1965 War - The complete story

[paritosh]

@Kasrkin

the point I raised about India accepting third party mediation once the war in Kutch had gone badly still holds.

you forget to include a whole war in between the rann of kutchh episode and India accepting terms and getting 90% of the territory it contested diplomatically.

You yourself accepted that India endorsed the commission after the Kutch War and before the September War.

you sound so naive Kasrkin...di Ayub wait for the commission to set up?Don't you agree that the success of the rann of kutch episode let him to believe that it can be repeated in kashmir?This is the whole point.It wasn't Paksitan that acted maturely and with noble reason...your whole idea was to get Kashmir and Rann of kutchh militarily.The inquiry was set due to Brits intervening after a stale mate was reached and the Pakistani plans gone haywire....I have read numerous accounts of us holding more territory than you...the point I believe is that Pakistan's objectives were not matched in action.

military maneuvering to encourage a neutral and fair settlement

that is laughable Kasrkin...you've justified the Kashmir issue not being settled in more than 60 years with that one statement.

India used military assertion simply to annex the disputed territory in disregard to prior commitments and UNSC resolutions

Not at all....prior to '65 India and Pakistan maintained a similar posture regarding the Kashmir issue.I am presuming that you haven't read the UNSC's statements on the Kashmir issue prior to the '65 war...
Kashmir in the United Nations

you'd notice that India was supposed to wait for Pakistan to demilitarize the pakistan controlled kashmiri areas and the northern areas to conduct the plebiscite.'WE' were supposed to conduct the plebiscite under the UN watch and with you as a contesting party....meaning we had to determine the conditions for a free and fair plebiscite.It was Pakistan that lost it's cool and thought that a rebellion would provide a faster solution or at least a turnover of the popular opinion in it's favor in the time of a plebiscite.

 

[third eye]

Zob;

ok i don't understand 1 thing someone takes over a piece of your land you think it is NOT WORTH DEFENDING currently you rather defend other areas.....and before the cease fire how did INDIA know it will infact get it back....??? doesn't make any logical sense...its like if the indians attack in sindh we say hey let them march on in sidh but we need to defend SIALKOT only!!! we will have areas in sindh back after the cease fire!!!

Gone are the days when internationally accepted borders can be altered by force. Saddam hung for what he started in Kuwait. Any real estate held by an adversary across an IB will have to be returned sooner or later. He may only hold on to it as a bargaining card - how long is debatable. Hope this answers the underlined part. Thats why PA tries to nibble at the LC & not the IB and the LC is held by regular troops & the IB by paramilitary - on both sides.

As rgds the rest , I cannot go into details beyond a point. Suffice to say these are tactical decisions that Generals are paid for to take ,of course they have to be in consonance with the national aims & policies and the situation as obtaining in their theater of war.

The USSR used their terrain wonderfully as a force multiplier when Hitler attacked in Op Barbarossa. They drew him in , stretching his logistics beyond break point, let the weather take over & decimated the attacker at their own time & place of choosing.

 

[Ratus Ratus]

What I was pointing out was that the Indian intent was ill conceived. As is obvious the south had more development and population, hence needed a degree of protection.
It also had the road and rail links to Pakistan.

But it still could not be protected enough from fast raiding parties from Pakistan as indicated in that History of India chapter I referenced. In essence a large force that was ineffective.

I would not use Laungewala in ‘71 as an example. It was tactically ill conceived from the start. History already dictates that such an operation should not be performed in the manner used by the PA, the best historic example being operation Market Garden WWII.

There are also enough NA WWII example of how it could be done and succeed.

Now with respect to this “If the attack on K Garh was a feint meant to divert troops from the south - it didn't work”. No I doubt it had anything to do with an attempt to divert Indian troops to the region. It was a pure land grab.

On a separate note I think the entry in Wikipedia for the Capture of Kishangarh Fort has some technical errors based on that Indian history. The main issue is that the Indian Forces seem to be allocated to an area south of this particular issue. This region appears to have been under the control of some other HQ.
One reason Wikipedia is not always the best source for information.

 

[Ratus Ratus]

The USSR used their terrain wonderfully as a force multiplier when Hitler attacked in Op Barbarossa. They drew him in , stretching his logistics beyond break point, let the weather take over & decimated the attacker at their own time & place of choosing.

Terrain is useful and yes in a simplified way it is used in WWII for Barbarossa. But There are better examples in NA and Italy, may be even the campaigns in Palestine or Syria of WWII.

 

[third eye]

What I was pointing out was that the Indian intent was ill conceived. As is obvious the south had more development and population, hence needed a degree of protection.
It also had the road and rail links to Pakistan.

But it still could not be protected enough from fast raiding parties from Pakistan as indicated in that History of India chapter I referenced. In essence a large force that was ineffective.

I would not use Laungewala in ‘71 as an example. It was tactically ill conceived from the start. History already dictates that such an operation should not be performed in the manner used by the PA, the best historic example being operation Market Garden WWII.


There are also enough NA WWII example of how it could be done and succeed.

Now with respect to this “If the attack on K Garh was a feint meant to divert troops from the south - it didn't work”. No I doubt it had anything to do with an attempt to divert Indian troops to the region. It was a pure land grab.

On a separate note I think the entry in Wikipedia for the Capture of Kishangarh Fort has some technical errors based on that Indian history. The main issue is that the Indian Forces seem to be allocated to an area south of this particular issue. This region appears to have been under the control of some other HQ.
One reason Wikipedia is not always the best source for information.

Could you send me a link to the entry in wikipedia ? Have not seen it myself.

Considering the troops available then, the deployment was sound & paid off. Simply coz PA could ( & did ) not proceed any further.

If it wasn't a feint then it can be attributed to aggressive defence all commanders are expected to show.Either way it did not alter anything on the Indian side.

 

[Renegade]

ok RENEGADE

listen carefully because i have answered this before!!! & thanks to ONE OF YOUR INDIAN FRIENDS who put the words in my mouth!! by explaining why india couldn't do better than a STALEMATE in 1965


his explaination was as follows

india was exhausted after fighting china just 3 years ago and depleted resources!!!


now if i use his example PAKISTAN fought a war in 65 and was under embargo throughout a 23 day war with a 6 times LARGER enemy......the only thing on our side was a 1 front war!!

now in 71 with depleted resources we were trying to suppress a civil uprising and INDIA intervened!!!

so now we faced a two front war and the resources were already thin.....& besides the enemy had the advantage of back stabbing us & calling it moral high ground!!


NOW PLEASE DON'T TRY TO MAKE PAKISTANIS GET INTO A GUILT TRIP HERE BY DISCUSSING 71....stick to 65

Kid experience has taught me not to waste my time debating with you - you seem to have a habit of contradicting yourself.

In this very thread you had claimed that Pakistan had no QUALITATIVE edge over India in 1965 and after my reply to that you accepted that Pakistan did have a QUALITATIVE edge but started the old rhetoric of Indian having a 6 times larger army and all that (in spite of knowing only too well that a large part of the Indian military was deployed on the Indo-Chinese border, so the so called QUANTITATIVE edge also did not exist).

My post was addressed to someone else, so please let him do the replying. I am gentleman in question does not need a lawyer and is very capable of putting forth his point.

 

[Kasrkin]

you forget to include a whole war in between the rann of kutchh episode and India accepting terms and getting 90% of the territory it contested diplomatically.

The point is that the commission was set up before the 65 war. Which is something you've already admitted and I'm tired of repeating it. It was claimed that Pakistan should've waited for Kashmir to be resolved the same way the Kutch process was going, this was BS. And the Kutch process was encouraged by a military clash which might’ve encouraged Pakistan along that course in Kashmir where India was increasingly in denial. Our superiority in Kutch gave us confidence in our ability to make the Indians malleable elsewhere.

Don't you agree that the success of the rann of kutch episode let him to believe that it can be repeated in kashmir?This is the whole point.It wasn't Paksitan that acted maturely and with noble reason...your whole idea was to get Kashmir and Rann of kutchh militarily.

And encourage or facilitate a mediated settlement after said victory was achieved, or the very least encourage India and the world along that path through military maneuvering.

The inquiry was set due to Brits intervening after a stale mate was reached and the Pakistani plans gone haywire

Actually, Pakistan was not on the offensive in Kutch. It was an Indian patrol that over came one of our garrisons and we were able to muster forces faster, counter attack and win the day through superior tactics. Yes, the British did intervene but India was agreeable to their intervention because of this, unlike Kashmir.

that is laughable Kasrkin...you've justified the Kashmir issue not being settled in more than 60 years with that one statement.

I was refering to the 65 war. The history of the Kashmir issue speaks for itself.

Not at all....prior to '65 India and Pakistan maintained a similar posture regarding the Kashmir issue.I am presuming that you haven't read the UNSC's statements on the Kashmir issue prior to the '65 war...

You would be presuming wrong. This issue of failure to demilitarize has already been addressed on this very thread. Go over those posts, or go over the Kashmir thread the link to which AM posted. This is a 65 War thread and I suggest we stop going around in circles.

A good insight into the origins of the war by Cloughley

The problem for Pakistan was that the Chinese victory was so complete that the rest of the (‘Free&#8217 World panicked almost as much as Nehru. It should been obvious that China had no intention of thundering south in India. But the world- especially America –saw ‘Red China’ on the move, and reacted accordingly. To the surprise and annoyance of Pakistan, it became apparent that Nehru’s former critics around the world, hitherto so supportive of Pakistan, the open and loyal ally of the West, could happily drop Pakistan like a hot brick if India- which had so scorned the West –were to be threatened. Britain, France, America rushed to provide weapons. Nehru begged for fighter aircraft and the US, artillery from the UK, tanks from France, for support from anywhere against the supposed invader from the north. Nehru’s abased himself, turned turtle, ditched his ‘non-aligned’ principles in his desperation. Then China turned off the tap. It declared a cease-fire on 20th November. India had been defeated and humiliated, yet it was to experience rebirth, militarily. The Western World continued to rally to its aid. Pakistan was to see a huge effort by its former supporters, helped, ironically, by the USSR, to supply India with an enormous arsenal.

As it turned out, little of his arsenal would be deployed against China, the threat from which it was intended by the donors. Most of these weapons were deployed against Punjab to the north, and not near the Kutch region which would explain our relatively easy victory.

 

[Ratus Ratus]

Could you send me a link to the entry in wikipedia ? Have not seen it myself.

Considering the troops available then, the deployment was sound & paid off. Simply coz PA could ( & did ) not proceed any further.

If it wasn't a feint then it can be attributed to aggressive defence all commanders are expected to show.Either way it did not alter anything on the Indian side.

Capture of Kishangarh Fort - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

With respect to the Indian force disposition this gives a reasonable indication. But it seems to imply only the southern region. Which this History document suggest was a separate command from the northern section of the Bugle.

Bharat Rakshak :: Land Forces Site - Official War History - 1965

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1965War/PDF/1965Chapter08.pdf

Chapter 8 has a map of the ares they are discussing, ie the southern sector/region.

 

[third eye]

What I was pointing out was that the Indian intent was ill conceived. As is obvious the south had more development and population, hence needed a degree of protection.
It also had the road and rail links to Pakistan.

But it still could not be protected enough from fast raiding parties from Pakistan as indicated in that History of India chapter I referenced. In essence a large force that was ineffective.

I would not use Laungewala in ‘71 as an example. It was tactically ill conceived from the start. History already dictates that such an operation should not be performed in the manner used by the PA, the best historic example being operation Market Garden WWII.

There are also enough NA WWII example of how it could be done and succeed.

Now with respect to this “If the attack on K Garh was a feint meant to divert troops from the south - it didn't work”. No I doubt it had anything to do with an attempt to divert Indian troops to the region. It was a pure land grab.

On a separate note I think the entry in Wikipedia for the Capture of Kishangarh Fort has some technical errors based on that Indian history. The main issue is that the Indian Forces seem to be allocated to an area south of this particular issue. This region appears to have been under the control of some other HQ.
One reason Wikipedia is not always the best source for information.

Capture of Kishangarh Fort - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

With respect to the Indian force disposition this gives a reasonable indication. But it seems to imply only the southern region. Which this History document suggest was a separate command from the northern section of the Bugle.

Bharat Rakshak :: Land Forces Site - Official War History - 1965

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1965War/PDF/1965Chapter08.pdf

Chapter 8 has a map of the ares they are discussing, ie the southern sector/region.

Yes this is sketchy, but the essence is pretty much the same. Operations in the desert was merely a side show left at the discretion of local commanders with meagre resources.

 

[chindit]

so was the shellling of Dwarka - which wasted several shells and killed one cow .

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

The shooting war in 71 started after the pre emptve strikes PAF 5 Indian airfields on 03 Dec.

Wonder if GOP was aware of the possiblilties brought out by Murad then ?

The Indian invasion was a forgone conclusion by that point, given the events in East Pakistan and Indian support for them.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Being in a rush to advice me to use my brain i think you forgot to use yours instead - look at post No:4 in this very thread where you friend claims that Pakistan had an edge over India in 65. To which my question was "How come this edge suddenly disappeared just 6 years later?" To which the poster in question blabbered something about Indians being cheats, bigots & the other usual rhetoric. He just ducked the question - there was never any answer to what edge Pakistan had????

I am still waiting for a reply to know what this so called edge was as claimed by your friend in post-4 of this thread.

Read Murad's post again - he answered your question.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

OK, Agno, I re-visited the UN resolutions starting from resolution VI of 13 August 1948 to the resolution 209 adopted on 4 September 1965. During this time period (13 August 1948-4 Sept. 1965) a total of 14 resolutions were adopted. And all of them keep referring back to the earlier resolutions while reminding both the parties of the principles contained in the UN resolutions of 17 January 1948, 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.

Resolution of 13 August 1948:

Part II A(2): The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavor to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.

Resolution of 5 January 1949:

2: A plebiscite will be held when it shall be found by the Commission that the cease-fire and truce arrangements set forth in Parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, have been carried out and arrangements for the plebiscite have been completed.

I will appreciate if you give me a reference in support of the argument you are making in the text I have underlined in your reply. Upon going through the reference you would provide me, I’ll see if I still hold to my understanding of “we lost the moral high ground”. It is an interesting scholarly debate and it should be continued in the present spirit.

RESOLUTION 98 (1952) ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 611TH MEETING ON 23 DECEMBER, 1952.​

Recalling its resolutions, 91 (1951) of 30 March 1951, its decision of 30 April 1951 and its resolution 96 (1951) of 10 November 1951,

...

4. Urges the Governments of India and Pakistan to enter into immediate negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan in order to reach agreement on the specific number of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, this number to be between 3,000 and 6,000 armed forces remaining on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and between 12,000 and 18,000 armed forces remaining on the India side of the cease-fire line, as suggested by the United Nations Representative in his proposals of 16 July 1952, such specific numbers to be arrived at bearing in mind the principles or criteria contained in paragraph 7 of the United Nations Representative's proposal of 4 September 1952;
http://www.kashmiri-cc.ca/un/sc23dec52.htm
---------------------------------

Resolution 98 refers to resolutions 91 and 96 - some important points from 91:

Resolution 98
...
Observing from Sir Owen Dixon's report that the main points of difference preventing agreement between the parties were:

1. The procedure for and the extent of demilitarization of the State preparatory to the holding of a plebiscite, and
2. The degree of control over the exercise of the functions of Government in the State necessary to ensure a free and fair plebiscite,

1. Accepts, in compliance with his request, Sir Owen Dixon's resignation and expresses its gratitude to Sir Owen for the great ability and devotion with which he carried out his mission;

2. Decides to appoint a United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan in succession to Sir Owen Dixon;

3. Instructs the United Nations Representative to proceed to the sub-continent and, after consultation with the Governments of India and Pakistan, to effect the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August, 1948, and, 5 January, 1949;

------------------------------------------------

What this shows is that Pakistan managed to argue its case and move from a situation where it was being asked for a unilateral withdrawal, that would leave the entire territory and the resolution of the dispute in the hands of the Indians (given the non-enforceable nature of the resolutions), to a situation where both countries would maintain some minimum force levels in territories under their control.

I'll maintain my previous point - all this was accomplished through negotiations and compromise in the UN. Pakistan remained actively involved in attempting to find a means of resolution to the issue that did not compromise her position.

 

[Zob]

so was the shellling of Dwarka - which wasted several shells and killed one cow .

yes we killed a cow & the indians got so scared that there navy never ventured out into the OPEN SEAS again!!!! please don't spoil the thread buddy!!! let's keep it intellectual!!!

 

[Zob]

@ RATUS

now if i take your word that this was just a land grabbing excersie by the pakistani platoon...why didn't this platoon go further in...obviously we are assuming that the indians were more focused in the south & didn't really care much about this certain area!!

now either the pakistanis were scared that this was indeed a trap like operation BARBAROSA...

but i don't understand one thing why wasn't there any sort of effort of a counter attack even by a smaller party of indian troops....why didn't the locals pick up arms against after all a few tribesmen!!!

nobody is saying india should have sent in armored divisions to the area but send in a probing party atleast......