For some of the members who weren't around for this discussion. this is probably the most insightful account of the 1962 Sino-Indian war I've read on the web. It was posted by an Indian member here at PDF Joe Shearer. It was just such a great post, I felt the need to share it.
To all Indian members here. A question... | Page 2
Dear Sir,
It is regrettable that the vast majority of us Indians have been kept in the dark, and ill-served both by our government and by our intellectuals with regard to the differences with China. Perhaps a good way to address these issues would be to start with your enclosed article, and to comment it suitably.
This only is the beginning of the deception. The facts are that for decades, more than a century, the nearby imperial powers, Czarist Russia and Imperial Britain, had acknowledged China's suzerainty over Tibet. The facts are that China had not been consulted either during the establishment of the line in the west, nor during the establishment of the line in the east. Of the two, the demarcation in the east was the worse of the two, and consisted of an arbitrary line drawn by Mr. MacMahon on the map, representing the watershed of the Himalayan ridges. He did this against the instructions of the British government in India. But let us go on.
Brahm Chellaney's account reads like bad propaganda, and is bad propaganda. Nehru accepted Chinese occupation of Tibet; he did not confirm the boundary with China, not because China offered no opportunity, but because he sought more than China was offering.
On the other hand, Noorani assessed the situation correctly and described Nehru's activities in greater frankness.
Both these facts are correct and well-established.
The position on the west had not been established clearly. The position on the east, the McMahon Line, was drawn arbitrarily by McMahon, with the hapless Tibetans consenting, but without the consent of the Chinese representative in Lhasa.
The McMahon Line sought to establish the line south of the watershed, but very largely deviated from this principle; it actually was in places NORTH of the watershed.
The underlying belligerence that was a part of Nehru's posiion is clear from the extract above.
This (the publication of the official map with a firm boundary in the west, in unilateral supersession of the previous correct position) is factual, and was a falsehood by Nehru and the External Affairs Ministry.
Here, for those who have not caught the allusion, it is necessary to recall that in 1841, General Zorawar Singh, the outstanding general of the Dogra Maharaja of Kashmir, had swept through Ladakh, conquered it (it was then a dependent principality of Tibet, itself a dependent on suzerain China) and mounted a sharp attack on Tibet. This attack failed; he was killed, his troops repelled and in a precursor of 62, they were thrust pell-mell back into Ladakh. There they made a stand and were able to beat off the Tibetan forces. The resultant peace treaty of 1842 was between the Dogra forces and the Tibetan general.
This is from memory and may need minor correction.
This, after he had cooked up the facts, both in the west and in the east.
It is not clear what political weakness this reference is about. Otherwise the rest of the facts are correct.
The Henderson-Brooks Report was not written by two amateurs; it was written by a very senior general, a veteran of WWII, and by the darling of the Army, the VC winner, the bravest of the brave, Prem Bhagat.
It was a damning indictment.
Reading it, even today, is for a patriotic Indian with a fierce pride in the Indian Army, and the Navy and Air Force, like undergoing a public whipping.
They actually withdrew to the McMahon Line,
even when it was north of the watershed.
As a student of military history, i have gone through the accounts on the Chinese side and the Indian side carefully. Contrary to the accounts of brute force Chinese massed attacks on small groups of isolated Indians who fought to the last with unmatched valour, the picture that emerges is that of the last of the Mao-led wars in history. It showed all the hallmarks of the military style prescribed by Mao in his textbook on Military Warfare, "On Guerrilla Warfare".
There was no frontal massed attack.
Typically, the Chinese drove regiments, even brigades through defiles and ravines, and outflanked or attacked from the rear totally unprepared Indian positions. They attacked at night, and captured bunkers in a linear sequence* that ensured that they always had a local superiority, although overall the numbers were nowhere so disparate as to dictate a military disaster. They used noisy and alarming tactics, bugles, loud-hailers and concerted shouts, to alarm and upset a rattled, befuddled enemy fighting without good leadership, in exposed positions.
* This reminded me so much of the enfilading tactics of Frederick the Great that I read and re-read the comparative passages several times. It was true; this was classic concentration of force on a thin section of the line, its overwhelming, and then on to the next thin section.
Put very bluntly, NEFA 62 was not Thermopylae; it was Cannae.
The Indians did not move; the Chinese moved, moved, moved all the time.
It is time to deal with another myth.
We are told that our troops were badly-clothed, badly-armed and badly-positioned. True, but the Chinese were not better clothed. These attacks were made, in wet weather, in October and November. There are authentic reports of serious and significant Chinese deaths due to exposure to the weather. They struggled against local conditions as much as the Indians.
Why, oh why, does a Chinese analyst have to post this?
I would like to console myself with one thought.
This was a classic Maoist campaign. Mao is acknowledged as an outstanding military genius, quite apart from his outstanding grip over politics. The old master was up against a nouveau-riche barrister who had never practised, was brought up in the lap of luxury, and had appointed the grotesque Krishna Menon as the Defence Minister. Menon, with his penchant for doing the wrong thing at the wrong time, encouraged the ambitious B. M. Kaul to weaken the authority of the then COAS, General Thapar (Karan Thapar's father, if I'm not mistaken) and to arrogate power.
Kaul, in turn, lined up a stellar constellation: the bluff, blunt Lionel Pratap (Bogey) Sen, his COS, the sinister Monty Palit, and some hapless field officers to serve as his official cover.
Was this a contest?
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Look at what happened twenty years later. A sharp contrast.
In 1982 and before and after, during the Chinese conflicts with Vietnam, when Deng was Chief, and everybody took their cue from him, we saw a different story. The invincible PLA had its nose bloodied by a hard-fighting Vietnamese Army which put up its traditional rugged, indefatigable resistance to their old foes, their historical enemy. It was a lesson to the PLA, even more of a lesson to the Indian Army.
I am frankly writing this to take away some of the pain and humiliation of the sacrifice of IV Indian Div and its gallant soldiers, who died as political pawns of Nehru, Krishna Menon and Kaul, and because their own professional leadership did not turn around and kick these people in the seats of their churidars.
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Sadly,