A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan

[muse]

It is inconceivable that success in either theatre of the war -- Afghanistan or Pakistan -- can be achieved without success in both

I reserve judgement on this and invite Pakistanis to regard anything that has to do with Afghanistan while the U.S is in Afghanistan with a great deal of caution.

We ought not be giving or assigning to Afghanistan anything, any points if you will, that it has not won by showing to Pakistan it's good will.

The Ambassador is exactly correct to my thinking, that Pakistan in Particular and the Pashtun, generally should be leading the struggle against the islamist terrorists - Pakistan because it the target of the islamist terrorists and Pashtun society because it has been targeted under the assumption that it a pathologically inhumane society and therefore susceptible to obscurantist message. fact of the matter is that in Pakistan the Pashtun society is the most progressive and also the more regressive, the difference in these worldviews is education, the availability, access to, education; Pashtun society "gets it" -- however; this does not mean that Pakistan should therefore recourse to it's usual stereotype, masking the neglect of the state -- We have bust a psychological cherry if you will, the Islamist terrorists and his political enablers, and the Pakistani public at large, now KNOW, that Pakistan are capable of separating the wheat from the chaff, so to speak, provided they are offered empowering leadership -- look what happened when Pakistani public was offered the opportunity to reject the Islamist terrorist - Leadership is always important.

The honorable ambassador has also raised the question of Poppy cultivation and infrastructure - these are questions that the occupying power in Afghanistan must be held accountable for. Transferring responsibility for these to a Afghan government whose authority barely exists outside Kabul is unfair, the occupying power must be held accountable.

 

[muse]

Speaking from both sides of it's both? You decide

You decide, whether we have been telling you truth or not and you decide whether you will go with ideology or with experience


May 21, 2009
U.S. Pullout a Condition in Afghan Peace Overture
By DEXTER FILKINS
KABUL, Afghanistan — Leaders of the Taliban and other armed groups battling the Afghan government are talking to intermediaries about a potential peace agreement, with initial demands focused on a timetable for a withdrawal of American troops, according to Afghan leaders here and in Pakistan.

The talks, if not the withdrawal proposals, are being supported by the Afghan government. The Obama administration, which has publicly declared its desire to coax “moderate” Taliban fighters away from armed struggle, says it is not involved in the discussions and will not be until the Taliban agree to lay down their arms. But nor is it trying to stop the talks, and Afghan officials believe they have tacit support from the Americans.

The discussions have so far produced no agreements, since the insurgents appear to be insisting that any deal include an American promise to pull out — at the very time that the Obama administration is sending more combat troops to help reverse the deteriorating situation on the battlefield. Indeed, with 20,000 additional troops on the way, American commanders seem determined to inflict greater pain on the Taliban first, to push them into negotiations and extract better terms. And most of the initial demands are nonstarters for the Americans in any case.

Even so, the talks are significant because they suggest how a political settlement may be able to end the eight-year-old war, and how such negotiations may proceed. They also raise the prospect of potentially difficult decisions by President Hamid Karzai and President Obama, who may have to consider making deals with groups like the Taliban that are anathema to many Americans, and other leaders with brutal and bloody pasts. Some of the leaders in the current talks have been involved with Al Qaeda.

While the talks have been under way for months, they have accelerated since Mr. Obama took office and have produced more specific demands, the Afghan intermediaries said.

The Taliban leaders, through their spokesman, and those of other armed groups publicly deny that they are involved in any negotiations. But several Afghans here and in Pakistan say they have been talking directly to the Taliban leadership group headed by Mullah Muhammad Omar, the movement’s secretive founder. The council is based in the Pakistani city of Quetta.

Discussions have also been held with representatives of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a longtime warlord with a record of extreme brutality, and with Sirajuddin Haqqani, whose guerrilla army is based in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Mr. Haqqani’s group is also known for its ruthlessness and for sending suicide bombers into Afghanistan.

“America cannot win this war, and the Taliban cannot win this war,” Mullah Abdul Salaam Zaeef, a former Taliban ambassador and one of the intermediaries, said in an interview. “I have delivered this message to the Taliban.”

The talks under way now appear to be directed not at individual bands of antigovernment insurgents — the strategy suggested by President Obama — but at the leaders of the large movements.

American officials insist they are not participating in any talks. “The U.S. would support such efforts only if Taliban are willing to abandon violence and lay down their arms, and accept Afghanistan’s democratically elected government,” said Ian Kelly, a State Department spokesman. Still, two of the principal intermediaries, Mr. Zaeef and Daoud Abedi, said they had held extensive discussions with American officials.

A State Department memo described a single meeting with Mr. Abedi, but said it ended abruptly because American officials were not permitted to meet with representatives of Mr. Hekmatyar. There is no independent confirmation of Mr. Zaeef ’s claim to have met with Americans.

Afghan officials said they welcomed the talks. “The government has kept all channels of communication open," said Homayun Hamidzada, a spokesman for Mr. Karzai. “This includes the Taliban and Hekmatyar.”

Mr. Abedi, an Afghan-American businessman from California and a member of Mr. Hekmatyar’s political party, the Islamic Party, said he conducted negotiations in March. Guerrillas loyal to Mr. Hekmatyar are battling the Americans in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan. His political party still has a wide following in the country.

In an interview, Mr. Abedi said he undertook the negotiations — with Mr. Hekmatyar and with the Taliban leaders — at the behest of the State Department, a claim that American officials deny. Mr. Abedi said he met several times with American officials in Washington before and after his trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan. He declined to say which American diplomats he met, saying, “I am a Pashtun, and I swore on my honor that I would not reveal the names of the people I met with, so I cannot.”

Mr. Abedi said he hammered out a common set of demands between the Taliban and Mr. Hekmatyar’s group. The groups agreed to stop fighting if those conditions were met, Mr. Abedi said. The Taliban’s demands seem incompatible with much of Mr. Obama’s strategy, which is to substantially weaken the Taliban through a combination of military force and economic development.

Nor did the deal Mr. Abedi described mention either Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahri, the two senior Qaeda leaders believed to be hiding in Pakistan under the protection of the Taliban or some other armed group.

The first demand was an immediate pullback of American and other foreign forces to their bases, followed by a cease-fire and a total withdrawal from the country over the next 18 months. Then the current government would be replaced by a transitional government made up of a range of Afghan leaders, including those of the Taliban and other insurgents. Americans and other foreign soldiers would be replaced with a peacekeeping force drawn from predominantly Muslim nations, with a guarantee from the insurgent groups that they would not attack such a force. Nationwide elections would follow after the Western forces left.

As for Mr. Hekmatyar, Mr. Abedi said that he maintained a “direct link” with him, and that he was authorized to negotiate on his behalf. He did not meet with Afghan government officials.

After the agreement between the Taliban and the Islamic Party was reached, Mr. Abedi said, the Taliban leaders added more conditions: an end to the drone attacks in Pakistan’s tribal areas, and the release of some Taliban prisoners.

Mr. Abedi said that when he returned to the United States with his proposal, he was greeted with enthusiasm by officials at the State Department. But he said they never called him back.

Mr. Hekmatyar earned a reputation as an especially brutal commander in the civil war that engulfed the country in the 1990s, in particular for the relentless bombardment of Kabul between 1994 and 1996 that killed an estimated 40,000 civilians during an attempt to capture the capital.

In 2002, after Mr. Hekmatyar resisted the American invasion, the Americans tried to kill him with a missile fired from a remotely piloted airplane. They missed.

The other main negotiation is led by Mr. Zaeef and Arsallah Rahmani, a former Taliban minister and now a member of the Afghan Parliament.

“We are not talking to low-ranking people — we are talking to the leaders,” Mr. Rahmani said in an interview. Mr. Zaeef was the Taliban’s ambassador to Pakistan; he served nearly four years in American military prisons, including the one at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.

Their plan would be for the guerrillas and the government to reconcile slowly, starting with the least contentious issues. One of the main low-level demands of the opposition leaders is that their names be removed from a so-called blacklist, contained in a resolution passed by the United Nations Security Council, which obliges governments to detain them. More difficult issues would follow.

“Blood begets blood, but talking begets peace,” Mr. Rahmani said.

Mr. Zaeef said the public declarations of Mullah Omar, who usually vows to fight on, are not necessarily to be taken seriously.

“A policy can have many faces,” he said.

Taimoor Shah contributed reporting.

 

[ajpirzada]

i dont know if its the rit place to post this


US troop surge in Afghanistan 'could push Taliban into Pakistan'
Joint chiefs of staff chairman concedes risk but tells US Senate that troop increase is the right move

The buildup of US troops in Afghanistan could force more Taliban fighters into neighbouring Pakistan, the chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff conceded last night.

Admiral Mike Mullen told the US Senate's foreign relations committee: "We can't deny that our success may only push them [the Taliban] deeper into Pakistan."

Mullen said military planning was under way to overcome that risk. He said the increase of 21,000 US forces in Afghanistan was "about right" for the new strategy of trying to quell the insurgency and speed up training of Afghan security forces.

"Can I [be] 100% certain that won't destabilise Pakistan? I don't know the answer to that," Mullen told the committee.

He was responding to Senator Russ Feingold, a Democrat who said he was concerned the buildup might push militants into already troubled Pakistani regions and "end up further destabilising Pakistan without providing substantial, lasting" improvement in Afghanistan.

"I share your concern," Mullen said. "Your point about insurgents going particularly into Baluchistan, but particularly across that border ... we all share the concern for that," Mullen said.

"Where I'm comfortable is at least planning for it and having some expectation [that] will allow us to address that," Mullen said.

"Pakistan is further away from being totally destabilised than a lot of people realise."

He said he did not know of "any other way to provide for the security" needed in Afghanistan other than sending more troops.

The Pakistani military chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, has told US officials he is worried not only about Taliban forces moving across the border, but the possibility that US troops could prompt an exodus of refugees from southern Afghanistan.

Marine commandant General James Conway, whose forces are entering southern Afghanistan, told a Pentagon news conference last month of Kayani's concern but said no one knew for sure where insurgents would move as US operations increased.

"There are others that think they may go in different directions," Conway said. "But in any event, we've got to do what we've got to do in the south."
US troop surge in Afghanistan 'could push Taliban into Pakistan' | World news | guardian.co.uk

 

[Bill Longley]

The June, 2002, National Assembly (Loya Jirga) held in Afghanistan to select the head of state was rigged by the Bush administration, forcing the former king, who had majority support among the delegates, to withdraw from consideration*. This shows that the "Bush freedom agenda" was basically a sham--a political gimmick, a phony; and that Karzai is a U.S. puppet. Once he was installed, the subsequent elections, held without established political parties, were little more than a rubber stamp.

However, many Americans think that the U.S. brought freedom to Afghanistan, and cling to the notion of Afghanistan as "the good war." The original U.S. sin behind the lack of legitimacy of the Karzai regime, although factually incontrovertible, has remained almost unnoticed.

The result is that blame for the situation tends to be placed on other factors, such as corruption and poor governance. Both are essentially a function of government weakness. But a puppet regime is weak virtually by definition.

The decision to sideline the king aggravated the disenfranchisement and oppression of the Pashtun tribes (the majority political element in Afghanistan) occasioned by U.S. support for the Northern Alliance and other warlords. Northern Afghanistan, for example, has been brutally ethnic-cleansed of Pashtuns since 2001--another fact that has remained almost completely unreported.
But as Vartan Gregorian, the great historian of modern Afghanistan, warned in 2001, "Pashtuns won't easily relinquish two centuries of memory and power. Without a major Pashtun role in the future of Afghanistan, there will be no viable peace." Gregorian also noted that the king was welcome, but not as a U.S. puppet.

It is sufficient to take a look at a map of the insurgency to see that it is practically the same as an ethnic map of Pashtun areas (including the Pashtun areas of Pakistan).

This is why throwing more military forces into the cauldron, and killing more Pashtuns, is not the best solution--and it is hardly a freedom and self-determination solution. It will perpetuate and, indeed, exacerbate a disastrous internal contradiction in U.S. policy.

As for tribal militias, so-called "Arbakai"--villagers armed with rifles--are not much to keep the Taliban at bay. Large scale, heavily armed and lavishly financed militias, like the Uzbeg militia led by the infamous General Dostam, were organized by the Soviets before their pullout in 1989, and proved effective in staving off the collapse of the Soviet-supported regime--until they turned against it.

What is needed is not handing out wads of cash, but a political solution based on reconciliation with the Pashtun tribes. In the words of a British colonial statesman, "An Afghan ruler rules only by the goodwill of the most powerful Afghan tribes" (Sir Olaf Caroe).



Carlo Cristofori was Secretary of the International Committee for Solidarity with the Afghan Resistance, set up by members of the European Parliament following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In that capacity, he worked closely with a number of Afghan resistance organizations, becoming personally familiar with many Afghan political figures. He has analyzed Afghan politics for thirty years.

 

[muse]

Northern Afghanistan, for example, has been brutally ethnic-cleansed of Pashtuns since 2001--another fact that has remained almost completely unreported.

I can tell you from experience this is factual. U.S policy makers will deny but they are have been at war with the Pashtun since they first came to Afghanistan and it is a mistake, the Pashtun are not the enemy.

What is needed is not handing out wads of cash, but a political solution based on reconciliation with the Pashtun tribes. In the words of a British colonial statesman, "An Afghan ruler rules only by the goodwill of the most powerful Afghan tribes" (Sir Olaf Caroe).

Is today the problem with Pashtun tribes? I don't think so, it would be a dificult case to make that the Talib insurrengcy is a a problem of Pashtun tribes - in fact we may want to look at the problem without reference to tribes as central to the problem or solution.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Northern Afghanistan, for example, has been brutally ethnic-cleansed of Pashtuns since 2001--another fact that has remained almost completely unreported.

An inconvenient truth.

Not surprising at all though - this was after all par for the course for the NA after the Soviet withdrawal and during the NA's war with the Taliban.

The ministries of defence, interior and intelligence - the most crucial perhaps in this current state of war - all continue to be staffed by elements affiliated with the NA. The interior ministry headed by a man who worked with Soviet intelligence against the Mujahideen.

 

[ironman]

New Strategy Treats Afghanistan, Pakistan as Integrated Theater

WASHINGTON: The new strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan treats the area as an integrated theater of operations, the Defense Department's policy chief said today.

Michele Flournoy, undersecretary of defense for policy, spoke of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, dangers from Iran and detainees during a wide-ranging interview with the Defense Writers' Group.

"We have to regard Pakistan and Afghanistan together, because each affects the other so profoundly," Flournoy said. "That said, the strategy calls for different but integrated approaches in either country. In Afghanistan, we are pursuing -- really for the first time -- a fully resourced counterinsurgency strategy with military on the ground and civilian experts as well."

In Pakistan, she said, the strategy has to be different, because the institutions are different. The Pakistani military is functioning and is going after the Taliban, and Pakistan has government institutions that Afghanistan lacks, she explained.

Flournoy stressed the integrated portion of the strategy. "When I say an integrated strategy, I mean the enemy doesn't respect the border between the two nations," she said. The Taliban and their allies travel back and forth across the border constantly, she noted, and problems on one side of the border affect the other side.

Still these are two sovereign nations and "our strategy on each side of the border has to be tailored to conditions and political situations in each country. In the end, the two pieces have to get together to make progress," she said.

Part of the problem in Pakistan, Flournoy said, is that the country still is too focused on a perceived threat from India. India and Pakistan have fought three wars since the Pakistan was born in the 1947 partition of India, and the two countries still maintain forces facing each other in Kashmir. The Pakistani military is a conventional force trained for conventional warfare. "It's now being used to conduct counterinsurgency operations," Flournoy said. "To their credit, they have asked for help."

The Pakistani military has asked for help in counterinsurgency training and different equipment, but it is going to take time to reorient the military, she said. The Pakistanis also realize the fight they are in against the Taliban in the northwestern provinces and the federally administered tribal areas doesn't have a "military only" solution.

"The real issue is allowing the Pakistani government to be able to provide for the needs of the population in this area," the undersecretary said.

The biggest growth in American assistance in Pakistan is on the nonmilitary side. This includes economic assistance, health reform, education reform and other aspects to enable the new Pakistani government to be more effective in filling the needs of the people, she said. "What we're trying to do is assist them where we are able to because the stakes are so great for us," Flournoy said.

And the people understand the threat. The attacks against cricketeers and others in Lahore "brought home the danger to the Pakistani people and Pakistani government like nothing before," she said. "There is greater willingness to deal with this than ever before."

Flournoy said the U.S. administration would love to see India and Pakistan re-engage in confidence-building measures and talk about Kashmir and other areas of difference.

"There is a lot they can do to lower tensions, and they had done a lot before the Mumbai attacks," she said. "We would like to see that process restarted. That could go a long way to allowing the Pakistani military and the Pakistani government to focus on the most urgent existential threat they face, and that's from within."

Flournoy also addressed the administration's handling of detainee affairs and Iran's missile program.

When it comes to detainee affairs, she said, everything the government does must be governed by American values. "Mistreatment [or] abuse of detainees is never acceptable," she said. "It's deplorable, and it does not reflect the values of the United States and its military."

President Barack Obama has banned use of torture, she noted, and has made sure that the policies, doctrine and training are clear so there can be no mistake about the issue. The president vowed to close the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by January. Flournoy acknowledged it's a challenging issue and said many people in the administration and on Capitol Hill are working through it.

Iran developing intermediate and long-range missiles is of concern to the United States "because of their interest in things nuclear," Flournoy said. The Obama administration is presenting Iran with stark choices, she said: the country can continue down its current path, and that will lead to further ostracism, further sanctions, more distrust and possibly an arms race in the region, or it can take another path in which it rejects terrorism and rejects nuclear weapons.

"They could actually be on a path better for their own security," she said. "They would be integrated into the region, having normal relations with others, being recognized as a culture with a great history and a regional power that deserves respect. It's a very fundamental choice they have to make."

 

[RabzonKhan]

Pakistan needs 'shift' to beat the Taliban

Wednesday, 27 May 2009

The latest deadly bomb attack in the Pakistani city of Lahore has once again highlighted the threat posed by the Taliban. The militants now face a much more determined government, people and army - but there is a long way to go, argues guest columnist Ahmed Rashid.

After a month-long military campaign that has created nearly 1.5 million refugees, some 15,000 troops of the Pakistan army are now well on their way to retaking the Swat valley from the Pakistani Taliban.

Twice since 2006 the army has been driven out of the valley by extremists - but this time they appear determined to eliminate the Taliban and secure the valley over the long term so that refugees can quickly and safely return home.

However major extremist threats still remain while the civilian government and the army's need for a long-term strategy against them is being debated.

Paradigm shift

The Swat campaign is the first time that the army has appeared determined to wipe out extremism in one region.

The military campaign has been buoyed by a dramatic shift in public opinion against the extremists, the support of all major political parties and the international community, who have promised major international aid.

Without all these factors coming together it is unlikely that the army would have been so determined.

However eliminating extremism from the entire country will need a strategic paradigm shift by the government and the army.

Such a shift will affect domestic and foreign policy, relations with Pakistan's neighbours and a different set of national interest priorities.


Some 10% of the country is still under the control of the extremists.

The Pakistani and Afghan Taliban - and al-Qaeda - are headquartered not in Swat, but in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) adjacent to Afghanistan.

Senior Afghan Taliban leaders are also based in Balochistan and Sindh provinces from where they provide logistics for the Taliban's war against US and Nato forces in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile militant groups in Punjab who have fought in Indian-administered Kashmir - frequently at the behest of the military - remain active.

Some groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba - which was accused of carrying out the attacks in Mumbai (Bombay) last year that killed more than 170 people - have set up relief camps for refugees in northern Pakistan as an Islamic charity.

Guerrilla attacks

The government's immediate aims must be to secure Swat so that the refugees can return home and not become a recruiting base for the Taliban.

But it will have to show much better management than it has up until now to help them rebuild their homes and livelihoods.

Thousands of troops will have to be based in Swat indefinitely to hold the valley and counter future Taliban guerrilla attacks.

Even after victory in Swat, extremism will remain a potent threat to Pakistan, undermining its economy, politics, social development and threatening the entire region.

For the US and Nato, Pakistan was once an appendage to their Afghan policy. Now it is their major concern.

There can also be no long-term solution to militancy without eliminating the command and control centres of the militants in Fata. So far the fighting there has been largely left to the under-armed and under-trained paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC).

Last August, when the FC deployed in Bajaur, the government promised that its actions there heralded the start of a campaign that would retake control of all seven tribal agencies.

Instead, nine months later the FC is still battling the militants in Bajaur.

That will have to change, but for the regular army to deploy in Fata in sufficient numbers and equipment, major external funding and military aid will be needed - which Washington and Nato countries will have to provide.

The army will have to get rid of its aversion to accepting Western training in modern counter-insurgency warfare.

However 80% of the army is deployed on the Indian border - and a dramatic improvement in relations with India has to take place before it can feel secure enough to move tens of thousands of troops from that border to Fata.

Before giving such assurances the Indians will demand that Islamabad also wind up groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, which the military continues to regard as a strategic asset.

For the army to give up on such groups there will have to be major progress on sorting out the multiple disputes between India and Pakistan - such as the Kashmir question and the sharing of river waters.

An equally decisive shift will be needed to deal with the Afghan Taliban leadership in Pakistan, which the army also treats as strategically important.

Pakistan's improved relations with Afghanistan since the advent of the civilian government reflects a major positive shift, but ultimately the Afghan Taliban will have to be given a timeframe to open talks with the Kabul government and leave Pakistan.

In order to deal with Fata and the overall threat of extremism, Pakistan will need to make a major shift in its national priorities that will be not so much based on enmity with India, but focused more on domestic threats and the economy.

Yet at the same time Pakistan's neighbours will also have to be more accommodating, changing their attitudes and policies in the region in order to make such a strategic shift by Pakistan both possible and sustainable.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Operation created goodwill for Pakistan in US: Jones

By Baqir Sajjad Syed and Syed Irfan Raza
Friday, 26 Jun, 2009

ISLAMABAD: US National Security Adviser Gen (retd) James L. Jones exchanged views with the Pakistani civilian and military leadership on Thursday on operational details and timing of the intensified counter-insurgency operation in Afghanistan and its synchronisation with the military offensive against extremists in Pakistan.

‘Gen Jones’ visit was for discussing current challenges confronting Pakistan and coordinating efforts with the Pakistan government in implementing the new shared comprehensive strategy,’ said a statement issued by the US embassy on the conclusion of his two-day visit during which he met President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, Chief of Army Staff Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and other government officials.

Apart from Washington’s keenness to engage with Islamabad, sources said, Gen Jones’ visit bore all marks of a ‘micro-management model’ which hitherto was missing from the relationship between the two allies.

The top US security official praised Pakistan’s military operation against militants as ‘tremendous confidence-builder for the future’. He indicated that Pakistan’s renewed resolve against militancy infused great optimism in Washington about the success of the fight against militancy.

He said the action had generated goodwill for Pakistan in the US, adding that terrorism was a shared threat.

‘Terrorism is not simply the enemy of America — it is a direct and urgent threat to the Pakistani people,’ he said.

President Obama’s ****** strategy attaches immense importance to Islamabad’s role in the fight against extremism as it deploys additional 21,000 troops in Afghanistan in a bid to quell the Taliban insurgency.

The troop build-up is feared to have a fallout on Pakistan, particularly in the restive region of Balochistan.

The sources privy to Gen Jones’ discussions in Islamabad say the intensified US offensive is likely to get into full swing by August-September and the Americans are of the opinion that the next 12-18 months will determine the fate of the new strategy.

From Gen Jones’ talks in Islamabad, it appears that Washington has agreed to the Pakistani demand to deploy its troops along the Afghan border to prevent cross-border movement of terrorists and spill-over of refugees.

The issue of displaced persons also came up for discussion and Gen Jones assured that the US administration would provide all possible assistance to Pakistan in handling the crisis.

Gen Jones, who later left for New Delhi, said in a TV interview the US wanted to be of help in the process of normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan. He said he would be carrying a message of equality, fairness and reason for the Indian leadership.

In his meeting with Gen Jones, Prime Minister Gilani urged the US to play its role in resolving the Kashmir and water disputes with India.

He emphasised that normalisation of relations between Pakistan and India was necessary for the stability of the region and would be of great help by allowing Pakistan to focus its efforts against militants and extremists.

Mr Gilani appealed to the US to write off its debt to help Pakistan overcome the economic crisis and make up for the losses it suffered because of the war on terror.

During his meeting with Gen Jones, President Zardari sought drone technology from the US to boost Pakistan’s capacity to hit high-value targets in specific areas of the tribal belt which were difficult to access by ground forces, spokesman Farhatullah Babar said.

The president thanked the US administration for its efforts in the adoption of the Kerry-Lugar Bill to provide $1.5 billion of annual assistance to Pakistan over a period of five years.

Mr Zardari said: ‘Pakistan needs much more assistance to rehabilitate the internally displaced persons and embark upon a massive socio economic development programme of the area to banish poverty and thereby the forces of militancy.’

He said: ‘I am looking forward to the materialisation soon of the building of reconstruction opportunity zones to help build the underdeveloped areas economically and provide jobs to the people.’

 

[Twain]

I think with general Jones heading up NSC and General McChrystal in command of the Afghanistan forces we will see a lot of changes that people have been asking for.


The new commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan will issue orders within days requiring troops to disengage from combat when possible, to reduce civilian deaths that have put their mission at risk, a spokesman said. Skip related content

General Stanley McChrystal, who took the reins of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan a week ago, has repeatedly pledged to take steps to limit civilian casualties, especially from air strikes, which have infuriated Afghans.

A U.S. military report issued last week found strikes by U.S. B1 bombers in May that killed dozens of civilians had violated orders already in place at the time. That report recommended drawing up new guidelines and ordering all U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan to undergo new training.

McChrystal's spokesman, Rear Admiral Greg Smith, said McChrystal hopes to publish the new guidelines soon, after taking advice from commanders he is meeting on a "listening tour" during his first days in the country.

A classified version should be issued "in a couple of days," and the military will also publish an unclassified version to show the public the steps it is taking.

New U.S. orders in Afghanistan aim to reduce deaths - Yahoo! News UK

They are still going to get into firefights, but when civilians are at risk, the orders are to back off to avoid civilian deaths.

 

[wtf]

I can tell you from experience this is factual. U.S policy makers will deny but they are have been at war with the Pashtun since they first came to Afghanistan and it is a mistake, the Pashtun are not the enemy.

Is today the problem with Pashtun tribes? I don't think so, it would be a dificult case to make that the Talib insurrengcy is a a problem of Pashtun tribes - in fact we may want to look at the problem without reference to tribes as central to the problem or solution.

Isn't ethnic cleansing too strong a word ? To me, the term signifies either killing or forcible migration of people to such an extent that the population changes significantly. I think of Hitler (Jews), Uganda (Indians/Pakistanis) etc. when I think of this.

Avoiding some groups in governmental groups or in the Army is reprehensible, but I would not use the term ethnic cleansing. To me Arab states (Shias), Iran (Kurds), Eastern Europe (Roma people) etc. come to mind.

Which one do you think the situation is closer to?

 

[RabzonKhan]

World Agenda: Pakistan and US unite in pursuit of Taleban leader

From Times Online
June 25, 2009
Jeremy Page, Islamabad

At last Pakistan and the United States appear to be genuinely co-operating in the battle against the Taleban and al-Qaeda militants in the mountainous tribal areas along the porous border with Afghanistan.

Pakistan has finally accepted that it has to send its army into South Waziristan to kill or capture Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Taleban in Pakistan and the main al Qaeda “facilitator” in the region.

The US has belatedly acknowledged that it needs to deploy its CIA drones against Mehsud, instead of concentrating solely on al-Qaeda figures seen as a bigger threat to America.

A drone strike on Tuesday that narrowly missed Mehsud but killed dozens of his men was probably carried out at Pakistan’s request and based on its intelligence — although the Government still publicly opposes such attacks. The strike also helped to suppress persistent rumours here that the United States is somehow supporting the militant leader as part of a conspiracy to split the country and capture its nuclear weapons.

The question is how long this apparent period of co-operation — and relative stability on the domestic political front — will last. US and British officials would like the army to attack not just Mehsud but other militant leaders in South Waziristan and North Waziristan — al-Qaeda’s main sanctuary and a possible hiding place of Osama bin Laden.

They would like the army to stay in the North West as long as it takes to strengthen the local police, improve local governance, and pour in millions of pounds of civilian aid to help to prevent the Taleban from returning. They would also like Pakistan to take stronger action against the militants blamed for last year’s attack on Mumbai so that India will resume frozen peace talks over Kashmir, seen as key to President Obama’s “AfPak” strategy.

But the army has made it clear that its aim is to kill or capture Mehsud, whom it blames for recent suicide bombings and for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the former Prime Minister, in 2007. It is understood to be negotiating a deal with two other Taleban leaders in the region — Mullah Nazir in South Waziristan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan — to make sure they do not come to Mehsud’s aid.

Pakistan’s Government has yet to present a detailed plan for improving security and governance in North West Frontier Province, and establishing control over the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The problem is that President Zardari lacks the political strength to push through the sweeping political reforms required in the area, or to grant India the concessions it is demanding to resume the peace process.

Moving too far or too fast could leave him vulnerable to attacks from Nawaz Sharif, the former Prime Minister who heads the opposition Pakistan Muslim League (N) party and remains determined to lead the country again. Mr Sharif has been remarkably quiet since leading a lawyers’ march against the government in March — and his aides like to say this is because of a deal with Washington under which he will return to power in the near future.

Western diplomats say there is no such deal. But they are acutely aware that the current window of opportunity to tackle the militants in the North West without risking a public backlash could slam shut as suddenly as it opened.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Editorial: Our demands from the US

June 27, 2009

The US National Security Adviser, General (Retd) James L Jones, has met everyone who matters in Pakistan — President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani and Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani. The atmospherics are reported to have been good and Pakistan’s leaders were able to put their demands on the table to the guest who went on to visit India next. If there was a meeting of the minds on the military operation going on against Baitullah Mehsud, there was also the insistence on the part of Pakistan on its old agenda vis-à-vis India.

Pakistan has trimmed its sails realistically by not out-rightly opposing the addition of 21,000 US troops in Afghanistan. It has now actually asked that the troop increase help Pakistan’s operation in South Waziristan: “Washington has agreed to the Pakistani demand to deploy its troops along the Afghan border to prevent cross-border movement of terrorists and spill-over of refugees.” The US is expected to ramp up its offensive by August-September this year as action under its new “Af-Pak” strategy. One can therefore expect Pakistan to get into the decisive phase of its operation in South Waziristan after a month or so.

President Zardari has asked General Jones to clear the way for the US loan of missile-firing drones to Pakistan; and Prime Minister Gilani, apart from asking for a debt write-off, has requested him to convince India to get back into talks with Pakistan. Mr Gilani has also tried to persuade him to get the US “to play its role in resolving the Kashmir and water disputes with India”. Gen Jones’ comment on TV was: “the US wanted to be of help in the process of normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan” and that he would be carrying a message of equality, fairness and reason for the Indian leadership.

It is a good augury that Pakistan is now thinking of accepting the US troop beef-up in Afghanistan as part of its own strategy in South Waziristan. Its earlier stance was probably based on a situation in which Pakistan was not engaged in South Waziristan and therefore feared an influx of the bad Taliban into FATA to further exacerbate the disorder there. It is clear that the national consensus against the Taliban in Pakistan has caused the change in outlook. Now it wants US troops deployed along the border to block the movement of terrorists from both sides.

The drone issue is a part of the “trust deficit” dating back to the time when Pakistan was looking at the Taliban as a “military asset” promising a foothold in Afghanistan if India made too many inroads there. The US has gone through times when intelligence shared with Pakistan ended up with the Taliban who then moved out of the target areas assigned to the drones. There is still a bit of the old fog left in this bilateral conversation as it is not clear what may happen if the drones given to Pakistan are controlled by a certain kind of “ideological” officers. But the situation has changed and requires a different handling of the drone issue now.

As for the Kashmir and “waters” issue, the US should nudge India towards resolution. And one reason for that would be America’s own meeting of the minds with India on the issue of punishing the terrorists whom Pakistan has been using as “non-state actors”. The talks on Kashmir under Gen Musharraf had moved on to the “azadi” tack for the Kashmiris and got stuck on the various modalities of possible “autonomy”. We can pick up on that and finish the job.

Indo-Pak disputes are a victim of trust deficit and lack of normalisation. The waters don’t belong in the “dialogue” but come separately under the Indus Waters Treaty, and the last time we went to the World Bank to resolve the Baglihar Dam dispute we did not win big. Friendly, trade-based ties with India will probably uncover a “third-party” as the real enemy: the changing ecology. If India is acting coy, Pakistan is not letting on that it needs the dialogue with India as a precondition to taking on the Taliban. The sooner this pantomime is broken the better.

 

[RabzonKhan]

U.S. to shift approach to Afghanistan drug trade

Afghan farmers work in a poppy field in Helmand province. U.S. efforts to eradicate the crop have benefited the Taliban, envoy Richard Holbrooke says.

The focus will move from opium eradication to fighting trafficking and promoting alternate crops, U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke says.

Associated Press
June 27, 2009


Trieste, Italy -- The United States is shifting its strategy against Afghanistan's drug trade, phasing out funding for opium eradication while boosting efforts to fight trafficking and promote alternate crops, the U.S. envoy for the region said Saturday.

The aim of the new policy: to deprive the Taliban of the tens of millions of dollars in drug revenue that is fueling its insurgency.

Richard C. Holbrooke, the U.S. special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, told the Associated Press that poppy eradication -- for years a cornerstone of U.S. and U.N. drug trafficking efforts in Afghanistan -- was not working and was driving farmers into the hands of the Taliban.

"Eradication is a waste of money," Holbrooke said on the sidelines of a Group of 8 foreign ministers' meeting on Afghanistan in Trieste, Italy, during which he briefed regional representatives on the new policy.

"It might destroy some acreage, but it didn't reduce the amount of money the Taliban got by one dollar. It just helped the Taliban. So we're going to phase out eradication," he said. The Afghan foreign minister also attended the G-8 meeting.

Eradication efforts were seen as inefficient because too little was being destroyed at too high a cost, United Nations drug chief Antonio Maria Costa said.

The old policy was also deeply unpopular among small-scale farmers, who often were targeted in the eradication efforts.

Afghanistan is the world's leading source of opium, cultivating 93% of the world's heroin-producing crop. Though opium cultivation dropped 19% last year, it remains concentrated in the country's southern provinces, where the Taliban is strongest, and last year earned insurgents an estimated $50 million to $70 million, according to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime.

There was no comment from the Afghan government Saturday, but the U.S. policy shift is likely to be welcomed. Officials eradicating opium poppies have often been attacked by militants. Afghan citizens, many of whom rely on farming for sustenance and income, are certain to welcome new agricultural programs.

In recent months, U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan have begun attacking drug labs and opium storage sites in an effort to deprive the Taliban of drug profits.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Policing Pakistan

OPINION ASIA JUNE 30, 2009
By C. CHRISTINE FAIR From today's Wall Street Journal Asia.

The army isn't well equipped to fight the insurgency.

The United States has spent some $12 billion trying to help Pakistan save itself. Unfortunately, Washington has lavished most of the aid on the Pakistan army. It is time to reconsider that decision and focus instead on improving the country's police force.

There are many reasons why the army can't fix what ails the nation. First, sustained use of the army against its own citizens goes against the grain. A number of Pakistani officers have told me that they did not join the army to kill Pakistanis; they joined to kill Indians. Officers themselves debate whether the army can successfully oust the militants, and even if it can, whether it could hold the area for long. The army's past and recent track record in clearing and holding territory is not encouraging.

Second, the army has resisted developing a counter-insurgency doctrine. It prefers to plan and train for conventional battles and views its struggle against insurgents as a "low-intensity" conventional conflict. Washington has been slow to understand that this is not a quibble over semantics but a serious difference in how the army intends to contend with the threat. The Pakistani army believes India is its principal nemesis, not the insurgents who have occupied the Swat valley and destabilized Pakistan and the region.

Third, the army's sledgehammer attempt to expel militants from their various redoubts has devastated much of Pakistan's Pashtun belt, flattening villages and forcing more than three million people to flee. The devastating blitzkrieg shows that the Pakistani army resists developing an effective counter-insurgency capability to secure, not dispossess, the local population.

A police force-led effort would be better than one led by the army, as the history of successful counterinsurgency movements in disparate theatres across the globe shows. Militants understand the potential power of the police even if Washington and Islamabad do not. Since 2005, insurgents and terrorists have killed about 400 police each year in suicide bombings, assassinations, and other heinous crimes, according to Hassan Abbas, a former police officer in Pakistan who is now a research fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

The police make for easy targets because they are outgunned, under-resourced, inadequately equipped and poorly trained. Because most don't even have the same lucrative death benefits as army personnel, many have simply fled the fight to protect their families. Police officers in Swat have even taken out newspaper advertisements declaring that they have left the force in hopes that insurgents will spare them and their families. To take the lead in fighting the militants, Pakistan's police will need training, modern weaponry, personal-protection equipment, life insurance and access to civilian intelligence.

Police in Pakistan are admittedly widely reviled for being corrupt. However there are encouraging signs of change. Several policing organizations, such as the National Highways and Motorway Police, the Islamabad Police and the Lahore Traffic Police have all gained the trust of their citizenry through professional and courteous conduct. In these forces, police are paid a handsome salary and are subject to strict accountability for their performance. Their new salaries are too valuable to lose by taking small bribes.

Pakistan's police leadership seems up for the challenge. Since 2000, Pakistan's own police leadership has led the demand for police reform only to be stifled by military and civilian political leadership who benefit from a corrupt police force that does their bidding. It's time for the international community to support these unexpected reformers.

So far, only 2.2% of U.S. funding to Pakistan has gone to assisting the police -- $268 million between 2002 and 2008 for narcotics control, law enforcement and border security. The U.S. has an enormous opportunity to help the one Pakistani institution that actually wants American help.

Should the Obama administration embrace this task, it will need to change its approach to police training, and it will need international partners. The State Department, which has traditional responsibility for this area, cannot do it alone. As the experience with police training in Afghanistan has shown, the Department of Defense has to step in to take the lead on police training. Unfortunately, the international community has resisted supplying trainers or resources to the Afghanistan effort and some contractors have not performed well.

Now more than ever, Pakistan's insecurity touches the shores of Europe and Asia. Washington and other friends of Pakistan should commit to helping Pakistan's police secure the country. It will take years. But it can only happen if preparations begin now.

Ms. Fair is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation.