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Why Is Military So Powerful In Pakistan?

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Why Is Military So Powerful In Pakistan?
11/28/2016 04:21 pm ET



Raza Habib Raja
Freelance writer, PhD Student

terrorism and also on criminal elements in Karachi, much to the respite of many. Moreover, he is also retiring on time, setting a very good precedent. Despite considering myself a critic of the army, personally I am an admirer of General Raheel Sharif. He is one of the finest soldiers to have emerged from the Pakistan Army and deserves special accolades.

At the same time, his tenure was also marked by civil-military tensions, resulting in several high-profile incidents, the latest being the so-called “Dawn” leaks. Civil-military tensions in Pakistan’s case are a regularity and all civilian governments have experienced it.

Military in Pakistan has been an omnipotent institution and will continue to do so. However, the balance between civilian and military leadership is complex and always in a state of flux. The only constant is that military has an upper hand. However, the degree to which it asserts its authority and is able to do so would really depend on many factors.

In Pakistan, there is a trend to look everything through a “conspiracy of the establishment” paradigm. However, the reality is quite complex. The army does not wield power ONLY because of its monopoly over physical violence and its maneuvers, but also because the balance of power changes towards it whenever the civilian side is weakened by internal strife and real or perceived incompetency. In a developing country like Pakistan, the army is after all one of the most cohesive and well-disciplined institutions, which enables it to successfully intervene in politics

Moreover, since it has become an established and powerful political player, the politicians also try to court it in order to get some political advantage. In recent times, Imran Khan, is a clear example of a politician, who has constantly been asking army to intervene.

But what makes the army so powerful?

In Pakistan’s case, the army became powerful in the early years of the country’s history and there were two major reasons for that.

The first reason was that Pakistan faced existential threat from India from the time it got independence, which meant that the state had to prioritize defense over everything else. British decision to withdraw from the subcontinent was a decision made in haste, which resulted in subsequent territorial disputes and large-scale rioting. The British withdrew, one year ahead of their original plan, after the rioting had already started. Moreover, the division of territory between India and Pakistan was controversial and the British also did not amicably settle the issue of princely states, which resulted in conflict between the two countries immediately after independence.

Pakistan and India went to war over Kashmir in 1947-1948, which merely exacerbated the fears of the Pakistani leadership. The state had to allocate huge resources towards defense and during the first three years, military commanded a whopping 70% of the federal budget. Besides getting enormous resources, the military was also given a lot of autonomy in their own domain. Pakistani leadership gave the military complete independence and did not try to meddle in their affairs. Military leadership also communicated to the civilian leadership that in order to defend Pakistan, it needed complete autonomy.

The complete freedom and high priority given to the military quickly transformed it, not only in terms of capability but also created its corporate and institutional identity. Further, Ayub Khan, the military chief, was given several extensions. He was appointed in 1951 and in 1954 given another extension. On the other hand, during the same time period, the country went through seven prime ministers and several cabinets. In India on the other hand, by 1955 the military chief had been changed six times whereas political leadership remained stable.

The second major reason was the weakness as well as incompetency of the civilian side exacerbated by low political institutionalization. Political institutionalization was low in Pakistan from the very beginning, allowing the army to become an important political player. An early part of Pakistan’s history was marked by constant changes and palace intrigues, resulting in a lot of political chaos which enabled army to intervene easily.

Once the army became a powerful political stakeholder, its role and position became entrenched due to path dependency. The argument is that if civil institutions, due to legacy or incompetency, do not get anchored in the polity, then the army and civil bureaucracy, due to their better discipline and competency, end up managing the civil affairs as well. Once that happens, a path is established which the polity follows.

In the case of Pakistan, once military became involved in politics, its role was further entrenched due to adaptive expectations of the other political actors (both domestic and foreign), positive feedback and exercise of power (backed by instruments of physical violence).

Generally, path dependency trajectory can be broken if an extraordinary event occurs which completely discredits the military. In Pakistan’s history, such event was East Pakistan debacle.

Never in the history of Pakistan had its army seen such humiliation. In fact, even till this date, in the collective psychology of the nation, the East Pakistan debacle remains the lowest point in its entire history.

For 24 years before that fateful incident, among other things, prestige in the public had enabled an army to become such a strong political player. Even when Ayub Khan himself was becoming unpopular, the Pakistan Army still enjoyed a considerable amount of respect. After the debacle, the Pakistan Army was discredited thoroughly.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had the support and popularity to build upon it and relegate an army to a purely conventional role. However, due to a combination of factors, including his own style of ruling (he ruled like a despot and targeted his opponents), the army was able to regain control.

After 1977 the army has constantly been in the driving seat, though balance at times has shifted slightly towards the civilian side. The degree to which the military would actively and regularly intervene in the governance of the country has depended on two factors.

First, it would intervene, when its institutional interests are threatened. Institutional interests encompass its corporate privileges, professional autonomy and even its influence over foreign policy. In 1999, it intervened to depose Nawaz Sharif to save itself as an institution.

Second, it would intervene when it perceives (rightly or wrongly is another matter) that civilian side is incompetent. Over the years, army has developed a tutelary role in which it sees itself as an ultimate protector and guardian of the state. This tutelary role is an outcome of years of autonomy, disregard of civilian supremacy and also its perception that civilian side is incompetent. Pakistan’s white collar urban middle class is an active supporter for this role of the army and media personnel belonging to the same class often eulogize the army and encourage it to interfere in governance. In fact, due to this, the civil military balance skews further towards the latter whenever the former is perceived as incompetent or corrupt.

Nawaz Sharif’s current reign is a visible proof of the above dynamic. His position relative to the army has deteriorated a lot after Panama leaks, despite the fact that he enjoys a comfortable majority in the legislature.

Every COAS has his own style and within the established parameters (in which army is better placed and looks for its institutional interests) influences the way tussle between civil and military is played out. After new COAS takes charge, the change will be in the style and extent, but not in the overall balance of power, at least in the short run. Too much has to happen, for that power imbalance to change.

A slightly different version of this article was published on Express Tribune on 25th November 2016
 
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Simple answer,,,crisis of a genuine leader who can take aspiration of the people of Pakistan....And the interesting part is Army can never fulfill the role of civillian leaders. If that would have been the case, Musharaf or later on Mr RS could have contested the election to win to lead the country...But this is not happening. This implies that Army is simply exploiting the situation of non availability of a good leader in your country to whom your people can trust...
 
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Simple answer,,,crisis of a genuine leader who can take aspiration of the people of Pakistan....And the interesting part is Army can never fulfill the role of civillian leaders. If that would have been the case, Musharaf or later on Mr RS could have contested the election to win to lead the country...But this is not happening. This implies that Army is simply exploiting the situation of non availability of a good leader in your country to whom your people can trust...
Genuine leader cannot come without a continuous political process.
 
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Simple answer,,,crisis of a genuine leader who can take aspiration of the people of Pakistan....And the interesting part is Army can never fulfill the role of civillian leaders. If that would have been the case, Musharaf or later on Mr RS could have contested the election to win to lead the country...But this is not happening. This implies that Army is simply exploiting the situation of non availability of a good leader in your country to whom your people can trust...
Genuine leader cannot come without a continuous political process.
The lack of a political process is one aspect of it. Nehru's greatest gift to India was the abolishment of the Feudal system, and the other great gift being the survival of his like minded(in sincerity) of compatriots.

Pakistan on the other hand had Jinnah, who was surrounded by sycophantic opportunists at the top tier(which he realised too late) of which Liaqat Ali Khan was at the head of. The original ML leagues who had sincerity of purpose were thrown out of this circle less than a year after the Quaid's death by this section of Unionists, Feudal and some military officers as well if the various accounts of history are correlated.

So essentially, any source material for producing a civilian leader of equal intellect, guile and support was extinguished early on during the Ayub years in which the bureaucracy and military was soon filled with moles and sell outs. The only opposition to it was Bhutto and the PPP but they too could not last long against the old nexus.

Regardless of ill informed media perceptions and ideals; Pakistan is not ruled by anyone as such and not even from within. It has circles of power that are always in conflict even within the military and establishment. Raheel Sharif is not celebrated as such for his anti-terrorist operations as much as de-politicising the military. That too however, will not last long as there are already people within the military that are fighting against his cleanups as it effects their internal corruption and at times instructions from abroad.

This is not a rant of conspiracy but rather the stark reality of a nation that does not have institutions with good integrity of purpose. One can call it characteristics of the land or people but as such it is the issue of passed down institutional rot. That is not to say that Pakistan is the ONLY nation with these problems as the neighborhood as them to a large extent as well, but as this topic is on Pakistan the focus is here.

The military is not just power because India does truly pose a threat to independent foreign and economic policy(BD is a prime example of where India dictates their day to day government operations) but also because the military is needed to hold together a nation quite ready to tear each other apart at the slightest of whims.
 
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The lack of a political process is one aspect of it. Nehru's greatest gift to India was the abolishment of the Feudal system, and the other great gift being the survival of his like minded(in sincerity) of compatriots.

Pakistan on the other hand had Jinnah, who was surrounded by sycophantic opportunists at the top tier(which he realised too late) of which Liaqat Ali Khan was at the head of. The original ML leagues who had sincerity of purpose were thrown out of this circle less than a year after the Quaid's death by this section of Unionists, Feudal and some military officers as well if the various accounts of history are correlated.

So essentially, any source material for producing a civilian leader of equal intellect, guile and support was extinguished early on during the Ayub years in which the bureaucracy and military was soon filled with moles and sell outs. The only opposition to it was Bhutto and the PPP but they too could not last long against the old nexus.

Regardless of ill informed media perceptions and ideals; Pakistan is not ruled by anyone as such and not even from within. It has circles of power that are always in conflict even within the military and establishment. Raheel Sharif is not celebrated as such for his anti-terrorist operations as much as de-politicising the military. That too however, will not last long as there are already people within the military that are fighting against his cleanups as it effects their internal corruption and at times instructions from abroad.

This is not a rant of conspiracy but rather the stark reality of a nation that does not have institutions with good integrity of purpose. One can call it characteristics of the land or people but as such it is the issue of passed down institutional rot. That is not to say that Pakistan is the ONLY nation with these problems as the neighborhood as them to a large extent as well, but as this topic is on Pakistan the focus is here.

The military is not just power because India does truly pose a threat to independent foreign and economic policy(BD is a prime example of where India dictates their day to day government operations) but also because the military is needed to hold together a nation quite ready to tear each other apart at the slightest of whims.

You're right, I agree with all of that. Although I could never state so with such concision. I am slightly more hopeful of the future. The fragile, limited and feigned democracy we have is far from adequate, but it's at least something and we might actually have a chance of influencing it for the better.
 
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The real important question here is not why the military is so powerful, but whether its power is good for the country or not.
 
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The real important question here is not why the military is so powerful, but whether its power is good for the country or not.
Yes, absolutely so. Reason? Like many developing countries Pakistan is unconstituted conflicted bedlam of ethnicities, tribes, clans, sects. Without a very strong unifying force the centrifugal forces that all the divisions engender would unravel the state and create a atomized land similar to how Iraq has descended into anarchy or even Afghanistan next door.

And the reason why Pak military is so overweaning is simple. It is historical. The British recruited almost 40% of their Raj Army from upper Punjab and KPK. In 1947 Pakistan might have got less of everything but it ended up with a larger portion of the erstwhile Raj Army then it's size warranted. That tradition of military service began back in 1860s ever since McMahon's declared preferance for marital theory recruitment from Potohar and K-PK and by 1947 was firmly embeded. It further was secured after Gen.Ayub Khan took over who moved his capital to the centre of the recruitment block - Rawalpindi. That historical legacy from British times continues today.
 
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Simple answer,,,crisis of a genuine leader who can take aspiration of the people of Pakistan....And the interesting part is Army can never fulfill the role of civillian leaders. If that would have been the case, Musharaf or later on Mr RS could have contested the election to win to lead the country...But this is not happening. This implies that Army is simply exploiting the situation of non availability of a good leader in your country to whom your people can trust...
Mushy contested in and won elections while RS is simply not interested.
 
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As an Indian I feel it was unnecessary on the part of author to have repeatedly brought Indian polity into this article. The first half of it seems to have been written half halfheartedly because its towards the end that the author makes some valid points.

among other things, prestige in the public had enabled an army to become such a strong important political player.

That is the crux of it!

I have always believed that military incursion into a country's politics is never in the benefit of the populace in the long term. After all military intervention is an act made by active members of the military heads, outside the conventions of the military institution with the aim of disrupting the political status quo, in the pursuit of their political interest.

Pakistan’s white collar urban middle class is an active supporter for this role of the army and media personnel belonging to the same class often eulogize the army and encourage it to interfere in governance.
I see this as a mere excuse for the army to harp on whenever one questions their authority. What if i were to say that army has over the decades slowly and cautiously cultivated such an image for itself?

The army does not wield power ONLY because of its monopoly over physical violence and its maneuvers, but also because the balance of power changes towards it whenever the civilian side is weakened by internal strife and real or perceived incompetency.

Not true. India has also gone through turbulent times but not once has Indian army ever taken over power from the civilian government. I'm talking about Indira Gandhi's era.

The first reason was that Pakistan faced existential threat from India from the time it got independence, which meant that the state had to prioritize defense over everything else.
India has always been viewed as an existential threat for no reason at all. This scaremongering by the politicians and military leaders is what has created a perpetual rift between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan and India went to war over Kashmir in 1947-1948, which merely exacerbated the fears of the Pakistani leadership.
Not as if India added fuel to fire...
 
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That is the crux of it!

I have always believed that military incursion into a country's politics is never in the benefit of the populace in the long term. After all military intervention is an act made by active members of the military heads, outside the conventions of the military institution with the aim of disrupting the political status quo, in the pursuit of their political interest.

Further, once they have grabbed power, they are loathe to give it up. Hence, they interfere and destroy all the processes that would give rise to a viable political leadership so that their illegal hold on power remains unchallenged. Add in extensive business interests, and the devastating mix is complete for the entire nation.
 
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What is the role of the bureaucrats???? We hardly get to discuss that aspect......
 
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PML(N) is the brainchild of the Military. There was and is never any conflict between them.

The conflicts was always between Punjabis on oneside and Muhajirs/Pathans on the other side.

India has always had good relations under Punjabi Generals as Punjabi Pakistanis have soft corner for India.


In fact: Punjabis dominate the Pakistan Army — but only just
A Jat from Ghakhar Mandi in Pakistan’s Punjab, Bajwa is the third successive Punjabi since 2007 to lead Pakistan Army.
Written by Sameer Arshad Khatlani | Updated: December 7, 2016 3:29 am
pakistan-army-chief_kuma759.jpg

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General Qamar Javed Bajwa (Source: AP)
WHEN General Qamar Javed Bajwa took over as Pakistan’s new Army Chief, superseding four Lieutenant Generals, it confirmed the Punjabi dominance over the country’s armed forces. A Jat from Ghakhar Mandi in Pakistan’s Punjab, Bajwa is the third successive Punjabi since 2007 to lead the country’s Army, which inherited the predominance of Pakistan’s largest linguistic group from the British.

In 1939, as many as 29% of soldiers in the British Indian Army, which was split between India and Pakistan after Partition, were Punjabi Muslims, mostly from Pakistani Punjab. Their ascendancy in the British forces is rooted in the Revolt of 1857 that made colonial rulers distrustful of men from the traditional recruiting grounds of modern-day Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. The hardy Punjabi Muslims were seen to be more loyal to the British; North Indian Muslims, one of the mainstays of the revolt, in contrast, were seen to be nostalgic for the Mughal rule that the British had replaced.

The Punjabi dominance, however, has not been absolute. Pathans, the second most dominant ethnic group within Pakistan’s armed forces, and Urdu speakers (Muhajirs) have punched above their weight when it comes to leading the Army. Pakistan got its first Punjabi Army Chief, General Tikka Khan, only in 1972, 25 years after independence. Five Punjabi generals, not including Bajwa, have headed the Army since then — Punjabis have occupied the top post for only 28 of the 69 years of Pakistan’s existence. Seven — fewer than half — of the 16 Chiefs so far have been Punjabis. Until 2007, only 4 out of 13 Chiefs were Punjabis, who account for 56% of Pakistan’s population and enjoy an upper hand in the military and bureaucracy. Just 1 out of 4 military dictators has been a Punjabi.

On the other hand, Pathans, who are 16% of the country’s population, have given Pakistan 4 Army Chiefs with a combined 16 years in charge. Two of the 4 military rulers, Field Marshal Ayub Khan and Punjab-born General Yahya Khan, were Pathans who ruled for 14 years.

General Zia-ul-Haq, the lone Punjabi dictator, who was from Jalandhar and an alumnus of Delhi’s St Stephen’s College, ruled Pakistan for 11 years. The Urdu-speaking General Pervez Musharraf, who was born in Delhi, ruled for 9 years after overthrowing Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a 1999 coup. Non-Punjabi dictators have ruled Pakistan for 25 of its 34 years of military rule.

The high proportion of Pathans in Pakistan’s armed forces has offset challenges to the country’s sovereignty. Successive Afghan regimes, including that of the Taliban, have refused to recognise the Durand Line that divides Pakistani and Afghan Pathan areas, where some 4 crore people live. Around 3 crore Pathans are Pakistani citizens who live in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly Northwest Frontier Province), where separatism predated Pakistan’s breakup in 1971. Unlike Pathans, Bengalis were less than 1% of the Pakistani Army — this lopsided representation is blamed for exacerbating tensions between East and West Pakistan that eventually led to the creation of Bangladesh with India’s help.

Pathan General Ayub Khan’s appointment as the first Pakistani head of the Army in 1951 coincided with the rise of separatism in NWFP. He led the first military coup 7 years later, and remained at the helm for the next 11 years as President. Pathans acquired greater stake in Pakistan during this time, and helped counter separatism. On the other hand, the language riots in East Pakistan over the imposition of Urdu in 1952 turned out to be a slippery slope. The one-language formula reflected the Muhajir dominance over the bureaucracy and their idea of a unitary state. Bangladesh’s creation led to the demise of the two-nation theory that the Muhajirs had played a key role in propounding.

Pakistan’s humiliating dismemberment played a key role in shaping the young commando Musharraf, one of the two Urdu-speaking Mujahir Army Chiefs — the other being the Azamgarh-born General Mirza Aslam Beg. Between them, they helmed the Army for 12 years — while their community of Urdu-speaking immigrants from India comprises only 6% of Pakistan’s population. Beg steered the Kashmiri insurrection in the late 1980s, while Musharraf masterminded the limited war in Kargil to internationalise the Kashmir dispute.

General Muhammad Musa, who belonged to the minuscule Hazara community from Baluchistan, led the Army for 8 years (1958 to 1966). But no Sindhi or Baluch (3%) has ever taken what’s arguably the country’s most powerful post. The late Army chief General Asif Nawaz’s brother, the author Shuja Nawaz, has accessed documents that show that only 15% of soldiers belong to Sindh and Baluchistan. Soldiers from Sindh may not necessarily be ethnic Sindhis, who form Pakistan’s second biggest ethnic group (17%). The British had granted large numbers of Punjabis land and settled them in the province for their military services. Author Anatol Lieven has argued that Punjabi settlers “have contributed a disproportionate number of recruits from Sindh”. There has, of late, been an attempt to encourage the recruitment of the so-called non-martial Sindhis and Baluch by lowering fitness and educational requirements.

The far smaller region of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, whose demographic makeup mirrors Punjab’s Pothwar region where a majority of Pakistani soldiers are recruited from, contributes 6% recruits, as per Shuja Nawaz’s account. A bulk of the soldiers are drawn from Punjab (65%), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Federally Administered (Pathan) Tribal Areas (15%). Even within Punjab, recruits are chiefly drawn from the Pothwar region’s Jat, Rajput, Awan, Gakkar and Gujjar biradris. At least three Army Chiefs — Generals Tikka Khan, Asif Nawaz and Raheel Sharif — have been Punjabi Rajputs.

sameer.khatlani@expressindia.com

http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/pakistan-army-general-qamar-javed-bajwa-4412295/
 
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bcoz feudal, industrial politicians were never representative or servant of people, they always represented and serve for Jati Umra or naodero.

Until we have true democratic parties who work like institutions instead of what their master aka looters desire, civilians will never be powerful.
 
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Not to brag about it but i have explained it as well as anyone can here:
https://defence.pk/threads/pakistans-political-history-part-1.407849/#post-7865321
@Levina , check the comparison made between Pakistan and India.

Muslim League also failed to sustain itself as a party, it faded away after the creation of Pakistan. Say if the party remained strong would any dictator be able to remain in power for long, politicians didn't even challenge bureaucrats.
 
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