Niaz Sb - good analysis - except for the requirement in the last para, all the above are 'within' the PN budget and no 'additional' funding wld be required - also historically the numbers match.
Reading Aamir Hussain's two notes, thereafter Niaz's was very informative and instructive. With respect, however, what seems to be needed in this situation is zero-based budgeting. It may be useful to assume nothing available, and then evaluate the possible threats, at different levels of intent. This can serve to generate the requirements of the Navy, not full-fat requirements, but even asymmetric warfare-oriented requirements.
For example, assuming for a moment that the threat is as small as the Indian Navy, a Pakistani naval strategist might decide to assume three levels of warfare. These might be
- A state of tension between the two states, leading to a passive naval blockade of Pakistan;
- Another, more intense state of tension, marked perhaps by small raids on naval and commercial assets in coastal areas, mounted by aircraft, small boats and special forces, alone or in combination;
- Finally, the possibility of open warfare, with no holds barred.
For the first, it is safe to assume that the Indian Navy will mount the blockade as far from Pakistani submarines, and its P3C Orions, as is possible. It is probable that the blockade will be mounted by frigates, by submarines, possibly, just possibly by air cover from a carrier over the horizon.
Responses to this obvious scenario have included both surface ship opposition as well as submarine-based oppositon. Quite honestly, given the conditions, it does seem that investing in submarines is a better ROI for the PN. Small, coastal boats with AIP seem to be the ideal configuration, and the best part is that not only does Pakistan have the core of such a fleet already in place, but her all-weather ally is also in an ideal position to help further indigenisation with technology transfers, knowhow and even outright leases on easy terms.
It does not seem reasonable to dilute a strong defence by hybridising the response.
For the second, we are really considering three distinct, independent causes of tension: air attacks, sea attacks and amphibian attacks. These necessarily have different responses, bearing in mind again that a zero-based budget, and a keen eye for costs will be required.
Against air attacks, the cheapest solutions appear to be extensive missile defences based on thorough radar coverage. The PAF already has a good C4I system in place; either replicating it for the Navy's specific inshore requirements, or extending it and making defence against aerial attacks purely an Air Force responsibility are possible options.
Against small boat attacks, there are a variety of considerations which require to be borne in mind.
While on the one hand, land-based missile and artillery defences are very stable platforms, small boat platforms are difficult to detect; their radar signatures are not prominent and spotting them in time to prevent a surprise attack is extremely difficult. It seems to be reasonable to extend the detection range of shore-based radar by patrolling light aircraft and by a seaward screen of light boats, gunboats or even armed fishing vessels with robust communications capabilities. This system of shore-based gunnery or missile systems with land-based radar, extended by airborne surveillance patrols and auxiliary boats, should give reasonable cover against missile boat or gunboat attacks.
For the third foreseeable danger, amphibian attacks, it is suggested that the defences against missile boat or gun boat attacks will serve just as well for defences against marine craft carrying special forces commandos. However, an additional land-based quick-reaction force operating out of a systematic network of terrestrial bases and mounted on helicopters may be necessary to give teeth to these other defences in case of a successful landing.
Finally, in case of outright war, it appears likely that the state of war is likely to subsume both the states of hostility, of manoeuvres other than war, mentioned above. Therefore, on top of the operations mentioned already, it remains to guard against an additional two options, one of which is an outright forceful attack pressed home firmly by carrier-based strike aircraft, followed by amphibious landings. For such a situation, it is submitted that a simple expansion of the existing facilities mentioned above may suffice. More coastal submarines, more small boats, more spotter aircraft, more auxiliary fishing vessels, and more land-based radar-linked missile and artillery backed up by naval or air force strike aircraft, and a mobile reaction force.
It is submitted that a suitable defence against any imaginable situation confronting Pakistan from the sea may be composed of between
- 15 to 20 coastal submarines with AIP, of
- perhaps 40 to 50 gunboats and missile boats,
- an additional 40 to 50 auxiliary craft consisting of converted fishing craft,
- perhaps three squadrons of two-seater piston-engined aerial patrol aircraft,
- the existing complement of P3C Orion marine surveillance aircraft, equipped with Harpoon missiles;
- extensive land-based artillery, possibly based on older pieces and on retired tanks, whose guns can still be used;
- a radar system which covers the entire coastline;
- a network of land bases for a quick reaction force, the total strength of which may not exceed an infantry division for the entire coast line;
- 2 to 3 squadrons of first-rate interceptors and strike aircraft.
It is submitted that this inventory, though somewhat at variance with other, more extensive projections, will cover every foreseeable threat that Pakistan will face, that it is a sustainable inventory and will not be difficult to maintain, staff and operate, or to replace progressively, and that it serves the purpose of defence to admiration. I might point out that each and every single aspect of this kind of force would be possible to build in Pakistan.
Quite obviously, it would be beyond the bounds of decency or legitimacy for any but a Pakistani commentator to propose organisation and structures, and equipment for offensive purposes. That is best undertaken by a Pakistani entity, and it will be fascinating to see the outcome. With some luck, they will squander on shiny new toys whatever savings may be achieved by the down-to-earth approach proposed above.
