1965 War - The complete story

[paritosh]

@Ratus Ratus
mate this particular thread is a tricky one...for no one's sure what really happened in 1965.the tricky part is that while the western neutral observers consider '65 to be a stalemate....both India and Pakistan have some annual celebrations with regard to their 'victory' of '65...so it's really bogged out.
Hence you cant have an easy and straight discussion as far as '65 is concerned

 

[Ratus Ratus]

@Ratus Ratus
mate this particular thread is a tricky one...for no one's sure what really happened in 1965.the tricky part is that while the western neutral observers consider '65 to be a stalemate....both India and Pakistan have some annual celebrations with regard to their 'victory' of '65...so it's really bogged out.
Hence you cant have an easy and straight discussion as far as '65 is concerned

Bluntly, you don’t need a victory to discuss the topic.

It is quite easy to discuss the collapse and capitulation of Belgium to Germany in WWII, with out a flame output equivalent of 50 volcanoes similar to the rubbish that appears here in this forum.

So why can’t this be discussed?
This is a public forum and all anyone from outside will see is a bunch of kids behaving as if they are in a cat fight.

I understand you point but I don't see why I have to excuse the numnuts at all.

 

[Ratus Ratus]

Well lest start with minor issues such as these:

• The capture of the Kishangarh Fort
  [*]The Battle of Asal Uttar
  [*]The Battle of Ichogil Bund
  [*]The Battle of Chawinda
  [*]Battle of Chamb and Dogra
  
  • -Battle of Chamb
  • -Battle of Dogra
  (I split this as I suspet each has slightly different issues.)

Not a definitive lot with respect to the whole 65 conflict/war.
Each has strategic and tactical issue that can be discussed with out the pathetic flame/sniping about totally useless points of nothing.

The whole 65 conflict/war was full of wins and losses, so why can’t it be discussed rationally without people trying to flame the discussion.



Now with out the flame and other indication of crass cases of indications of intellect loss how about starting with something rather minor but has some interesting aspects.

Kishangarh Fort, Capture of.

This is a small side show from what I can gather but it holds some interesting tactical issues.

Considering the attacking force and its composition how come they were not detected by the fort’s defenders?

Anyone care to discuss this or any of above battles?

 

[Zob]

@RATUS

KISHANGARH fort....well its simple militia attacked it....local HURs don't wear uniforms as well as they had the element of surprise on their side the indians didn't expect them to come out & attack the might of the indian military.....so just like DWARKA & PATHANKOT....element of surprise was used effectively & efficiently!!

 

[Zob]

well if junk makes up your quantity you are at a loss...and if that junk is in your airforce and you are at war...you can expect a perfect ball-busting.Gnats...Vampires...mystere...were all out-dated...weren't they?
this debate of quality v/s quantitiy is futile..if we do not consider the man flying the machine...if the man is well trained and well suited to fly his machine even a gnat can slay a saber...or an Alam can show what the saber can really do.My point was that...many paksitanis claim that the PAf had NO quantitative edge in '65...while I totally agree to the 'edge' being there...but when all things are kept constant...quality scores over quantity for an airforce...as happened in '65.
...and was the IAF really five times the PAF as you claim..?I doubt that...i need a link to quench my curiosity.

well to answer this rant i have one of your sources to quote!!

The U.S.-backed UN initiatives hardly had time to mature before India sent its own troops over the international border toward Lahore on the 6th.

As much of Pakistan's military hardware was of American origin, the embargo had a much heavier impact on Pakistan and probably contributed to the Pakistani calculation that its forces could not sustain the fighting much beyond mid-September absent U.S. spares and ammunition. The U.S. decision thus had the dissuasive effect of helping to curtail the conflict by promoting Pakistani acceptance of the UN-sponsored cease-fire.

so yes QUALITITIVE EDGE...was stolen from us no surprise there by the USA...(funny how we sicne then till today end up trusting them but that is besides the point here)!!!

so you call your equipment junk...i am sorry we didn't give you time to buy good equipment....but its your money you made your choices....besides who said your equipment was junk...THE MEDIA....well the media always thought back then anything non american was junk!!!

I donot understand what you mean by the "opening of the international border by us".We did not initiate the war.As far as the years are concerned...It's more to do with being ready and prepared.The IAF had a complete change in it's policy post '65...we stopped compromising on quality.We got heavily involved with the Soviets(after realizing that the americans have already chosen to side with you)
the mig-21 was a much more comfortable plane to handle in '71 and we had the numbers too...and the PAf was at a loss handling almost the same aircrafts it did 5 years back against a 'changed' IAF.so it is about the preparation....in '65 PAF got the a/cs to suit it's aggressor role...but did not follow up in '71 when it couldn't see the war coming...while the IAf got a major face-lift and got Su-7s and mig-21s.

as for opening the international border you crossed the border we crossed the LOC into kashmir....so yes disputed territory not demarcated as YOURS or OURS...so actually you do become the agressor in that case....you cross the international border you start the war....everything that happens in KASHMIR stays in kashmir....example india entering SIACHEN us entering KARGIL...


as for mig21 being a good plane and a tested plane by 71....well i think you put words in my mouth in your previous post hey we fought a larger enemy for 23 days and our stocks never got topped up since the war and a war in 5 years you can't expect us to fight as well as the last time around...(you said something on similar lines in your post about 1962 india china war & the indian army being tired by 1965)

the reason why I am calling it a defensive move is because the PN did not venture upto Bombay which was our western naval base to launch an offensive with the leverage of having destroyed a radar station in Dwarka.The PN's attack of Dwarka was a containment ploy...andhenece defensive.The offensive would be to launch an attack on the IN ships or the naval base( I am not undermining the effectiveness of the PN in '65..just letting you know why I think of it as being defensive)

well bombing DAWRKA did give us complete superiority of the high seas.....so ok defensive or aggressive objectives were achieved....just like if pearl harbor had worked out well the japanese would have ruled the seas.....or like i said after sinking of the BISMARCK was a turning point...from then on the GERMAN navy never ventured out of port....so yes defensive or offensive as long as you attain superiority of the area i think your main objective has been achieved!!


ok as for the PATHANKOT breaking your back well ....we atleast got the equation stacked in our favour...and yes destroying the MIG21s on the ground is a success my friend......we never let the migs get airborne....we destroyed 22 planes on the ground...that is more than a squadron... our aim was never to make the airfield nonoperational....if that was the aim we would have sent bombers not FIGHTERS such as f86s....so yes our aim was to destroy your fighters not the airfield...so you kept flying but not in a way that you would have liked to!!!

 

[Ratus Ratus]

OK besides all the simplistic stuff about this little conflict.

Lest start with some of the basics for discussion.
Now many sites make the following comment about the forts location:
It is an important and historic structure. It sits on a crossroad, between the towns of Tanot, Ramgarh and Mandha. It also sits on the only road linking any part of Rajasthan with the Pakistani city of Rahim Yar Khan, making it a highly strategic location.

Actually they all seem to copy each other.
According to my determination and good old Google Earth I get the following villages/towns/cities at these locations.
Tanot – 27°47'43.35"N, 70°21'20.61"E

Ramgrah – 27°22'14.26"N, 70°29'53.02"E

Rahim Yar Khan – 28°25'23.26"N, 70°18'1.24"E

Kishangarh Fort – 27°52'13.86"N, 70°33'47.97"E

One thing I seem to miss is the location of Mandha.
Though it may not be important it relates to the laocation of the fort. First this is stated as sitting on the cross roads of Tanot, Ramgarh and Mandha. Now I see that Tanot and Ramgarh are linked by a reasonable road, but the location of the fort, using above coordinates, places it outside this implied road link. To be precise it is an extension of that road.
Further the fort is by the description at a cross roads. This does not appear in Google earth. Not even a faint hair line.
So first where is Mandha?

Now assuming the location above is correct for the fort, considering its size, how many troops were stationed there?
What type of troops. The Indians appear to have had a few more trained pers that the Pakistani forces in this region.

Now considering the terrain what was the Indian defence like or was it just a collection around the fort with no SOPs re early warning patrols?


So from a tactical point of view even this simplistic battle has many questions that some should be able to answer.
If you discuss history this is what it is about. Details.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Nothing more I can say. Reread my post and count. Nobody but Pakistan complains that India intervened then. So basically everyone thinks there is enough justification. Your argument is simply a weak version of 'India cut Pakistan into two theory'.


India did not start Bengali unrest. India did not massacre Bengalis. But was effected with 8-10 mil refugees. India and US did contemplate all possible circumstances. Even those that would try to save the then Pakistan. refugees are not a consequence of indian involvement if any. The humanitarian grounds more than justify the operation.

I am interested to read. Please give links to sources abt comments from Manekshaw.

I have given you the sources before (they are posted in this forum), since I have had this exact discussion with you before. You obviously have no interest in actually reading them.

Whether anybody complains or not does not change the fact that India intervened in East Pakistan before the refugee crises, and therefore the refugee crises cannot be used as justification.

Only the jingoists living in la la land, who wish to somehow maintain this myth of Indian 'moral superiority' over Pakistan in terms of the dirty covert games the two countries played, continue to cling to the fairy tale that India was sitting around doing nothing until the flood of refugees poured into India.

P.S: Just read Ratus Ratus's posts - so this discussion can be continued on the East Pakistan threads, which if you bother to read through them, have the sources posted already.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

We have to look at the main objectives.

Pakistan's objective: To capture Kashmir
Result: Objective was not achieved.

India's objective: To open up more than one fronts along the international borders to relieve pressure from the Kashmir front.
Result: Objective achieved.

Out of curiosity, does that logic then imply that we won the 1948 war, since India's objective was to claim all of J&K, and going by the accounts in Shuja Nawaz's book about the political leadership's directions to the Pakistan Army, our objective was to fight defensively and prevent the Indians from taking over all of J&K, and obtain a link to the NWFP (since that would allow the hostile Afghan government and India to act in concert)?

 

[Zob]

@Ratus

you have really got me curious here my friend....

where is MANDHA... i guess an indian would be able to tell us exactly...

well as for the size of the fort well again i guess an indian would be able to tell us the exact size...but i read up somewhere that it was a BIRD watchers paradise...with its unobstructed view.

as for the number of men stationed inside the fort on the day of the attack...again there is a silence from both sides on the issue....pakistan doesn't claim to have bleed all the indians in india to death and make this fort into what VERDUN was for the FRENCH....

on the contrary the indians don't claim that this fort was undefended and had no strategic importance to them!!


why the silence from both the sides....why are both sides downplaying it.....

 

[Ratus Ratus]

@Ratus

you have really got me curious here my friend....

where is MANDHA... i guess an indian would be able to tell us exactly...

well as for the size of the fort well again i guess an indian would be able to tell us the exact size...but i read up somewhere that it was a BIRD watchers paradise...with its unobstructed view.

as for the number of men stationed inside the fort on the day of the attack...again there is a silence from both sides on the issue....pakistan doesn't claim to have bleed all the indians in india to death and make this fort into what VERDUN was for the FRENCH....

on the contrary the indians don't claim that this fort was undefended and had no strategic importance to them!!


why the silence from both the sides....why are both sides downplaying it.....

Yes it has some interesting issue from a military perspective.

I suspect the Google Earth coordinates I gave are correct as the fort shadow on the ground relates to this picture:

Protector Needs Protection... Kishangarh Fort on Flickr - Photo Sharing!

Now from a terrain perspective the fort is actually in a break in the ridge lines, sort of pass, hence the road at that point.
This also comes back to what type of patrols did the Indians have if any. because not to have forward patrols would mean the enemy could get close without detection.

Also if a battalion size was in place there with its support weapons how were they dispersed if at all. In many ways this should have lasted longer than 2 days.
Details lead to questions and possibly incompetence of a commander.

Now throw in the fact that the Pakistan 'Desert Force' was made up of Pakistani military and para-military forces, which included the Hurs, and they had already been conducting raids and captured/attacked villages, leaves many questions why this place fell so easily.
next issue being Indian relief or counter attack if any attempted. Something I doubt happened.

 

[Ratus Ratus]

P.S: Just read Ratus Ratus's posts - so this discussion can be continued on the East Pakistan threads, which if you bother to read through them, have the sources posted already.[/B]

Thanks.

Since much of the previous posts relate to '71 or some other issue it seems they cloud the '65 concepts of the original post.

 

[qsaark]

Out of curiosity, does that logic then imply that we won the 1948 war, since India's objective was to claim all of J&K, and going by the accounts in Shuja Nawaz's book about the political leadership's directions to the Pakistan Army, our objective was to fight defensively and prevent the Indians from taking over all of J&K, and obtain a link to the NWFP (since that would allow the hostile Afghan government and India to act in concert)?

No because our objective was to claim the entire J&K and most importantly Srinagar and so was of Indians. We captured only a part of Kashmir and most was retained by the Indians.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

No because our objective was to claim the entire J&K and so was of Indians. We captured only a part of Kashmir and most was retained by the Indians.

That does not quite gel with the instructions the political leadership at the time were issuing to the PA, per Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords.

He mentions that it took the British CiC to point out the threat of allowing the Indians to claim all of J&K and obtain a direct link with the NWFP, that finally convinced the political leadership to give the go ahead for the PA to act overtly.

He also points out how the orders were to fight defensively and hold positions, with some significant offensive assaults that the PA wanted to conduct not approved or postponed (while the UN negotiations played out).

His accounts of the political decision making indicates that the Pakistani leadership had faith in the UN to approve a means of resolution.

 

[qsaark]

Agno, what exactly is the point you are making here? I am not really understanding.

 

[Kasrkin]

Agno, what exactly is the point you are making here? I am not really understanding.

That the conditioning you've applied to notions of 'victory' and 'defeat' is selective and possibly biased. The Pakistani Army was ordered to avoid heavy confrontation with the Indian Army and this has been well documented in Shuja Nawaz’s well publicized and widely available book. So out of curiousity, would your extremely particular standards apply to that war as well?

BTW the Indians invaded Pakistani territory not only to ‘open up a new front’ (which they achieved, duh!) but to batter the Pakistan Army into submission and cease vital territory including Lahore. They failed in this and a ceasefire was declared with both sides holding territory belonging to the other. Now contrast this with the crushing defeat of the Arabs when Israel took whatever land it wanted in 1967 and kept it. Ask yourself if you’re being a bit biased when so readily proclaiming defeat for us based on these very particular standards (straight from an Indian propaganda book); standards which you also don’t seem to bother applying to other wars.

The whole notion that Pakistan lost and India won because Occupied Kashmir is still under Indian control is based on the notion that it was Pakistan on the offensive. But relatively speaking it was the Indians who used up more manpower, equipment and resources in their offensive operations and all of Pakistan’s offenses (other than the initial Op Grand Slam in Disputed Territory) were preemptive and flanking in nature. So the logic that retain-ment of the status quo automatically means success for India is flawed. The Indian propagandists have just had more success convincing Pakistani minds about ‘their victory’ through a very narrow and flawed perspective; focused and coherent counter-propaganda has always been our weak point ofcourse.