a message to pakistani deep state, ISI , military

[R Wing]

OP continues the fundamental problem behind our woes. It is our hesitance to forthright blame India and call for operations against India within India itself. Till the time we muster courage for this, nothing will change.

I think we have traded barbs over certain issues on this forums in the past --- but you are absolutely right.

This is the only way forward. The world's deepest and darkest mystery is WHY successive Army Chiefs and PMs are incapable of doing this properly and switching to an offensive strategy.

We don't have any "Deep State". It's all propaganda. We only have a bunch of meek, weak, complacent and incompetent decision makers at the top, whose most favorite pastime is scratching their bollocks and unnecessary chest thumping.



If one care to probe a little deeper; Afghan Taliban are not our choice, but compulsion, under the existing geopolitical positioning.

The next time I hear the following terms, I might shoot myself out of frustration:
1.) "do not mistake our restraint for weakness"
2.) "we will give them a befitting reply"

Been hearing these pathetic excuses for years now. There is a total and utter lack of imagination, creative thinking and audacity in the higher ups of all institutions. I have seen it with my own eyes. It doesn't matter if you're civ or mil or intel or not --- nobody has the balls to do what is necessary.

Will there be consequences? Could the proxy war escalate further? Will India try more 'strikes' that could lead to a limited war? Yes!

BUT WE'RE ALREADY IN AN F'ing LIMITED WAR!!! Might as well fight for what's right.

 

[CriticalThought]

I think we have traded barbs over certain issues on this forums in the past --- but you are absolutely right.

This is the only way forward. The world's deepest and darkest mystery is WHY successive Army Chiefs and PMs are incapable of doing this properly and switching to an offensive strategy.

Actually, Gen Raheel was very different. In his time, intimation was given to India about teaching a lesson which their generations will remember. ACM Sohail Aman not only challenged the Indians, he gave the go ahead to shoot down American drones. The drone attacks stopped in his time. Gen Musharraf, Gen Kiyani, and now Gen Bajwa have proven to be lame duck, respond only when water has risen above the flood mark types. Interestingly, Gen Raheel was shipped off to Saudi Arabia to lead a force that has nothing to its name to date. Do you smell a rat?

 

[R Wing]

Actually, Gen Raheel was very different. In his time, intimation was given to India about teaching a lesson which their generations will remember. ACM Sohail Aman not only challenged the Indians, he gave the go ahead to shoot down American drones. The drone attacks stopped in his time. Gen Musharraf, Gen Kiyani, and now Gen Bajwa have proven to be lame duck, respond only when water has risen above the flood mark types. Interestingly, Gen Raheel was shipped off to Saudi Arabia to lead a force that has nothing to its name to date. Do you smell a rat?

The inside scoop is that while Raheel was certainly more bold, he also didn't give the legitimate Kashmiri resistance the kind of support that could really bring things to a boil.

The ISI has an entire Wing dedicated to Media affairs, the ISPR itself has become a well-funded machine and of course we have the Info Ministry and PEMRA too --- and between all these, even in his time, we couldn't put together a coherent narrative on Indian terrorism, public threats of retaliation via our own "surgical strikes," etc.

If we don't raise the cost of supporting anti-State elements for our enemies --- and don't introduce the fear of consequences --- everything else is just a tactical victory with no strategic relevance in the long run.

 

[SIPRA]

This is the only way forward. The world's deepest and darkest mystery is WHY successive Army Chiefs and PMs are incapable of doing this properly and switching to an offensive strategy.

Will there be consequences? Could the proxy war escalate further? Will India try more 'strikes' that could lead to a limited war? Yes!

I believe somehow that Pakistan committed the following two biggest mistakes, in respect of its counter intelligence dealings:

1) Handing over the command structure of the ISI to military personnel, unlike RAW, CIA etc etc
2) Developing in-house proxies, for covert operations against enemy states, instead of creating these proxies in those countries or utilizing those already existing there

I wouldn't dilate upon it; but, in my view, that is why, RAW has been far far more successful, in virtually all terms, than our ISI.

Even, a large part of the Pakistan's current economic problems can also be attributed to the covert actions, executed against it, during the past about 20 years.

 

[Pakistani Fighter]

it is time to wake up and end the reactive mode of operation. the enemy is still striking ( albeit with lesser intensity ) and STILL has secure bases in Afghanistan and Iran. the enemy is exploiting every gap available. its sleeper cells randomly activate and strike targets with impunity and cause first strike damage

1. attack on makran coastal highway . service men are taken off the bus and shot in the head

2. suicide bomber sent to lhr, attacks an unsuspecting police van

3. the apparently missing persons turn up at PC gwadar and wreck mayhem. we lose 2 x guards And a navy commando



ISPR should stop apologizing. we dont need songs or tweets praising the dead commandos. we need blood. simple as that.

FFS, this is hybrid warfare. russia has deployed a whole division in Ukraine wearing masks and simply shrugs off their existence. learn maskirovka, learn black ops .

the enemy must be crushed in its secure basis in afghanistan and iran. if ISI is too afraid to leave a foot print, it can hire killers from the dark web , simple .

deny every thing

be ambiguous

be ruthless. read the art of war FFS

send assassins and hit station chiefs of RAW in Afghanistan. instead of inviting c*** like hamid mir and saleem safi to ISPR briefings and patronizing them, completely black them out and point their crimes . smear their careers


i have been saying this again and again. the pak army understands hy warfare, but its too afraid to practice it . eventually, god forbid, it'll lose it

I think we are cowards

 

[Mamadouso]

The intelligence agencies need to come to the Parliament and give summaries like the head of CIA does to the US Senate.

Let them come in front of a Senate Panel in Pakistan and explain in simple terms Indian involvement in funding of ‘Baloch’ terror networks or others they are helping. Get the message out in a calm and professional setting - in front of lawmakers.

 

[CriticalThought]

The inside scoop is that while Raheel was certainly more bold, he also didn't give the legitimate Kashmiri resistance the kind of support that could really bring things to a boil.

The ISI has an entire Wing dedicated to Media affairs, the ISPR itself has become a well-funded machine and of course we have the Info Ministry and PEMRA too --- and between all these, even in his time, we couldn't put together a coherent narrative on Indian terrorism, public threats of retaliation via our own "surgical strikes," etc.

If we don't raise the cost of supporting anti-State elements for our enemies --- and don't introduce the fear of consequences --- everything else is just a tactical victory with no strategic relevance in the long run.

I feel Gen. Raheel was severely limited by Nawaz. He was a decent man and he saw goodness in Nawaz but he was backstabbed. To this day I remember the video clip where Nawaz was brought to observe major drills involving newly acquired LY-80s, tanks etc. Nawaz was sitting next to Gen. Raheel and was looking ahead with an expression of glee with his thunk raised up, the rest of his fingers balled into a fist, and jerking his hand up and down. His intentions didn't look good. Then there was the media onslaught against Gen. Raheel, with Dawn publishing pejorative articles saying 'Well General, will you leave or ask for an extension?' Any possibility of extension was linked to his very dignity and honor whereas he never gave any indication he is seeking an extension.

I remember towards the very end, he introduced Nawaz to all the Generals and I believe he gave clear indication of whom to choose. The idiot Nawaz went with the choice of his Western masters, and Bajwa on the one hand threw a curved ball on the disgusting Nawaz, but on the other hand, disbanded the entire team of Gen. Raheel. During the initial days, he gave a statement saying you cannot control terrorism everywhere, and this is something we may have to live with. Then young soldiers questioned him during a visit to Quetta and slowly he at least started being serious about terrorism. In his initial days, there were stories of him having served under and Indian general in the UN and that he is the best chance for reaching understanding on Kashmir. Today, although we are paying lip service to Kashmir, in reality the movement has been orphaned. The victory of Feb 27 has been turned into a diplomatic defeat. I don't have a high opinion of the Imran/Bajwa duo at the helm of affairs.

 

[R Wing]

I believe somehow that Pakistan committed the following two biggest mistakes, in respect of its counter intelligence dealings:

1) Handing over the command structure of the ISI to military personnel, unlike RAW, CIA etc etc
2) Developing in-house proxies, for covert operations against enemy states, instead of creating these proxies in those countries or utilizing those already existing there

I wouldn't dilate upon it; but, in my view, that is why, RAW has been far far more successful, in virtually all terms, than our ISI.

Even, a large part of the Pakistan's current economic problems can also be attributed to the covert actions, executed against, it during the past about 20 years.

You bring up great points, but there are more to consider.

1.) The ISI wasn't handed over to military personnel; it was and is a military-dominated and run institution with some civilian employees. The strange thing is how it started reporting to the PM and how the PM has a say in the appointment of its head. This weird 'kichri' is unnecessary. The IB, a totally civilian intel agency, is the PM's eyes and ears already.

2.) The RAW, CIA, Mossad and SVR are all external-focused intel agencies whose sole occupation is operations in other countries (while their domestic counterparts --- the IB, FBI, Shabak and FSB --- take care of internal dissent, counter intel, counter terrorism, propaganda/local media management, etc.) The ISI, by contrast, is an "all inclusive" agency with only a part of it dedicated to external ops. Therefore, the DG has to worry about all internal and external issues simultaneously --- this job and therefore the agency should be split up to focus on external vs. internal.

3.) The fact that it is military-run in a place like Pakistan is not actually a bad thing. Military men, through the MI, etc., have a lot of checks on them throughout their career. And the examples of civilian institutions are in front of you (FIA, IB, LEAs, etc.) All are corrupt to the bone and just as incompetent, if not more.

4.) The proxies point is fair but it's not so simple. The proxies supported by both enjoy some 'safe haven' territory (Afghanistan for Baloch terrorists supported by RAW, for example.)

5.) Don't forget the HUGE discrepancy in size and budget. The ISI continuously has to punch way above its weight and deal with schemes and operations hatched by the likes of the CIA where as India is now firmly in the pro-West anti-China camp. We think many things are failures but they are actually achieving quiet strategic objectives (such as keeping 600,000+ Indian army/paramilitary troops occupied in IOK; this is the size of the entire Pak Army, roughly speaking) and is quite an achievement. Also, our intel on Indian military movements, comms, etc., is pretty incredible. That's how we knew about their plan to launch missile strikes on cities and warned them about it before hand. They couldn't believe it --- those missile bases are highly secure and comms are encrypted. But we knew.

6.) We have two main failures. The first is the fear of imagined Western criticism (who the F cares?!) which has stopped leaders in all institutions to go soft on domestic traitors. The West cleverly links aid packages, IMF loans, market access and a lot more stuff that we unfortunately need (due to decades of bad governance) to conditions such as freedom of press, etc. Instead of fighting this double standard (Saudi Arabia, a draconian dictatorship, is the largest buyer of sophisticate US arms and enjoys blanket US support, just as Israel does --- another draconian State indulging in an insane illegal occupation of and war crimes against an entire people), we simply go along with this sick logic.
The second is our inability to properly redefine the rules of engagement in the wake of India's push to establish a "new normal" where any proxy attack can result in a limited war or, at the very least, risky strikes in our territory. By accepting this premise, we are painting ourselves into a corner. What we need is influence over TTP-level insurgencies in India that are homegrown with genuine grievances and can regularly and reliably strike urban centers.

Happy to hear your thoughts.

 

[CriticalThought]

You bring up great points, but there are more to consider.

1.) The ISI wasn't handed over to military personnel; it was and is a military-dominated and run institution with some civilian employees. The strange thing is how it started reporting to the PM and how the PM has a say in the appointment of its head. This weird 'kichri' is unnecessary. The IB, a totally civilian intel agency, is the PM's eyes and ears already.

2.) The RAW, CIA, Mossad and SVR are all external-focused intel agencies whose sole occupation is operations in other countries (while their domestic counterparts --- the IB, FBI, Shabak and FSB --- take care of internal dissent, counter intel, counter terrorism, propaganda/local media management, etc.) The ISI, by contrast, is an "all inclusive" agency with only a part of it dedicated to external ops. Therefore, the DG has to worry about all internal and external issues simultaneously --- this job and therefore the agency should be split up to focus on external vs. internal.

3.) The fact that it is military-run in a place like Pakistan is not actually a bad thing. Military men, through the MI, etc., have a lot of checks on them throughout their career. And the examples of civilian institutions are in front of you (FIA, IB, LEAs, etc.) All are corrupt to the bone and just as incompetent, if not more.

4.) The proxies point is fair but it's not so simple. The proxies supported by both enjoy some 'safe haven' territory (Afghanistan for Baloch terrorists supported by RAW, for example.)

5.) Don't forget the HUGE discrepancy in size and budget. The ISI continuously has to punch way above its weight and deal with schemes and operations hatched by the likes of the CIA where as India is now firmly in the pro-West anti-China camp. We think many things are failures but they are actually achieving quiet strategic objectives (such as keeping 600,000+ Indian army/paramilitary troops occupied in IOK; this is the size of the entire Pak Army, roughly speaking) and is quite an achievement. Also, our intel on Indian military movements, comms, etc., is pretty incredible. That's how we knew about their plan to launch missile strikes on cities and warned them about it before hand. They couldn't believe it --- those missile bases are highly secure and comms are encrypted. But we knew.

6.) We have two main failures. The first is the fear of imagined Western criticism (who the F cares?!) which has stopped leaders in all institutions to go soft on domestic traitors. The West cleverly links aid packages, IMF loans, market access and a lot more stuff that we unfortunately need (due to decades of bad governance) to conditions such as freedom of press, etc. Instead of fighting this double standard (Saudi Arabia, a draconian dictatorship, is the largest buyer of sophisticate US arms and enjoys blanket US support, just as Israel does --- another draconian State indulging in an insane illegal occupation of and war crimes against an entire people), we simply go along with this sick logic.
The second is our inability to properly redefine the rules of engagement in the wake of India's push to establish a "new normal" where any proxy attack can result in a limited war or, at the very least, risky strikes in our territory. By accepting this premise, we are painting ourselves into a corner. What we need is influence over TTP-level insurgencies in India that are homegrown with genuine grievances and can regularly and reliably strike urban centers.

Happy to hear your thoughts.

Regarding point 6, our dilemma is that our leaders are either turncoats (Nawaz etc) or more Western than Westerners themselves. There is a quiet bias in the army where above the Brigadier level, no one with visibly religious views is able to proceed. American military personnel take education in the military college in Quetta and monitor the level of acceptance of American and Western values in the people surrounding them. You have people going on exchange programs to America. The very well resourced CIA has many opportunities to place its moles at our highest levels. Pervaiz Musharraf is a glaring example of this deep flaw. And then people try to send messages to the deep state...

 

[R Wing]

I feel Gen. Raheel was severely limited by Nawaz. He was a decent man and he saw goodness in Nawaz but he was backstabbed. To this day I remember the video clip where Nawaz was brought to observe major drills involving newly acquired LY-80s, tanks etc. Nawaz was sitting next to Gen. Raheel and was looking ahead with an expression of glee with his thunk raised up, the rest of his fingers balled into a fist, and jerking his hand up and down. His intentions didn't look good. Then there was the media onslaught against Gen. Raheel, with Dawn publishing pejorative articles saying 'Well General, will you leave or ask for an extension?' Any possibility of extension was linked to his very dignity and honor whereas he never gave any indication he is seeking an extension.

I remember towards the very end, he introduced Nawaz to all the Generals and I believe he gave clear indication of whom to choose. The idiot Nawaz went with the choice of his Western masters, and Bajwa on the one hand threw a curved ball on the disgusting Nawaz, but on the other hand, disbanded the entire team of Gen. Raheel. During the initial days, he gave a statement saying you cannot control terrorism everywhere, and this is something we may have to live with. Then young soldiers questioned him during a visit to Quetta and slowly he at least started being serious about terrorism. In his initial days, there were stories of him having served under and Indian general in the UN and that he is the best chance for reaching understanding on Kashmir. Today, although we are paying lip service to Kashmir, in reality the movement has been orphaned. The victory of Feb 27 has been turned into a diplomatic defeat. I don't have a high opinion of the Imran/Bajwa duo at the helm of affairs.

Excellent points, though some facts contradict a few things here and there.

Bajwa may not have the gusto and audacity of his predecessor but he continued many of the same policies. Sidelining of teams is natural in the Fauj where terms are defined. Bajwa's ISI pick, Lt. Gen Naveed Mukhtar, served as DG CT in the ISI before he was promoted (by a board under Raheel) and posted as Corps Commander Khi (after which he was made DG ISI.) This was the time that many RAW and NDS assets started to mysteriously get assassinated in Afghanistan. The Khalistan Movement finally started to see some movement. Anti-State bloggers disappeared for weeks. Huge shortcomings in Bajwa, just like all of his predecessors, but don't underestimate his ability to do what's necessary. Is this ability where it should be? Absolutely not. But it's not as bad as you fear.

Kashmir absolutely doesn't have the kind of support it should. I don't understand what we're so scared of. Some Western criticism? If we play things smart, all we'll have to hear is some complaints and some negative press in Western publications (designed to pressurize us to let anti-State elements operate under "freedom of expression" principles, etc.) --- if we can't even handle that, then how do we expect to stare down hostile intelligence agencies in hardcore ops?!

From talking to people involved, I know for a fact that no COAS or PM in the recent past has been in favor of any sort of escalation with India; therefore the hands of the relevant Wings in the ISI and other places have been tied by the very leaders who are supposed to unleash them to protect our interests. The excuses are always the same: weak economy and being scared of pissing off the West (losing market access, losing IMF, losing aid.) What they don't mention is that the latter also includes losing their own secret stashes in the West, which is also where all their kids study. When this shifts to China (both wealth and progeny), we'll start to see improvement. Till then, there's no hope. Peace.

The intelligence agencies need to come to the Parliament and give summaries like the head of CIA does to the US Senate.

Let them come in front of a Senate Panel in Pakistan and explain in simple terms Indian involvement in funding of ‘Baloch’ terror networks or others they are helping. Get the message out in a calm and professional setting - in front of lawmakers.

This has happened before too. Barely anyone showed up. Some people fell asleep. Each PM is briefed for hours at ISI HQ and then on an on-going basis by the DG and the COAS.

It's not about an information shortfall. It's about testicular shortfall.

 

[Crusher]

ISPR should stop apologizing. we dont need songs or tweets praising the dead commandos. we need blood. simple as that.

This may not change because there is an invasion of marasi types in ISPR/military these days, just like marasis they are fully satisfied by taking revenge merely through their marasi songs.

 

[R Wing]

Regarding point 6, our dilemma is that our leaders are either turncoats (Nawaz etc) or more Western than Westerners themselves. There is a quiet bias in the army where above the Brigadier level, no one with visibly religious views is able to proceed. American military personnel take education in the military college in Quetta and monitor the level of acceptance of American and Western values in the people surrounding them. You have people going on exchange programs to America. The very well resourced CIA has many opportunities to place its moles at our highest levels. Pervaiz Musharraf is a glaring example of this deep flaw. And then people try to send messages to the deep state...

Absolutely. Everybody is approached by the CIA; the Americans, through SIGINT especially, have dirt on 99% of them (money laundering, secret stashes, affairs, etc.) that can destroy their careers instantaneously.

However, I do disagree slightly with the 1-star and above statement. The DG ISI is a Hafiz-e-Quran and many top ranking people are devout Muslims, even if they don't have the look. Almost everybody prays from the heart, is up for Fajr and so on. I know this personally. But I do get your point 100%.

 

[Crusher]

OP continues the fundamental problem behind our woes. It is our hesitance to forthright blame India and call for operations against India within India itself. Till the time we muster courage for this, nothing will change.

There could be a reason behind it, maybe a lot of people in pakistani military higher ups still have relatives living in india and they treat india like a second home. I always notice a "soft corner" towards india among many in Pakistani media, I wouldn't be surprised if such elements are infecting other organs of state too including military.

2) Developing in-house proxies, for covert operations against enemy states, instead of creating these proxies in those countries or utilizing those already existing there

Totally agree on this, this stupidity has never made any sense to me since 90s, I remember I used to talk to my friends about this issue in 90s that one day these "snakes" that are being groomed in our country with religious intoxication to be used against east and west are going to turn on us. And look it did happen and our state is reaping the crop of 90s. Those policy makers of 90s were the douches who were creating as you said "in-house" proxies under dozens of religious banners thinking that they will always be loyal to them and once their need is over then they will order them to dismantle and everything will be back to square 0. I cannot believe pakistan had retards of highest order at such high level of policy making in 90s.

 

[SIPRA]

The ISI, by contrast, is an "all inclusive" agency with only a part of it dedicated to external ops. Therefore, the DG has to worry about all internal and external issues simultaneously --- this job and therefore the agency should be split up to focus on external vs. internal.

I must tell you that I am a total layman on security matters and issues. So, your post entails a lot of learning for me, and people like me. Thanks.

The highlighted portion in your post reflects, to some extent, my concern. What havoc RAW has played in Pakistan, during the last about 20 years, particularly in terms of its economic implications; we have grossly failed to respond to it. Of course, you have also variously pointed it out.

The fact that it is military-run in a place like Pakistan is not actually a bad thing. Military men, through the MI, etc., have a lot of checks on them throughout their career. And the examples of civilian institutions are in front of you (FIA, IB, LEAs, etc.) All are corrupt to the bone and just as incompetent, if not more.

My objection on the military command structure of the ISI was not with regard to the criteria of professional competence. No. It was more to do with the occupational psychology. I believe that a soldier is trained, on certain well-established professional norms and conventions, which don't go very well with the kind of covert operations, required to be carried out, in other states. They need far more callous and cold professionals. That's why perhaps most of such agencies don't go for the soldiers, who would otherwise appear to be very suitable, for such jobs. That's how I think.

The proxies point is fair but it's not so simple. The proxies supported by both enjoy some 'safe haven' territory (Afghanistan for Baloch terrorists supported by RAW, for example.)

Yes. But India don't accommodate them in their country and hence can maintain its denial, at least, at a public level.

The second is our inability to properly redefine the rules of engagement in the wake of India's push to establish a "new normal" where any proxy attack can result in a limited war or, at the very least, risky strikes in our territory. By accepting this premise, we are painting ourselves into a corner. What we need is influence over TTP-level insurgencies in India that are homegrown with genuine grievances and can regularly and reliably strike urban centers.

The highlighted portion of your post is what was in my mind. This is where, I think, that ISI has failed, in comparison with RAW. They have used every insurgency in Pakistan, to its hilt, against us.

Once again, thanks.

 

[Crusher]

What we need is influence over TTP-level insurgencies in India that are homegrown with genuine grievances and can regularly and reliably strike urban centers.

Happy to hear your thoughts.

The best candidate for that are dalit groups in india that are present all over india, they are marginalized and have genuine grievances but somehow the establishment's focus is always on bearded sikhs which are good for nothing.