World Armies - India

[fatman17]

Dear Indian Members:

Starting a Info-thread on the Indian Army. it will include the following:

Summary
Assessment
Deployments, tasks and operations
Recent and current operations
Command and control
Organisation
Order of battle
Special Forces
Army aviation Order of battle
Operational art and tactical doctrine
Training
Excercises
Army procurement
Equipment in service

it will take a few days to complete, so please be patient!
hope you will like it!

 

[fatman17]

Summary
Strength
1,100,000 (plus 300,000 first-line reserves within five years full-time service; a further 500,000 have committment until age 50). The Territorial Army has 40,000 first-line and 150,000 second-line troops.

Infantry
RAPID x 4. Reorganised Army Plains Infantry Division (RAPID) formations have three brigades - two mechanised infantry and one armoured.

Conventional Infantry division x 18

Mountain division x 10. Mountain units may serve in other terrain when circumstances dictate, and thus all may not be prepared for immediate operations at high altitude.

Counter Insurgency Force (Div eqvt) x 4. The para military Rashtriya Rifles - each force has three brigade equivalents.

Independent infantry brigade x 8 (inc. some mech.)

Independent parachute brigade x 1

Independent mountain brigade x 2

Armour
Armoured division x 3

Independent armoured brigade x 8

Artillery
Artillery division x 2

Air-Defence
Air Defence brigade x 6

Others
Engineer brigade x 4

SSM group x 3 or 4



Assessment
The Indian Army is by far the largest in South Asia and has capabilities well beyond those of its south asian neighbours. India's regional competitor, Pakistan, recognised India's supramacy in the early 1990's by adopting the doctrine of the "Riposte" which accepts that there would probably be multi-front advances into Pakistani territory in the event of a conflict, and intends to counter this by a seperate thrust (or thrusts) to the east.

Alrhough the 1999 conflict with Pakistan along the Line of Control (LOC) in the Kargil region thwarted the army's plans to reduce force levels in the area, it announced a withdrawal of approx. 20,000 troops from indian administered Kashmir in November 2004. This decision was motivated by the continuing peace negotiations and with Pakistan. The two infantry divisions withdrawn have been allocated to the new IX Corps of the new South Western Command.

The army has been subject to diminished morale following the 10-month debilitating operational deployment along the Pakistan frontier in 2002, with a growing number of suicides and murders resulting in a request that 400 psychiatrists be recruited specifically to treat troops suffering from psychological problems. Further disciplinary problems arose in the north-east and along the LOC. There has been a number of courts martial and boards of inquiry in 2006-2007 involving charges ranging from corruption to female harassment.

Senior positions are becoming increasingly difficult to fill with high quality officers. There are 732 brigadiers, 213 major generals and over 60 lieutenant generals, and length of time in postings especially command appointments, is often only a year or 18 months. Low recruitment and high loss rates of officers are verging on the critical, given the competing attraction of higher paid civilian employment.

Despite repeated declarations by successive army chiefs of intensions to create a lean and technologically driven force, the army has not yet achieved this and has had to rely on increasing use of para military forces to meet the country's growing counter-insurgency tasks. The admitted shortfall of 11,238 officers (the figure is greater when taking into account secondments to UN posts and the expanding para military forces), mainly in junior ranks, cannot help but contribute to dilution of standards. Total authorised establishment strength is 46,615, it is apparant that new units and capabilities will be less effective, if there is a lack of adequate leadership at the officer level. It was stated by the defence minister in parliament on 22 August 2007 that 882 officers had sought discharge from the army thus far in 2007, compared to 811 in 2006, 536 in 2005 and 425 in 2004. Should the shortfall ever be overcome, the financial implications would be substantial.

Financial allocations have not kept up with acquisitions and modernisation requirements, especially in armour and artillery, given the growing and competing demands of high technology communications systems. Whilst the army's share of the defence budget has increased and remains by far the largest, it has barely met annual inflation rates. The long term implications are that capabilities will be adversely affected. Given the absence of combined service planning, little improvement can be expected.

to be continued...

 

[fatman17]

Deployments, tasks and operations
Role and Deployment
The principal role of the army is to safeguard the territorial integrity of the state against external threats, which is a considerable task as almost half India's 16,500 Km land border is disputed by China, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Frontier terrain varies from deserts in the west, through the snowbound peaks and passes of the Himalayas on the country's northern rim, to the dense jungles and rain forests of the north-east. Terrain-specific training is lengthy, and it is only in an emergency that formations are committed outside their base areas.

The army has also been allocated, along with various ad hoc and para military elements, an enhanced role in protection against internal security threats which have persisted since independence in many areas of the country. This largely anti-terrorism role has been recognised as a core mission, and alterations in training, logistics and doctrine have followed. There has been more consideration given by senior commanders to countering insurgency by Naxalites, which operate in eight states. The issue was discussed at the Army Commander's Conference in April 2005, with the aim of producing proposals to assist the Home Ministry in coping with the growing insurgency. The govt. has stated that the army will not be deployed to deal with the insurrectionist People's War Group (PWG; now known as the Communist Party of India - Marxist-Leninist) in spite of the gravity of what has become an insurrection in the first phase of classic guerrilla warfare. In some areas, given the ability of the insurgents to conduct parallel government or even to be the sole guarantor of local stability, it appears that phase 2 may apply.

The announcement in September 2003 that the govt. was was to spend USD65 million to create "lethal units" in its conventional infantry battalions tasked with countering terrorism was greeted with enthusiasm by the media, but training is difficult and there are misgivings about duplication with existing counter-terror assets. The officer shortage is critical in this respect, as transfer of high quality leaders from conventional units can only have a negative impact on their effectiveness. No special equipment has been earmarked for the new platoons and although some units have been formed, they are far fewer than first envisaged. It was also announced that during 2004-2005 the army was to spend an additional USD62 million to create special units to counter land mines and improvised explosive devises (IEDs) used in ambushes.

The Northern, Western, South Western and Eastern commands are the most significant of the Indian Army in that they face the two potential adversaries with whom India has had conflicts in the past - China and Pakistan. Northern command has the responsibility of tackling the continuing insurgency in Kashmir as well as the localised low-intensity conflict in the Siachen glacier area (in which there is also a cease-fire). Eastern command has operational responsibility for the insurgencies in Assam, Manipur and Nagaland, all of which continue with considerable ferocity being displayed on both sides. The scale of the insurgent's operations is of major concern. Western and South Western commands although at a medium readiness alert for conventional war, have no internal security issues.

The army redeployed three infantry divisions from Eastern command (responsible for the border with China and Bangladesh), to confront Pakistan during heightened tensions in 2001/2002. The confrontation named Operation Parakram, lasted from 19 December 2001 to 16 October 2002, and it was stated in the Indian media that 680 soldiers were killed in the period of deployment. This figure may include the number killed elsewhere (that is, in indian administered Kashmir and the northeastern insurgency), as the Paramilitary Standing Committee on Defence recorded the official version that 473 soldiers were killed and 1,401 wounded in an operation that did not involve any contact with hostile forces. Many deaths and injuries appear to have been caused by poor mine discipline, and post operation analysis concluded, among other matters, that mine laying and mine lifting procedures were ineffective.

Major movement of troops and military equipment throughout India is a remarkably efficient process. The extensive railway system is geared to instant mobilisation, and procedures are tried and proven. During 2001/2002 additional artillery was deployed along the eastern border, fortifications strengthened, trenches dug, mines laid and scores of village defence committees issued with additional ammunition, ostensibly as insurance against enemy infiltration but in reality to encourage patriotic support among the rural population for an operation that resulted in much crop destruction and general disruption. Leave for all defence personnel was cancelled and military telephone exchanges across India rendered inaccessible to outside callers. The govt. eventually ordered withdrawal of the army (and airforce) to peacetime locations, having achieved nothing, and Pakistan's Army followed suit.

On 3 February 2008 the defence minister stated that he was "totally opposed" to deployment of the army against Naxals, Maoist guerrillas who control large areas of north-central India and present a grave threat to national security.

to be continued...

 

[fatman17]

Recent and current operations
UN Deployments
Along with other south asian nations, the Indian Army has been one of the largest providers of UN peacekeeping troops. In July 2007, Bangladesh, Pakistan, India and Nepal were ranked as the four most significant contributors of military personnel to UN missions. Indian troops have been valued for their professionalism throughout their UN deployments and, in a major incident, provided gunship support to Pakistani UN troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo in March 2005.
In January 2007, the UN's first all-female peacekeeping unit was deployed, comprising 103 Indian policewomen for the mission in Liberia. It is, in fact, not trully all female as 22 men will be employed "doing logistic work" but it will deploy only women and will assist the new Liberian National Police.
India has 8,862 personnel participating in 11 UN missions as of May 2008:

MONUC (DRCongo): 4,392 troops, 250 police and 55 military observers.
UNDOF (Golan Heights): 189 troops
UNFICYP (Cyprus): seven police
UNIFIL (Lebanon): 882 troops
UNIOSIL (Sierra Leone): three police
UNMEE (Ethiopia and Eriteria): 159 troops and 2 military observers.
UNMIK (Kosovo): 87 police
UNMIL (Liberia): 125 police
UNMIS (Sudan): 2,606 troops, 70 police and 20 military observers
UNMIT (East Timor): eight police, and
UNOCI (Cote d'Ivoire): seven military observers.

Consistent with its energetic support of the UN Charter, India is joint host (with Pakistan) to the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which is tasked to observe and report on the quantum of forces and incidents along the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir. In practice India refuses to permit the mission to undertake its duties in Indian administered Kashmir.


Command and Control
Minister of Defence: A.K.Antony

Chief of Army Staff: General Deepak Kapoor
Vice Chief of Army Staff: General M L Naidu

GOC-in-C Central Command: Lt. Gen. O P Nandrajog
GOC-in-C Eastern Command: Lt. Gen. V K Singh
GOC-in-C Western Command: Lt. Gen. T Kumar Sapru
GOC-in-C Northern Command: Lt. Gen. H Singh Panag
GOC-in-C Southern Command: Lt. Gen. N Samburaj
GOC-in-C South Western Command: Lt. Gen. P Kumar Singh

Commander, Army Training Command: Lt. Gen. J K Mohanty

The Army's headquarters are in New Delhi, and are conventionally organised on the UK model. The CoAS is assisted by the VCoAS and seven other principal staff officers who together form the Principal Staff Officers Committee.

Deputy chief of army staff - Planning and Systems
Deputy chief of army staff - Training and Coordination
Adjutant general (AG)
Quarter master general (QMG)
Master general of the ordnance (MGO)
Military secretary (MS)
Engineer-in-chief (E-in-C)

The army is organised into seven commands: six geographical operational commands (field armies) and army training command (ARTRAC). Army HQ excercises direct command over these. Each command in under a general officer commanding -in-chief, who holds the rank of Lt.Gen. He is commander of a demarcated geographical area and has both field and static formations under his command. The major field formations are corps, division and brigade, each the responsibility of an officer at the rank of Lt.Gen, Maj.Gen and Brig. respectively.

 

[fatman17]

Organisation
The Indian Army is the world's third largest with a current strenght of some 1,100,000. There are 300,000 first line reservists who were former regular soldiers and have five years reserve committment, and a further 500,000 who have committment until age 50. The Territorial army has 40,000 first line and 160,000 second line troops.

The army has six operational/geographic commands and ARTRAC. Operational commands are established on a regional basis and have force structures according to their environment (desert, mountain and so on. Policy dictates that commands be capable of conducting operations independently of the others in a two front conflict (for example against China and Pakistan). In early 2005 South Western Command was created to reduce the command span of HQ Northern Command. Two divisions of XVI Corps of Northern command fromed a new IX Corps in SW command.

The Northern, Western and South Western and Eastern Commands face the two potential adversaries with whom India had conflicts in the past - China and Pakistan. Northern command has the responsibility of tackling the continuing "proxy" war and insurgency in Kashmir as well as the localised middle intensity conflict over the Siachen glacier (in which there is also a ceasefire). Similarly, the Eastern command has to deal with the continuing insurgencies in Assam, Manipur and Nagaland. Western and Southern commands are are at a medium readiness state for conventional war, and are less committed to counter insurgency duties.

Training Command (ARTRAC)
ARTRAC (HQ, Shimla, Utter Pradesh) is responsible for developing and disseminating tactics and doctrines for the army in all phases of war, with emphasis on combined arms operations.

 

[fatman17]

...since this thread has not generated much interest or dialouge, i feel continuing this info-thread (which requires a lot of time) may not be worthwhile!

Thanks to all for their time.

 

[satishkumarcsc]

we were waiting for the end...we will first let you finish and then the discussion will start...

 

[Amanpuneet Singh]

complete it then we will discus it.

 

[Metallic]

Thanks for the info

 

[fatman17]

complete it then we will discus it.

aye aye sir!

 

[Cheetah786]

...since this thread has not generated much interest or dialouge, i feel continuing this info-thread (which requires a lot of time) may not be worthwhile!

Thanks to all for their time.

i am trying to catch up so didnt wanna join the party till the chapter is close to done

 

[fatman17]

i am trying to catch up so didnt wanna join the party till the chapter is close to done

no problem - it will start again by this saturday!

 

[RedBaron]

FATMAN Sahib, I've finally found you!!

Sir, you've been missed elsewhere in the WoT thread...we're having a fascinating debate on Indian support for Taliban, with the full complement of members: Think Tanks, firebrand Jihadists, screaming newbies, thoughtful intellectuals, quiet Americans, etc. etc. Or is that the reason you keep your distance?

This is in fact a great thread with potential for rich discussion. I will spend some time researching as well. My primary and most worrisome concern is shortage of officers due to unattractive compensation scales. There have been recent cases where armymen have surrendered their medals in protest. This is unfortunately not given adequate (I mean sustained) media coverage in India. Another concern is lengthy procurement delays. Both are mentioned in your posts but more debate is needed. I will be happy to research and contribute.

I welcome your thoughts on recent WoT threads like Swat agreement, India/Taliban nexus, etc...so please try and stop by.
Your views are held in high esteem by one and all, Sir...

 

[fatman17]

FATMAN Sahib, I've finally found you!!

Sir, you've been missed elsewhere in the WoT thread...we're having a fascinating debate on Indian support for Taliban, with the full complement of members: Think Tanks, firebrand Jihadists, screaming newbies, thoughtful intellectuals, quiet Americans, etc. etc. Or is that the reason you keep your distance?

This is in fact a great thread with potential for rich discussion. I will spend some time researching as well. My primary and most worrisome concern is shortage of officers due to unattractive compensation scales. There have been recent cases where armymen have surrendered their medals in protest. This is unfortunately not given adequate (I mean sustained) media coverage in India. Another concern is lengthy procurement delays. Both are mentioned in your posts but more debate is needed. I will be happy to research and contribute.

I welcome your thoughts on recent WoT threads like Swat agreement, India/Taliban nexus, etc...so please try and stop by.
Your views are held in high esteem by one and all, Sir...

do u mean uzbek/tajik nexus!
i will join soon as per my PM

 

[RedBaron]

do u mean uzbek/tajik nexus!
i will join soon as per my PM

No, Pak members are insisting India is collaborating with TTP/Pak Taliban as per some former US intel. It's a bizarre argument, but healthy debate nevertheless...