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A JF-17 equipped with Aselpod & SOM cruise missiles ?

Here is the 1/1 scale of SOM-J next to SOM-B1 introduced in a fair in recent weeks bro.

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These are two different weapons all together.
 
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The development challenge will be a smaller and lighter ALCM that retains the range and room for a nuclear warhead.

I agree with a subtle point made by @Oscar and @Bilal Khan 777 - there's no point in SOM. No matter what, we have to look at the SOM from the perspective of Turkey's defence needs, and those needs do not include nuclear strike as a vital component. Minus the prospect of Turkey violating its agreements on curbing nuclear proliferation and abiding by the MTCR. At best, we'd get a conventional stand-off range weapon, and we have plenty of conventional SOW options (e.g. glide bombs, re-purposed AShM, etc.

But at the same time, I wasn't alluding to buying the SOM. Rather, I wanted us to incorporate (if any) design aspects that we haven't mastered in Pakistan. What this is ... I don't know, but for argument's sake, if it is in the area of making an even lighter - very composite heavy - airframe, then we need that. If it is swapping out the electronics for even lighter counter parts, so be it. If it involves a lighter and more efficient micro-turbojet, then let's get that too.

The best approach is R&D collaboration, we want these precious capacities to grow in-house (if they aren't already). Since there is no rush in getting rid of the Mirages, this could be a relatively slow and gradual program, but if it isn't in the pipeline, it needs to be (for the sake of maintaining our airborne strategic deterrence). If we design that new ALCM to be configurable with guided sub-munitions as well, then all the better.

An example for your perfect analogy. Babur got similar dimensions as that of American And Indian yet to be ope-rationalized LACM. Yet former is at 750 while first later is at 2500 KM and second later is trying to achieve 1000 in its first version of LACM

Similar is the case of RAAD. With its current size and dimension it can easily go to 450-500 KM if there are efficient components in it. Or If if introduced efficent components and materials, size can be decreased while still maintaining the 350 KM range. We are still reliant COTS. Our metallurgy game is weak. Hence the size and length of our missiles are hugh and contemporary missile sizes have double or triple the ranges

Its been 11 years since Babur was tested first time. We should look at American developments of updating their Tomahwk by adding an active seeker in the LACM to go after moving targets and using leftover fuel of Tomahawk as an additional warhead i.e JP-10 to maximize the blast radius
 
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Other day it got me thinking, why we need nasr when we have RAAD, which has a greater range, can be launched in less time than that of NASR and from a far greater range as well.

Hi,

Nasr has its own utility---very short range missile and long range missiles----it would be just like comparing a Mortar to a howitzer---.

Both have their utility----our small tactical nucs can be launched thru by MRL's if I am not mistaken---next to impossible to shoot it down.
 
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Hi,

Nasr has its own utility---very short range missile and long range missiles----it would be just like comparing a Mortar to a howitzer---.

Both have their utility----our small tactical nucs can be launched thru by MRL's if I am not mistaken---next to impossible to shoot it down.

But if we analyze the logistic risks attached with nasr and raad, Former has 100 x risks attached with it. First to move MLRS truck from point A to B. Then to battlefield. If the indians have broken through via Thar dessert, you can imagine the distance of moving Nasr from karachi or Punjab or from balochistan to near the battle-filed will take minimum two hours if it is airlifted and then to mission planning, and where to explode it and how to avoid NASR truck being obliterated by enemy fire and thus causing nuclear exploding within our own armored column as well as avoid getting captured.

Whereas single raad delieverd through mirage in far much less risk environment because it can be fired from much larger distance and can be deployed in much less time than Nasr could be
 
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But if we analyze the logistic risks attached with nasr and raad, Former has 100 x risks attached with it. First to move MLRS truck from point A to B. Then to battlefield. If the indians have broken through via Thar dessert, you can imagine the distance of moving Nasr from karachi or Punjab or from balochistan to near the battle-filed will take minimum two hours if it is airlifted and then to mission planning, and where to explode it and how to avoid NASR truck being obliterated by enemy fire and thus causing nuclear exploding within our own armored column as well as avoid getting captured.

Whereas single raad delieverd through mirage in far much less risk environment because it can be fired from much larger distance and can be deployed in much less time than Nasr could be

Hi,

I think that you need to re-evaluate your post----. Why would they be sitting in karachi or punjab---?
 
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Nasr is atomic artillery, but the Army can also load them up with conventional HE warheads too.
 
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Hi,

I think that you need to re-evaluate your post----. Why would they be sitting in karachi or punjab---?

Because to avoid the preying eyes of America and its allies who are very much interested in knowing the location of Nasr missiles. So it is an assumption nasr are hidden in such regions.

The whole concept of Hot start is to attack Pakistan with utmost surprising element. India 1st corp is regularly exercising in Rajhstaan Desert. What if they attack us under the garb of such training exercises.
 
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Because to avoid the preying eyes of America and its allies who are very much interested in knowing the location of Nasr missiles. So it is an assumption nasr are hidden in such regions.

The whole concept of Hot start is to attack Pakistan with utmost surprising element. India 1st corp is regularly exercising in Rajhstaan Desert. What if they attack us under the garb of such training exercises.

The answer is in my post.
 
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they dont need it
the raad was supposedly tested on the jf-17 on its last test. its classed as a sow missiles and i dont see why anther would be used. yes the som is smaller but that dont matter, why have two missiles to do one job. and for targets within 120km will be dealt with the glide bombs. sea targets will be dealth with c802. speaking of the c802 im sure it can be modified to engage land targets

You are absolutely right sir , c802 already being tested fron shore with the name azab missile indicating it has been already inducted
 
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The issue with today I believe lies less in the equipment and more towards creating a better synergy with the army to make them understand the limitations of the airforce. I had a massive laugh at a colonel of a mechanised regiment who claimed that our F-16s would take care of any problems the IAF put up. He was oblivious to the ability of the IAF to deploy CBU-105s and decimate an entire column using just 4 aircraft and his understanding of even the basics of air warfare were delusional at best; hopefully he did not get promoted.

This is why our SOMs also need to incorporate smart weapons. The Pakistani military needs to look beyond just tac nukes as the failsafe and look for more proactive strategies such as this.
http://warontherocks.com/2014/11/th...ker-and-the-beginning-of-the-rsta-revolution/
Replace the following with India:
Soviet forces had integrated large numbers of anti-tank systems into its armored forces. Where increased effectiveness of Soviet ground forces suggested that a surprise attack might cripple NATO’s ability to use ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons, Soviet advances in air defenses suggested that NATO’s air-delivered tactical nuclear weapons might not be effective either.
and see how many of the following points reflect on Pakistan?
Among the gaps addressed in FOFA programs were:

  • Lack of suitable ground-launched missiles
  • Inability to operate aircraft at night and in bad weather
  • Inability to acquire and target moving vehicles at night and through clouds
  • Inability to dynamically identify and target armored vehicles moving in and out of urban or other areas (reacquiring lost target tracks)
  • Lack of effective integration of corps, division, and battalion capabilities to support maneuver forces across division control lines
  • Defeating enemy air defenses, including shoulder-fired missiles
  • Ever-increasing demands to increase the depth of sensors, targeting, and deep strike systems
  • Requirements for unmanned aerial vehicles

Yes, partially you are correct and may I say partially that colonel is correct too. In start PAF focus mainly will be to provide area denial and protection from hostile air and much less on CAS. Also what I think that AD is deeply integrated in armour formations and operations, even when moving from peace time locations to deployment positions they move systematically with formation's Air Defence and there are detailed operational procedures about how to do this. whether these work or not only a war can tell.
Also COIN operations in the west are I think helping intra-service communication and operations better, we are learning ways to collect and share data through SAR, recce pods etc. and create/modify rules of engagement to quickly take actions upon it.
 
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The brimstone is the ideal weapon, but both it and PARS would be cut of by India whose purchasing patterns are aimed more at cutting off sources for Pakistan rather than an actual procurement strategy.


Excellent write up... 100% true.
 
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The issue with today I believe lies less in the equipment and more towards creating a better synergy with the army to make them understand the limitations of the airforce. I had a massive laugh at a colonel of a mechanised regiment who claimed that our F-16s would take care of any problems the IAF put up. He was oblivious to the ability of the IAF to deploy CBU-105s and decimate an entire column using just 4 aircraft and his understanding of even the basics of air warfare were delusional at best; hopefully he did not get promoted.

This is why our SOMs also need to incorporate smart weapons. The Pakistani military needs to look beyond just tac nukes as the failsafe and look for more proactive strategies such as this.
http://warontherocks.com/2014/11/th...ker-and-the-beginning-of-the-rsta-revolution/
Replace the following with India:
Soviet forces had integrated large numbers of anti-tank systems into its armored forces. Where increased effectiveness of Soviet ground forces suggested that a surprise attack might cripple NATO’s ability to use ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons, Soviet advances in air defenses suggested that NATO’s air-delivered tactical nuclear weapons might not be effective either.
and see how many of the following points reflect on Pakistan?
Among the gaps addressed in FOFA programs were:

  • Lack of suitable ground-launched missiles
  • Inability to operate aircraft at night and in bad weather
  • Inability to acquire and target moving vehicles at night and through clouds
  • Inability to dynamically identify and target armored vehicles moving in and out of urban or other areas (reacquiring lost target tracks)
  • Lack of effective integration of corps, division, and battalion capabilities to support maneuver forces across division control lines
  • Defeating enemy air defenses, including shoulder-fired missiles
  • Ever-increasing demands to increase the depth of sensors, targeting, and deep strike systems
  • Requirements for unmanned aerial vehicles



Excellent read... thoroughly professional.
 
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