A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan

[RabzonKhan]

ANALYSIS: Dissecting Obama’s speech

Najmuddin A Shaikh
April 03, 2009

Islamabad found much to rejoice about in President Obama’s speech. For one, President Zardari had been briefed by Obama himself on what was going be said. He must have underlined that the principal element of his speech was his request to Congress to quickly pass the Kerry-Lugar Bill providing $1.5 billion annually to Pakistan in economic assistance for the next five years and his request for more such pledges of assistance from the members of the “Friends of Pakistan” when they meet in Tokyo in April.

Obama probably also mentioned, in the context of the assurance that America was seeking a long term, durable relationship with Pakistan, that the wording of the bill would probably retain the recommendation that this assistance should be extendable for another five years. His emphasis was probably on the fact that this showed that America was no longer to be seen as a fickle ally.

The president also emphasised: “To avoid the mistakes of the past, we must make clear that our relationship with Pakistan is grounded in support for Pakistan’s democratic institutions and the Pakistani people.”

This is all laudable, but equal attention needs to be given to Obama’s warning that “after years of mixed results, we will not provide a blank cheque. Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out Al Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders. And we will insist that action be taken — one way or another — when we have intelligence about high-level terrorist targets.”

What does this mean? The Obama administration is making clear that there will be a greater emphasis on accounting strictly for the monies that are doled out as economic assistance and perhaps even more importantly for the monies provided to fund military operations against militants and Al Qaeda.

This is not something that the Obama administration has come up with as a fresh plan. It was the Bush administration that had taken the initiative to put together the “Friends of Democratic Pakistan” in September last year and it was the Bush administration that wholeheartedly endorsed if not authored the Group’s statement that “At the request of the Government of Pakistan, the Group agreed that a special representative should be appointed from a member nation or organisation to take forward the...agenda”.

In other words, given the Pakistani establishment’s patchy record on aid utilisation, the international community decided that it would have to supervise the economic assistance Pakistan needed. It is a devastating indictment of the deterioration in the integrity and quality of governance that a theoretically sound administrative structure was supposed to provide.

Equally importantly, Obama has put Pakistan and its armed forces on notice. The Americans are clearly unhappy with the degree of progress that had been made in the battle against the extremists. On the eve Obama’s speech, a spate of articles in the American media talked of the Taliban shura in Quetta planning attacks in Afghanistan; others spoke of ISI elements, the S branch providing equipment and training to the Taliban. These reports were reinforced by Admiral Mullen and General Petraeus who, appearing on American talk shows shortly after Obama’s speech, seemed to give credence to some of these reports.

While Obama will respect the “red line” with regard to “American boots on the ground” in Pakistan, drone attacks will continue. President Zardari may well say that Pakistan’s sovereignty will not be violated, but the reality on the ground will be different. Perhaps we should acknowledge that most of the human intelligence required for these attacks comes from our sources and we should focus more on getting authentic information on the damage drones strikes inflict on the extremists and collateral damage.

All one can see from newspaper accounts is that after every drone attack, it is the Taliban who take charge of the area, arrange the burials and tell the press about the number of innocent civilians killed. At the moment, the government’s statements on protecting Pakistan’s sovereignty against drone attacks while being helpless in the face of terrorist attacks inflames public opinion in exactly the wrong direction and plays into the hands of the country’s adversaries.

In stating that “Make no mistake: Al Qaeda and its extremist allies are a cancer that risks killing Pakistan from within,” Obama was clearly addressing not the American people but the Pakistan establishment which the Americans suspect continues to have a measure of ambivalence with regard to perceiving all those fighting in Afghanistan as enemies of Pakistan as much as they are enemies the Afghan regime, NATO and the US.

Obama was also addressing the Pakistanis who, in distressingly large part, appear to believe that terrorist attacks in Pakistan are the result of Pakistan fighting America’s war rather than a war to prevent the Talibanisation of Pakistan.

The Pakistani establishment, particularly after the two tragedies in Lahore, will be able to overcome the forces within its ranks that have so far successfully advocated the policy of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. They may be helped in this endeavour by Obama’s offer of concrete assistance: “we must focus our military assistance on the tools, training and support that Pakistan needs to root out the terrorists.” Welcome words, since our armed forces have frequently complained that they do not have the tools or the training needed for counter-insurgency operations.

The inter-agency report gives details of this assistance, suggesting “this will include increased US military assistance for helicopters to provide air mobility, night vision equipment, and training and equipment specifically for Pakistani Special Operation Forces and their Frontier Corps”. A more recent report suggests that the US is planning on providing some $2.8 billion over the period 2009-2013 in such military assistance.

Obama also addressed another concern of the establishment — relations with India: “to lessen tensions between two nuclear-armed nations that too often teeter on the edge of escalation and confrontation, we must pursue constructive diplomacy with both India and Pakistan.” How effective this will be may be open to question but again there is in this a degree of reassurance with regard to the eastern border that has far too often been a source of distraction for the armed forces.

Accounting, however, is going to be strict. Obama’s proposal that Secretaries Clinton and Gates lead the US side in a regular trilateral dialogue with their Afghan and Pakistan counterparts is theoretically designed to “enhance intelligence sharing and military cooperation along the border”, but this will be really an exercise in monitoring what has been achieved on the ground in curbing insurgency.

As regards the public mood, it is noteworthy that the inter-agency report’s recommendations include in its Afghanistan portion “the development of a strategic communications strategy to counter the terror information campaign is urgent...and should be developed in Afghanistan as a top priority to improve the image of the United States and its allies. The strategic communications plan — including electronic media, telecom, and radio — shall include options on how best to counter the propaganda that is key to the enemy’s terror campaign.”

It is clear that such a campaign by the Pakistani authorities is also needed and that it can be successfully waged only if all the mainstream political parties are on board and if their responses to the unwise and provocative remarks of our TV anchors are designed to mould public opinion rather than accepting at face value the absurd allegations that are heard from people who should know better.

More on the content of Obama’s speech, particularly the portion on Afghanistan, in the next article.

The writer is a former foreign secretary

 

[BanglaBhoot]

U.S. Set to Win Only Small Shows of Support on Afghanistan

The U.S. was poised to win only small contributions of troops from other countries for its planned surge in Afghanistan, as President Barack Obama's first NATO summit convened -- with a new obstacle arising from the Afghan government's move to embrace an Islamic law on women's rights.

Mr. Obama already faced a difficult challenge trying to win concrete contributions to his Afghan mission from members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization -- while playing down expectations for the support. "I don't come bearing any grand designs," he said in Baden Baden, Germany, on Friday, where the summit began with a concert and dinner.

It appeared he could count on Britain to commit at least a few hundred troops through the Afghan election in August, and that Spain and Belgium would add token increases. French President Nicolas Sarkozy also offered some symbolic support as he greeted the U.S. president Friday, saying he will send as many as 150 French military police to train the Afghan police force.

Mr. Sarkozy also offered to accept a prisoner from the U.S. military prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, if Mr. Obama makes good on his promise to close it by January. But the French president added that "there will be no extra troops, French troops."

Afghan President Hamid Karzai's acceptance of a set of Islamic laws, which critics say will limit the rights of minority Shiite women and authorize rape within marriage, threatened to add new barriers, said the outgoing NATO secretary-general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.

"We are there to defend universal values and when I see, at the moment, a law threatening to come into effect which fundamentally violates women's rights and human rights, that worries me," Mr. Scheffer told the BBC. "I have a problem to explain, and President Karzai knows this."

A flap over choosing Mr. Scheffer's successor also posed a distraction from U.S. priorities, and tension for the alliance. Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan told reporters he opposed the nomination of Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen as the next NATO secretary-general. Mr. Rasmussen infuriated many Muslims when he defended the right to free speech of a Danish cartoonist, who published images of the prophet Muhammad, including one with a bomb in his turban.

Mr. Erdogan is alone in opposing the nomination. But as the leader of NATO's only predominantly Muslim member, Mr. Erdogan argues Mr. Rasmussen's appointment would make the alliance's task in Afghanistan harder. "How can those who have failed to contribute to peace, contribute to peace in the future?" Mr. Erdogan said, speaking at a conference in London on Friday before he left for the summit.

Mr. Obama's new strategy emphasizes diplomacy and civilian reconstruction in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where top leaders of al Qaeda and other militant groups are thought to be hiding. Obama aides said the president will seek to gradually build support for his approach among European leaders and the public, arguing that confronting a resurgent Taliban movement and Islamist militants is a shared responsibility.

Speaking at an American campaign-style town hall meeting with European students earlier Friday, Mr. Obama made clear he wouldn't stop asking for military assistance. "There will be a military component," he said, "and Europe should not expect the United States to shoulder that burden alone. This is a joint problem, and it requires a joint effort."

The NATO gathering will launch what White House National Security Adviser James Jones described as an effort to modernize its mission for the new century. It could also officially accept two new members, Albania and Croatia.

Mr. Obama backs Albania and Croatia's immediate accession over Russian objections, a position he reiterated Friday. Some members are balking, saying there are small border disputes to be settled with both countries first.

U.S. Set to Win Only Small Shows of Support on Afghanistan - WSJ.com

 

[fatman17]

Obama sets ambitious objectives for Afpak strategy

Obama has unveiled a new approach to addressing the huge challenges posed by the borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Trefor Moss reports

Winston Churchill said of the place that "every man's hand is against the other, and all against the stranger". Little having changed a century later, US President Barack Obama described Afghanistan and Pakistan as "the most dangerous place in the world" as he unveiled his new strategy for the two countries' border region in what is perhaps the last major roll of the dice in NATO's eight-year Afghan war. The question is whether Obama's fresh approach can make it any safer for the wider world.

The announcement of the new US strategy on 27 March came amid a flurry of diplomatic initiatives. On 3 April, NATO leaders left the G20 summit for Strasbourg/Kehl to discuss possible European troop increases to match those pledged by the White House. On 1 April Turkey earned praise for hosting the Afghan and Pakistani presidents for talks on improving cross-border collaboration.

The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation and the Afghan government, echoing Obama's call for broader international involvement, proposed an Afghan 'action plan' on 30 March aimed in particular at countering the flow of Afghan narcotics (rising levels of Russian heroin addiction have pushed Moscow to act). On the following day, 72 nations met in The Hague to discuss ways of bringing progress to Afghanistan.

Significantly, Iran unclenched enough of its fist to attend the 'big-tent' gathering; China, another regional power whose role could helpfully be expanded, pledged USD75 million in Afghan aid; and India, also attending, should become more involved in Afghanistan than Pakistani objections have previously allowed via a new contact group to be set up by the United States.

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer issued a further call for more international partners - especially Japan, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states - as he sought contributions to a new fund of EUR2 billion (USD2.7 billion) a year to bankroll the fast-growing Afghan security services.

As these multilateral steps suggest, the goodwill surrounding Obama should make "involving the international community" the most achievable of his 'Afpak' strategy's five main objectives. The other four are the right ones, too; but achieving them will be difficult.

1. Disrupting terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan
However, the first three months of 2009 were by far the bloodiest of the war so far for the allies, with 78 soldiers killed compared with the previous high of 40 in January to March 2008. More troops will mean more contact with the enemy and still higher casualty figures (both military and civilian). The US must also be ready for a very long campaign.

"A NATO military pullout is achievable in a decade," reckoned Seth Jones, a political scientist with the RAND Corporation, but he said he would be "utterly shocked" if a withdrawal should prove feasible from around 2011: a date widely touted in the media. "The additional troops will be helpful," Jones said. "Terrorism is rightly the main focus [of the new strategy]. It is also important to remember that what has been provided to the general public is only the tip of the iceberg."

The US plan wisely discusses "breaking the link between narcotics and the insurgency"; an effective counter-narcotics strategy will be essential to depriving the Taliban of funds. Operation 'Diesel', in which UK forces in Helmand seized USD70 million worth of heroin in February, made for positive headlines, but the real inroads will be made by promoting crop substitution and through effective agricultural initiatives. The Taliban will still be able to tithe whatever crops local farmers happen to grow, as they do now with poppy, but the proceeds from licit agriculture will never be as high as they are from the poppy harvest, from which Afghan militants earned an estimated USD500 million in 2008.

Disrupting insurgent networks inside Pakistan presents an even greater challenge for Washington and NATO.

Proposals outlined by US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General David Petraeus on 31 March to establish a new Pakistani Counter-insurgency Capability Fund, worth about USD2.8 billion over five years, should help the Pakistan Army to fight insurgents more effectively than its current large-conflict capabilities allow - as well as preventing US aid from being squandered, as in previous years.

The Pakistan Army's operations in Bajaur, Mohmand and Swat have been effective in places, but they have all been conducted against Pakistani, and not Afghan, militants.

"The real issue is still how to get the Pakistani military to move away from supporting the Afghan Taliban," Ahmed Rashid, the author of 'Descent into Chaos', told Jane's. "I am very positive [about the new US strategy] overall; it is a very good start. It is civilian, not just military, and that is what has been lacking all along. But in Pakistan, the US' options are far more limited than in Afghanistan."

Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia centre at the Atlantic Council, said that Pakistan's willingness to pursue the Afghan Taliban hiding in its territory would "depend on what Pakistan sees happening in Afghanistan" over the next couple of years. "Pakistan will be hedging as to which side is eventually ascendant," he said. The US strategy contains no details on how it can persuade Islamabad to abandon this position.

One tool at the US' disposal is the controversial tactic of conducting Predator or Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strikes inside Pakistan. Most analysts now believe that the Pakistani government hands intelligence to the US to enable these missions. However, Jane's has spoken to Pakistani officials who continue to vehemently deny that this kind of support is being provided and also question whether the Afghan insurgency is really based in the Pakistani city of Quetta, as reports suggest.

"These are high-level targets," said one source, rejecting the idea of Pakistan harbouring Taliban or Al-Qaeda leaders. "There is a USD50 million reward for Bin Laden, a USD10 million reward for Mullah Omar. And we are talking about tribesmen who would kill someone for USD1,000."

2. Promoting a more capable, accountable and effective government in Afghanistan
The absence of a credible rival to Karzai exemplifies what decades of strife have done to Afghanistan: there are few potential Afghan leaders, if any, who are not tainted by the violence and corruption that has come to typify society. One official source also argued that the very concept of installing modern government in these traditional, tribal areas is unsound. "You are trying to impose 21st century government on a 19th century society and it cannot work," he commented.

Centralisation remains a strange and unwelcome novelty in much of the country. "Central government is not liked in the far south and east, and has little relevance there," explained Jones. "One issue that needs to be adequately addressed by the US is figuring out a way to work with local sub-tribes in the Pashtun border region."

If relatively little can be expected of a central Afghan government, effective governance can be delivered at the tribal level and through traditional jirgas. "We need to be co-ordinating and co-opting local tribes," said Jones. "This is a bottom-up strategy that the Taliban has been much more effective at; they are better at deal-cutting, they have a better understanding of local power."

However, Karzai, to his credit, has been right to place an emphasis on reconciliation. Many Taliban fighters that are not ideologically motivated can and must be induced to turn their backs on militancy if the Afghan government is to have any hope of setting down roots.

3. Developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces
"Self-reliance financially is a very long-term prospect," said Jones. "But a self-reliant Afghanistan that can push back most of the insurgency is realistic."

Jones listed "the mentoring of Afghan national forces in the field" as one of the highest priorities for US forces. Obama's announcement on 27 March of an additional 4,000 military personnel who will focus exclusively on training the Afghans showed that the president shares this sense of urgency and aims to achieve a 134,000-strong Afghan National Army and police force as quickly as possible.

This is where European countries reluctant to commit combat troops can really help: by pledging additional trainers for the Afghan army and police.

4. Assisting efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy
The US' intention of spending USD7.5 billion over five years on development projects in Pakistan will certainly promote a stable society. "But [the Pakistanis] do not appreciate the accountability part," said Nawaz in reference to Obama's comment that "after years of mixed results, we will not provide a blank cheque" to Islamabad. "We still have to see a lot of the details," Nawaz continued, "but it is important that objectives or targets [that Pakistan will need to achieve to continue receiving US aid] will have to be mutually agreed."

Rashid said that, irrespective of US benchmarks, the USD7.5 billion in aid is "absolutely essential" as it will provide "incentives for the Pakistani public to support US policy" amid the country's severe economic crisis. Perhaps even more importantly, it will also provide economic opportunities for ordinary Pakistanis, especially those in the remote tribal areas, and give young men a viable alternative to joining the insurgency in return for a livelihood.

Daunting challenges
Nawaz agreed US options are limited and that the best hope is to work to overcome the "trust deficit" that the strategy paper identifies. "The US does not have the tools [to make a big difference itself in Pakistan], but it has the ability to win Pakistan over by providing them with the tools they need," he said.

Obama's troop increases are necessary but can only achieve so much. "Unilaterally clearing territory is going to be very short-lived," said Jones. "The Taliban and other insurgents will bleed into the background for a while." However, if military and developmental programmes are successfully yoked together for the first time in this long and often misguided campaign, Obama could see his objectives at least partially achieved.

Trefor Moss is JDW's Asia-Pacific Editor, based in London

 

[spurdozer]

NATO Backs Obama's Afghan Plan but Pledges Few New Troops


By Edward Cody
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, April 5, 2009; Page A12


STRASBOURG, France, April 4 -- NATO allies handed President Obama a broad endorsement of his new Afghan strategy Saturday, pledging the temporary dispatch of 3,000 troops to protect elections next August, new military training teams to strengthen Afghanistan's army and more civilian experts to consolidate its government.

The promises, at a two-day summit marking NATO's 60th anniversary, constituted a sweeping demonstration of support for the new administration's leadership in what has become the alliance's main mission of the moment. But they dramatized once again that European leaders are unwilling to follow Obama's lead in making major new commitments of troops to fight and perhaps die in a faraway war that is widely unpopular among their voters.

At a closing news conference, Obama portrayed the outcome as a success for his maiden encounter with NATO summitry, suggesting that trainers and civilians can be just as valuable as fighters. The 28-nation alliance, he added, had come together in unanimous agreement that Afghanistan must be a strategic priority, even though it is thousands of miles from the European nations that the North Atlantic Alliance was conceived to protect. In addition, more European troop deployments could come in the months ahead, he suggested.



"These commitments of troops, trainers and civilians represent a strong down payment on the future of our mission in Afghanistan and the future of NATO," he declared, adding: "This was not a pledging conference."

French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who co-hosted the summit with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, said the alliance was quick to endorse Obama's new strategy because it responded "point by point" to a long-standing European desire to put less emphasis on military attacks against the Taliban and more on building Afghanistan's army and civilian institutions.

"It is the European vision that is triumphing," he said, shrugging off a reporter's observation that the United States was sending in more troops while Europe was not.

The tension over troop levels in Afghanistan was one of two issues that overcast the NATO anniversary celebrations, held in this border city on the Rhine to emphasize Franco-German friendship after years of hostility and war. Unexpectedly, the other was choosing a new NATO secretary general to replace Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, a Dutchman who will step down in July.

European leaders, backed by the Obama administration, had chosen Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen of Denmark. But Turkey, NATO's only Muslim nation, said Rasmussen was unacceptable because of his actions during a 2006 controversy in Copenhagen over cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad in ways many Muslims found offensive.

Turkey's Muslim population objects to the choice, Turkish officials said, adding that it is tactically unwise to put Rasmussen forward as the face of NATO just as the alliance seeks to win support against the Taliban among the deeply Muslim people of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Sarkozy and Merkel dismissed Turkey's suggestion of further consultations and insisted that a decision be made in Strasbourg. Seeming irritated by the Turkish stand, Sarkozy said afterward that the "Franco-German axis" had prevailed over what he dismissed as "susceptibilities and misunderstandings" that distracted the alliance from its real problems.

In an effort to smooth over the dispute, U.S. officials said, Obama met on the sidelines with Turkish President Abdullah Gul and then with Gul and Rasmussen together. By the end of a long day of repeated delays in the summit schedule, Turkey relented on a promise that a Turk would be Rasmussen's assistant, opening the way for Rasmussen to be approved by consensus according to NATO rules.

In another demonstration of the U.S.-European alliance's difficulty in dealing with the Muslim world, Sarkozy and Merkel strongly condemned a new law in Afghanistan that, according to some interpretations, legalizes rape within marriage.

A country with that kind of a law is not what NATO is fighting to support, Sarkozy said. Obama joined the outcry, calling the law "abhorrent."

In a separate statement on the Afghanistan war, alliance leaders said they would be setting up a new bureaucracy called NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan to coordinate and intensify training of officers for the Afghan national army and police. To make more training possible, they said, an international military aid fund will be expanded by $100 million -- half of it paid by Germany -- and its role will be broadened to cover more Afghan military expenditures.

Alliance leaders endorsed France's suggestion for a 300-member European Gendarmerie Force that would provide training and mentoring of Afghan national police in pacified areas that are turned over to Afghan authorities. In the meantime, the White House said, European governments promised to send 70 additional military training teams to accompany Afghan army units as the country's military grows to its authorized level of 134,000.

Absent from the list of intentions was any substantial commitment for additional European fighting forces as Obama had requested several weeks ago.

Spain announced Friday, for instance, that it would slightly increase its 780-member force. Prime Minister Sali Berisha of Albania, which along with Croatia was inducted into NATO on Saturday, said in an interview that he had ordered the Albanian military to double its mission, from 140 to 280.



Three miles from the summit site, meanwhile, anti-NATO protesters set fire to a disaffected border control station and looted shops before being driven away by helmeted riot police firing tear-gas canisters. The protests caused the cancellation of a hospital visit by Michelle Obama and French first lady Carla Bruni-Sarkozy.

Staff writer Michael D. Shear contributed to this report.



washingtonpost.com

 

[India_loves_peace]

27 March 2009

Obama on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan
U.S. working with Afghanistan and Pakistan to disrupt, defeat al-Qaida


(begin transcript)

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
March 27, 2009

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
ON A NEW STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

Room 450
Dwight D. Eisenhower Executive Office Building
9:40 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning. Please be seated.

Before I begin today, let me acknowledge, first of all, Your Excellencies, all the ambassadors who are in attendance. I also want to acknowledge both the civilians and our military personnel that are about to be deployed to the region. And I am very grateful to all of you for your extraordinary work.

I want to acknowledge General David Petraeus, who's here, and has been doing an outstanding job at CENTCOM, and we appreciate him. I want to thank Bruce Reidel -- Bruce is down at the end here -- who has worked extensively on our strategic review. I want to acknowledge Karl Eikenberry, who's here, and is our Ambassador-designate to Afghanistan. And to my national security team, thanks for their outstanding work.

Today, I'm announcing a comprehensive, new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. And this marks the conclusion of a careful policy review, led by Bruce, that I ordered as soon as I took office. My administration has heard from our military commanders, as well as our diplomats. We've consulted with the Afghan and Pakistani governments, with our partners and our NATO allies, and with other donors and international organizations. We've also worked closely with members of Congress here at home. And now I’d like to speak clearly and candidly to the American people.

The situation is increasingly perilous. It's been more than seven years since the Taliban was removed from power, yet war rages on, and insurgents control parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Attacks against our troops, our NATO allies, and the Afghan government have risen steadily. And most painfully, 2008 was the deadliest year of the war for American forces.

Many people in the United States -- and many in partner countries that have sacrificed so much -- have a simple question: What is our purpose in Afghanistan? After so many years, they ask, why do our men and women still fight and die there? And they deserve a straightforward answer.

So let me be clear: Al Qaeda and its allies -- the terrorists who planned and supported the 9/11 attacks -- are in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Multiple intelligence estimates have warned that al Qaeda is actively planning attacks on the United States homeland from its safe haven in Pakistan. And if the Afghan government falls to the Taliban -- or allows al Qaeda to go unchallenged -- that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can.

The future of Afghanistan is inextricably linked to the future of its neighbor, Pakistan. In the nearly eight years since 9/11, al Qaeda and its extremist allies have moved across the border to the remote areas of the Pakistani frontier. This almost certainly includes al Qaeda's leadership: Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. They have used this mountainous terrain as a safe haven to hide, to train terrorists, to communicate with followers, to plot attacks, and to send fighters to support the insurgency in Afghanistan. For the American people, this border region has become the most dangerous place in the world.

But this is not simply an American problem -- far from it. It is, instead, an international security challenge of the highest order. Terrorist attacks in London and Bali were tied to al Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan, as were attacks in North Africa and the Middle East, in Islamabad and in Kabul. If there is a major attack on an Asian, European, or African city, it, too, is likely to have ties to al Qaeda's leadership in Pakistan. The safety of people around the world is at stake.

For the Afghan people, a return to Taliban rule would condemn their country to brutal governance, international isolation, a paralyzed economy, and the denial of basic human rights to the Afghan people -- especially women and girls. The return in force of al Qaeda terrorists who would accompany the core Taliban leadership would cast Afghanistan under the shadow of perpetual violence.

As President, my greatest responsibility is to protect the American people. We are not in Afghanistan to control that country or to dictate its future. We are in Afghanistan to confront a common enemy that threatens the United States, our friends and our allies, and the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan who have suffered the most at the hands of violent extremists.

So I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That's the goal that must be achieved. That is a cause that could not be more just. And to the terrorists who oppose us, my message is the same: We will defeat you.

To achieve our goals, we need a stronger, smarter and comprehensive strategy. To focus on the greatest threat to our people, America must no longer deny resources to Afghanistan because of the war in Iraq. To enhance the military, governance and economic capacity of Afghanistan and Pakistan, we have to marshal international support. And to defeat an enemy that heeds no borders or laws of war, we must recognize the fundamental connection between the future of Afghanistan and Pakistan -- which is why I've appointed Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who is here, to serve as Special Representative for both countries, and to work closely with General Petraeus to integrate our civilian and military efforts.

Let me start by addressing the way forward in Pakistan.

The United States has great respect for the Pakistani people. They have a rich history and have struggled against long odds to sustain their democracy. The people of Pakistan want the same things that we want: an end to terror, access to basic services, the opportunity to live their dreams, and the security that can only come with the rule of law. The single greatest threat to that future comes from al Qaeda and their extremist allies, and that is why we must stand together.

The terrorists within Pakistan's borders are not simply enemies of America or Afghanistan -- they are a grave and urgent danger to the people of Pakistan. Al Qaeda and other violent extremists have killed several thousand Pakistanis since 9/11. They've killed many Pakistani soldiers and police. They assassinated Benazir Bhutto. They've blown up buildings, derailed foreign investment, and threatened the stability of the state. So make no mistake: al Qaeda and its extremist allies are a cancer that risks killing Pakistan from within.

It's important for the American people to understand that Pakistan needs our help in going after al Qaeda. This is no simple task. The tribal regions are vast, they are rugged, and they are often ungoverned. And that's why we must focus our military assistance on the tools, training and support that Pakistan needs to root out the terrorists. And after years of mixed results, we will not, and cannot, provide a blank check.

Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders. And we will insist that action be taken -- one way or another -- when we have intelligence about high-level terrorist targets.

The government's ability to destroy these safe havens is tied to its own strength and security. To help Pakistan weather the economic crisis, we must continue to work with the IMF, the World Bank and other international partners. To lessen tensions between two nuclear-armed nations that too often teeter on the edge of escalation and confrontation, we must pursue constructive diplomacy with both India and Pakistan. To avoid the mistakes of the past, we must make clear that our relationship with Pakistan is grounded in support for Pakistan's democratic institutions and the Pakistani people. And to demonstrate through deeds as well as words a commitment that is enduring, we must stand for lasting opportunity.

A campaign against extremism will not succeed with bullets or bombs alone. Al Qaeda's offers the people of Pakistan nothing but destruction. We stand for something different. So today, I am calling upon Congress to pass a bipartisan bill co-sponsored by John Kerry and Richard Lugar that authorizes $1.5 billion in direct support to the Pakistani people every year over the next five years -- resources that will build schools and roads and hospitals, and strengthen Pakistan's democracy. I'm also calling on Congress to pass a bipartisan bill co-sponsored by Maria Cantwell, Chris Van Hollen and Peter Hoekstra that creates opportunity zones in the border regions to develop the economy and bring hope to places plagued with violence. And we will ask our friends and allies to do their part -- including at the donors conference in Tokyo next month.

I don't ask for this support lightly. These are challenging times. Resources are stretched. But the American people must understand that this is a down payment on our own future -- because the security of America and Pakistan is shared. Pakistan's government must be a stronger partner in destroying these safe havens, and we must isolate al Qaeda from the Pakistani people. And these steps in Pakistan are also indispensable to our efforts in Afghanistan, which will see no end to violence if insurgents move freely back and forth across the border.

Security demands a new sense of shared responsibility. And that's why we will launch a standing, trilateral dialogue among the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our nations will meet regularly, with Secretaries Clinton and Secretary Gates leading our effort. Together, we must enhance intelligence sharing and military cooperation along the border, while addressing issues of common concern like trade, energy, and economic development.

This is just one part of a comprehensive strategy to prevent Afghanistan from becoming the al Qaeda safe haven that it was before 9/11. To succeed, we and our friends and allies must reverse the Taliban's gains, and promote a more capable and accountable Afghan government.

Our troops have fought bravely against a ruthless enemy. Our civilians have made great sacrifices. Our allies have borne a heavy burden. Afghans have suffered and sacrificed for their future. But for six years, Afghanistan has been denied the resources that it demands because of the war in Iraq. Now, we must make a commitment that can accomplish our goals.

I've already ordered the deployment of 17,000 troops that had been requested by General McKiernan for many months. These soldiers and Marines will take the fight to the Taliban in the south and the east, and give us a greater capacity to partner with Afghan security forces and to go after insurgents along the border. This push will also help provide security in advance of the important presidential elections in Afghanistan in August.

At the same time, we will shift the emphasis of our mission to training and increasing the size of Afghan security forces, so that they can eventually take the lead in securing their country. That's how we will prepare Afghans to take responsibility for their security, and how we will ultimately be able to bring our own troops home.

For three years, our commanders have been clear about the resources they need for training. And those resources have been denied because of the war in Iraq. Now, that will change. The additional troops that we deployed have already increased our training capacity. And later this spring we will deploy approximately 4,000 U.S. troops to train Afghan security forces. For the first time, this will truly resource our effort to train and support the Afghan army and police. Every American unit in Afghanistan will be partnered with an Afghan unit, and we will seek additional trainers from our NATO allies to ensure that every Afghan unit has a coalition partner. We will accelerate our efforts to build an Afghan army of 134,000 and a police force of 82,000 so that we can meet these goals by 2011 -- and increases in Afghan forces may very well be needed as our plans to turn over security responsibility to the Afghans go forward.

This push must be joined by a dramatic increase in our civilian effort. Afghanistan has an elected government, but it is undermined by corruption and has difficulty delivering basic services to its people. The economy is undercut by a booming narcotics trade that encourages criminality and funds the insurgency. The people of Afghanistan seek the promise of a better future. Yet once again, we've seen the hope of a new day darkened by violence and uncertainty.

So to advance security, opportunity and justice -- not just in Kabul, but from the bottom up in the provinces -- we need agricultural specialists and educators, engineers and lawyers. That's how we can help the Afghan government serve its people and develop an economy that isn't dominated by illicit drugs. And that's why I'm ordering a substantial increase in our civilians on the ground. That's also why we must seek civilian support from our partners and allies, from the United Nations and international aid organizations -- an effort that Secretary Clinton will carry forward next week in The Hague.

At a time of economic crisis, it's tempting to believe that we can shortchange this civilian effort. But make no mistake: Our efforts will fail in Afghanistan and Pakistan if we don't invest in their future. And that's why my budget includes indispensable investments in our State Department and foreign assistance programs. These investments relieve the burden on our troops. They contribute directly to security. They make the American people safer. And they save us an enormous amount of money in the long run -- because it's far cheaper to train a policeman to secure his or her own village than to help a farmer seed a crop -- or to help a farmer seed a crop than it is to send our troops to fight tour after tour of duty with no transition to Afghan responsibility.

As we provide these resources, the days of unaccountable spending, no-bid contracts, and wasteful reconstruction must end. So my budget will increase funding for a strong Inspector General at both the State Department and USAID, and include robust funding for the special inspector generals for Afghan Reconstruction.

And I want to be clear: We cannot turn a blind eye to the corruption that causes Afghans to lose faith in their own leaders. Instead, we will seek a new compact with the Afghan government that cracks down on corrupt behavior, and sets clear benchmarks, clear metrics for international assistance so that it is used to provide for the needs of the Afghan people.

In a country with extreme poverty that's been at war for decades, there will also be no peace without reconciliation among former enemies. Now, I have no illusion that this will be easy. In Iraq, we had success in reaching out to former adversaries to isolate and target al Qaeda in Iraq. We must pursue a similar process in Afghanistan, while understanding that it is a very different country.

There is an uncompromising core of the Taliban. They must be met with force, and they must be defeated. But there are also those who've taken up arms because of coercion, or simply for a price. These Afghans must have the option to choose a different course. And that's why we will work with local leaders, the Afghan government, and international partners to have a reconciliation process in every province. As their ranks dwindle, an enemy that has nothing to offer the Afghan people but terror and repression must be further isolated. And we will continue to support the basic human rights of all Afghans -- including women and girls.

Going forward, we will not blindly stay the course. Instead, we will set clear metrics to measure progress and hold ourselves accountable. We’ll consistently assess our efforts to train Afghan security forces and our progress in combating insurgents. We will measure the growth of Afghanistan’s economy, and its illicit narcotics production. And we will review whether we are using the right tools and tactics to make progress towards accomplishing our goals.

None of the steps that I've outlined will be easy; none should be taken by America alone. The world cannot afford the price that will come due if Afghanistan slides back into chaos or al Qaeda operates unchecked. We have a shared responsibility to act -- not because we seek to project power for its own sake, but because our own peace and security depends on it. And what’s at stake at this time is not just our own security -- it's the very idea that free nations can come together on behalf of our common security. That was the founding cause of NATO six decades ago, and that must be our common purpose today.

My administration is committed to strengthening international organizations and collective action, and that will be my message next week in Europe. As America does more, we will ask others to join us in doing their part. From our partners and NATO allies, we will seek not simply troops, but rather clearly defined capabilities: supporting the Afghan elections, training Afghan security forces, a greater civilian commitment to the Afghan people. For the United Nations, we seek greater progress for its mandate to coordinate international action and assistance, and to strengthen Afghan institutions.

And finally, together with the United Nations, we will forge a new Contact Group for Afghanistan and Pakistan that brings together all who should have a stake in the security of the region -- our NATO allies and other partners, but also the Central Asian states, the Gulf nations and Iran; Russia, India and China. None of these nations benefit from a base for al Qaeda terrorists, and a region that descends into chaos. All have a stake in the promise of lasting peace and security and development.

That is true, above all, for the coalition that has fought together in Afghanistan, side by side with Afghans. The sacrifices have been enormous. Nearly 700 Americans have lost their lives. Troops from over 20 countries have also paid the ultimate price. All Americans honor the service and cherish the friendship of those who have fought, and worked, and bled by our side. And all Americans are awed by the service of our own men and women in uniform, who've borne a burden as great as any other generation’s. They and their families embody the example of selfless sacrifice.

I remind everybody, the United States of America did not choose to fight a war in Afghanistan. Nearly 3,000 of our people were killed on September 11, 2001, for doing nothing more than going about their daily lives. Al Qaeda and its allies have since killed thousands of people in many countries. Most of the blood on their hands is the blood of Muslims, who al Qaeda has killed and maimed in far greater number than any other people. That is the future that al Qaeda is offering to the people of Pakistan and Afghanistan -- a future without hope or opportunity; a future without justice or peace.

So understand, the road ahead will be long and there will be difficult days ahead. But we will seek lasting partnerships with Afghanistan and Pakistan that promise a new day for their people. And we will use all elements of our national power to defeat al Qaeda, and to defend America, our allies, and all who seek a better future. Because the United States of America stands for peace and security, justice and opportunity. That is who we are, and that is what history calls on us to do once more.

Thank you. God bless you, and God bless the United States of America. (Applause.)

END 10:02 A.M. EDT


Read more: Obama on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan - Obama on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan

 

[spurdozer]

So in my opinion the only other country that can provide USA with troops is the India and it is no question that USA needs more troops in Afghanistan. We all know how much India is interested in playing a part in WOT. If it does send it's troops in Afghan then it would be interesting to see the reaction of Pak in the Af-Pak war.

There are also reports Turkey might help providing troops. But what would be the reaction of the Turkish people as we know the biggest protest against Israel and in favour of Palestine was held in Turkey. There would internal pressure on the Turkish government. Pakistan won't have a problem with Turkish forces.

Let's see how it unfolds in the future!!

 

[fatman17]

Obama’s Af-Pak strategy has dangerous ramifications for Pakistan

Sat, 2009-04-04

By Asif Haroon Raja

The psychological operations bullets are being persistently and systematically fired at Pakistan by its adversaries. The aim is to implant impressions, and to convince the world that Pakistan has become the main headquarters of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, it is the most dangerous country in the world, it is fast becoming a failing state, the Islamists have captured FATA and NWFP and made deep inroads into Punjab and Karachi and the situation in Balochistan is explosive. The propagandists are also selling the idea that the Islamists are on the verge of annexing power in Pakistan and that the nuclear weapons would also be taken over by them thereby threatening the world security. Both President Obama and Gen Petraeus stated on 01 April that Islamist insurgents pose a growing threat to Pakistan’s very existence.

Obama said that Al-Qaeda based in FATA is planning attacks in Pakistan. He said that Al-Qaeda and its extremist allies are a cancer that risks killing Pakistan from within. The Obama led US leadership is now convinced that the stage has been set for Al-Qaeda stationed in FATA to launch an attack on US homeland. To lend strength to US assertions Baitullah Mehsud has suddenly sprung a huge surprise that its squads would teach the Americans a lesson by attacking White House in Washington. Does it not sound fishy and bizarre? I will comment upon it separately.

The army and ISI continue to be in the firing line and alleged to be linked with the Taliban and their associates and are out of control of civil government. Besides India the entire civil and military leadership of USA have focused their guns on ISI and have not minced their words in threatening the ISI in particular to disassociate itself from the extremist elements. Renewed hostility against ISI is not without a sinister purpose and is reflective of bad intentions of USA.

Some of the reasons for their ire are as under: One, retraction of notification on placement of ISI under their handpicked Interior Adviser Rehman Malik. Two, change of mind of Pakistan government to send DGISI to New Delhi after PM Gilani had acquiesced to demand of Manmohan in the aftermath of Mumbai attacks. Three, the ISI exposed covert operations by RAW and CIA in Balochistan, FATA and Swat and is keeping a strict watch on their activities.

The ISI gave advanced information on several RAW sponsored terrorist acts including 3 and 30 March terrorist acts in Lahore. It has now forewarned all concerned about nefarious plan of RAW to target chief justice Iftikhar and attacks in Rawalpindi and Islamabad on the pattern of Lahore. 20 Uzbek terrorists duly trained and equipped in Afghanistan have reportedly entered Islamabad through Baitullah led Taliban in FATA. Possible assigned targets are Pak Secretariat blocks, TV stations, police training centres, English medium schools. Another group has been dispatched to Lahore.

In the new Af-Pak strategy spelled out by Obama, "war on terror" has been changed to read "war against Al-Qaeda", and the irreconcilable have been affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Likewise, FATA has been linked with Afghanistan and turned into a single battleground. While exhibiting aggressive intentions against Pakistan and expressing its displeasure on recent peace deals with militants in Swat and Bajaur, Pakistan has been offered handsome monetary assistance strictly in return for its performance against the extremist elements. Unlike Bush who would only deal with Musharraf and Karzai and keep praising them lavishly and in the same breadth condemn Pakistanis and Afghanis, Obama has addressed concerns of the people of two countries in the hope of winning their support to fight the extremists. USA has again extended an olive branch to reconcilable within Afghan Taliban.

The truculence and arrogance of US leadership has apparently melted down to some extent not because of human considerations but because of economic meltdown and its utter failure to control militancy through shock and awe. However, behind the farce of friendly overtures towards Afghanistan and Pakistan to improve their image and win over public support, there is no change in their laid down objectives. The stick has been dipped in honey to achieve their hidden agenda with the willing cooperation of the government of the two countries. While dangling the carrot of $ 7.5 billion package spread over 5 years, Gen Petraeus has hurled a clear cut threat that US military would reserve the right to strike inside Pakistan as a last resort. Their patience which is already wearing thin will wear out if the alleged ties between the ISI and Taliban are not severed completely, the ISI is not defanged as per their wishes, the so-called sanctuaries as well as the anti-US and anti-Indian militants are not destroyed wholly and above all Pakistan voluntarily hands over its nuclear assets to USA. While the US has termed terrorism as a cancer that Pakistan needs to fight from within for its own sake, it has shut its eyes to multiple deadly ailments that afflict Pakistani society. These include poverty, illiteracy, corruption, nepotism, cronyism, feudalism, insatiable avarice, injustice, immorality, vulgarity and obscenity under the garb of modernism which in my view are deadlier and terrorism is a consequence to these curses. Without curing these diseases no amount of effort put in to eliminate terrorism would prove fruitful.

The covert plan collectively formulated by CIA, RAW, MI-6, RAM-Mossad had been put into operation in 2003 to destabilize and denuclearize Pakistan and then balkanize it so as to make India the unchallenged super power of South Asia. After repeating ad-nauseam the mantra of “do more “and never getting satisfied and at the same time fuelling militancy in selected spots, the US bared its teeth soon after the suicide attack on Indian Embassy in Kabul in July last year. The ISI was blamed for it without any proof and both Mike Mullen and Director CIA came rushing to Islamabad in white heat with cudgels in their hands. The incident had put a temporary spanner in the way of covert operations undertaken by RAW in collaboration with CIA against Pakistan, which by then had reached an advance stage. From that time onwards, the US accelerated the tempo and has applied various defamatory and coercive tools to prepare a case for attacking Pakistan. Instead of defining Pakistan as a victim of terrorism it has been painted as a safe haven for terrorists and the ISI linked with them.

Declaring FATA as the most dangerous place on earth and a war zone, locating bulk of Al-Qaeda and its top leadership in that region, linking the ISI with extremists, blaming Pakistan in Mumbai attacks, affiliating ISI with banned Lashkar-e-Taiba, disqualification of Sharif brothers and imposition of Governor Rule to destabilize Punjab were links of a chain to make Pakistan ungovernable and to prepare conducive conditions to apply military instrument both from western and eastern fronts. The US has stepped up the threat of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates to the very existence of Pakistan to scare Pakistani leadership and to make it agree to let US forces step into FATA and provide all out support for the fulfillment of its nefarious designs.

From the above it can be inferred that USA has finally made up its mind that if required, it would invade and occupy parts of Pakistan and let India do the rest. Kilcullen’s prediction that Pakistan would collapse within 1-6 months together with the heightened jingoism of US civil and military leaders fits into the dangerous scheme. They are repeatedly warning Pakistan to do as told to do or suffer the consequences of defiance. It is ironic that any institution trying to safeguard the integrity of Pakistan against the malevolent designs of adversaries comes in the bad books of USA and is branded as a rogue institution. Anti-American elements are branded as extremists and terrorists. Those who follow the dictates of USA at the cost of national interests or those who are pro-America are most liked and are rewarded.

The battle plan has been finalized by Adm. Mike Mullen and Gen Petraeus and approved by Pentagon and Obama Administration. Economic packages for Afghanistan and Pakistan are a smoke screen to conceal their hidden agenda and intended crimes against humanity behind it. It wants to fight the extremists along the Pak-Afghan border belt including whole of FATA and Pashtun belt in Balochistan under the overall command of US military. It wants that Pak army and the ISI to remain subservient to US Centcom and its command HQ in Kabul and the government to follow the dictates given by Holbrooke on civil matters. In the final phase of Vietnam War, Cambodia was turned into a killing field on the plea that it provided sanctuaries to the Vietnamese. Learning no lesson from the Vietnam debacle as well as all its failed military ventures, the US Administration in the firm grip of Jewish lobby and neo-cons is hell-bent to repeat history irrespective of the costs.

While Zardari has hailed the speech of Obama and promptly consented, the military, the ISI as well as PM Gilani have serious reservations since they know that the new plan has dangerous ramifications for Pakistan. Zardari and his NRO cleared associates are jubilant over the aid announcement and are least bothered about the sinister designs and grave implications of the new US battle plan in which Pakistan northwestern region would be turned into a war zone. Sooner than later the flames of war would engulf whole of Pakistan. But why our blood sucking rulers and parasitic elite should be bothered about such a dreadful scenario since they have safe havens and foreign accounts abroad. When the Soviets occupied Afghanistan in 1979, the elite shifted to Peshawar, Islamabad and western capitals and had no problem in starting a new life under affluent conditions. They have returned to the safe confines of Kabul and recommenced their life of pleasure as second rated citizens and are begging the Americans to keep the Taliban at bay. The liberal elite of Iran too are still living overseas after the onset of Islamic revolution in March 1979.

The earth beneath Pakistan will continue to quiver as long as the white elephants are prancing in the immediate neighborhood which they have trampled and are now menacingly itching to jump the fence to extend their radius of playing field. They had stepped into the barren fields of Afghanistan to make it greener but their macabre dance destroyed everything. They should return to their own grazing pasture and stomp as much as they can rather than playing in someone else’s meadow and destroying the grass as well as peace of the inhabitants of the region under the plea of protecting them and their own grazing field.

Asif Haroon Raja is a retired Brig and author of books titled Muhammad Bin Qasim to Gen Musharraf; Roots of 1971 Tragedy; Kashmir Battles and Freedom Struggle; and Battle of Hilli in Former East Pakistan.

- Asian Tribune -

 

[fatman17]

Rugged frontier a challenge to US anti-terror strategy

* US army official says more troops will always be welcome and helpful, ‘just because of nature of the terrain’
* Says US president’s plans to develop Pakistan’s security forces ‘will pay dividends’

DOKALAM: Rain clouds hug the rocky peaks of Afghanistan and Pakistan as a few cars and some bony cows brave the gloom and head to a small valley stream marking the border between the neighbours.

Afghan Border Police (ABP) watch the travellers pass to the official checkpoint. No passports are produced. A vehicle may be stopped if guards are suspicious, but surveillance of this frontier relies heavily on local ties.

“My soldiers... they know their people, who live in their village. So they know the ones who are bad,” said Captain Mahmoud Qasim, who is in charge of the Dokalam border post in Afghanistan’s remote northeastern Kunar province.

On the other side of the stream is the NWFP, where Washington and its Western allies allege Al Qaeda and the Taliban are holed up, plotting new terror attacks.

But Qasim is unconcerned. Extremists would not cross at an official border point, he says, but would rather infiltrate somewhere else along Pakistan and Afghanistan’s porous and ill-defined 2,500-kilometre border.

This hostile frontier landscape is one of the places where the United States says Taliban-linked insurgents are slipping into Afghanistan, staging an escalating campaign of bloody attacks on government targets and foreign troops.

US President Barack Obama, unveiling his new strategy to turn around the Afghan war, put Pakistan at the heart of the fight to defeat Al Qaeda and vowed to boost US aid and assistance to Pakistan.

Obama also pledged to train and increase the size of the Afghan security forces, whose jobs include policing the vast frontier of towering mountain passes impenetrable for much of the year.

But the plan faces huge challenges, especially in a country known as the “graveyard of empires” and one, which has bogged down US troops since the 2001 invasion overthrew the Taliban government.

“The biggest problem that we have to date is probably the same problem that every army has had in this area for hundreds or even thousands of years,” said Captain Paul Roberts, who oversees US forces in Kunar’s Naray district.

More troops: “That is the terrain,” he said. “More troops would always be welcome and helpful, just because of the nature of the terrain.”

Obama has pledged to send 17,000 US troops into Afghanistan on top of the 62,000 international soldiers already deployed in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Most of the US reinforcements are headed to the south, which, along with eastern Afghanistan, sees the most violence.

He also announced 4,000 extra soldiers to train the Afghan security forces.

Dividends: Roberts said Obama’s plans to develop the Pakistan security forces “will pay dividends”, but said improved contacts between coalition forces and Pakistan’s military were also crucial.

“If we were talking to the Pakistan military and they were effective, then really we could shut down a lot of these places that these militants are crossing over,” he told AFP.

“It does seem to me like there is not a lot of resistance to the fighters moving from Pakistan into Afghanistan,” Roberts added.

“Maybe they are overwhelmed. Maybe they have as many problems with the terrain as we do. And I think a lot of it is the culture, I think they are a lot more tied into the culture of the militants than we might want to think about.”

afp

 

[India_loves_peace]

US think-tank asks Obama to acknowledge Pak as N-power
5 Apr 2009, 2233 hrs IST, PTI


WASHINGTON: The Obama administration should encourage the Indo-Pak dialogue, including back-channel diplomacy on Kashmir, and acknowledge

Islamabad's nuclear status, a task force formed by US-based Asia Society has suggested in comments which may raise hackles in India.

The independent task force set up last year included Richard Holbrooke, the special US representatives for Pakistan and Afghanistan, and General James Jones, l. But both of them stepped down from the task force before the first draft was written, and as such they are not associated with the report, it says.

Co-chaired by Thomas Pickering (Ambassador to India 1992-93) and strategic expert Barnett Rubin, the report "A Strategy for Stabilising Afghanistan-Pakistan" gains significance given that the tone and tenor of this 50-page document echoes that of the Obama administration officials.

This has been reflected in the statements made by them even during Congressional hearing in the past two weeks.

"The United States should continue to encourage Pakistan and India to build on their existing composite dialogue to normalise their relations, including their behind-the-scenes efforts to deescalate tensions over Kashmir and find a lasting settlement to this dispute," the report said.

"These efforts are especially important given the history of three wars and several crises between these two nuclear weapons states. Moreover, Kashmir has provided the rationale for decades for support of guerrilla and terrorist operations by groups based in Pakistan that have escaped the control of the state apparatus that established and protected them," the task force said.

The independent task force, which prepared this report, recommended that the Obama administration should seek ways to incorporate Pakistan into global nuclear nonproliferation regime and enter into a dialogue with it to discuss how its nuclear status could be acknowledged.

It took note of a 2005 statement by International Atomic Energy Agency director Mohamed ElBaradei that "India, Pakistan and Israel, in my view, are not going to come to the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) through the normal route."

ElBaradei suggested accepting that India and Pakistan are declared nuclear weapons states as a fact and endorsed the US-India civilian nuclear agreement as a way to bring a declared nuclear state closer to the NPT.

 

[Neo]

Pakistan-US economic ties ​

By Ishrat Husain
Wednesday, 08 Apr, 2009

THE Obama administration has recently completed a review of Washington’s Pakistan strategy. The US Congress is considering a bill that will triple aid appropriations to Pakistan for non-military economic development and another bill to set up Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in Fata.

Is US aid as envisaged in the Kerry-Lugar bill an appropriate tool for Pakistan’s long-term economic development? Is its disbursement through the existing channels the most preferred mode of assisting Pakistan in its endeavour to resume its journey to sustainable and equitable growth? Before we get overwhelmed by this act of generosity the issue needs to be explored.

In my view, the proposed appropriation and mode of delivery with inherent political conditions built into the bill is the least desirable of all options to help Pakistan and improve the US image. Literature on the effectiveness of aid gives evidence that very few developing countries have made good use of this resource for the larger benefit of their populations. Government-to-government assistance results in the relaxation of domestic efforts to mobilise revenues through taxation, non-tax receipts, user charges, and induces wasteful and unproductive expenditures.

Tied aid, in the form of procurement of goods and services sourced from the donor country, reduces the net benefits to the recipient country. USAID is particularly notorious in this respect as it is popularly believed that as many as 70 cents per aid dollar ends up in the hands of US-based private contractors, consultants, administrators and suppliers. This form of assistance hardly creates a significant number of jobs in the economy.

There is a mistrust of government agencies in developing countries and these are often bypassed. This has created more distortions in the economy. Instead of strengthening the capacity of institutions responsible for delivering basic services to the people, NGOs are permitted to act as intermediaries in the execution of projects. They hire government officials or professionals at very high compensation packages. This tends to deplete the human resource reservoir available to the government and impairs its capacity. Aid flows also lead to ‘Dutch disease’ where the appreciation of domestic currency discourages exports and exportable goods and makes non-tradable goods more attractive.

The political dependence and loss of control over these aid resources are the most persuasive argument as far as public opinion is concerned. Pakistanis are convinced that their economy waxes and wanes with the rise and ebb of US assistance. As democratically elected governments, in contrast to military dispensations, may not always toe the US line they are more vulnerable to the abrupt suspension of aid and the consequent economic dislocation. The goal of building a stable civilian government thus remains at risk.

Although there is no empirical evidence to substantiate it, there is a widespread feeling that exceptional US aid has been instrumental in boosting economic growth recorded under military governments. Despite huge losses suffered by the economy (an estimated Rs37bn) as a result of 9/11, most outsiders attribute Pakistan’s economic turnaround to the inflow of $10bn from the US.

Although the proposed US aid of $1.5bn in the Kerry-Lugar bill would contribute only three to four per cent of Pakistan’s total foreign exchange earnings the psychological damage it will cause to Pakistanis and Americans far exceeds the benefits derived from this paltry sum. Pakistanis will resent their economic fortune being controlled by the US and strong anti-American sentiments would be reinforced as a result.

There is no doubt that the Obama administration wishes to demonstrate through this aid bill that the US is a long-term friend of Pakistan. But there is the risk that Congress, think tanks, and the media will use this as a stick against Pakistan every time they perceive that it is not doing enough. Hundreds of Pakistani soldiers have been killed in the war on terror, many more have suffered crippling injuries. The country, which has captured hundreds of Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives, has seen infrastructure destroyed, hundreds of thousands of people internally displaced, its political leaders exposed to terrorist threats, millions among its population antagonised, and has spent large amounts from its resources on beefing up internal security.Yet the consistent theme from the other side is that Pakistan is providing sanctuary to the Al Qaeda leadership, nurturing the militants and that its intelligence agencies leak sensitive information to the other side. The possibility of the suspension of US aid, under pressure from American public opinion, will, therefore, always loom large, cause economic disruptions and sour relations between the two countries. The best way forward to strengthen US-Pakistan economic relations and create a vibrant economy is through the following measures.

First, the US should finance only such infrastructure, education and health projects that are included in the government’s development programme. It should commit the money by co-financing these projects with the World Bank and Asian Development Bank that have the required expertise and the experience of working with and strengthening the institutions responsible for project planning and execution. This would be the most effective use of the US taxpayers’ money.

Second, the US Chamber of Commerce has rightly called for easing access for the country’s textiles to American markets. American tariffs on Pakistan’s leading exports average approximately 10 per cent, about four times the average US tariff rates on imports from other countries. A reduction in tariff rates would not confer any favour on Pakistani exporters but provide them with a level playing field. For a country that so strongly believes in marketplace competition this is a correction not a concession.

Third, Pakistan needs foreign direct investment in power-generation, transmission and distribution, gas pipelines, oil and LNG terminals, refining capacity, petrochemical complex, etc. US investors should be encouraged through Export-Import Bank loans and Overseas Private Investment Corporation guarantees to participate in Pakistan’s energy development plans.

Fourth, the US leads the world in higher education and scientific and technological research. They should resume their assistance in training our teachers and scientists in leading US institutions, forging links between Pakistani and American universities and strengthening the capacity of our research organisations in agriculture, water resources, renewable energy and low-cost building materials.

These four channels of US assistance have a much better chance of achieving the goals shared by the US and Pakistan – a strong and prosperous Pakistan capable of safeguarding its territorial integrity – than direct US assistance administered through the existing traditional channels.

The writer is a former governor of the State Bank of Pakistan.

 

[muse]

First, the US should finance only such infrastructure, education and health projects that are included in the government’s development programme. It should commit the money by co-financing these projects with the World Bank and Asian Development Bank that have the required expertise and the experience of working with and strengthening the institutions responsible for project planning and execution. This would be the most effective use of the US taxpayers’ money.

Second, the US Chamber of Commerce has rightly called for easing access for the country’s textiles to American markets. American tariffs on Pakistan’s leading exports average approximately 10 per cent, about four times the average US tariff rates on imports from other countries. A reduction in tariff rates would not confer any favour on Pakistani exporters but provide them with a level playing field. For a country that so strongly believes in marketplace competition this is a correction not a concession.

Third, Pakistan needs foreign direct investment in power-generation, transmission and distribution, gas pipelines, oil and LNG terminals, refining capacity, petrochemical complex, etc. US investors should be encouraged through Export-Import Bank loans and Overseas Private Investment Corporation guarantees to participate in Pakistan’s energy development plans.

Fourth, the US leads the world in higher education and scientific and technological research. They should resume their assistance in training our teachers and scientists in leading US institutions, forging links between Pakistani and American universities and strengthening the capacity of our research organisations in agriculture, water resources, renewable energy and low-cost building materials.

These four channels of US assistance have a much better chance of achieving the goals shared by the US and Pakistan – a strong and prosperous Pakistan capable of safeguarding its territorial integrity – than direct US assistance administered through the existing traditional channels.

Prescriptions 1 and 2 make good sense but how will prescription 3 work in the absence of the will to secure the nation? and as for prescription number 4, it's quite incredible but the learned bureaucrat has not realized that in the US, for the the US, it's diplomacy follows where it's private business interests lead - if a truely deep relationship with the US is desired then the deep involvement of it's business community is a must and this means structural reform, do Pakistani politicians have such will??

 

[abdulrafi]

Thursday, May 14, 2009
Differing perceptions over security matters
By Asif Haroon Raja


The US and Pak military leadership are at variance over threat perception. The former identifies Pakistan as the hub centre of terrorism and maintains that war on terror in Pakistan is Pakistan's war and not US war. The latter on the other hand perceives Afghanistan to be so which has been inflamed by USA and India and its effects have spilled into Pakistan. It argues that invasion and occupation of Afghanistan by USA and forcing Pak army to join US war on terror brought militancy into Pakistan. While Pakistan is keen on finding political solution through policy of dialogue, USA insists on continuation of policy of force with focus on Pak-Afghan border which has dangerous repercussions for the security of Pakistan.



After lapse of seven years the Americans have belatedly realized that military force alone will never defeat terrorism and that socio-economic uplift has to go hand in hand to achieve fruitful results. While it has extended an olive branch to the moderate Taliban in Afghanistan and is also wooing Iran and Russia for the attainment of its objectives, it doesn't want Pakistan to have any connection with militants in Pakistan and desires full application of force to eliminate them.



While the US officials assert that US and Pakistan have a common cause for attainment of common goals, Pakistan was not made part of the team which formulated new ****** policy. On the contrary India and American-Jewish lobby had major inputs in the new policy which is injurious for Pakistan. During Mike Mullen and Holbrooke visit to Islamabad in April, Gen Kayani had bluntly informed the abrasive visitors that the new US policy had been formulated without taking Pakistan into confidence. He said that unilateral policies directed entirely against interests of Pakistan would be no more acceptable.



Issue of drones, unsubstantiated accusations against the ISI and RAW's subversive activities became sticking points and it was made clear that these issues be amicably addressed to make overall atmosphere conducive for any meaningful cooperation. Joint Pak-US operations in FATA were ruled out.



Pakistan has been repeatedly accused of alleged linkage of the army and ISI with Taliban and Al-Qaeda and rudely told to disconnect. Despite our pleadings we are blankly told that drone attacks would continue and also stress for joint US-Pak military operations in FATA. They express their deep concerns about security and governance problems and reiterate that Al-Qaeda and Taliban are a great threat to Pakistan, Afghanistan and USA. Pakistan is cautioned that the US aid would be linked to Islamabad's concrete support to war against terror. The taunts and barbs are being directed against the government, army and ISI to convey to them that the only way to survive as an independent nation is to completely surrender to US dictates and do as told to do. They want the entire state machinery to be let loose on the religious extremists which in their view are the root cause of all the ills afflicting Pak society.



USA spends $12 billion a month in Iraq and has so far spent over $800 billions. Afghanistan has received US and western aid much more than it has ever received before. The US now plans to spend $17 billions to upgrade Afghan army and police. The two countries have never been asked to account for the aid given. On the contrary Pakistan received only $10 billion in first five years from Bush Administration after 2002 and lost $34 billion while fighting the US war on terror. Bulk of the amount given was not gratis but for services rendered to US-Nato forces. $7.5 billion have now been promised for the next five years but subject to fulfillment of hard conditions. Conditional aid is self defeating since it is like offering milk filled with goat droppings and would never help in erasing mistrust against USA seen as an unreliable and untrustworthy ally.



Pakistan has been persistently needled to do more from 2006 onwards. FATA is 3% of Pakistan while southern Afghanistan is two-thirds of the country and a stronghold of Afghan Taliban. Pakistan has 120000 troops in FATA with 950 check posts along Pak-Afghan border. Further beefing up is underway. Swat has about 20000 troops and additional forces are being inducted. The other side has nearly 48000 troops in southern and eastern Afghanistan and has established only 120 check posts. Pak army and FC has suffered 2100 fatalities while US-Nato forces casualties in Afghanistan have not exceeded 1100. 72% of Afghan territory is under the control of Taliban. Yet the US has the audacity to ask Pakistan to do more; or is it saying so with mala fide intentions.



The US wants to browbeat and humiliate Pakistan and its premier institutions, and make the aid conditional to its performance and still expect unquestioned obedience and whole hearted support from it. Strange are the ways of the bullies drunk with power and megalomania. If Gen Kayani and Lt Gen Pasha can look into the eyes of Americans and draw a red line, why can't Zardari and his team pick up courage to keep the bully at bay? Why are they so frightened if 170 million Pakistanis are not? It is tragic that the 170 million lions are herded by bleating sheep.



There is growing suspicion that like mythical Al-Qaeda, Pakistani Taliban too are a creation of USA to create ideological divisions within Pakistani society and to bring a bad name to Islam. The American funded Taliban are made to carryout suicide attacks, destroy schools, kidnap for ransom, kill notables and religious scholars, destroy shrines, bomb mosques and Imambargahs, and help Islamists in battling security forces.. They are wholly focused towards Pakistan and play no role in Afghanistan to fight occupation forces. These elements are well trained in art of fighting and in sabotage activities, richly funded and equipped.



10% of money earned through drug trade in Afghanistan is utilized to support terrorism in Pakistan. CIA is regularly shipping refined heroine to European markets and earning $10 billion annually. Drug money is also helping USA in sustaining war on terror in Afghanistan. Money collected by militants through ransom, bank looting and robberies are other ways to pay salaries to the recruits at the rate of $200 per month. Appointment holders draw $300-500. Suicide bombers are richly awarded while extra bonuses are given for each successful mission assigned. In view of extreme poverty in FATA, Swat and adjoining areas and. with no scope of employment, the youth is joining the Taliban and TNSM in big numbers. Southern Punjab has also become fertile for recruitment of Jihadis because of extreme poverty.



Swat peace deal and introduction of Nizam-e-Adl greatly consternated USA and its partners. Return of peace and normality in Swat and in Bajaur would have had a healthy spillover effect on the neighboring regions as well which went against the gory plan that has now reached the final stage. In the Indo-Pak military confrontation in December last, the schemers were disappointed to find that the army had maintained its strategic balance and was in a strong position to beat back any Indian adventure. Return of normalcy in the tribal belt and in Swat would have further strengthened response actions of the army and hence had to be prevented at all costs. Rather, additional steps were required to be taken to cause an imbalance in system of forces during the next round. Going by this line of reasoning, the US seems to have achieved its purpose by compelling Pakistan army to break its strategic reserves to reinforce Swat and Fata sectors. It is now to be seen how quickly the army manages to restore normalcy and pulls out of the troubled spots to regain strategic balance.



Asif Haroon Raja is Rawalpindi based defence and political analyst.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Making AfPak work​

The double-speak will need to end for Americans to convince all those in the know on their real objectives for sustainable peace and security in the region. There are gaps that need to be filled right away for AfPak to deliver

Serious re-work is required on Barack Obama’s AfPak strategy. For starters, it does not have a clearly defined end-state; next, it is not inclusive enough to forge a consensual stability paradigm in the geo-political context for the region.

First, the end-state. Obama’s strategy does not state what shape does the US wants to leave Afghanistan in. Ideally, though, a democratic, progressive country with stable institutions, and a sustainable economy minus the narco-production and trafficking; a place where the US could return every now and then to respond to its interests in the region.

These may well be valid interests for the US, but are they achievable? At least the strategy does not seem to indicate any of this; it remains more of a wish and a prayer without its implementing elements.

Now, what does it not factor in? While it targets Al Qaeda, it does not mention the Taliban. What does the US hope to achieve with the Taliban?

They come in two varieties. The original Afghan Taliban, who were dethroned after 9/11, are Pashtuns and have been engaged in a bloody war with the foreign forces in Afghanistan. The Pashtuns comprise 56 percent of the Afghan population, and are estranged with the ruling dispensation because of disproportionately low political representation and the presence of foreign troops. Killing the 15 million or so Afghan Pashtuns may not be feasible; also it might take an entire generation of war to achieve so — a difficult proposition for the US war machine, which is more used to achieving quick, clearly-stated objectives; else they descend into Vietnam mode.

If the US is pinning hopes on the Pakistani military to do them the favour, they may be in for a surprise — the first category of the Taliban inspired the formation of the second, the Pakistani Taliban. These are more ferocious, and dangerously committed to their cause, i.e. capturing space and power in Pakistan to carve out an Islamic emirate of their own. The Pakistani military is engaged in a full-scale conflict now to prevent this nuclear nation from falling to the Pakistani version of the Taliban.

There is sufficient redemption though. First, the Pakistani Taliban are a small minority; the larger Pakistani populace does not relate to their brand of Islam or governance. Also, they do not carry the popular support of their Pashtun kin. But this fight will still be a long haul what with the coalescing of the two strands of the Taliban, suitably splattered with Al Qaeda elements of Arab, Tajik and Uzbek origins.

The Pakistani military is more than likely to dominate this struggle now that it has set its heart to it, but will need to stay the course for a long, long time. A lack of support from the people, the politicians, or the world community will only encourage it to throw in the towel and let things be. The consequence of the military by-standing the issue can only be horrendous, and most politely stated, non-salutary to American geo-political objectives.

That is the worst case scenario, hopefully avoided through rectifying processes to cleanse Pakistan’s tribal regions, but what to do with the Afghan Taliban, assuming of course that Al Qaeda, being the centre of gravity of the American effort, does finally stand dismantled, defeated and destroyed?

The absence of the anvil in a typical hammer-and-anvil manoeuvre is nowhere to be seen. Else, if and when the Pakistani military was to continue the sweep from north to south, it shall entail pushing the Afghan Taliban back to their original residence, backtracking through Tora Bora and the adjoining areas of Afghanistan. It would serve us well to remember that southern Afghanistan, from Helmand east to Kandahar and all along the eastern border till Kunar, is predominantly Pashtun and is hence the Taliban belt of influence. It may end up a welcome homecoming.

In another twist, the new US commander in Afghanistan, General McChrystal, is a green beret special operations commander, who is more likely to get to business on the other end, pushing the Afghan Taliban, from the south in particular, into the tribal regions of Pakistan, earning temporary relief and justifying the addition of 21,000 troops to the US ORBAT in Afghanistan. What that will do to the Pakistani military designs can only be speculated. Even the worst killing fields of ‘The (great) Charge of the Lightning Brigade’ in the mid-west may stand to shame before the butchery that might take place in this counter-flow of militants.

This reinforces the question: what is the US trying to achieve in Afghanistan? And if these plans don’t complement Pakistan’s designs, God save Pakistan from the ensuing complexity. If it ever came to that — which is more than likely given the absolute absence of a joint military strategy between Pakistan and the US, and an absence of shared objectives in the real sense, not the superficial identification of shared concerns — what safety route do the Americans have to avoid the nightmare of a nuclear-armed Taliban state?

One reason why General McKiernan, the previous US commander in Afghanistan, needed to be replaced was that he was losing the urge for the fight, having been stationed in Afghanistan for over two years and having possibly judged the futility in the American cause, as indeed in the strategy. He is known to have opined that one could only lose from where the Americans were placed; remember General Petraeus voicing the same, that the war is neither won nor lost? McKiernan firmly believed in engaging with the Afghan Taliban and finding a way to make place for the Pashtuns in the government. McChrystal will defy that natural logic and rational thought for some time, and then become victim to the reality of what he will be forced to face: Afghanistan cannot be a stable state without the Pashtun getting his share of power. Hamid Karzai, or his band of Pashtun cohorts, are but only a band-aid on the festering wound of non-representation and exclusion.

As part of the complementary policy process, there is also an overly keen interest in replacing poppy as a cash crop in the predominantly Pashtun belt of Afghanistan with another crop. Cotton has been tried in Helmand with very limited success. Here, the capitalist notion of profit efficiency will hinder any effort. There is no other crop hardy enough to withstand the extreme climes of the area, as indeed nothing that pays as well within a procurement, refinement and distribution system that has been established and streamlined over decades. The bigger issue is: is such an established economy replaceable en bloc?

Superimpose that with another means of economic sustenance: more to the point in the current morass when operations are on in Swat to counter Talibanisation, the Nawai Pass from the neighbouring Kunar province of Afghanistan into Bajaur is as active as in any economic boom. The transit-trade agreement might just see the light of the day by the end of the year, but routes are agog with merchandise of the most precious variety making its way into Bajaur and onwards to Swat, Dir and Chitral. Non-custom paid vehicles, Talibs on their 4x4s with weapons of all varieties ply their trade without check. Why have the Americans or the Afghans not closed entry and smuggling into Pakistan?

The double-speak will need to end for Americans to convince all those in the know on their real objectives for sustainable peace and security in the region. There are gaps that need to be filled right away for AfPak to deliver. A point that Karzai made repeatedly in Washington on his recent visit needs recounting: money will not make the Americans buy love. But are they really looking for love?

Next week, the second gaping hole in Obama’s strategy.

The writer is a security and defence analyst. He can be contacted at shahzad.a.chaudhry@gmail.com

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

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I have to say, I get no sense of honest or sincerity from the Obama administration - I think senior US military officials (Mullen and Petraeus) have appeared more sincere and straightforward in their public comments so far.

 

[RabzonKhan]

A Conversation with Barack Obama


By Jon Meacham | NEWSWEEK
Published May 16, 2009
From the magazine issue dated May 25, 2009

In a 30-minute interview aboard Air Force One en route from Washington to Phoenix last Wednesday, President Obama talked with NEWSWEEK's Jon Meacham about Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Dick Cheney—and Star Trek. Edited excerpts:

Meacham: The theme here is what you've learned. What's the hardest thing you've had to do?

The President: Order 17,000 additional troops into Afghanistan. There is a sobriety that comes with a decision like that because you have to expect that some of those young men and women are going to be harmed in the theater of war. And making sure that you have thought through every angle and have put together the best possible strategy, but still understanding that in a situation like Afghanistan the task is extraordinarily difficult and there are no guarantees, that makes it a very complicated and difficult decision.

Can anything get you ready to be a war president?

Well, I think that it certainly helps to know the broader strategic issues involved. I think that's more important than understanding the tactics involved because there are just some extraordinary commanders on the ground and a lot of good advisers who I have a lot of confidence in, but the president has to make a decision: will the application of military force in this circumstance meet the broader national-security goals of the United States? And you can't do that without understanding, let's say in Afghanistan, how that connects to Pakistan and what the nature of the insurgency there is, and what the history of the Soviet invasion was. So having some context, I think, is critical.

The other thing that's critical, I think, is having spent a couple of years on the campaign trail and then a number of years as a senator, meeting with young men and women who've served, and their families, and the families of soldiers who never came back, and knowing the price that's being paid by those who you're sending.

Can you talk about how you reached the surge decision?

I think the starting point was a recognition that the existing trajectory was not working, that the Taliban had made advances, that our presence in Afghanistan was declining in popularity, that the instability along the border region was destabilizing Pakistan as well. So that was the starting point of the decision.

We then embarked on a strategic review that involved every aspect of our government's involvement—Defense, State Department, intelligence operations, aid operations. Once that strategic review had been completed, then I sat in a room with the principals and argued about it, and listened to various perspectives, saw a range of options in terms of how we could move forward; asked them to go back and rework their numbers and reconsider certain positions based on the fact that some of the questions I asked could not be answered. And when I finally felt that every approach—every possible approach—had been aired, that all the questions had either been answered or were unanswerable, at that point I had to make a decision and I did.

Was the change-in-command decision that was made this week [Gen. David McKiernan was relieved as commander of the forces in afghanistan] part of the ongoing reaction to facts on the ground?

That is, I think, a reflection of a broader recognition that we have to apply some fresh eyes to the problem. General McKiernan has done an outstanding job; he's an outstanding military commander and has served his country with great distinction. But I have an obligation to make certain that we are giving ourselves the best possible opportunity to succeed, and at this moment there was a strong recommendation from the secretary as well as [Joint Chiefs of Staff] Chairman [Adm. Mike] Mullen that the team that we're now putting in place is best equipped to succeed.

Are you open to sending more troops in if this particular number can't make the progress you need to make?

I think it's premature to talk about additional troops. My strong view is that we are not going to succeed simply by piling on more and more troops. The Soviets tried that; it didn't work out too well for them. The British tried it; it didn't work. We have to see our military action in the context of a broader effort to stabilize security in the country, allow national elections to take place in Afghanistan and then provide the space for the vital development work that's needed so that a tolerant and open, democratically elected government is considered far more legitimate than a Taliban alternative. And the military component is critical to accomplishing that goal, but it is not a sufficient element by itself.

Moving to Pakistan, would you be willing to keep the option alive to have American troops secure those nuclear weapons if the country gets less stable?

I don't want to engage in hypotheticals around Pakistan, other than to say we have confidence that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is safe; that the Pakistani military is equipped to prevent extremists from taking over those arsenals. As commander in chief, I have to consider all options, but I think that Pakistan's sovereignty has to be respected. We are trying to strengthen them as a partner, and one of the encouraging things is, over the last several weeks we've seen a decided shift in the Pakistan Army's recognition that the threat from extremism is a much more immediate and serious one than the threat from India that they've traditionally focused on.
More

 

[RabzonKhan]

Peace in Af--Pak.

Thursday, May 21, 2009
Zafar Hilaly

Admittedly these are as yet early days and the army action is far from complete. But already there are disturbing signs that the result of the big push may not achieve the intended results. The Taliban are not being killed or surrendering, at least not in sufficient numbers, instead they are relocating. This is evident from Zahid Hussain's article in the Dawn of May18.

Reporting from Dagger he says that while the Taliban have been flushed out of this town of 10,000 persons, "the militants still lurked in the mountains not far from here". Most Pakistanis recognise that this is a war that had to be fought and are supportive of the army action. They are glad that the government appreciates that the answer lies not in sporadic military forays against the enemy but hunkering down with determination in the territories reclaimed from the Taliban for as long as it takes in order to protect the populace from the enemy.

It is difficult to surmise at the outset of what will be a long and bitter conflict as to who will be the eventual victor and whether the military will achieve what few have in the past namely the pacification of the Frontier tribes.

Success will depend on a number of factors some of which are:

1. The Pushtuns of Pakistan must lead the war effort against the Taliban. And if for some sad and inexplicable reason they do not or unite with the Taliban, their fellow Pushtuns, the war will become unwinnable. No nationalist insurgency against a foreign occupation has lost over the past 50 years.

2. It is inconceivable that success in either theatre of the war -- Afghanistan or Pakistan -- can be achieved without success in both. Success requires a far, far greater level of cooperation between all the major stakeholders fighting the Taliban in ****** than that exists today. Efforts must be made to co-opt Iran and persuade India to play a constructive role. True, wars are won on the battlefield but negotiations to enhance the prospects of victory are also advisable.

3. As long as there is a regime in Kabul which is reluctant to end the cultivation of poppy because it profits from it; and as long as the US is reluctant or unable to prevail on Kabul to desist the Taliban will continue to skim off $300-400 million annually from the drug trade to fund their war effort. This is serious money and there are many takers in the poverty-stricken bad lands of Afghanistan.

4. Hard-won successes on the battlefield will be lost unless governance improves and corruption is reduced. Saturating the target area with bombs and dollars will fail if the bombs hit the poor and the money does not. The former will breed hatred and the latter great anger.

5. Poverty, illiteracy and the stagnant economy leave few opportunities for the majority of young Pushtuns especially those who survive on $1 a day. These young men do nothing, earn nothing and look forward to nothing. They provide a fertile recruiting ground for the Taliban. Once the fighting ebbs, massive investments in schools, health units, poverty alleviation and employment schemes must be made in the Frontier.

Defeating the Taliban and caring for the IDPs are formidable tasks and when to these are added the additional tasks of good governance, capable leadership, the elimination of corruption and myriad other tasks, including a skilful handling of the economy, the burden is an onerous one; and far too heavy for a government, particularly one that is regarded as inept, inexperienced and unpopular. Hence today the need for a national government that can forge and implement such an agenda is crucial.

The writer is a former ambassador