1965 War - The complete story
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qsaark
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We have to look at the main objectives.
Pakistan's objective: To capture Kashmir
Result: Objective was not achieved.
India's objective: To open up more than one fronts along the international borders to relieve pressure from the Kashmir front.
Result: Objective achieved.
Now whether Indians failed to capture Lahore is irrelevant, that was never a major objective.
I am copying a letter from General Akhtar H Malik to his younger brother, Lieutenant General Abdul Ali Malik while he (AHM) was stationed in Turkey. This should clear up what was the situation and how military personnel thought. Please read paragraph g. very carefully. It is also interesitng to note that AHM got killed in a road accident in Turkey.
Pakistan’s Permanent Military Deputy
Embassy of Pakistan
Ankara
23-11-67
My Dear brother,
I hope you and the family are very well. Thank you for your letter of 14 Oct. 67. The answers to your questions are as follows:
a. The de facto command changed the very first day of the ops [operations] after the fall of Chamb when Azmat Hayat broke off wireless communications with me. I personally tried to find his HQ [headquarters] by chopper and failed. In late afternoon I sent Gulzar and Vahid, my MP [military police] officers, to try and locate him, but they too failed. The next day I tore into him and he sheepishly and nervously informed me that he was ‘Yahya’s brigadier’. I had no doubt left that Yahya had reached him the previous day and instructed him not to take further orders from me, while the formal change in command had yet to take place. This was a betrayal of many dimensions.
b. I reasoned and then pleaded with Yahya that if it was credit he was looking for, he should take the overall command but let me go up to Akhnur as his subordinate, but he refused. He went a step further and even changed the plan. He kept banging his head against Troti, letting the Indian fall back to Akhnur. We lost the initiative on the very first day of the war and never recovered it. Eventually it was the desperate stand at Chawinda that prevented the Indians from cutting through.
c. At no time was I assigned any reason for being removed from command by Ayub, Musa or Yahya. They were all sheepish at best. I think the reasons will be given when I am no more.
d. Not informing pro-Pak Kashmiri elements before launching Gibraltar was a command decision and it was mine. The aim of the op was to de freeze the Kashmir issue, raise it from its moribund state, and bring it to the notice of the world. To achieve this aim the first phase of the op was vital, that is, to effect undetected infiltration of thousands across the CFL [cease-fire line]. I was not willing to compromise this in any event. And the whole op could be made stillborn by just one double agent.
e. Haji Pir [Pass] did not cause me much anxiety. Because [the] impending Grand Slam Indian concentration in Haji Pir could only help us after Akhnur, and they would have to pull out troops from there to counter the new threats and surrender their gains, and maybe more, in the process. Actually it was only after the fall of Akhnur that we would have encashed the full value of Gibraltar, but that was not to be!
f. Bhutto kept insisting that his sources had assured him that India would not attack if we did not violate the international border. I however was certain that Gibraltar would lead to war and told GHQ so. I needed no op intelligence to come to this conclusion. It was simple common sense. If I got you by the throat, it would be silly for me to expect that you will kiss me for it. Because I was certain that war would follow, my first choice as objective for Grand Slam was Jammu. From there we could have exploited our success either toward Samba or Kashmir proper as the situation demanded. In any case whether it was Jammu or Akhnur, if we had taken the objective, I do not see how the Indians could have attacked Sialkot before clearing out either of these towns.
g. I have given serious consideration to writing a book, but given up the idea. The book would be the truth. And truth and the popular reaction to it would be good for my ego. But in the long run it would be an unpatriotic act. It will destroy the morale of the army, lower its prestige among the people, be banned in Pakistan, and become a textbook for the Indians. I have little doubt that the Indians will never forgive us the slight of 65 and will avenge it at the first opportunity. I am certain they will hit us in E. Pak [East Pakistan] and we will need all we have to save the situation. The first day of Grand Slam will be fateful in many ways. The worst has still to come and we have to prepare for it. The book is therefore out.
I hope this gives you the gist of what you needed to know. And yes, Ayub was fully involved in the enterprise. As a matter of fact it was his idea. And it was he who ordered me to by-pass Musa while Gibraltar etc. was being planned. I was dealing more with him and Sher Bahadur than with the C-in-C. It is tragic that despite having a good military mind, the FM’s [Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto’s] heart was prone to give way. The biggest tragedy is that in this instance it gave way before the eruption of a crisis. Or were they already celebrating a final victory!!
In case you need a more exact description of events, I will need war diaries and maps, which you could send me through the diplomatic bag.
Please remember me to all the family.
Yours,
Akhtar Hussain Malik
Reading from the paragraph g. It is more than obvious that unfortunate things did happen during 23 day war, and Army Officers did know that if those decisions and events followed were made public, it will result in the destruction of Army’s morale, and in the lowering of its prestige among its people. So the matter regarding the recent book from General Mahmood should be viewed in the light of things mentioned above.
Pakistan's objective: To capture Kashmir
Result: Objective was not achieved.
India's objective: To open up more than one fronts along the international borders to relieve pressure from the Kashmir front.
Result: Objective achieved.
Now whether Indians failed to capture Lahore is irrelevant, that was never a major objective.
I am copying a letter from General Akhtar H Malik to his younger brother, Lieutenant General Abdul Ali Malik while he (AHM) was stationed in Turkey. This should clear up what was the situation and how military personnel thought. Please read paragraph g. very carefully. It is also interesitng to note that AHM got killed in a road accident in Turkey.
Pakistan’s Permanent Military Deputy
Embassy of Pakistan
Ankara
23-11-67
My Dear brother,
I hope you and the family are very well. Thank you for your letter of 14 Oct. 67. The answers to your questions are as follows:
a. The de facto command changed the very first day of the ops [operations] after the fall of Chamb when Azmat Hayat broke off wireless communications with me. I personally tried to find his HQ [headquarters] by chopper and failed. In late afternoon I sent Gulzar and Vahid, my MP [military police] officers, to try and locate him, but they too failed. The next day I tore into him and he sheepishly and nervously informed me that he was ‘Yahya’s brigadier’. I had no doubt left that Yahya had reached him the previous day and instructed him not to take further orders from me, while the formal change in command had yet to take place. This was a betrayal of many dimensions.
b. I reasoned and then pleaded with Yahya that if it was credit he was looking for, he should take the overall command but let me go up to Akhnur as his subordinate, but he refused. He went a step further and even changed the plan. He kept banging his head against Troti, letting the Indian fall back to Akhnur. We lost the initiative on the very first day of the war and never recovered it. Eventually it was the desperate stand at Chawinda that prevented the Indians from cutting through.
c. At no time was I assigned any reason for being removed from command by Ayub, Musa or Yahya. They were all sheepish at best. I think the reasons will be given when I am no more.
d. Not informing pro-Pak Kashmiri elements before launching Gibraltar was a command decision and it was mine. The aim of the op was to de freeze the Kashmir issue, raise it from its moribund state, and bring it to the notice of the world. To achieve this aim the first phase of the op was vital, that is, to effect undetected infiltration of thousands across the CFL [cease-fire line]. I was not willing to compromise this in any event. And the whole op could be made stillborn by just one double agent.
e. Haji Pir [Pass] did not cause me much anxiety. Because [the] impending Grand Slam Indian concentration in Haji Pir could only help us after Akhnur, and they would have to pull out troops from there to counter the new threats and surrender their gains, and maybe more, in the process. Actually it was only after the fall of Akhnur that we would have encashed the full value of Gibraltar, but that was not to be!
f. Bhutto kept insisting that his sources had assured him that India would not attack if we did not violate the international border. I however was certain that Gibraltar would lead to war and told GHQ so. I needed no op intelligence to come to this conclusion. It was simple common sense. If I got you by the throat, it would be silly for me to expect that you will kiss me for it. Because I was certain that war would follow, my first choice as objective for Grand Slam was Jammu. From there we could have exploited our success either toward Samba or Kashmir proper as the situation demanded. In any case whether it was Jammu or Akhnur, if we had taken the objective, I do not see how the Indians could have attacked Sialkot before clearing out either of these towns.
g. I have given serious consideration to writing a book, but given up the idea. The book would be the truth. And truth and the popular reaction to it would be good for my ego. But in the long run it would be an unpatriotic act. It will destroy the morale of the army, lower its prestige among the people, be banned in Pakistan, and become a textbook for the Indians. I have little doubt that the Indians will never forgive us the slight of 65 and will avenge it at the first opportunity. I am certain they will hit us in E. Pak [East Pakistan] and we will need all we have to save the situation. The first day of Grand Slam will be fateful in many ways. The worst has still to come and we have to prepare for it. The book is therefore out.
I hope this gives you the gist of what you needed to know. And yes, Ayub was fully involved in the enterprise. As a matter of fact it was his idea. And it was he who ordered me to by-pass Musa while Gibraltar etc. was being planned. I was dealing more with him and Sher Bahadur than with the C-in-C. It is tragic that despite having a good military mind, the FM’s [Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto’s] heart was prone to give way. The biggest tragedy is that in this instance it gave way before the eruption of a crisis. Or were they already celebrating a final victory!!
In case you need a more exact description of events, I will need war diaries and maps, which you could send me through the diplomatic bag.
Please remember me to all the family.
Yours,
Akhtar Hussain Malik
Reading from the paragraph g. It is more than obvious that unfortunate things did happen during 23 day war, and Army Officers did know that if those decisions and events followed were made public, it will result in the destruction of Army’s morale, and in the lowering of its prestige among its people. So the matter regarding the recent book from General Mahmood should be viewed in the light of things mentioned above.
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rubyjackass
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gibberish .....
At the end of the day, maneklshaw and Indian analysts who wrote books documenting RAW activities admitted that RAW was destabilizing EP starting from the sixties. Covert support to insurgents in EP preceded any 'refugee crises', and the latter therefore cannot be used as justification for India's intervention.
Nothing more I can say. Reread my post and count. Nobody but Pakistan complains that India intervened then. So basically everyone thinks there is enough justification. Your argument is simply a weak version of 'India cut Pakistan into two theory'.
India did not start Bengali unrest. India did not massacre Bengalis. But was effected with 8-10 mil refugees. India and US did contemplate all possible circumstances. Even those that would try to save the then Pakistan. refugees are not a consequence of indian involvement if any. The humanitarian grounds more than justify the operation.
I am interested to read. Please give links to sources abt comments from Manekshaw.
Kasrkin
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I was talking about the other one from an Indian source that says:
Even in the other article the 'myth' comments are attributed to some anonymous source. Id be retaining judgment in regards to the books myth busting abilities and to the notion that there are any myths that need to be busted.
The source also said this about the former general:
If true, this could mean that there are other factors behind General Ahmeds censorship, maybe he just has a bad reputation for causing trouble and GHQ is not taking chances with his work. Also the article mentions:
Ironic how some Indians are falling over each to treasure this unread book as if it were the indisputable bible of the 1965 war. If youd read it, maybe you wouldnt like all the conclusions this hawkish pan-Islamist draws after all
Zob
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sorry boys GULF NEWS is run by an INDIAN if that also implies things that indians are implying!!! 23 days and a stalemate....PATHANKOT,HALWARA & DAWARKA....all bold aggresive moves from pakistan...indian army stopped in its tracks in CHAMB.....NOT AN INDIAN VICTORY my friends....
Nihat
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I concur , it was not an Indian victory but that also depends for many on what can be classified as a victory - in clear cut scenario only a surrender by an advesary can count as a decisive victory for the other.
Taking that line , no one won the war in 65.
Alternatively as mentioned before the Pak objective was cut and clear - to capture the entire Kashmir or at least make significant territorial gains , however the end result was that not a blade of grass was given or taken after the settlements.
India succesfully repulsed the attack but did not achive a conclusive victory a la 72 , Pak did not get any of Kashmir so primary objective was not achieved.
paritosh
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1.)So you do admit that you had the qualitative edge.
2.)Mig-21 was a new plane with the IAF...as you pointed out...it was becoming operational...you would know how long it takes to get accustomed to an airplane...hundreds of flying hours...so the mig wasn't all that useful...or in other words you had the quality advantage.
3.)Dwarka?no you did not bomb it to a hiroshima...it was insignificant(read neutral accounts of the operation 'Dwarka')
but that did achieve the all important objective of containing the Indian navy to bombay.it was a clever ploy...but a defensive one.
4.)Dude,India had just started developing it's capabilities in the 60s...you had ample American and chinese support prior to the war to build up your armed forces.We weren't five times your size...by no measure....we had fought an exhaustive war with an ever more powerful army in 1962...and three years is not a long time to recover and fight another full scale war.
here is a good read into the metamorphosis of the IN...
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA462727&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
Zob
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1.)So you do admit that you had the qualitative edge.
vs a QUANTITY....5 times our size to be correct...
2.)Mig-21 was a new plane with the IAF...as you pointed out...it was becoming operational...you would know how long it takes to get accustomed to an airplane...hundreds of flying hours...so the mig wasn't all that useful...or in other words you had the quality advantage.
hey an untested generation 3 fighter is better than a tested generation 1 fighter right?? or look at it this way RED BARON's plane vs an untested SPITFIRE....
having said that we never gave the MIG a chance to get airborne...a bold move...a good gamble...
3.)Dwarka?no you did not bomb it to a hiroshima...it was insignificant(read neutral accounts of the operation 'Dwarka')
but that did achieve the all important objective of containing the Indian navy to bombay.it was a clever ploy...but a defensive one
defensive...well i think it is an aggressive move how can attacking the enemy be a DEFENSIVE move?? like you said it achieved its objective of restricting the enemy to its bases....another bold move....and the indian navy never THREATENED our sea throughout the war after that....its like the destruction of the BISMARCK by the british....the GERMANS never dared to come out in the open from then on....
4.)Dude,India had just started developing it's capabilities in the 60s...you had ample American and chinese support prior to the war to build up your armed forces.We weren't five times your size...by no measure....we had fought an exhaustive war with an ever more powerful army in 1962...and three years is not a long time to recover and fight another full scale war.
i am sorry we didn't give you enough time but you should have thought about this before opening the international border....and 3 years isn't a long time i guess 5 years was enough right (referring to 71 here).....we fought an enemy 5 times our size for 23 days and 5 years later the same enemy came back and got involved in our civil war when we had our backs to them....
you said china was bigger more powerful you were exhausted i think we can use that logic for 71 as well as civil war 2 fronts back stabbing and so much more.....
conclusion.....DWARKA restricts the INDIAN navy to its bases....PATHANKOT destroys the backbone of the IAF....chamb repulse a 5 times bigger enemy....do i say more....??
vs a QUANTITY....5 times our size to be correct...
2.)Mig-21 was a new plane with the IAF...as you pointed out...it was becoming operational...you would know how long it takes to get accustomed to an airplane...hundreds of flying hours...so the mig wasn't all that useful...or in other words you had the quality advantage.
hey an untested generation 3 fighter is better than a tested generation 1 fighter right?? or look at it this way RED BARON's plane vs an untested SPITFIRE....
having said that we never gave the MIG a chance to get airborne...a bold move...a good gamble...
3.)Dwarka?no you did not bomb it to a hiroshima...it was insignificant(read neutral accounts of the operation 'Dwarka')
but that did achieve the all important objective of containing the Indian navy to bombay.it was a clever ploy...but a defensive one
defensive...well i think it is an aggressive move how can attacking the enemy be a DEFENSIVE move?? like you said it achieved its objective of restricting the enemy to its bases....another bold move....and the indian navy never THREATENED our sea throughout the war after that....its like the destruction of the BISMARCK by the british....the GERMANS never dared to come out in the open from then on....
4.)Dude,India had just started developing it's capabilities in the 60s...you had ample American and chinese support prior to the war to build up your armed forces.We weren't five times your size...by no measure....we had fought an exhaustive war with an ever more powerful army in 1962...and three years is not a long time to recover and fight another full scale war.
i am sorry we didn't give you enough time but you should have thought about this before opening the international border....and 3 years isn't a long time i guess 5 years was enough right (referring to 71 here).....we fought an enemy 5 times our size for 23 days and 5 years later the same enemy came back and got involved in our civil war when we had our backs to them....
you said china was bigger more powerful you were exhausted i think we can use that logic for 71 as well as civil war 2 fronts back stabbing and so much more.....
conclusion.....DWARKA restricts the INDIAN navy to its bases....PATHANKOT destroys the backbone of the IAF....chamb repulse a 5 times bigger enemy....do i say more....??
paritosh
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well if junk makes up your quantity you are at a loss...and if that junk is in your airforce and you are at war...you can expect a perfect ball-busting.Gnats...Vampires...mystere...were all out-dated...weren't they?
this debate of quality v/s quantitiy is futile..if we do not consider the man flying the machine...if the man is well trained and well suited to fly his machine even a gnat can slay a saber...or an Alam can show what the saber can really do.My point was that...many paksitanis claim that the PAf had NO quantitative edge in '65...while I totally agree to the 'edge' being there...but when all things are kept constant...quality scores over quantity for an airforce...as happened in '65.
...and was the IAF really five times the PAF as you claim..?I doubt that...i need a link to quench my curiosity.
why are you giving absurd examples?Spitfire was developed by the brits for their own airforce with the aid of interactions with their own pilots...which gives an advantage of not teaching everything from scratch.in our case...mig-21was a different plane..entirely.We were operating western planes prior to the mig...so it's a paradigm shift.
you had the sabres and f-104s for a long time...compared to the migs with us...
as far as pathankot is concerned...only two migs were destroyed...is there a neutral link that can establish the validity of the pathankot incident?
the reason why I am calling it a defensive move is because the PN did not venture upto Bombay which was our western naval base to launch an offensive with the leverage of having destroyed a radar station in Dwarka.The PN's attack of Dwarka was a containment ploy...andhenece defensive.The offensive would be to launch an attack on the IN ships or the naval base( I am not undermining the effectiveness of the PN in '65..just letting you know why I think of it as being defensive)
I donot understand what you mean by the "opening of the international border by us".We did not initiate the war.As far as the years are concerned...It's more to do with being ready and prepared.The IAF had a complete change in it's policy post '65...we stopped compromising on quality.We got heavily involved with the Soviets(after realizing that the americans have already chosen to side with you)
the mig-21 was a much more comfortable plane to handle in '71 and we had the numbers too...and the PAf was at a loss handling almost the same aircrafts it did 5 years back against a 'changed' IAF.so it is about the preparation....in '65 PAF got the a/cs to suit it's aggressor role...but did not follow up in '71 when it couldn't see the war coming...while the IAf got a major face-lift and got Su-7s and mig-21s.
I only agree with the Dwarka incident.PAthankot did not break the back of the Indian air force..throughout the war we flew more sorties than the PAF...and the five times claim I don't buy.
ironman
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Yes it is not working but I have found out an another link by United States Library of Congress.
The 1965 war began as a series of border flare-ups along undemarcated territory at the Rann of Kutch in the southeast in April and soon after along the cease-fire line in Kashmir. The Rann of Kutch conflict was resolved by mutual consent and British sponsorship and arbitration, but the Kashmir conflict proved more dangerous and widespread. In the early spring of 1965, UN observers and India reported increased activity by infiltrators from Pakistan into Indian-held Kashmir. Pakistan hoped to support an uprising by Kashmiris against India. No such uprising took place, and by August India had retaken Pakistani-held positions in the north while Pakistan attacked in the Chamb sector in southwestern Kashmir in September. Each country had limited objectives, and neither was economically capable of sustaining a long war because military supplies were cut to both countries by the United States and Britain.
On September 23, a cease-fire was arranged through the UN Security Council. In January 1966, Ayub Khan and India's prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, signed the Tashkent Declaration, which formally ended hostilities and called for a mutual withdrawal of forces. This objectively statesmanlike act elicited an adverse reaction in West Pakistan. Students as well as politicians demonstrated in urban areas, and many were arrested. The Tashkent Declaration was the turning point in the political fortunes of the Ayub Khan administration.
ironman
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Something more for readers pleasure.
The 1965 war came at a time when the United States was not only absorbed in the Vietnam conflict and other Cold War concerns, but also weary and frustrated after nearly two decades of supporting or leading international efforts to promote India-Pakistan reconciliation, most recently in 1963, and after ten years of major economic and military assistance to both countries. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk commented subsequently: "[W]e in effect shrugged our shoulders and said, 'Well, if you're going to fight, go ahead and fight, but we're not going to pay for it'."[6] The United States supported British attempts to calm tensions during the difficult summer of 1965 after Indian and Pakistani forces had skirmished in the desolate Rann of Kutch during April,[7] and participated in the UN Security Council's vain attempts during August to bring about a cease-fire and restoration of the status quo ante when Pakistani infiltration into Indian Kashmir sparked serious fighting. In the Johnson Administration's eyes, however, U.S. influence was at an ebb with both sides, so Washington preferred to play its supporting role through the UN even after the Pakistanis launched large conventional forces (equipped with American weapons) across the Kashmir cease-fire line on 1 September. "Highest level decision here not to engage in direct pressure on either Pak[istani]s or Indians for time being, but to place primary reliance on UN," Secretary Rusk informed Ambassador Chester Bowles in New Delhi on 2 September.[8]
The U.S.-backed UN initiatives hardly had time to mature before India sent its own troops over the international border toward Lahore on the 6th. With both antagonists fully committed to combat along the entirety of their mutual border, there was no longer a question of preventing or limiting conflict, and international pressure thereafter was aimed at bringing the two sides to the negotiating table, a process that did not bear fruit until the 23rd of the month.[9]
The United States thus made little effort to dissuade India and Pakistan in the period leading to the 1965 war and its support of the UN failed to preclude the expansion of fighting beyond Kashmir. However, two aspects of American policy relating to dissuasion require further comment. First, Washington imposed an arms embargo on both belligerents on 8 September. As much of Pakistan's military hardware was of American origin, the embargo had a much heavier impact on Pakistan and probably contributed to the Pakistani calculation that its forces could not sustain the fighting much beyond mid-September absent U.S. spares and ammunition. The U.S. decision thus had the dissuasive effect of helping to curtail the conflict by promoting Pakistani acceptance of the UN-sponsored cease-fire. On the other hand, the United States probably missed an opportunity to dissuade Pakistani adventurism in the years leading up to the war and even in months following the April clash in the Rann of Kutch. Having acquired most of its weaponry from the United States and having received vague assurances of American support vis-à-vis India, many Pakistani leaders mistakenly concluded that Washington would come to their assistance even when they provoked a conflict by pushing thousands of infiltrators into Indian Kashmir and attempted to rescue this failed operation by opening the full-scale conventional assault on 1 September.[10] U.S. Ambassador Walter McConaughy's stern attempts to warn Pakistan against using U.S. arms in a conflict with India could not penetrate this Pakistani preconception.[11]
@Kasrkin:
This is posted in The Federation of American Scientists (FAS)
Other than ideology and Kashmir, the main source of friction between Pakistan and India in the 1960s was the distribution of the waters of the Indus River system. As the upper riparian power, India controlled the headworks of the prepartition irrigation canals. After independence India had, in addition, constructed several multipurpose projects on the eastern tributaries of the Indus. Pakistan feared that India might repeat a 1948 incident that curtailed the water supply as a means of coercion. A compromise that appeared to meet the needs of both countries was reached during the 1950s; it was not until 1960 that a solution finally found favor with Ayub Khan and Jawaharlal Nehru.
The 1965 war began as a series of border flare-ups along undemarcated territory at the Rann of Kutch in the southeast in April and soon after along the cease-fire line in Kashmir. The Rann of Kutch conflict was resolved by mutual consent and British sponsorship and arbitration, but the Kashmir conflict proved more dangerous and widespread. In the early spring of 1965, UN observers and India reported increased activity by infiltrators from Pakistan into Indian-held Kashmir. In mid-1965 Pakistan sent guerrilla forces into the Indian part of Kashmir in the hope of stirring up a rebellion that would either oust the Indians or at least force the issue back onto the international agenda. Pakistani forces did not find as much support among the Kashmiri population as they had hoped, and no uprising by Kashmiris against India took place. Fighting spread, and by August India had retaken Pakistani-held positions in the north while Pakistan attacked in the Chamb sector in southwestern Kashmir in September. A process of escalation culminated in a full-scale Indian offensive toward Lahore on September 6. Fighting, frequently very bitter, continued until a UN-sponsored cease-fire took hold on September 23. Both sides had tacitly agreed not to let the war spread to the East Wing of Pakistan. Each country had limited objectives, and neither was economically capable of sustaining a long war because military supplies were cut to both countries by the United States and Britain.
The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively heavy--on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by "Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government.
The 1965 war came at a time when the United States was not only absorbed in the Vietnam conflict and other Cold War concerns, but also weary and frustrated after nearly two decades of supporting or leading international efforts to promote India-Pakistan reconciliation, most recently in 1963, and after ten years of major economic and military assistance to both countries. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk commented subsequently: "[W]e in effect shrugged our shoulders and said, 'Well, if you're going to fight, go ahead and fight, but we're not going to pay for it'."[6] The United States supported British attempts to calm tensions during the difficult summer of 1965 after Indian and Pakistani forces had skirmished in the desolate Rann of Kutch during April,[7] and participated in the UN Security Council's vain attempts during August to bring about a cease-fire and restoration of the status quo ante when Pakistani infiltration into Indian Kashmir sparked serious fighting. In the Johnson Administration's eyes, however, U.S. influence was at an ebb with both sides, so Washington preferred to play its supporting role through the UN even after the Pakistanis launched large conventional forces (equipped with American weapons) across the Kashmir cease-fire line on 1 September. "Highest level decision here not to engage in direct pressure on either Pak[istani]s or Indians for time being, but to place primary reliance on UN," Secretary Rusk informed Ambassador Chester Bowles in New Delhi on 2 September.[8]
The U.S.-backed UN initiatives hardly had time to mature before India sent its own troops over the international border toward Lahore on the 6th. With both antagonists fully committed to combat along the entirety of their mutual border, there was no longer a question of preventing or limiting conflict, and international pressure thereafter was aimed at bringing the two sides to the negotiating table, a process that did not bear fruit until the 23rd of the month.[9]
The United States thus made little effort to dissuade India and Pakistan in the period leading to the 1965 war and its support of the UN failed to preclude the expansion of fighting beyond Kashmir. However, two aspects of American policy relating to dissuasion require further comment. First, Washington imposed an arms embargo on both belligerents on 8 September. As much of Pakistan's military hardware was of American origin, the embargo had a much heavier impact on Pakistan and probably contributed to the Pakistani calculation that its forces could not sustain the fighting much beyond mid-September absent U.S. spares and ammunition. The U.S. decision thus had the dissuasive effect of helping to curtail the conflict by promoting Pakistani acceptance of the UN-sponsored cease-fire. On the other hand, the United States probably missed an opportunity to dissuade Pakistani adventurism in the years leading up to the war and even in months following the April clash in the Rann of Kutch. Having acquired most of its weaponry from the United States and having received vague assurances of American support vis-à-vis India, many Pakistani leaders mistakenly concluded that Washington would come to their assistance even when they provoked a conflict by pushing thousands of infiltrators into Indian Kashmir and attempted to rescue this failed operation by opening the full-scale conventional assault on 1 September.[10] U.S. Ambassador Walter McConaughy's stern attempts to warn Pakistan against using U.S. arms in a conflict with India could not penetrate this Pakistani preconception.[11]
@Kasrkin:
This is posted in The Federation of American Scientists (FAS)
Other than ideology and Kashmir, the main source of friction between Pakistan and India in the 1960s was the distribution of the waters of the Indus River system. As the upper riparian power, India controlled the headworks of the prepartition irrigation canals. After independence India had, in addition, constructed several multipurpose projects on the eastern tributaries of the Indus. Pakistan feared that India might repeat a 1948 incident that curtailed the water supply as a means of coercion. A compromise that appeared to meet the needs of both countries was reached during the 1950s; it was not until 1960 that a solution finally found favor with Ayub Khan and Jawaharlal Nehru.
The 1965 war began as a series of border flare-ups along undemarcated territory at the Rann of Kutch in the southeast in April and soon after along the cease-fire line in Kashmir. The Rann of Kutch conflict was resolved by mutual consent and British sponsorship and arbitration, but the Kashmir conflict proved more dangerous and widespread. In the early spring of 1965, UN observers and India reported increased activity by infiltrators from Pakistan into Indian-held Kashmir. In mid-1965 Pakistan sent guerrilla forces into the Indian part of Kashmir in the hope of stirring up a rebellion that would either oust the Indians or at least force the issue back onto the international agenda. Pakistani forces did not find as much support among the Kashmiri population as they had hoped, and no uprising by Kashmiris against India took place. Fighting spread, and by August India had retaken Pakistani-held positions in the north while Pakistan attacked in the Chamb sector in southwestern Kashmir in September. A process of escalation culminated in a full-scale Indian offensive toward Lahore on September 6. Fighting, frequently very bitter, continued until a UN-sponsored cease-fire took hold on September 23. Both sides had tacitly agreed not to let the war spread to the East Wing of Pakistan. Each country had limited objectives, and neither was economically capable of sustaining a long war because military supplies were cut to both countries by the United States and Britain.
The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively heavy--on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by "Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government.
Kasrkin
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Funnily enough Mr ironman, the link you provided leads to some Intelligence Resource Program with a big Indian flag smack in your face. Needless to say it is not from the source claimed at Wikipedia, neither is it from a neutral source as far as I can tell, certainly not from as prestigious a source as claimed. A lot of what is posted on Wikipedia is a distortion of facts and sources, members should refrain from referring to it over contested issues.
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This I thought was Military History sub forum and the thread supposed to be 1965 War - The complete story
The initial vid clips in the first post are interesting but I forget my Bable fish, unfortunate technical error.
What I wanted and expected was to read some realistic mature comments on the 1965 war, NOT a bunch of people trying to prove that they can rant better than someone else and provide absolutely no significant commentary of realistic mature discussion.
Yes there are some sound useful posts but in 5 pages these are rare.
Is there any though slight chance that one day the collective will Borg themselves to present a decent discussion on history without the sniping.
The initial vid clips in the first post are interesting but I forget my Bable fish, unfortunate technical error.
What I wanted and expected was to read some realistic mature comments on the 1965 war, NOT a bunch of people trying to prove that they can rant better than someone else and provide absolutely no significant commentary of realistic mature discussion.
Yes there are some sound useful posts but in 5 pages these are rare.
Is there any though slight chance that one day the collective will Borg themselves to present a decent discussion on history without the sniping.
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