Would America Risk a Nuclear War with China over Taiwan? | The National Interest Blog
Actually...They have gave it a lot of thought.
Or that they see enough parallels between then and now that they felt safe enough to make that assumption. One of those parallels is how Germany, under Hitler, felt about the injustices of the past and how China today feels about that 'century of humiliation'.
They did not have to assume. China made it clear enough that Chinese hegemony is Asia is the final goal.
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The problem is perception -- that China does not have enough of a 'positive' image as a power that must be 'reckoned with'. Yes, China's military is formidable and to reckon with China is to face China politically, economically, and militarily. But perception of those factors is independent of of the mechanics of how to face them, and currently and at least for the next decade, that perception is and will be negative.
It is not as easy to simply invade Taiwan after aerial bombardment as the Chinese section on this forum so naively posited. Back in WW II, merely 30 km of water separate England from continental Europe at the Strait of Dover. Germany had overwhelming control of the English Channel, from the entire coast of France all the way north to Belgium, and yet, never mind the arrogance of Hitler himself, no one sane on Hitler's staff felt that Germany could physically invade England without suffering casualties in terms of manpower and resources that it would negatively affect the war's effort elsewhere.
One hundred and sixty kilometers of water is a long way to go from mainland China to Taiwan. If being generous and say 20 kts or 40 k/hr, that would mean PLAN amphibious landing ships are vulnerable for at least 3 hrs on that journey, and 3hrs is generous considering it is unlikely that the route will be direct from two closest points between mainland China and Taiwan. So realistically and still being generous -- 4 hrs of vulnerability.
As expected, air power will be the dominant player in every aspect of the invasion. China could take dominant airspace control of Taiwan the way the Nazi Luftwaffe did with England's airspace, but China do not have the numerical advantage over Taiwan the way Germany had over England to make that control persistent. Taiwan's air bases are on the coast around the island and Taiwanese air power are vulnerable only to the naive. The RoCAF is proficient enough at using highways for air operations and the PLA do not have enough missiles to take them all out, by numbers and accuracy.
That mean even though the underdog, the RoCAF will be the equivalent of the RAF against the Luftwaffe to the point that it will give pause to the PLA for any amphibious invasion of Taiwan. As for the PLAN amphibious landing ships, the Taiwanese do not have to take them all out, just enough of them to demoralize the remaining force, and if the PLAAF do not have absolute airspace control over Taiwan, whatever remaining amphibious force that survived the journey and make it to Taiwan will be slaughtered on the beaches.
Hugh White may not have a high opinion of those who made assumptions about the US but he made the same mistake in assuming that China is militarily powerful to make escalation unpalatable to the US. So the question is not so much if the US is willing to go
mano-a-mano with China all the way to the nuclear threshold and see who blinks first, but whether the PLA leadership have the same wisdom as Hitler's staff did in trying to plan an invasion of England.
The question is also not so much if the PLA can sustain its buildup. Yes, it can and probably will. But equally important is whether Taiwanese defenses will continue to build, not to achieve parity, but to make any PLAN amphibious operations costly enough no matter how much the PLA can build itself up. The PLA talks about area denial with focus on the US. The Taiwanese can also talk about area denial with focus on China.
