After initial balk, India reconsidering buying Iron Dome

[Gessler]

Israelis have the luxury of taking the time of their life for deciding to intercept the missile or not , whether it is going to fall in the cities or towns because Hamas fires a bunch of rockets by a delay of days , even then the successful intercept rate is close to 70% assuming that the Israelis aren't exaggerating , something which wont happen in a theater level warfare when both sides are heavily armed with sophisticated weaponry . There is no parallel , none at all . Tel Aviv faces different threats of different severity than you do . How much time do you have in such case ?

What if the artillery shells headed for the protected zones ( assuming your 100x50 meters area ) are simply in high number ? Think , just too many credible threats for the system to be feasible . After all , you cant field X systems of Iron Dome for X number of MBRLs/Artillery , right ? .

It is not just Israelis,,, but there are also many top-ranking US Defence experts who are
confirming ID's intercepting probability as truth in the articles they write.

Here's one by James Dunnigan, heard of him, didn't you?
Iron Dome faces bad numbers | Strategy Page

Although the new Israeli Iron Dome system succeeded in shooting down about 85 percent of the 500 hundred rockets (of 1,500 launched) headed for Israeli populated areas, this was something of a shock. This was the original situation the system was designed for. It was originally believed that only ten percent of less accurate rockets would need to be intercepted by Iron Dome missiles. The rest would fall into un-populated areas that are common near the northern and southern borders. But the eight day bombardment by Hamas rockets last November saw 1,500 larger or longer ranged rockets fired at larger targets (cities). This meant a third of the rockets headed for populated areas and thus needing an Iron Dome interceptor missile. Even though Israel has ordered more Iron Dome missiles, too many rockets headed for populated areas in a short time means some incoming rockets that should get an interceptor missile won’t.

Meanwhile, the key to Iron Dome’s success continues to be its software. Iron Dome uses two radars to quickly calculate the trajectory of the incoming rocket and does nothing if the rocket trajectory indicates it is going to land in an uninhabited area. But if the computers predict a rocket coming down in an inhabited area, a Tamir guided missile is fired to intercept the rocket. This makes the system cost-effective. That's mainly because most of these unguided rockets land in uninhabited areas but the few of those that do land in populated areas inflict casualties. The system was so successful and reliable that it was found safe to fire one missile, instead of two, at each rocket. In addition, during the eight day campaign last November, the Iron Dome software was updated almost daily as users reported any problems which were collected and fixed quickly and a new version of the software created, tested, and issued.

There’s nothing special about the rest of the Iron Dome system. The Tamir missiles each weigh 90 kg (200 pounds), are three meters (9.8 feet) long, and 160mm in diameter. They have the usual components of a guided missile (rocket motor, electronics, and mechanical devices to actuate the fins and batteries). Without the predictive software Iron Dome would quickly run out of missiles and be much more expensive to operate as well.

The most recent Israeli rocket threat was from a terrorist organization (Hamas) operating out of an area (Gaza) that is basically home for Palestinian refugees who have been there for over 60 years and want nothing less than the destruction of Israel. A similar organization (Hezbollah) controls southern Lebanon and is also dedicated to the destruction of Israel, using 40,000 unguided rockets they received from Iran. Hezbollah last attacked with rockets in 2006.

Israel is organizing a force of 13 Iron Dome batteries to defeat Hezbollah and Hamas rocket attacks. Each of the five existing Iron Dome batteries has radar and control equipment and three or four missile launchers (each containing twenty missiles). Two more batteries are on order. Each battery costs about $40 million, which includes up to a hundred Tamir missiles (costing $90,000 each). The U.S. contributed nearly $300 million for development of Iron Dome.

It is true numbers can overwhelm any system, but numbers don't grow on trees.

For example, if IA acquires some 2-3 batteries of ID, it will take 100 x MBRL rockets to do a job which
would otherwise be done by just 20-30 rocket arty. That's the key to it's game.

Same will apply to Nasr provided ID undergoes the software changes needed to take care of
IA's threats. It can distinguish between what projectile is going to hit you, and what is going to fall
away from you (including possibly a safe-distance line, but that depends...).

To overwhelm the system, you need to go into an overdrive to procure massive numbers of
projectiles, for whatever purpose, to serve as weapons of attack, or just decoys. And that will end
up costing just as much money as a few batteries of ID.

Anyway, saturating a column/base of IA forces defended by ID will take a much larger number of offensive weapons than previously needed, and these PA offensive formations will also be under attack by their counterparts in IA (i.e. Pinaka/Smerch/Prahaar/BrahMos/Shaurya-type missiles/rockets), as well as air strikes (Israelis could not effectively take out the rocket launching sites used by Hama/Hezbollahs because these sites are often situated deep inside civilian population areas, whom Israel has an obligation not to hurt. But this won't be the case in an all-out war where Pak is expected to use something like Nasr.)

So it won't be that easy to overwhelm the ID either.

 

[Gessler]

It's ineffective against mbrls.

That's totally incorrect. MBRLs are actually nothing but unguided rockets launched
in salvos from a mobile platform over a longer distance.

Its non mobile.

What nonsense.

It (and it's radars & BMCs too) can be easily mounted on mobile platforms.



^^Here it is shown on a wheeled truck platform, we can mount it on a similar or a different
tracked platform (T-72 hull for example) if we want.

 

[Secur]

It is true numbers can overwhelm any system, but numbers don't grow on trees.

For example, if IA acquires some 2-3 batteries of ID, it will take 100 x MBRL rockets to do a job which
would otherwise be done by just 20-30 rocket arty. That's the key to it's game.

What are they basing their opinions on , my friend ? The same Israeli data from the Israeli Defense Force , right ? Somehow , here , I am not ready to take the Nazi's word for the image of the Fuhrer , if you know what I mean , even more when people are boasting about ridiculously high successful intercept rates of 80%+ . There are plenty reports to the contrary by the way . Here's one to balance things out , I do not take it as the Gospel's truth though . This is a criticism of the critic's report so you cant really accuse me of any bias

A number of articles published recently in Israel and abroad – including an article in Haaretz by Reuven Pedatzur – have questioned the actual number of rockets shot down by Iron Dome during Operation Pillar of Defense. The source of these articles is a study conducted by Professor Theodore Postol, a well-known expert at MIT, together with Israeli researcher Dr. Mordechai Shefer and an unnamed engineer from Raytheon.

The report claims that Iron Dome was able to intercept only 5 percent of all the rockets fired at Israel during Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012, a far cry from the 87 percent success rate boasted by Israel. The authors also cite Property Tax Authority reports indicating that 3,200 claims were made for damages caused by the rockets, as well as a report from the southern district of the Israel Police that 109 rockets fell in built-up areas, which is almost double the 58 reported by the IDF

http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=11166

Isn't it also true that a single artillery shell or MBRLs system will at any day , be less than a $50K battery and $90K / interceptor ? Besides , Pakistan produces the A100 and KRL-21 domestically with complete Transfer of Technology hence the cost of additional systems is cheap for us , relatively . The part of increasing the numbers of rockets/artillery is true but still the cost is much lesser than the Iron Dome .

A software upgrade will not do the trick here , the problem isn't with the software but with the design and purpose of the defensive system in question , it cant differentiate between BM's and artillery/rockets which is by the way , something not possible , to the best of my knowledge , Israelis only face some Fajr rockets from Hamas , nothing sophisticated or large in numbers , can it ever come close to thousands of artillery shells/rockets fired in a matter of minutes during a theater level battle discounting the fog of war thing here ? Not really .

True , the acquisition of Iron Dome can increase the numbers of rockets/artillery required to do the same job . But again you forget the astronomical cost of the system compared with the relatively cheap counter-measure . No , the cost isn't the same and cant be the same ever . It differs by a factor of 10 , being modest here . This is a luxury , even the Americans cant afford , in my opinion . The same otherwise in such case , Pakistan Army has the counterparts to every single system , you name , hence the isolation and focus on this particular one , I know how messy the arguments can become if we take into account , every single weapon of both armies . Israelis bomb the populated areas with impunity , read a bit about ' Dahiya Doctrine ' .

Last thing , for a change .

The fiscal problems presented by defensive technologies also bear some mention. Due in no small part to the largess of the United States, Israel has the luxury of spending tremendous resources on the task of mitigating damage from rocket attacks. This does not change the fact that ballistic missiles cost much less than the systems designed to defeat them; much, much less.

And so while Iron Dome appears technically impressive, it’s use has only limited lessons for the pursuit of missile defense technologies in East Asia. One size does not fit all; the applicability of Iron Dome to the Israel-Gaza conflict has few implications for broader questions of missile defense, whether in historical context or in modern defense policy.

http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/11/22/sorry-folks-israels-iron-dome-wont-work-in-asia/

 

[The Deterrent]

This would be true provided ID tries to intercept every single projectile launched by PA,,,
but that is not the case. Read this: -

The most impressive capability of the Iron Dome system is it's selective target choice

For example, if PA fires 20 MBRLs (among them will be 1 Nasr) at an IA tank column that is in formation
covering an area of 100 meters wide and 50 meters long, an ID battery located among the tank column
can figure out what is the area supposed to be defended (100x50 meters), and it intercepts only those
projectiles who's calculated trajectory is supposed to land within that area (ofcourse the area numbers
are only for example).

Therefore a large number of MBRL's (most of which land away from the target) are
unlikely to confuse it.

But however even if a Nasr is going away from the target area and then maneuvers to hit
the column, ID can still hit it with a fair intercept probability because even those projectiles
that go outside of the defended area are monitored by the radar and control system.

Nasr can be intercepted by the salvo of Tamirs, when it comes within the defended circle's
airspace.
@Secur read that^^

You misunderstand. I was referring to a saturated attack at the same target area. MBRLs do have the accuracy to take out an entire square kilometer.

And please, no tank column that covers a mere 50x100 m is worthy enough to be neither attacked by a tactical nuclear weapon or defended by a BMD. Please reconsider the area you are stating.

 

[Gessler]

@Secur

What India can afford vis-à-vis Pakistan is different as well.

I don't take anyone's report for granted, but it is not difficult to see and understand what each
source is trying to prove and by showing what - are they referring to how many rockets ID
intercepted among all the rockets fired, or are they looking at how many rockets that
were actually supposed to hit the designated target that ID intercepted?

Such reports cannot be taken for granted to show ID is a useless system (Israelis are not fools
to waste billions on a system that doesn't work, neither is the US a fool to invest money in a
system that doesn't work.)

Secondly, IA will conduct it's own tests and trials of ID before buying it, rest assured.

Thirdly, it's not a simple game of...piling up hundreds of MBRLs/missiles etc. at the border and fire
them all at once, they can be wiped out by a single CBU-105 or a salvo of PJ-10s.

That's why large numbers of weapons are never stored or operated from a single place,
there is a limit to how many rockets can be deployed at one location to attack a single
column of IA forces, and how many of those formations will escape early detection (therefore
leading to an early attack) by surveillance systems ranging from AWACS to satellites!

And...it is not possible for Pakistan to increase it's forces quantity overnight! It will take years...
and India can always afford to build/buy much more than Pakistan.

The objective of ID is to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's offensive over-the-horizon
weapon systems by as much as possible, as long as it fulfills that goal, and forces the enemy
to spend more money that what they previously could, it has already won the game.

Pak's production capacity (and the money needed for it) cannot match India's (yes, ID's
Tech transfer is also there for local production) economic capability anyway.

You misunderstand. I was referring to a saturated attack at the same target area. MBRLs do have the accuracy to take out an entire square kilometer.

And please, no tank column that covers a mere 50x100 m is worthy enough to be neither attacked by a tactical nuclear weapon or defended by a BMD. Please reconsider the area you are stating.

Those were rough examples. Any massed artillery formation is always vulnerable to counterattack,
so there is a definitive limit for how many rockets it can fire before a number of the formation's
units are destroyed by return fire.

 

[bloo]

Can you post about it if anything is available on the public domain in such case ? I would be more interested in knowing if there's anything that can be done to bring the cost of interceptors down which is somewhere close to $50,000-90,000 for Israel , the export variants will be more expensive . Considering that thousands of artillery shells are fired in a duel , how Iron Dome can identify a particular Nasr fired in between or differentiate a MBRL/Artillery from a Battlefield BM? Keeping in mind that the system has been criticized heavily by the Israelis for its response time against Palestinian primitive rockets .

You don't exactly think that in such a scenario India would only be defending?
Most probably the short range interception systems like that would be placed behind the attack units of the Pinakas, Prahaars, BM-30s and Brahmoss, which again have greater range than most of the Pakistani tactical missiles.
Its all about Geography, its not like Israel vs Hamas here.

 

[Gessler]

You don't exactly think that in such a scenario India would only be defending?
Most probably the short range interception systems like that would be placed behind the attack units of the Pinakas, Prahaars, BM-30s and Brahmoss.
Its all about Geography, its not like Israel vs Hamas here.

The conclusion is that if 100 MBRL rockets are stashed at a location to fire on an Indian base,
then...

1) ID will shoot down some of them.
2) Some will fall away from target
3) Some MBRLs will be destroyed in the counterattack before they are fired.

Which concludes that less than 30 of the 100 stashed rockets will actually be of any use. But you
spend money for all 100 rockets anyway!

 

[Secur]

@Gessler

Let me assure you that even the Americans do not have the luxury of fielding such systems for such purposes , forget your own country here for a second . I know the disparity , but I know the limit too . Remember , something about infinite money ?

I never said that Iron Dome is useless for Israel , I just mentioned the exaggerated claims of 80-90% successful interception of primitive rockets heading for the ' protected zone ' and the high response time even for those home made Fajr and Qasam used by Hamas fired in a delay of days costing $ 800 and only fired in a dozen in a best case scenario . The IDF's successful claims are something , which I do not buy . Does the US field the system or does it only contribute money for Tel Aviv for its development and deployment ? The day the US Army fields such systems for interception of artillery shells/rockets , I can accept what you have said in your post .

Nobody's placing the whole arsenal at one place but know of areas where battles are likely to take place , do not we ? Does the same argument of placing every single at a single area not apply for Iron Dome limiting the numbers that can be placed at border in case of hostilities ? Again , does the other side not possess cluster munitions or PGM's or ground attack missiles ? You amaze me by these arguments of having this and this , whilst underestimating the opponent .

Why isn't it possible for Pakistan to increase the quantity of MBRLs/other artillery ? May I know ? The acquisition of A100's and the domestic production of it and KRL-21 isn't something new , maybe you heard it just now . India cant afford to place $90 interceptors a pop for every barrage of artillery coming from here , the same is true otherwise .

I know the Iron Dome can somehow reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's fire but the factor by which it reduces it , compared to the cost of the system renders it unfeasible and impractical for the use you suggest here . If the main purpose is to defeat Nasr , then sadly it isn't of much use because of the differentiation between shells/rockets/BM's problem .Selective target engagement isn't possible in such case , specially when the Iron Dome has difficulty targeting the Palestinian rockets at times because of slower response times .

You don't exactly think that in such a scenario India would only be defending?

Its all about Geography, its not like Israel vs Hamas here.

Nah I do not , if you had read my arguments , you wouldn't even have asked , since I make it abundantly clear in my posts . There's a reason why I am trying to discuss the system in isolation against the threats it may face , because the other side has SAM's , missiles , weapons locating radars too .

There's no parallel . What does Israel even face ?

Which concludes that less than 30 of the 100 stashed rockets will actually be of any use. But you
spend money for all 100 rockets anyway!

Then again , the 100 rockets in question are nowhere close to the cost of Iron Dome's batteries and interceptors , right ?

 

[Gessler]

@Gessler

Let me assure you that even the Americans do not have the luxury of fielding such systems for such purposes , forget your own country here for a second . I know the disparity , but I know the limit too . Remember , something about infinite money ?

I never said that Iron Dome is useless for Israel , I just mentioned the exaggerated claims of 80-90% successful interception of primitive rockets heading for the ' protected zone ' and the high response time even for those home made Fajr and Qasam used by Hamas fired in a delay of days costing $ 800 and only fired in a dozen in a best case scenario . The IDF's successful claims are something , which I do not buy . Does the US field the system or does it only contribute money for Tel Aviv for its development and deployment ? The day the US Army fields such systems for interception of artillery shells/rockets , you can say what you have in your post .

Nobody's placing the whole arsenal at one place but know of areas where battles are likely to take place , do not we ? Does the same argument of placing every single at a single area not apply for Iron Dome limiting the numbers that can be placed at border in case of hostilities ? Again , does the other side not possess cluster munitions or PGM's or ground attack missiles ? You amaze me by these arguments of having this and this , whilst underestimating the opponent .

Why isn't it possible for Pakistan to increase the quantity of MBRLs/other artillery ? May I know ? The acquisition of A100's and the domestic production of it and KRL-21 isn't something new , maybe you heard it just now . India cant afford to place $90 interceptors a pop for every barrage of artillery coming from here , the same is true otherwise .

I know the Iron Dome can somehow reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's fire but the factor by which it reduces it , compared to the cost of the system renders it unfeasible and impractical for the use you suggest here . If the main purpose is to defeat Nasr , then sadly it isn't of much use because of the differentiation between shells/rockets/BM's problem .Selective target engagement isn't possible in such case , specially when the Iron Dome has difficulty targeting the Palestinian rockets at times because of slower response times .



Nah I do not , if you had read my arguments , you wouldn't even have asked , since I make it abundantly clear in my posts . There's a reason why I am trying to discuss the system in isolation against the threats it may face , because the other side has SAM's , missiles , weapons locating radars too .

There's no parallel . What does Israel even face ?



Then again , the 100 rockets in question are nowhere close to the cost of Iron Dome's batteries and interceptors , right ?

It is evident that you still haven't understood that there are going to be changes in the variant supposed
to be purchased by IA?

And what ID's effectiveness is against new types of threats we'll see in the trials IA conducts of
it before placing the order.

Both sides have all the offensive weapons they need, but Pakistan lacks the degree of defensive
systems that India has acquired/plans to acquire. That means that while both sides can inflict a lot
of damage to the other guy, the effect of Pak's weapons on India is reduced by these systems
to a fair degree, thereby increasing our battlefield effectiveness and ability to hold out longer
during war.

I guess it's true ID's true effectiveness against SRBMs can be gauged only after IA evaluates it.
We should wait for that.

 

[Abingdonboy]

Talk to me about David Sling boys.

Iron done is a waste of time for India.

 

[Secur]

We should wait for that.

When you aren't even trying to explain/assume for the arguments , the changes that may be made to the system to suit the Indian needs , I cant do nothing to understand them since they aren't there , let alone comment on them . Still , I talked about the ever increasing cost which are expected if the system is modified . As for the defensive part , second that , but Pakistan isn't planning to fight a long war , neither are you .

Time will tell . In the meantime , read your AF's chief statement .

Marshal Norman Anil Kumar Browne, the Indian Air Force (IAF) chief, told reporters at Aero India 2013 that Iron Dome is not suitable for the service.

Air Chief: India Will Not Buy Israel's Iron Dome air defence system says not suitable for IAF - NewsMilitary.com

Over and Out .

 

[Gessler]

When you aren't even trying to explain/assume for the arguments , the changes that may be made to the system to suit the Indian needs , I cant do nothing to understand them since they aren't there , let alone comment on them . Still , I talked about the ever increasing cost which are expected if the system is modified . As for the defensive part , second that , but Pakistan isn't planning to fight a long war , neither are you .

Time will tell . In the meantime , read your AF's chief statement .

Marshal Norman Anil Kumar Browne, the Indian Air Force (IAF) chief, told reporters at Aero India 2013 that Iron Dome is not suitable for the service.

Air Chief: India Will Not Buy Israel's Iron Dome air defence system says not suitable for IAF - NewsMilitary.com

Over and Out .

It's not the Air Force but the Army which intends to buy Iron Dome.

Browne was asked whether ID will be purchased, and he replied from an IAF point of view (strategic
defense of IAF air bases). He probably prefers SPYDERs.

The reports got mixed up by the journalists, this was explained by Prasun K. Sengupta who was
also present at the press meet.

Anyway, Air Chief is not responsible to make the call on Army's acquisitions.

 

[bloo]

[MENTION=137452]Nah I do not , if you had read my arguments , you wouldn't even have asked , since I make it abundantly clear in my posts . There's a reason why I am trying to discuss the system in isolation against the threats it may face , because the other side has SAM's , missiles , weapons locating radars too .

There's no parallel . What does Israel even face ?

Oh no, I read ur arguments. Actually it seems u just fleeted past my argument.
I never commented on the point that u made so "abundantly clear".
But then again you seem a bit too sure that the Iron Dome will face a flurry of artillery shells with a pinch of Nasr or two.
Which I disagree to, coz I don't think that situation will occur as India will be equally aggressive.

You don't really think that an Iron Dome system will be put in the vanguard for the impending doom of the Pakistani tanks and Nasrs?

Because as you pointed out "system in isolation", ur argument became moot. Coz to face such odds the Iron Dome will have to face a surprise attack of tanks and Nasrs while the Indian army will have to be unaware of a whole regiment of tanks knocking in their backyard. Again as I said its not Israel vs Hammas.

We'll probably use it in a different context, probably an Iron Dome MFU or 2 between a whole regiment of tanks or Pinakas or BM-30s or Prahars etc

The truth is with us it'll(Iron Dome) hardly be isolated with such odds SAM's , missiles , weapons locating radars, and the whole situation would be different as we'll have our regiments of tactical missiles along side it and as I said, which have better ranges than the ones Pak possesses so the Iron Dome working against not so many targets and fortuitous few artillery shells or a Nasr.

But then again Pakistan has no such defensive systems so even if we are hit a counter attack is very much possible however not so much for the Pakistani army.

 

[Secur]

You don't really think that an Iron Dome system will be put in the vanguard for the impending doom of the Pakistani tanks and Nasrs? Because as you pointed out "system in isolation", ur argument became moot. Coz to face such odds the Iron Dome will have to face a surprise attack of tanks and Nasrs while the Indian army will have to be unaware of a whole regiment of tanks knocking in their backyard. Again as I said its not Israel vs Hammas.

We'll probably use it in a different context, probably an Iron Dome MFU or 2 between a whole regiment of tanks or Pinakas or BM-30s or Prahars etc

The truth is with us it'll(Iron Dome) hardly be isolated with such odds SAM's , missiles , weapons locating radars, and the whole situation would be different as we'll have our regiments of tactical missiles along side it and as I said, which have better ranges than the ones Pak possesses so the Iron Dome working against not so many targets and fortuitous few artillery shells or a Nasr.

No I didn't , I said that the other side has such systems as well , doesn't it ? The point that I was trying to make was that the Iron Dome will have extreme difficulty to recognize , differentiate and then target the artillery barrages in the fog of war , its response time just isn't upto par and the cost is astronomical . Do you have the luxury to spend $ 90K per interceptor for a dozen shells heading for ' protected zones ' ? India will be equally aggressive , but does that mean that the artillery duels will not happen somehow ? The intensity will be far more than what we used to see on the Line of Control before the ceasefire . You can draw your conclusions by analyzing those duels and then decide whether the Iron Dome can make the difference , neutralize the BM's threat and more importantly , justify the sky rocketing cost .

I do not even think that somehow you can field X systems of Iron Dome for X number of artillery/MBRLs , more realistic , eh ? The thing about the system facing a barrage of artillery isn't that hard to digest since that is the first thing , that will start during a theater level warfare . I pointed out ' systems in isolation ' because there's no way to take into consideration every weapon system in service with both armies and then try to paint a plausible and comprehensible scenario . The system is useless due to that very thing that it isn't ' Israel vs Hamas ' since Tel Aviv faces nothing , what both countries will in case of hostilities .

Sure , you can add the Al Khalid , KRL-21's and Nasar in such case . That is easy , very easy . The sites of the major battles are well known , I think .

I am very much aware that the systems do not really work in isolation , but ask yourself that are SAM's , missiles , WLR's something exclusive to Indian Army somehow or are they possessed by other party too ? What sort of deficiency in ranges of tactical missiles of Pakistan are you looking at ? Have a detailed look at the original Hatf series and the continuous up-gradation . The range of Iron Dome at maximum is just 70 km and keep in mind that it isn't the effective range , where exactly are you going to place it to be safe ? Port Blair ? What are you trying to protect in such case if you want to take it far away from the battlefield to lessen the threats ?

No such defensive systems ? I never knew that my country doesn't have SAM's .

 

[sancho]

Let's buy it and integrate it with our forward thrust assault columns, let the Pakistanies overhype their Nasar, we can trust our experts' decision any day.
@sancho @Penguin what do you think about this ??

That the report is more PR from Israeli media. IA indeed showed interest in the system, while IAF prefers the David Sling system and but IA aimed to have a defence system for their forwarded bases, mainly against artillery or unguided rockets. IAF instead searches for systems to counter different missiles, where the David Sling could be the long range solution, while they also will get the Barak 8 and the Spyder sytem at short ranges. So the aim is pretty different from what the author claimed here!

I do think that the Iron Dome is a capable system to protect certain bases, but it's an expensive solution and there are alternatives available. For the wide range missile defence, we will have plenty of different missiles available to counter different threats. Imo we even have too many, because IA and IAF keep procureing different systems for the same locations, which doesn't really make sense.