1965 Indo-Pak War: Busting the myth
Air Cdre (Retd) Ishfaq Ilahi Choudhury
THIS article is to recall the 17-day war of Sep 1965 between India and Pakistan that, among other things, helped to do two things as far as the Bengalis were concerned. One, it completely destroyed the myth created about the Bengalis being a non-martial race. And secondly, it exposed the lax preparedness for the defence of the eastern wing of the country. President Ayub Khan of Pakistan, in his book “Friends Not Masters”, had exposed the discriminatory mindset of the Pakistani establishment towards their Bengali compatriots. The September War was an opportunity for the Bengalis in the armed forces to vindicate their military prowess.
Forty nine years ago on 6 September 1965, a full-scale war broke out between India and Pakistan. It was a short 17-day war that was virtually confined to West Pakistan and parts of the disputed territory of Kashmir.
As the war unfolded, the Bengalis all over Pakistan were excited over the stories of heroism by the 1st Battalion, The East Bengal Regiment (EBR) in the defence of the key Pakistani city of Lahore. Also in the air, stories of valour by Bengali pilots of Pakistan Air Force (PAF) greatly inspired the Bengali youths. The West Pakistanis used to belittle the Bengalis by calling them a non-martial race; this was belied by the military prowess and bravery shown by the officers and men of Bengali origin. The war also exposed the eastern wing's vulnerabilities with so little military assets to defend it. The war is virtually forgotten in Bangladesh today, despite the fact that the Bengalis played an important part in it.
Pakistani leadership at that time had led the nation to a disastrous war that was fraught with serious political and military lapses. After the debacle in the border war with China in 1962, India started a massive expansion and modernization of its armed forces with generous aid from the Soviet Union and Western powers. Pakistani leadership realized that the possibility of militarily pressurizing India was fast slipping away as the power balance tilted more towards India. They started planning a secret military operation to force India to come to a negotiated settlement on Kashmir. In early August 1965, Pakistan launched a clandestine operation, code named “Operation Gibraltar”. The aim was to infiltrate inside Indian held Kashmir and to demolish bridges, cutoff supply lines, etc to create panic among the populace. They also set up a radio station, called “Sada-e-Kashmir”, purported to be the voice of the Mujahedin fighting for Kashmir's liberation. The assumption was that the radio broadcast, along with the guerilla activities, will trigger a general uprising among the Kashmiris. None of that happened. In fact, many of these infiltrators were arrested, killed in encounters and often were handed over to the authority by the locals. By the end of August, Operation Gibraltar petered out; remnants of the so-called Mujahedin tracked back to Pakistan.
On 1 September 1965, regular Pakistani troops crossed the cease fire line (CFL) and moved towards Jammu. The forces made quick advance and in the next couple of days threatened to cut Jammu-Srinagar road. The Indian PM gave a warning on 2 September that unless Pakistan withdrew its forces across the CFL, India would respond “at a time and place of its own choosing”.
The Indian response came on 5-6 Sept night when it launched attacks across Sialkot and Lahore. The Indian response was full one month after the Pakistani incursion. The Indian forces, besides threatening two key cities, poised to cut the vital Grand Trunk (GT) road. At this time, the 1st Battalion of the EBR was deployed in the defence of Lahore along the Bambawali- Ravi-Bedian canal, commonly known as BRB canal. They held their ground despite repeated Indian attacks. At the end of the war, this regiment had the honour of being awarded the highest number of gallantry awards among all the regiments of Pakistan Army.
In the air war that followed, Pakistan Air Force (PAF) had a qualitative edge over the IAF in terms of pilots and aircraft, which, despite IAF's quantitative advantage, gave PAF a slight edge in the end. Here too, a number of PAF pilots of Bengali origin earned high military honour. Many Bengali soldiers and airmen embraced martyrdom and many others were wounded in battle.
By the second week into the war, Pakistani forces were running out of ammunition and spares. US had imposed on both the warring sides an arms embargo which hurt Pakistan badly because almost all her weapons were of US origin. Pakistan had no option but to accept a UN resolution for a ceasefire to take effect from 22 September 1965. An initiative by the Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, resulted in a peace deal, known as “The Tashkent Declaration”, signed by the warring parties on 4 January 1966 in Tashkent. The declaration was hailed as a new beginning of peace. It stated that both countries will pull back their forces to pre-war positions, will restore economic and diplomatic ties and will initiate orderly exchange of prisoners. The treaty was viewed by many Pakistanis as a diplomatic defeat for President Ayub. Ayub never recovered from the fall of his stature after Tashkent and was ousted four years later in the face of popular uprising.
This was a war that had no clear victor or vanquished. The aim of the Pakistani high command was to seize a portion of Kashmir to force India to the negotiating table; on the other hand, India's aim was to stop any Pakistani incursion and not to allow external interference in the Kashmir issue. In the end, India largely achieved her aim and objectives, while Pakistan was in disarray. The facade of democracy that President Ayub created was shattered because what to speak of the ordinary people, even the Parliament or the Cabinet was not consulted when the vital decision to send infiltrators into Kashmir was taken.
On the economic front, Pakistan suffered badly due to war. The 3rd Five Year Plan (1965-70) was virtually in tatters. 6% GDP growth rate of early 1960s almost stalled by the end of the decade. East Pakistan was cut-off from its western wing during the War. A deep sense of separatism and alienation grew in East Pakistan as an aftermath. The war raised the issue of the defence of East Pakistan.
With only one infantry division, a squadron of fighters and no naval assets, except for a few patrol crafts, East Pakistan was virtually defenseless. In June 1966, the Awami League in its 6-Point Programme demanded greater defence investment in East Pakistan which soon became a rallying point for the Bengalis. Among the demands were shifting of the NHQ to Chittagong, establishment of an ordnance factory and raising of a paramilitary force to augment the defense of the eastern wing. The Bengali soldiers, sailors and airmen proved that as professional military men they are second to none. We honour those valiant sons of the soil who gave their best in the field of battle in September 1965 to keep up the honour and dignity of the Bengali nation. Many veterans of 65-War displayed the same valour in the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971.
The writer is Registrar, East West University, Dhaka
THIS article is to recall the 17-day war of Sep 1965 between India and Pakistan that, among other things, helped to do two things as far as the Bengalis were concerned. One, it completely destroyed the myth created about the Bengalis being a non-martial race. And secondly, it exposed the lax...
www.thedailystar.net
First I would like to clarify, that as a Pakistani, I fully recognize that we owe a debt of gratitude to our Bengali brothers and sisters for their contributions to our joint independence from the British, without the Muslims of Bengal, it would have been very hard to gain independence, perhaps near impossible. We shall always be in your eternal debt.
But, there are few statements within the article that do not seem to make sense or convey an incomplete interpretation of history. Facts are wrong if the interpretation is incorrect. So, I would like to add a clarification.
We tend to take a simplistic view of history, a story is told and repeated endlessly before it becomes a fact, but that is unfair if the facts portray a falsehood. Let's not forget Pakistan had nothing when it started, both wings. All the industries and administrative structures, everything was in the area that became India. Pakistan, both wings had to start from scratch.
It takes time to establish anything anew, if you move house it takes a lot of effort, we are discussing a new country, in two parts, separated by 1000 miles of hostile territory. In the end, mistakes were made but there was also a lot of good. It was Ayub who decided to have a second capital in East Pakistan, the Bangladesh Parliament building was approved before Bangladesh came into being because it was recognised there was a need for a second capital for a country like Pakistan. People are not born with wisdom, but over time, they were learning. There are other examples, but this is enough to prove an essential point, that good was also done, and remedies were being worked out.
Now, regarding the article.
West Pakistanis used to belittle the Bengalis by calling them a non-martial race;
It has to be understood, this attitude was an overhang of British thinking, martial races theory was a widely held belief across South Asia. it was still wrong, but it was not due to the hatred of East Pakistanis, old thinking takes time to die. The fighting spirit of Bengalis was proving it wrong. But, it needs to be understood that this thinking came from somewhere else, and not a West Pakistani sourced idea.
The war also exposed the eastern wing's vulnerabilities with so little military assets to defend it.
That was purely due to the lack of resources, the capital was in West Pakistan, and it was also a larger area that was also more suited for heavy warfare, and the core conflicts were located in West Pakistan, Kashmir, and Rann of Katch. The areas that India claimed were in West Pakistan, so logic dictates that you would concentrate your military assets where there is a live threat. Combine that reality with a lack of resources and there are very few options left.
Pakistani leadership realized that the possibility of militarily pressurizing India was fast slipping away as the power balance tilted more towards India.
There was never a military opportunity with regards to India, because it was many times larger, and had access to Soviet and European weaponry. The main reason was that India did not abide by its promises and frustration built-in among the Pakistani leadership.
When China defeated India in the 1962 war, India ran to America and Europe, who in return gave India nearly a billion dollars worth of weapons, very quickly, but also forced Pakistan not to do anything in return for a promise of a negotiated settlement of Kashmir dispute. India dragged its feet once China pulled back, and frustration set in, which resulted in int the 1965 situation. That's the actual reason.
The Indian forces, besides threatening two key cities, poised to cut the vital Grand Trunk (GT) road
This was the main reason for India's attack, it failed on both accounts, miserably.
This was a war that had no clear victor or vanquished. The aim of the Pakistani high command was to seize a portion of Kashmir to force India to the negotiating table; on the other hand, India's aim was to stop any Pakistani incursion and not to allow external interference in the Kashmir issue. In the end, India largely achieved her aim and objectives, while Pakistan was in disarray.
There is a clear contradiction in the same paragraph, it just does not make sense at all. It starts off by saying there was no clear victor, which is actually correct, then goes on to say Pakistan was in disarray and India met its aim, which is ridiculous. The author has already pointed towards the main reasons for India attack above and declared there was no clear winner. You cannot have two contradictory conclusions on the same issue.
The fact is Pakistan failed to meet its objectives having crossed the ceasefire line (not the border), and India failed to meet its objectives after attacking across the international border. There was actually no clear winner. The second claim does not make sense at all.
On the economic front, Pakistan suffered badly due to war. The 3rd Five Year Plan (1965-70) was virtually in tatters. 6% GDP growth rate of early 1960s almost stalled by the end of the decade.
On the face of it, this statement is true, but it implies a wrong conclusion, which is wrong. India also suffered economically, just as much as Pakistan.
Please see the links below.
https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/IND/india/gdp-growth-rate
https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/PAK/pakistan/economic-growth-rate
en.m.wikipedia.org
