 861st and 862nd BrahMos regiments in Rajasthan.
FOR THE LAST TIME IF WE ACQUIRE IRON DOME IT'LL NOT BE POSTED IN BORDERS, ITS NEITHER PRACTICAL OR FEASIBLE, BUT WILL BE ALONGSIDE A TANK OR ARTILLERY UNIT OR ALONGSIDE A HILL OR SUCH VANTAGE POINT FROM WHERE AN APPROACHING TANK UNIT CAN BE EASILY SPOTTED AND THE ONLY WAY TO DO AN ARTILLERY FIRE ALONGSIDE THE VANTAGE POINT WILL BE THROUGH TOWED ARTILLERY THROUGH A SPECIAL FORCES INTERVENTION OR NORMAL INFANTRY.
As for committing numbers, neither will the Pakistani army.
And again we have numbers to spare even after committing here and there.
As for "because that is the first thing , that happens in a theater level warfare"
Correction: That used to happen.

And I am adamant to believe that Iron Dome will not face such numbers to begin with, its not like a tank battle in the Smolensk during the 40s. We have gone waaaaaaay past that era during the last 10 years of advancement.
We are looking at planes with laser guided bombs and cluster munitions like the CBU-105 that India will receive, that obliterate tank regiments, and cruise missile regiments that are ready to fire off at a whiff of an artillery unit approaching anywhere near.
Will the opposing army be so confident to send many a tank at once with that kind of looming dangers.
Today we have UAVs and satellites like the Heron, Nishant, the to be launched spy satellite CCI-Sat and the already launched IRNSS-1A which will continuously monitor the border, SO DO TELL WHERE'S THE SURPRISE?????
A large and slow artillery force approaching an enemy is just not practical, and I do not believe a tank unit of more than 4-10 approaching through no matter what terrain will have any element of surprise, it'll Be even more slower if there is towed or self-propelled artillery mixed in.
So either the approaching force will be cut down or it'll have to be smaller from the very beginning.
In effect the Iron Dome faces a smaller force.
Tank battle in this day and age just doesn't sound right.
Thus here is as much inside as I can go for you, I hope it was basic warfare for you.
So please give some details rather than just statements like "The comment about ignorance of military matters was made because , face it , you are missing the basics of warfare ."


It is your continuous stream of thought that, 'since India is bringing in Iron Dome what kind of challenge can PA give that Israels Iron Dome has faced'.If u believe situation are different then why won't it be different for India too?

As for ' you weren't aggressive back then , since you didn't have the system in question ', where was I wrong, please define?

All these experts base their estimates on some data from the Israeli sources , isn't it true ? Despite the fact that Israelis like to claim a near 90% successful intercept probability rate , it looks exaggerated , extremely exaggerated . No defense system that I know of , boasts such a success rate and Iron Dome isn't really some game changing technology . Just a system , designed to protect Israeli cities from primitive slow moving and short range rockets . I think , I posted an article just at the beginning to prove that the high estimation of the intercept probability , is unrealistic .

I understood every part of the Israel vs Hamas scenario , but you are still reluctant to even consider it . I do not know why , since the system has only been deployed in Tel Aviv's land and nowhere else , until now . Lets try again . This is my post , where I asked you to find any relevance . Because if there are none , then the system is indeed useless being designed for some purposes , than you want to use it for .

Somehow , that because the IDF is trying to protect cities , it will be easy for Iron Dome to suit Indian needs , really ? What is a ' protected zone ' which I speak of ? Is it an entire city in your view ? The Israelis know exactly what is going to be fired at them and can estimate from what locations . You do not have that luxury . Fighting for small strips of land is easy , very easy but we aren't going to fight for some small strips , are we ? . I made it clear that Tel Aviv faces slow moving home made primitive Fajr and Qassam rockets , at max 10 at a time and with a delay of days . Even then , the intercept probability is estimated at 60% by more realistic experts , with the high response time of the system being a problem , forget the cost , any relevance you see with an India-Pakistan conflict ? Any at all ? If the answer is ' no ' , then the Iron Dome wasn't designed for the threats , you want it to neutralize now . - Secur


I never mentioned anything about an armored corps not being spotted , actually that is something which has never been possible to hide , it is just that the armored corps isn't the only part of the army nor the only attacking force in a battle . As for the surprises in fourth generation warfare , there are artillery units placed across the Line of Control by both sides ready to fire and being difficult to detect due to the mountainous terrain and because the sole orbiting satellite you have today is incapable of continuous monitoring , shall I explain this part too ?

The long and diverse terrain-ed border thing is what I wanted you to understand in the first place , for example Israel shares ~40 KM border with Gaza Strip where the rockets are fired from . Even then , the cost is so high that Israel has to request AID from the Americans to pay for the measly 5 batteries and 15 launchers deployed . Please , do the math and tell me how many batteries and interceptors do you require for the long 2900 KM India-Pakistan border , assuming that it will be placed with a tank or artillery unit and you want to intercept every threat coming in , something which can easily overwhelm the system , with a higher response time , knowing that you aren't facing some primitive crude rockets here , what do you think the cost will be for you ? Whatever it is , is it , by any chance , feasible or practical ? Trust me , when I say that the Pakistan Army land forces are the strongest link of the armed forces of Pakistan and equipped with enough tanks and artillery units to quickly nullify this advantage .

The problem isn't with protecting cities , since the primitive Hamas rockets are predictable , unsophisticated , crude and fired with a significant delay , thereby increasing the effectiveness of the system . Will it be the case with you ? Do you face an adversary , you believe to be even remotely resemble the insurgent groups ? Israel faces nothing , it is that simple . - Secur


I agree that it can indeed provide a certain level of protection , the only question is at what cost ? At what cost , does the price of winning , becomes too high a price to pay ?

Iron Dome isn’t likely to be exported extensively. For one thing, it works best in a threat environment like that of Israel and its particular geography. Israel faces a unique mix of threats, especially to its population centers, in a geographically constrained space. Hostile groups are able to fire large numbers of unsophisticated rockets at close range and then melt back into a civilian population, making retaliation difficult and enhancing the value of active defenses.Second, the system is relatively expensive, although this has been contested by government and industry officials, as well as some outside analysts. Experts estimate that Iron Dome interceptors cost between $30,000 and $100,000 apiece, while the primitive incoming mortars and rockets may cost less than $100 and longer-range rockets may go for only a few thousand dollars. Then there is the question of how many Tamirs are fired to engage one incoming missile—a matter of both shot doctrine and practical experience. Finally, the cost of Iron Dome as a system depends on how many batteries are required for full, or at least sufficient, coverage of a threatened area. For a large country such as India, for instance, the cost of obtaining sufficient batteries to protect its full expanse would likely be prohibitive. - Demystifying Iron Dome
Peter Dombrowski, Catherine Kelleher, Eric Auner

Next thing , Pakistan Army can certainly bring large numbers to the border because it doesn't really face any two faceted threat like the Indians . Artillery duels are still the first thing that happen in theater level warfare , doubt me , check what used to happen on the LOC before the ceasefire . If you honestly have started to think that somehow the Indian Army can execute the ' Full Spectrum Dominance ' strategy , then there's nothing again to debate . These delusions of grandeur may look good here but the last three instances where we came close to war and you still had the conventional advantage tell a different , very different story . If you are looking at CBU-105 sensor fused weapon , then I am looking at H2 , H4 and Hijara which are produced domestically in Pakistan and hence able to deployed at large numbers . If you have Brahmos , then the other side is equipped with Babur , Ra'ad and CM400-AKG to name a few . If you have Heron and Nishant then the other side has Falco , Uqaab , Jasoos and Hornet to name a few . If you have IRNSS-1A , then the other side has Pakistan Remote Sensing Satellite in addition to satellite feed from the Beijing which has recently signed the Beidou access agreement too . That is why , I asked you to avoid bringing everything in and to discuss the ' system in isolation ' . You were wrong in the ' you weren't aggressive back then , since you didn't have the system in question ' argument , because ' aggressiveness has nothing whatsoever to do with a defensive system like Iron Dome ' , because you still haven't analyzed the artillery duels part which I speak of .

You aren't going inside by any means , you are again painting scenarios which are not possible today and making the components of fourth generation warfare look like some sort of obsolete things , by declaring artillery duels and tank battles not happening in this age , by making statements that the Iron Dome will face individual units in isolation . Keep in mind that even if 100 shells are fired by a unit , then the Iron Dome is overwhelmed . This isn't Gaza or Khan Younus to expect Pakistanis to fire a bunch of rockets and then wait for days . Was I then wrong to point out that you lack the basic knowledge of warfare and merely posting stuff to continue the argument ?

See, the primary advantage of Iron Dome over other systems is its efficiency: it doesn't waste interceptors on incoming missiles which are deemed non-threatening. That's a false advantage which is only relevant against the most primitive of adversaries. - Developereo

 

[bloo]

@Secur

There is a debate underway about how effective Israel’s iron dome system is in protecting populated areas from missile attacks. On the pro side it is argued that somewhere between 85% to 90% of incoming missiles are destroyed. The con side argues that the proportion is much smaller, 40% or less. A large part of the difference comes from how one defines `destroy’. Perhaps a better term would be intercept. It is possible that about 90% of incoming missiles are intercepted. However, a missile once intercepted may not have its warhead disabled, making at least one of the fragments that falls to ground (in a populated area) dangerous.

From the above article we can draw up that 90% intercept rate is possibly correct, what doesn't happen is that the artillery are not always destroyed and even though their momentum is lost they still fall off to a populated area thus killing people and this is what "the experts" claim as unsuccessful.
However in our case there will be no cities to protect as Indian army's own artillery unit will possess them for defense and the Pak army shells when struck will fall off in deserted areas and on top of that unlike the Hammas Pak army won't be able to retreat int urban areas and fire again tomorrow, they'll have to face a counter attack.
And maybe for the Israelis its not so much of a game changer but here with civilians to not hold the Indian army back it may very well be a game changer. Coz I don't know what you have seen but I haven't seen a such a quick response system with a crazya$$ radar range and maneuverable electro-optical missile.


Correction: you considered only those scenarios that that suit you.
Lets actually look at some of the scenarios.
Back in Tel Aviv the Hammas could put a towed artillery at different places and launch them simultaneously and it would be difficult to figure out where the fire is coming from until the radar has actually detected it, this is mainly because the DISTANCE is not so much between them and there is the urban environment that act as buffers.
Whereas Pakistan has modern weaponry Hammas doesn't. Therefore just like we have to cope with protecting all of the 2900km border(according to you) you too have to cope with hitting simultaneously with large units alongside the border to achieve that advantage.
If you want the same advantage the Hammas have then you'll have to do the same coz as far as I can gather you want the Iron Dome to have a disadvantage in such a situation yet you are not willing to see that the PA has to equally deal that kind of damage.
And I don't think small artillery units placed along the so called terrain-ed border is sufficient for the barrage of artillery fire that you are hoping for.
What do you think the rate of fire is for artillery weapons is? they are not automatic weapons.
Lets look at your highest caliber artillery weapon, the M110 with 203mm rounds, it can do a sustained fire at 1 round per 2 minutes lets look at a more usable artillery caliber weapon, the 155mm artillery the Norinco SH1 I don't know the sustained rate of fire but the max is around 3-4 rounds per minute.
As for rockets are concerned, if I am not mistaken Pakistan uses the KRL-122 which is said to be version of the Grad rockets the very same rockets that the Iron Dome has faced against.


The likely attack positions along the LOC are either already known and the ones that aren't are being monitored.
Lets be realistic apart from a few artillery units the Pakistan has around the border what kind of surprise of barrage fire will that achieve?
Besides cease fire violations happen all the time even artillery fire.
Kashmir: Residents near the LoC insist there is 'nothing unusual' about artillery fire there | Mail Online
No matter how "terrain-ed" the specific places are, IA is probably all ready with counter attack units.
AND AGAIN not all "terrain-ed" places are suitable for artillery fire. So don't jump up seeing huge numbers lik3 2900km.
Lets be honest in only a few years we'll have the capability of complete regional monitoring with the 7 IRNSS satellites and the spy satellite CCI-Sat to be launched next year which will have the capability continuously monitor the borders. SO there, I explained it for you.

The threat of continuous fire doesn't arise as I have said FOR THE BILLIONTH time the Iron Dome if bought will be used in an artillery defense role.
Coz tell me how many cities are there along the border that require protection?
A complete border defense role WHICH I AGREED WITH YOU IS UNREALISTIC AND COSTLY.

Do not be stupid the Hamas' objective was to hurt the urban area along side the military establishments. And they could do this only coz of the geography.
Pakistan will have only one objective that is to attack the vanguard units already placed alongside the border.
I completely disagree when you say that Israel didn't face anything, coz they had the added burden of protecting the urban establishments alongside the military stronghold, whereas we have no such constraints and an open area along side the LOC and the hills and mountains which are already monitored.
So quite the contrary where the Iron Dome protected a whole city it'll have less work to do, defending only a single artillery unit.

Why do u keep parroting the same thing? Why won't you just admit it that if a border defense role is not possible with a costly few units of Iron Dome then it'll probably used in a different context altogether? And I bet IA has thought of something along that line.

As for "assuming that it will be placed with a tank or artillery unit and you want to intercept every threat coming in , something which can easily overwhelm the system".
Why?
We are not looking to intercept every attack from the Pakistani side, just enough to give an apt counter attack to cripple the approaching forces.
As far as I can gather the Iron Dome can protect a 150sqkm of both urban and military establishment so how much space does a whole tank unit require? With all the radars pointed in the known direction and the mobile MFUs of the Tamir missiles pointed towards enemy fire it becomes quite easy.
You believe the Iron DOme will be easily overwhelmed, well that situation was when the missile MFUs were scattered all over the place, imagine when they are between and around a single a regiment it becomes quite easier then with the very powerful ELM-2084 with the air surveillance detection range at 256NM, continuously pointed in 1 direction .

"Nullify this advantage"???
Are you are taking for granted the fact that Indian army won't attack at all.
We will have more units than PA to begin with and we'll have as much firepower or don't you remember Kargil?
And lets for your sake accept the fact that Iron Dome is only 60% capable, still with more units on our side and Iron Dome still destroying 60% of ur "barrage" it seems the scale is still tilting on our side.



As for

I agree that it can indeed provide a certain level of protection , the only question is at what cost ? At what cost , does the price of winning , becomes too high a price to pay ?

Iron Dome isn’t likely to be exported extensively. For one thing, it works best in a threat environment like that of Israel and its particular geography. Israel faces a unique mix of threats, especially to its population centers, in a geographically constrained space. Hostile groups are able to fire large numbers of unsophisticated rockets at close range and then melt back into a civilian population, making retaliation difficult and enhancing the value of active defenses.Second, the system is relatively expensive, although this has been contested by government and industry officials, as well as some outside analysts. Experts estimate that Iron Dome interceptors cost between $30,000 and $100,000 apiece, while the primitive incoming mortars and rockets may cost less than $100 and longer-range rockets may go for only a few thousand dollars. Then there is the question of how many Tamirs are fired to engage one incoming missile—a matter of both shot doctrine and practical experience. Finally, the cost of Iron Dome as a system depends on how many batteries are required for full, or at least sufficient, coverage of a threatened area. For a large country such as India, for instance, the cost of obtaining sufficient batteries to protect its full expanse would likely be prohibitive. - Demystifying Iron Dome
Peter Dombrowski, Catherine Kelleher, Eric Auner

I don't believe that pak army will attack and then turn away which for us makes retaliation quite possible.
The Pak KRL-122 is a version of the Grad rockets that the Iron Dome intercepted.
Unlike the whole of Israel which is fixed and is free to attack, the Pak army will only get to attack a certain artillery unit which moves and is smaller than a whole of Israel.

Suppose Pak army gathers at point A anywhere in the 2900km border, assuming that the artillery unit is already detected the Indian artillery units will also gather there for a standoff.
As per your article "how many batteries are required for full, or at least sufficient, coverage of a threatened area"
And again the area acquired by the tank unit will not be as big as Israel.
And in any scenario possible Pak army is attacking if we consider an Iron Dome system in our side, we are still able to protect to some degree while you'll have no such system, in all ends we last longer. As your article says "Hostile groups are able to fire large numbers of unsophisticated rockets at close range and then melt back into a civilian population, making retaliation difficult", and since PA is not retreating all the more good for us.
As for "the cost of obtaining sufficient batteries to protect its full expanse would likely be prohibitive".Correct thats not possible for India, so the Iron DOme will probably be used in a regiment defense role not an urban environment defense role.



Lets say we bring in 3/5th of our number, its stll more than Pakistan's. And I don't believe the Pakistani numbers in Kargil were that small, so why didn't the PA use more numbers back then, if they were not afraid of a two faceted threat?
I never said that it won't happen but since you are adamant on pointing out Kargil, how do you think that it actually happens?

Do you see a barrage?

As for "delusions of grandeur" and "conventional advantage" you do realize what happened when the Indian army brought all of the 250 Bofors field guns?
As much as I know the Hijara, H2 and H4 are not precision guided bombs and you want use air interdiction in a mountainous and foggy area so yes I believe the CBU-105 will have the advantage there.
Coz unlike the ones u mentioned, they use bomblets the CBU is however a precision guided bomb in itself and the bomblets inside the CBU are fused with sensors which will fire on a tank directly as they come over it, unlike dumb bombs.
The last I heard of Babur it traveled only 22km on its test run while already being "proclaimed" inducted. I would doubt its credibility.
Don't believe me? ask Oscar http://www.defence.pk/forums/indian-defence/239648-nirbhay-cruise-missile-test-failed-18.html#post4026085
The point being I didn't name BrahMos for the sake of bragging like you did, coz what a BrahMos can do Raad or Babur can't. The Block 3 Brahmos had successfully hit the target behind a mountain range with its supersonic steep dive ability , and since we are talking LOC there is use for BrahMos there.
Lets imagine that Babur and Raad are operational however can they pull of a BrahMos? And besides are there regiments of Babur ready at the go alonside the artillery units? BrahMos is already a part of the 40th and 41st artillery units of IA.
Babur is simply not suitable for mountainous warfare.
Can Falco , Uqaab , Jasoos and Hornet operate in 17000ft, i.e. around LOC mostly Tiger hill? Maybe Falco can. Again the Heron is better in this aspect.
What kind of payload does the PRSS have? Does it have a navigation payload or a CDMA ranging equipment? WHat kind of signals does it generate? WHat is the precision?
If not then its not enough to continuously track and observe like the IRNSS can.
As for Beidou

Pakistan Employs China's Beidou Guidance System, but Access Not Guaranteed

Its better to have your own stuff than to rely on someone, just like during a BrahMos test the Americans tampered with GPS and it went off target.
ALL of these guided bombs, BrahMos, UAVs, satelllites etc, are in some way better than Pak's.
And on their own don't look much and you might say that each of them have only a little advantage but when all of it are bound together they form a unit that is more powerful.


You are still only giving statements not explanations.
But let me tell you what I mean by aggressiveness.
You must have seen the Video I posted and how frequent artillery fires happen so tell me how will you overwhelm a quick reaction system like Iron Dome if you don't fire around 50 shells simultaneously, and that is not even possible coz you need to have 100 artillery units to do that as u must know by now an artillery weapon's rate of fire, and supporting that-so many artillery units converging is not possible, and supporting that-an Iron Dome facing a large artillery fire is not possible either.
Is this analyzed enough for you?


Please do explain which scenario I painted that is not possible today??????????

As for "Iron Dome will face individual units in isolation". Are u that stupid or just stubborn?
The very 1st point that I made was that Iron Dome in itself will never face an artillery unit on its own, an escorting artillery unit on its side automatically gives counter attack abilities and that is wht will actually happen.
Assuming that range finding and precision fires are completed, then tell me if pak army's artillery can fire 5 rounds under a minute and suppose the Iron Dome intercepts 3 of them while IA's artillery too fires 5 rounds simultaneously tell me which side has chances of survival and counter attack?

As for "Keep in mind that even if 100 shells are fired by a unit , then the Iron Dome is overwhelmed ."
This is not possible as I proved above.
And what do you think artillery are? Do u think they can churn shells like news papers?
A unit has to wait after a significant amount of time to cool off,then to range find again, and do the calculation, observe enemy fire, allocate the movable units after doing all of this, and confirm a kill or no and go through the whole process all over again until they are hitting the right spot.
And 100 shells can hardly be fired in a day in a place like LOC with all its terrain.


As for "to expect Pakistanis to fire a bunch of rockets and then wait for days . Was I then wrong to point out that you lack the basic knowledge of warfare and merely posting stuff to continue the argument ?"
You are so linear minded, can you not understand that the Hammas had the ability to retreat and regroup and fire again, PA will not have that advantage coz as PA starts hitting IA will too and that in itself will lower your volley.
We would have already located and fired simultaneously along with PA.
That is the "basic knowledge" that u are so adamant in missing, and I am at least arguing to the point you are stubbornly repeating the same thing over and over again without any explanation and u expect me to believe u r the greatest armchair warrior ever.

As for
"it doesn't waste interceptors on incoming missiles which are deemed non-threatening. That's a false advantage which is only relevant against the most primitive of adversaries"

It doesn't waste interceptors coz in Israel they are protecting cities and it cannot afford to use every other Tamir interceptor on every other rocket that has strayed off target, whereas unlike the "primitive of adversaries" pakistan won't be able to run back to Islamabad to regroup and attack another day while we sit like ducks and don't even touch our artillery guns even though Pakistan has no urban areas to hide in.

 

[Secur]

@bloo

How does the 90% successful intercept probability rate look realistic to you ? Keep in mind that Israel only engages those targets which are projected to fall in urban centers and can threaten the population . Have a look at this data from IDF which a TT posted just above .

Official figures from the IDF:

Total number of rockets launched from the Gaza Strip - 1,506
Open areas - 875
Urban areas - 58
'Iron Dome' Interceptions - 421
Failed launching attempts - 152

The Israeli Air Force : Pillar of Defense Ends in Ceasefire

Now ask yourself this question: is Pakistan likely to use primitive rockets which have a 70% failure rate (bad launch or aim)?

The problem isn't arising with protecting whole cities , there the cost is still under control with the American assistance because of the small geographical area which has to be covered . The problem isn't even with militants blending back in the population ,since Israelis are known to bomb Gaza Strip and West bank with impunity , without any regards for civilians and non combatants , attacking targets and people indiscriminately , according to the ' Dahiya doctrine ' . There's no moral high ground anywhere as you would like to believe . The listed disadvantages are actually , advantages in reality increasing the effectiveness of the system in that case , allowing Tel Aviv to launch operations into the occupied territories . I simply pointed out the 2900 KM border between India and Pakistan to make you realize that Israel only has a ~40 KM border with Gaza Strip , even then the Iron Dome's cost is extremely high with just 5 batteries deployed with 15 launchers . Perhaps , you took that part too seriously , by making a comment that we will deploy and fight all along the border ? Nothing that I intended to make a point of .

So , Indians aren't going to magically turn the disadvantages of the system into advantages by deploying them in their country because these things are inherent , the system was designed that way and for a particular purpose . Well , that is just your opinion , but Israeli defense analysts have heavily criticized the system for its high response time and slow reaction , that too when faced with primitive rockets with a high delay of repetition . Nothing , that is true for you .

Tell me something , cant a relatively smaller unit achieve a collective firing rate of 100 shells per minute , by most modest estimates , considering that we aren't short of artillery or MLR systems ? I agree with you that Indian Army enjoys a conventional superiority over us neither have I denied that there will be no retaliation . What I have said is that it will only increase the intensity of the conflict , not diminish it as you assume it to be . Iron Dome disadvantage isn't due to being in a urban environment as I explained above , it is the other way around . The system will be quickly overwhelmed even if 50% shells/rockets fall in the region which you are trying to protect . Now , keep in mind that a protected zone isn't necessarily a city . What major cities or towns do you have near the border , which are in range of the Pakistan Army's artillery ?

Forget the larger units altogether , because 1000's of shell/rockets can be fired there in a matter of minutes @Oscar Need your opinion here , sir . The M110 and M109 self propelled howitzer have a sustained firing rate of 3/minute , the maximum rate goes upto 6 for a highly trained crew . The Norinco SH1 estimated sustained rate of fire is around 6/minute , in the absence of any data from the operators . The Norinco A100 MLRS which is locally produced in Pakistan and currently numbers around 100 can do a salvo of 12 per minute . The KRL-21 is an indigenously produced MLRS who's specification aren't revealed by Khan Laboratories ever . Pakistan has around 1200 units of all the artillery/rocket system which I have named minus the towed artillery and tanks .

Wrong , again . There are places at Line of Control where the element of surprise can be achieved over the enemy by any side , you could have said that the sites of areas which are suitable for heavy mechanized offensives are known , that would make more sense . @AhaseebA The Element of Surprise part we discussed ? . The link you have posted is from 2014 , today there is nothing serious going on except for rare violations which are mostly limited to firing by small arms , nothing what used to happen before the ceasefire came into effect . Are you seriously questioning the advantages and disadvantages that come with having a diversely terrained border ? You do not have the capability of continuous monitoring of the border yet , by the time you get it , we are going to place 3 RS satellites into orbit in that time frame - the Chinese access to satellite feeds shall suffice for now . Again , for the billionth time , the artillery defense role is unrealistic too , since that artillery unit will face heavy fire from the other side , again overwhelming the system .

I will tell you something about Hamas's rocket attacks . They do not cause much causalities , just a psychological shock . Israel faces slow moving , primitive , crude , home made rockets that too with 60-70% intercept rate achieved with insurgents firing a bunch of rockets over days thus giving time to identify , differentiate and engage , imagine where that successful probability intercept rate will go in your case defending a larger area with sophisticated weaponry coming in and with not-so-much delay as in case of Israel .

I will leave the weapons part alone since H2 , H4 are precision guided bombs produced in the country while the Hijara is a sensor fused weapon . Babur and Raad were inducted after tests which were reported . You can have a look at that report . CM400 AKG can attack land and sea targets with a speed of Mach 4+ and following a quasi-ballistic trajectory . Falco can go near the 21,000 ft mark while the Uqaab and Jasoos are limited to 10,000 ft .

Of course it is better to have your own , but even you do not have your own at the moment . Some future plans , sure . But today you rely on GLONASS and GPS - the latter is used by us too . Kargil was a different game , where Pakistan was in damage control mode , if you want , there are detailed numbers available of the soldiers and the artillery deployed by Pakistan , you can check the disparity there .

The degree of defense , the system's providing isn't under contest , the cost and the adversary's level sure is . You will get some sort of protection but at 90K/interceptor something which you cant afford against an adversary like Pakistan . Even assuming that the firing rate isn't high however the credible threats are in dozens , what do you think will happen in such case ? As for your assumption of me underestimating the enemy and not expecting the Indians to retaliate , it is anything but true . Just too much focus you have on the urban thing without realizing that you have got a bigger area to cover with the system coming with astronomical cost . I can only give statements for now since you aren't answering my questions and bringing in other things .

A unit has to wait after a significant amount of time to cool off,then to range find again, and do the calculation, observe enemy fire, allocate the movable units after doing all of this, and confirm a kill or no and go through the whole process all over again until they are hitting the right spot.

True , however that time isn't that high as you trying to portray it to be .

Assuming that range finding and precision fires are completed, then tell me if pak army's artillery can fire 5 rounds under a minute and suppose the Iron Dome intercepts 3 of them while IA's artillery too fires 5 rounds simultaneously tell me which side has chances of survival and counter attack?

Therein lies the problem , Iron Dome can deal with a small number fired with significant delay like it does in Gaza , the problem with the cost , reaction time and identification begin when such variables are raised . Just how many batteries and interceptors can you buy to take care of every shell/rocket coming in , which you said before ?

 

[Armstrong]

@Secur - Lets not continue on with this ludicrous discussion - Shall we ?

The only thing common between Pakistan & Palestine are the first two alphabets of our respective names ! It bodes rather well for us if our enemies think that we'd be launching unguided maaaachis-bumb from our side as if it were Shab-e-Barat, in case of war !

 

[Secur]

@Secur - Lets not continue on with this ludicrous discussion - Shall we ?

The only thing common between Pakistan & Palestine are the first two alphabets of our respective names ! It bodes rather well for us if our enemies think that we'd be launching unguided maaaachis-bumb from our side as if it were Shab-e-Barat, in case of war !

Well put , sire .

I am seriously amazed that some members are comparing the seventh largest army in the world with an insurgent group with hit-and-run tactics .

 

[SQ8]

Certain members are only indulging in loghorrea to try and prove a failing argument. There is no comparison into the effectiveness of Iron Dome against an organized army operating precision rocketry with much higher velocities and numbers.. to a rag tag rebels.

In case you are wondering what Loghorrea is:

excessive and often incoherent talkativeness or wordiness