1965 War - The complete story

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

In fact one of the reason of India's blatant disregard for its previous commitments and a unilateral annexation of the territory as part of India was because Pakistan failed to comply with the UN resolution of August 13, 1948.

Part II A(2): The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.

Part II A(3): Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the commission.

Now in the light of the above, we really don’t hold high moral grounds.

RoadRunner IMO did a good job of addressing that issue, and what caused the breakdown of the implementation of the UNSC resolutions, in this thread:

http://www.defence.pk/forums/strate...es/7904-kashmir-resolutions-explanations.html

I believe even the UN special rapporteur primarily criticized the Indian attitude for the breakdown in implementation. In addition, the thread also lists some quotes of Nehru (from and Indian site) that clearly indicate that Nehru had no intention of implementing the UNSC resolutions as early as the fifties. As such, that sheds light on the Indian motivations behind the failure of the negotiations over the UN resolutions, and why the Pakistani leadership started to believe that trying 'alternate means' of dispute resolution was the only way to address the issue.

 

[qsaark]

Stop being so touchy and confrontational, I like to think we are beyond that.

Point well received.

Well I didn't presume that you feel Pakistan lost just because you failed to say Pakistan won. I was simply reacting to your posts and if you tell me right now that you feel Pakistan did indeed not lose then I believe you.

Yes, militarily Pakistan did not lose until the ceasefire even though the major objective of capturing Kashmir was not achieved. In fact they were Indians who were apparently more interested in a ceasefire than the Pakistan. Whether it was because of ever increasing Chinese pressure or because of their failed assessment of our rapidly depleting ammunition and oil reserve.

 

[rubyjackass]

The political causes behind Bengali estrangement are irrelevant to my point. My point is that Indian support for insurgents and therefore Indian support for the destabilization of Pakistan occurred before any refugee crises.

If India had no interest in breaking apart Pakistan, why would it support the insurgents and separatists? Destabilizing EP before the refugee crises clearly debunks the argument that Indian intervention was some sort of last resort - the goal was always to damage Pakistan through destabilizing EP, and the argument of 'India took the moral ground' is nothing but a bed time story fed to brainwash Indian minds.

All out Indian support was indeed last resort option given the carnage that was goign on.

That one liner is not an appropriate response to some detailed arguments made by kasrkin and I indicating that the Pakistani political leadership

The one liner is comprehensive enough for the definition we are using , defined by qsaark.

a. Very reluctantly authorize the PA to go into Kashmir, after the repercussions of India occupying all of J&K and linking up with the NWFP were clarified.

b. Refused to authorize offensive operations and primarily ordered holding operations to prevent any further Indian territorial gain while the dispute was addressed in the UN.

a is solely Pakistan's problem.
UN was never in the picture until India brought it, so b is meaningless.

Furthermore, it was in response to Qsaark's post that India achieved its objectives in 1965, while Pakistan did not, and if achievement of objectives is to be the standard for 'victory', then 1948 by that standard was a 'victory' for Pakistan.

Now if all the talk about 'victory' pipes down, I have no interest in pursuing this line of discussion - it was merely in response to Qssark's post, which he appears to have subsequently clarified.

Its just a definition I am working under. As Karskin said you may have your own definition but dont invent something thats not there to claim you win under the same definition.
I too have no interest in asserting Indian victory. I am nowhre close to sensitive.

About UNSC resolutions, need I say that it was a diplomatic stunt? When is Pakistan going to give up control of the part it occupied and when will the other parts of articles come into force? The pre-cursor should be the withdrawal of Pakistan's forces which never happened and may never will.

One more thing I need not convince YOU of all people that India has the moral high ground. The world knows it.

 

[Ratus Ratus]

ok ratus between all the jumble up of 65 that usually leads to either a discussion by the indians into GUILT TRIPPING PAKISTANIS into discussing 71 or 48 let us continue with something more relevant to 65 & interesting!!

now at kishangarh fort supposedly the indians had the following concentration of troops....

Maratha Regiment
Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC)
30 Indian Infantry
3 Guards (a mixed unit)
1 Garhwal
4 Maratha Light Inf.: 85 Indian Inf. Bde
17 madras
13 Grenadiers (a mixed unit - Camel borne)


vs a PAKISTANI assault party of

51 Infantry Brigade(2 Infantry battalions)
Hurs
West Pakistan Rangers


now from the looks of it...and i may say i am not an ARMY man the PAKISTANIS were out numbered and were mostly using irregular HUR tribesmen to fight off a proper well trained indian army....of grenadiers & infantry men.

the question then arises what type of patrol setup indians had....and were the indians in a defensive posture or were planning an attack of their own......

if the indians were defensive then overcoming an enemy that has fortified positions & can repulse attacks is & will be harder than fighting off an enemy that is gearing up to attack and you catch them by surprise....


defending a fort in between a pass well should be easier because the enemy( pakistan in this case) has a narrow corridor to throw in its troops.....

ratus will be glad if you can just express your opinon on this issue you being well versed in the army tactics maneuvers & point defense planning....

Zob:
IN terms of the deployable forces what you list is in fact the total deployable forces for the complete region. It is not limited to this specific battle.

Note in the Wikipedia page these are listed under "Sindh-Rajasthan Operations". hence the Indian forces were spread as was the Pakistan forces.

@third eye:
One problem I have come across is lack of detail and also any easy reference. hence this discussion.
The Wikipedia page only lists ONE reference/source and that makes it thin. This is "History of Indo-Pak War of 1965. Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed (ret).".
The web ref is:
Capture of Kishangarh Fort - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

My arguments is that either this position was only held by a few and they resisted well or it was held by large number and they collapsed quickly.
The other point is that the general description of the 'forts' location is somewhat skewed to reality, ref past post #81, as well as not being able to locate a place called "Mandha".

One thing that appears to be missing and that is the details of this small battle, besides more detail on the complete area.

This is the 'best' that I have found:
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1965War/PDF/1965Chapter08.pdf

 

[qsaark]

RoadRunner IMO did a good job of addressing that issue, and what caused the breakdown of the implementation of the UNSC resolutions, in this thread:

http://www.defence.pk/forums/strate...es/7904-kashmir-resolutions-explanations.html

I believe even the UN special rapporteur primarily criticized the Indian attitude for the breakdown in implementation. In addition, the thread also lists some quotes of Nehru (from and Indian site) that clearly indicate that Nehru had no intention of implementing the UNSC resolutions as early as the fifties. As such, that sheds light on the Indian motivations behind the failure of the negotiations over the UN resolutions, and why the Pakistani leadership started to believe that trying 'alternate means' of dispute resolution was the only way to address the issue.

You are right but the option of trying ‘alternate means’ was not on the tables in the fall of 1948. The real problem was the lack of confidence on both the sides. Pakistan was required to remove its regular troops and lashkaris from the Pakistani-occupied Kashmir (at the time of the resolution, now it is Pakistani-administered) in 1948 as per the resolution but it failed to comply. The point I am trying to make here is, we had the choice, to take Kashmir by force or by peaceful means through UN intervention. However, we did not follow either path properly and lost international support in the process. Political leadership is often blamed for not showing full commitment to a military solution of Kashmir in 1948 which in turn also lead to a failed but first ever attempted coup in Pakistan in 1951. However, it was probably a combination of economical situation of Pakistan that could not sustain a prolonged war in Kashmir and the dubious role of the top Pakistani commanders who were all British. Several authors have written on the shady role of Douglas Gracey, the first C-in-C of PA, who was working in the interest of British more than in the interest of Pakistan. It is not a secret that General Bucher (than C-in-C Indian Army) was a close friend of General Gracey and General McKay (Chief of Staff of PA). It is interesting that even the Indians did not trust their British C-in-C and kept him out of the loop during several occasions.

 

[third eye]

RR,

Kishangarh is a mud fort of not tactical significance in '65.

I know for a fact that the region was held only by the RAC, thats why I was curious onthe deployment mentioned.

 

[abdulrafi]

** history is a lie that historians lie to suit themselves **

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

All out Indian support was indeed last resort option given the carnage that was goign on.

All out Indian support (military invasion) came about after support for the insurgents and separatists had continued for years. The Indian objective was always to destabilize East Pakistan, the Military intervention was merely the culmination of the strategy.

The one liner is comprehensive enough for the definition we are using , defined by qsaark.

If the definition is that in 1948 and 1965 both countries attempted to control Kashmir and both failed, then yes, the one liner is sufficent. But if the intention is to start arguing over specific objectives, then the argument that in 1948 Pakistan was not looking to militarily take over all of j&K, and did not authorize offensive operations to accomplish that objective, come into play.

About UNSC resolutions, need I say that it was a diplomatic stunt? When is Pakistan going to give up control of the part it occupied and when will the other parts of articles come into force? The pre-cursor should be the withdrawal of Pakistan's forces which never happened and may never will.

Please see my response to Qsaark on the UNSC resolutions.

One more thing I need not convince YOU of all people that India has the moral high ground. The world knows it.

The world believes what it wishes in the pursuit of serving its interests - but digging into history illustrates that India did not have the moral high ground either in implementing the UNSC resolutions or in its intervention in East Pakistan - the quotes of Nehru, the UN rapporteur and Manekshaw clearly establish that.

 

[rubyjackass]

I personally think India's position on Kashmir is indeed not good for people at large. I am for wider consensus on the issue and more freedom nad self-determination to people. A lot of nationalism is attached by both sides especially Indian to the issue. I am not of that breed.


My point was only that India maintained a moral high ground in the eyes of the world. I never said whatever India did is good. But India was careful enough to make it seem good. Although it suffered miserably after 1990.

1971 is a whole different story. Here I genuinely believe India should have acted on humanitarian grounds. The violation of IB was there but it server a greater purpose, freedom and peace for people.

There is a lot of difference between being good and seemingly good.

Thanks,
Ruby

 

[Ratus Ratus]

RR,

Kishangarh is a mud fort of not tactical significance in '65.

I know for a fact that the region was held only by the RAC, thats why I was curious onthe deployment mentioned.

I knew that re the fort.
As a structure it has no significence but it referes to the location.

I was looking more at the specific details of this and the rest of the fighting within that region.

 

[fatman17]

the best book to read for a critique of the 65 war is Crossed Swords by Shuja Nawaz (pakistani) but a very candid, open and un-biased narration of the war!

 

[Ratus Ratus]

the best book to read for a critique of the 65 war is Crossed Swords by Shuja Nawaz (pakistani) but a very candid, open and un-biased narration of the war!

At least I can get it from Amazon.com

 

[Zob]

WITH ALL DUE respect to PAKISTANI members & MODs please don't be led into a guilt trip on 71 or discussing 48.....indians prefer to avoid 65 and discuss other issues!!

to all indians YOU HELD A MORAL HIGH GROUND!!! YES THE WORLD SAW INDIAN MORAL HIGH GROUND IN 1984 AS WELL!!

 

[abdulrafi]

Take A Moment Out To Observe An Indian Defeat 1965 War

Monday, 08 September 2008 02:15

An American Radio Service Journalist Rai Milan writes in his war diary: “I want to bring it on record that India is claiming victory but on ground there is no evidence to support Indian claims. What I see is only destroyed Indian tanks and huge logistic support units rolling towards their forward area. During my long journalistic career spanning over two decades, I have never seen a group of such confident individuals as the victorious Pakistani soldiers fighting against Indians.”

“In the Jammu-Sialkot Sector, the Indian Army massed the largest chunk of its might, i.e. 1 Corps consisting of one Armoured Division (one Armoured Brigade and one Lorried Brigade), two Infantry Divisions and one Mountain Division. However, 1 Corps did not achieve proportionate results. Here again, bad generalship at the Corps and the Divisional levels, and lack of cooperation among the formations, were responsible for their poor showing.”

The above quotes are from chapter 12 of the Indian Official History of 1965 war.

The Indian official History is full of such observations about the inefficiency of their military leadership during 1965 which ultimately led them to defeat.

On the morning of 6th September when the Indians crossed into Pakistani territory in the Burki Sector, the higher ups had assured their under-command that they would have their lunch in Lahore. But in the next few days the Indian Army was to learn that a nation’s spirit could never be taken lightly.

An American Radio Service Journalist Rai Milan writes in his war diary:

“I want to bring it on record that India is claiming victory but on ground there is no evidence to support Indian claims. What I see is only destroyed Indian tanks and huge logistic support units rolling towards their forward area. During my long journalistic career spanning over two decades, I have never seen a group of such confident individuals as the victorious Pakistani soldiers fighting against Indians.”

In the Wikipedia (the online encyclopedia), while analyzing the war of 1965 it is written that invasion the Indian army’s invasion of Pakistan was a strategic blunder. Indian Army failed to analyze the real potential of Pakistan Army. This resulted in the invasion’s defeat. The official History of the 1965 War drafted by the Indian Ministry in 1992 was a long suppressed document that outlined intelligence and strategic blunders by India during the war. According to the document, on September 22, when the Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister asked his army chief General Chaudhri if India could possibly win the war were he to delay accepting the ceasefire for a little while longer. The General replied that most of India’s frontline ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered tank losses.

It was revealed later that only 14% of India’s frontline ammunition had been fired and India still held twice the number of tanks than Pakistan. By this time the Pakistan Army had used up to 80% of its ammunition. India’s Air Chief Marshal (Retired) P.C. Lal, who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the conflict, points to the lack of coordination between the Indian air force, the IAF, and the Indian Army. Neither side revealed its battle plans to the other. The battle plans drafted by India’s Ministry of Defense and General Chaudhri did not specify a role for the Indian Air Force in the order of battle.

There are hundreds of other blunders by the Indian Intelligence and their field commanders.

Pakistan Army, with the backing of the entire nation, stood like a wall against Indian onslaught on all fronts. On the Sialkot front, one Indian Infantry, one Armoured Division and an Armoured Brigade were repulsed by an Infantry Division. At just one sector, the Chawida-Philora sector, fifteen consecutive Indian attacks were repulsed.

The Indians had to face the biggest of humiliations on the Lahore front, where their thirteen consecutive attacks were repulsed. At Kasur, Pakistani forces not only repulsed many Indian attacks but went deep into India and captured a substantial chunk of their territory.

The spirited Pakistanis faced boldly the Indian might and defeated them on all fronts. The examples of extreme valor and courage shown during the 1965 war by the Pakistani nation and soldiers can be listed among the best in the military history of modern warfare.

Despite numerical superiority, the Indians were humiliated on all fronts in sea, air and ground. The war that India foisted on Pakistan on September 6, 1965, was the product of several years of constant and deliberate planning in New Delhi.

The underlying Indian philosophy behind this aggressive attack on a smaller neighbor Pakistan was to take revenge for the division of India in 1947 and the endeavor to reverse the freedom and independence of the Muslims of Pakistan.

The war that continued with full resolve and determination in the ranks and file of Pakistani armed forces proved once and for ever, that the valiant Pakistani soldiers backed by a resolute nation were not to be cowed by Indian threats and intimidations.

Pakistanis need to take a moment out today and think about their ability to achieve the impossible if they put their minds to it. The changing global environment and challenges faced by us today demand the same unity, faith, discipline and determination that the nation displayed forty-one year ago during the 1965 war. After the October 8t, 2005, earthquake, the nation once again proved that whether it is a natural calamity or a foreign aggression, the Pakistani nation is ready to face all challenges with fortitude and courage. It was heartening to see when every individual of this nation came out to help their brethren in distress and pain in Azad Kashmir and NWFP who were affected due to earthquake. Long live Pakistan

 

[third eye]

I knew that re the fort.
As a structure it has no significence but it referes to the location.

I was looking more at the specific details of this and the rest of the fighting within that region.

As far as the location is concerned tactically K' Garh held no significance in '65. The fact that the RAC held it indicates the importance given to that axis.

I do recall reading of this fort shall try & locate some information & post.

Meanwhile , all the troops mentioned as deployed at K Garh in previous posts were in fact deployed way to its south in Barmer.