OK. Maybe "collapse" was a little harsh. But over reach they did, and then they realized their "oops".
The organized withdrawal was a result of political and military timing. The govt. announced the ceasefire and the withdrawal had already begun, and airstrikes by the US was about a week away.
More a case of "time to get outta Dodge before it really hits the fan".
Korea was still very much in the US military mindset.
It was certainly a political defeat for China. The badwill it earned for itself on the world stage, was not worth Aksai Chin, which is all they really got.
It certainly was a much needed wake up call for India.
You are basically right on that war. China's withdrawal in 1962 was largely due to its weak logistics. China does understand that Tawang was not north China Plateau where they can wield their formidable army as easily as using chopsticks. The chinese army was outnumbered and running out of supply. They realized that an escalating war with india was not in its best interests and the victory they already had was unsustainable. Though india also had a tough time supplying its army in NE india, china's situation was way harder than it enemy. They went across Tibet as known as "the roof of world" to fight indian on feet because no veichles could possibly climb the vast tibetan mountains. It took a man a month time to carry two mortar balls from lhasa to the front. it is hard to image china could winn an full-scale war with india in south asia sub-continent at that time.
In some sense, any large scale wars can be seen as war of logistics. Stalin said USSR's victory over Hitler was decided by their sheer gas engine numbers in essence. Their stronger industry produced far more tanks and artilleries than facists did and through which they won the war.
PLA learnt a lot from Korea war, the chief commander of PLA in Korea, Peng Dehuai (if I am not mistaken) said that what chinese army could achieved in the battlefield was directly decided the logistic behind. Chinese army secured Seoul twice but was pushed back by Americans to regions near 38th parallel with great loss, because they had difficult time supplying the front under Korea's freezing climate and American's extensive Airstrike. In chinese's opinion, Ridgway was far better commander than McAurther, he welll observed the weakness of PLA - their offensivse barely sustained one week, he made UN Forces avoid direct confrontation with PLA, and fight back when chinese retreat. He successfully helped UN army walk out of the failure in North Korea and retook the initiative in the army and had PLA a tough year.
In India's case, Bejing didn't want to play fiddle too much and decided to compromise Tawang to keep the initiative they've gained. i think it was a correct decision made on reality and pragmatics. Still, China's de facto control line in east front still advanced after the war compared with pre-war line and they advanced alot to AKsai Chin in the west front.
AKsai Chin is a highland overlooking the NW india. it has signicifcant strategical importance for china, as it's easy to take defense for china and difficult for india to secure. The famous Kela-Qunlun highway connecting China and Pakistan is also running through that area. In case of war, PLA's steel current would advanced to the gate of India's heart area, New Delhi from Xinjiang in days through Aksai Chin.That is a much greater burden for india's defense than a few of mountainous regiments in the east front. As for China, they are less concerned about the safety of its wild wild west and Gobi desert adjacent to Kashmir, but for india, its northwest means alot.
