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Why Putin is being so helpful to the US
The United States is now sending almost all its supplies for the Afghan war through Russia or countries obedient to Moscow. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan would not allow US convoys had Russian President Vladimir Putin not sanctioned it. This route has taken away the leverage that Pakistani generals had over the US by virtue of the importance of the southern convoy routes.
In world affairs, one power only rarely helps another without incurring a debt, financial or otherwise. Even during World War II, the US leaned on Britain to open its empire to US commerce. Today, Putin has been exceptionally helpful to the US, despite having to endure disappointments and annoyances over the missile shield, Libya, and Syria.
He even faced an uninformed and worrisome statement from presidential contender Mitt Romney about Russia being the US's chief foe in the world.
The Russian president might obligingly inform his potential counterpart - in the interest of greater international understanding, of course - that if he were a foe, or treated as one in the future, he could maroon an American-European expeditionary force in the foreboding mountains and deserts of Central Asia.
Accommodating foreign powers and forbearance on the world stage have not been hallmarks of Russian or Soviet foreign policy over the years.
Nor are they readily discernible in the outlooks of former KGB officers. So why is Putin being so helpful to the US? The answer lies in common interests in Afghanistan, but perhaps more importantly in common concerns over the emerging geopolitics of Central Asia.
Russia and the US share an interest in countering Islamist militancy in Afghanistan and elsewhere. In recent years Russia has faced such militants in the Caucasus (Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ossetia) and does not wish to see their likes regain control of Afghanistan from which militancy might readily spread into Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Russia sees these former Soviet republics as in its sphere and it has worried of pan-Islamic movements there since the days of the communists - if not those of the tsars.
The importance of US supply lines into Afghanistan, in the eyes of the Kremlin, is not limited to the war and a show of cooperation. Putin is an avid student of state power and economics and knows that during the American Civil War (1861-65), the army built up the rail and telegraphic infrastructure which contributed mightily to the nation's subsequent economic boom; during World War II, the US built ports and air bases around the world that later expanded global commerce; and the port facilities and logistical hubs of the Vietnam war have proved useful to the Hanoi government long after the US departed in 1975.
Putin is also knowledgeable in judo, a martial art in which the expert uses his opponents' strengths to his advantage. In the Central Asian case, however, both partners will benefit though not equally. As the limitations of the roads, depots, and rail lines running from the Black Sea and Baltic Sea into Central Asia become clear to NATO logistics experts, it will be necessary to improve, expand and modernize them.
The US will build an infrastructure system that Russia and other countries in the region will benefit from for many decades. Corporations that today see Afghanistan as tempting but inaccessible will look again at those promising geological surveys that found great riches.
The US will be bringing in war material and development supplies; the enterprises of various countries will be taking out Afghan copper, iron, and rare earths. Extraction will be confined for the near term to the north where the insurgency is weak but with a settlement someday, southern resources too can head north, especially if Pakistan becomes more unstable and Iran remains under international sanctions.
Russia sees this economic potential as stabilizing the region, enriching its coffers and influence, and limiting or balancing the already considerable Chinese presence in Central Asia.
China is ascendant, Russia is not. China has been booming and its leadership and people look about them with a sense of limitlessness. Russia is comparatively stagnant and demoralized. Both powers know that they have vied over many centuries for power in Central Asia and that Russia usually won out, appropriating large swathes of the region.
From Moscow's perspective, China's economic expansion into Central Asia may be the basis for greater influence - perhaps a neo-colonial arrangement that from Beijing's perspective rights the wrongs of centuries past and helps restore its place as the center of the world.
Russia's goal is not to forge an anti-Chinese alliance with the US. Neither power wants that just now. The goal is to provide the basis for non-Chinese-centered development of the region and to strengthen a triangular power relationship among Russia, China, and the US - one with potential for each power's shifting over from side to side as circumstances warrant. Undoubtedly, circumstances will change.
The US, however, will be the weakest power in the Central Asian triangle. Geography guarantees that. Crucially, Russia can limit US influence in the region through its influence in several of the former Soviet republics, where old communist personnel and political arrangements have persisted. And of course should the US weary of the region or be expelled by Russia, the roads, depots, and other infrastructure it built over the years cannot very well be taken out.
Asia Times Online :: Why Putin is being so helpful to the US
The United States is now sending almost all its supplies for the Afghan war through Russia or countries obedient to Moscow. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan would not allow US convoys had Russian President Vladimir Putin not sanctioned it. This route has taken away the leverage that Pakistani generals had over the US by virtue of the importance of the southern convoy routes.
In world affairs, one power only rarely helps another without incurring a debt, financial or otherwise. Even during World War II, the US leaned on Britain to open its empire to US commerce. Today, Putin has been exceptionally helpful to the US, despite having to endure disappointments and annoyances over the missile shield, Libya, and Syria.
He even faced an uninformed and worrisome statement from presidential contender Mitt Romney about Russia being the US's chief foe in the world.
The Russian president might obligingly inform his potential counterpart - in the interest of greater international understanding, of course - that if he were a foe, or treated as one in the future, he could maroon an American-European expeditionary force in the foreboding mountains and deserts of Central Asia.
Accommodating foreign powers and forbearance on the world stage have not been hallmarks of Russian or Soviet foreign policy over the years.
Nor are they readily discernible in the outlooks of former KGB officers. So why is Putin being so helpful to the US? The answer lies in common interests in Afghanistan, but perhaps more importantly in common concerns over the emerging geopolitics of Central Asia.
Russia and the US share an interest in countering Islamist militancy in Afghanistan and elsewhere. In recent years Russia has faced such militants in the Caucasus (Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ossetia) and does not wish to see their likes regain control of Afghanistan from which militancy might readily spread into Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Russia sees these former Soviet republics as in its sphere and it has worried of pan-Islamic movements there since the days of the communists - if not those of the tsars.
The importance of US supply lines into Afghanistan, in the eyes of the Kremlin, is not limited to the war and a show of cooperation. Putin is an avid student of state power and economics and knows that during the American Civil War (1861-65), the army built up the rail and telegraphic infrastructure which contributed mightily to the nation's subsequent economic boom; during World War II, the US built ports and air bases around the world that later expanded global commerce; and the port facilities and logistical hubs of the Vietnam war have proved useful to the Hanoi government long after the US departed in 1975.
Putin is also knowledgeable in judo, a martial art in which the expert uses his opponents' strengths to his advantage. In the Central Asian case, however, both partners will benefit though not equally. As the limitations of the roads, depots, and rail lines running from the Black Sea and Baltic Sea into Central Asia become clear to NATO logistics experts, it will be necessary to improve, expand and modernize them.
The US will build an infrastructure system that Russia and other countries in the region will benefit from for many decades. Corporations that today see Afghanistan as tempting but inaccessible will look again at those promising geological surveys that found great riches.
The US will be bringing in war material and development supplies; the enterprises of various countries will be taking out Afghan copper, iron, and rare earths. Extraction will be confined for the near term to the north where the insurgency is weak but with a settlement someday, southern resources too can head north, especially if Pakistan becomes more unstable and Iran remains under international sanctions.
Russia sees this economic potential as stabilizing the region, enriching its coffers and influence, and limiting or balancing the already considerable Chinese presence in Central Asia.
China is ascendant, Russia is not. China has been booming and its leadership and people look about them with a sense of limitlessness. Russia is comparatively stagnant and demoralized. Both powers know that they have vied over many centuries for power in Central Asia and that Russia usually won out, appropriating large swathes of the region.
From Moscow's perspective, China's economic expansion into Central Asia may be the basis for greater influence - perhaps a neo-colonial arrangement that from Beijing's perspective rights the wrongs of centuries past and helps restore its place as the center of the world.
Russia's goal is not to forge an anti-Chinese alliance with the US. Neither power wants that just now. The goal is to provide the basis for non-Chinese-centered development of the region and to strengthen a triangular power relationship among Russia, China, and the US - one with potential for each power's shifting over from side to side as circumstances warrant. Undoubtedly, circumstances will change.
The US, however, will be the weakest power in the Central Asian triangle. Geography guarantees that. Crucially, Russia can limit US influence in the region through its influence in several of the former Soviet republics, where old communist personnel and political arrangements have persisted. And of course should the US weary of the region or be expelled by Russia, the roads, depots, and other infrastructure it built over the years cannot very well be taken out.
Asia Times Online :: Why Putin is being so helpful to the US
