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When a single strike reduced IAF by 30%

Windjammer

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Operation ‘Grand Slam’ was launched in the early hours of 1st September 1965. Audacious as the plan was, it took the Indians by complete surprise. A Pak Army force consisting of an infantry division and two armoured regiments, along with extensive artillery support, started the attack on Indian positions. Outnumbered and out-gunned, Brig Man Mohan Singh, Commander 191 Infantry Brigade, was faced with a critical situation and he frantically called for air support. By the time the request got an ultimate approval from the Ministry of Defence in Delhi, it was late in the afternoon.

Pathankot was the nearest airbase in the zone of conflict. It housed three squadrons including two with Mystère IVs – Nos 3 and 31 – and one with Vampires – No 45. Under command of an enthusiastic and energetic Sqn Ldr Sudesh K Dahar, No 45 Sqn had recently moved from Pune in anticipation of the hostilities. The Vampires had been armed and waiting on the tarmac since morning. Three missions had been planned and on receipt of orders, the first formation of four aircraft took off at 1650 hrs (PST) with Dahar leading.

The grim situation on the ground found the Vampires at work immediately. Much has been made of their success by the IAF, but Maj Gen G S Sandhu was not impressed; in his book History of Indian Cavalry, he recounts how the first Vampire strike of four “leisurely proceeded to destroy three AMX-13 tanks of India’s own 20 Lancers, plus the only recovery vehicle and the only ammunition vehicle available during this hard-pressed fight. The second flight attacked Indian infantry and gun positions, blowing up several ammunition vehicles.” 3 Mahar is also said to have shared the ignominy at the hands of IAF. Any pretension as to the success of Dahar’s mission was quashed when Flt Lt S V Pathak was hit by ground fire1. He however managed to stagger across to friendly territory before carrying out a remarkable bail-out, as the early vintage Vampires were not equipped with ejection seats.

At Sargodha, the main PAF airbase, Air Defence Alert duties were being shared by different F-86 Sabre squadrons. The exuberance and excitement of the pilots was exemplified by nobody better than Flt Lt Imtiaz A Bhatti of No 15 Sqn who, having completed his 0400-1200 hrs shift, pleaded to stay on for the second half, hoping to get an opportunity of flying a coveted combat sortie. With him on alert was PAF’s highly regarded and popular Sqn Ldr Sarfaraz Ahmad Rafiqui, the Squadron Commander of No 5 Sqn. Rafiqui’s happy-go-lucky style belied a thoroughly sound professional standing amongst PAF’s elite group of pilots. A gifted flier, he had bagged the ‘Atcherly Trophy’ for the Best Pilot as a cadet in the Flying College at Risalpur. He continued with a string of above average reports in his Advanced Flying Course as well as the Fighter Weapons Instructors’ Course, both done in USA. He again showed his prowess as a superb fighter pilot by topping the course at PAF’s Fighter Leaders’ School. After yet another course at RAF’s prestigious Fighter Combat School, he ended up piling a unique assortment of highly rated qualifications that served him (and the PAF) in good stead. As an exchange pilot in UK, he flew Hunters for two years. His credentials looked good; it remained to be seen if he was equally impressive in actual combat.

As the pilots ‘scrambled’ in response to the buzz on Sargodha hot line shortly before 1700 hrs (PST), it seemed certain that Rafiqui’s flair and Bhatti’s fervour would come together in a lethal combination. Within minutes, the Sabres took-off and were directed by Sakesar radar to head 060º and climb to an altitude of 20’000 ft or ‘Angels 20’, in radar jargon. Reaching the area, the radar controller set them up in a racetrack pattern in Sialkot-Chamb direction, ten miles from the border. It wasn’t long before they were ‘vectored’ to Chamb, where the second formation of four Vampires led by Flt Lt A K Bhagwagar was busy in the fray. The Sabres descended and started a visual search not only for the attacking aircraft, but also for the PAF C-in-C who was reported to be making an on-site assessment of the battle in a T-37. To say that consequences of fratricide would have been grave would be an under-statement!


Bhatti was the first to spot two Vampires crossing 3-4,000 ft underneath and the sooner he informed his leader, Rafiqui immediately acknowledged, “Contact, going for them.” Bhatti set about clearing tails while Rafiqui stalked his prey. Just then, Bhatti spotted two more aircraft a mile away, which he mistook for Canberras in the glare of the low evening sun; in fact these were Vampires from Dahar’s formation on the way out after completing their mission. As Bhatti was about to seek his leader’s permission to go for the pair, he saw another two Vampires trying to get behind Rafiqui. Almost instinctively, Bhatti broke off, positioned behind these two and in no time had one of them in his gunsight; but before Bhatti could shoot, he had to have Rafiqui out of his line of fire.

Rafiqui meanwhile, had despatched one of the Vampires with a blazing volley from the lethal 0.5” Browning six-shooter (actually six guns) and was chasing the other. At this stage, the Vampire on whom Bhatti had trained his guns was closing in on Rafiqui and the situation was getting perilous. “Break left,” yelled Bhatti, but Rafiqui managed to make short work of the second one before reacting just in time. Rafiqui then readjusted on the wing of Bhatti who got busy with his quarry. While Rafiqui cleared tails, Bhatti did an equally fast trigger job. One Vampire nosed over into the ground, which was not too far below; the other, smoking and badly damaged, ducked into the trees. It’s bewildered pilot, Flg Off Sondhi staggered back to tell the horrifying tale. The less fortunate Flt Lts A K Bhagwagar, V M Joshi and S Bharadwaj went down with their Vampires in full view of the horrified Indian troops.


Also watching the dogfight was Pakistani Brig Amjad A K Choudhry, Commander Corps Artillery. He reminisced in his book September ’65 – Before and After, “When we saw the bombers from our command post, we were apprehensive because our tanks and infantry surrounding Chamb were in the open, in close formations and were very vulnerable to air attack. The bombers went into action and came low to drop their bombs. Before they could do much damage, there was a flash in the air on top of these bombers and before we could comprehend what had happened, the Indian bombers came down in three columns of smoke.” Suggestion of Divine intervention aside, Choudhry correctly mentions the number of Vampires that fell in the dogfight, an issue that has been mired in some confusion over the years.

Back at Pathankot, the first three Vampires landed, then a singleton came in and finally, another four Vampires landed. Those on the ground thought that the lone Vampire was actually a straggler from the first formation, the four Vampires were of the second formation and, four more were yet to come. When Flt Lt Farokh J Mehta and his wingmen removed their oxygen masks, the Engineering Officer was shocked to discover that three of the second formation were missing. “He had this horrified look on his face,” Mehta recollected. Providentially, Mehta had changed places with Bhagwagar on the latter’s request, being the more experienced to lead the last formation in poor lighting conditions. He ruefully remembered how a badly shaken Sondhi narrated details of the dogfight to the crest-fallen squadron mates.

When Air Marshal M Nur Khan, who had landed at Sargodha after his recce sortie, summoned Rafiqui and Bhatti, nobody was sure if it was for a dressing down for starting an air war. Shoot-to-kill orders had not yet been issued and Rafiqui felt somewhat apprehensive, though he re-assured Bhatti that he alone would take the flak from the C-in-C. “Well done my boys,” was the reply from the man who was never in doubt about how the PAF should have responded.

This single engagement resulted in a windfall of strategic dimensions for the PAF. The shocked and demoralised IAF immediately withdrew about 80 Vampires, together with over 50 Ouragons, from front-line service.

The IAF was effectively reduced in combat strength by nearly 30% in one deadly stroke, thanks to Rafiqui and Bhatti’s marksmanship. Both were awarded a Sitara-i-Jur’at each. As for Sqn Ldr Dahar, he made up for his dampened enthusiasm with a display of considerable fortitude; it earned him a consolation Vir Chakra.

The+first+combat.jpg
 
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Trolling aside by Pakistanis, you Pakistanis can chest thump all you want in your imaginary worlds, but at the end of the day, the geographical reality of your country that we have caused will forever be etched in every world map. The fact that you dont have kashmir or East Pakistan in your national geography anymore is all that really needs to be said.

If you can reduce IAF by a single strike by 30%, we can reduce the size of your country by a single strike by 50%. Have a good night. Pce out
I think reduce the IAF by a single strike by 50% is possible.

I have to say, I am a little angry about India.

If India can not see MH370, a boeing 777, I mean, is there any military plane has bigger RCS? Ruin the whole IAF by one strick is not mission impossible.
 
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The Americans had armed Pakistan with F-104s, F-86 Sabres, B-57 bombers and advanced air defence radars still we fought them. :D :D
 
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"Pakistan claims to have destroyed something like 1/3rd the Indian Air Force, and foreign observers, who are in a position to know say that Pakistani pilots have claimed even higher kills than this; but the Pakistani Air Force are being scrupulously honest in evaluating these claims. They are crediting Pakistan Air Force only those killings that can be checked from other sources."

Roy Meloni,
American Broadcasting Corporation
September 15, 1965.

1965 War, the Inside Story by R.D. Pradhan:

In Chapter 8 titled "Of Cowardice and Panic", the author describes the cowardice of Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad, the Indian general commanding officer in Lahore sector. When the general was fired upon by Pakistani forces, he "ran away". "On learning that, Lt. Gen. Harbakash Singh and the corps commander drove in a Jonga to the battlefront. Army commander found that the enemy (PAF) air attack had created a havoc on G.T. Road. (Indian) Vehicles were burning and several vehicles of 15 Division abandoned on the road, the drivers having run away, leaving some of the engines still running. Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad was hiding in a recently irrigated sugar cane field. As described by Harabakash Singh: "He (Prasad) came out to receive us, with his boots covered with wet mud. He had no head cover, nor was he wearing any badges of his rank. He had stubble on his face, not having shaved." Seeing him in such a stage, Harbakhash Singh asked him: "Whether he was the General Officer commanding a division or a coolie? Why had he removed badges of rank and not shaved? Niranjan Prasad had no answer."

Pradhan's book contains many different entries by Indian Defense Minister Y.B. Chavan. A Sept 9, 1965 entry reads: Had a very hard day on all fronts. Very fierce counter-attacks mounted and we are required to withdraw in Kasur area. COAS was somewhat uncertain of himself. I suggested to him that he should go in forward areas so that he will be in touch of realities. He said he would go next day.

In Line of Duty: A Soldier Remembers, Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh reveals that not only did Gen Chowdhury play a very small role in the entire campaign, he was so nervous as to be on the verge of losing half of Punjab to Pakistan, including the city of Amritsar. Harbakhsh describes, in clinical detail, how our own offensive in the Lahore sector had come unhinged. The general commanding the division on Ichchogil canal fled in panic, leaving his jeep, its wireless running and the briefcase containing sensitive documents that were then routinely read on Radio Pakistan during the war. Singh wanted to court martial him, Chowdhury let him get away with resignation.

According to Shekhar Gupta, the editor of Indian Express, Harbkhash Singh recounts that a bigger disaster struck a bit to the south where the other division cracked up in assault, just as it encountered a bit of resistance. Several infantry battalions, short on battle inoculation, deserted and Singh gives a hair-raising account – and confirmation of a long-debated rumor – that Chowdhury panicked so badly he ordered him to withdraw to a new defensive line behind the Beas, thereby conceding half of Punjab to Pakistan. Singh describes the conversation with Chowdhury at Ambala where he refused to carry out the order, asking his chief to either put it down in writing or visit the front and take charge of the battle.

The London Daily Mirror reported in 1965:

"There is a smell of death in the burning Pakistan sun. For it was here that India's attacking forces came to a dead stop.

"During the night they threw in every reinforcement they could find. But wave after wave of attacks were repulsed by the Pakistanis"

"India", said the London Daily Times, "is being soundly beaten by a nation which is outnumbered by four and a half to one in population and three to one in size of armed forces."


In Times reporter Louis Karrar wrote:

"Who can defeat a nation which knows how to play hide and seek with death".

USA - Aviation week & space technology - December 1968 issue.

"For the PAF, the 1965 war was as climatic as the Israeli victory over the Arabs in 1967. A further similarity was that Indian air power had an approximately 5:1 numerical superiority at the start of the conflict. Unlike the Middle East conflict, the Pakistani air victory was achieved to a large degree by air-to-air combat rather than on ground. But it was as absolute as that attained by Israel.
 
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