What India’s Indus Waters Treaty suspension means for Pakistan

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What India’s Indus Waters Treaty suspension means for Pakistan​

The Indus and its tributaries that have sustained civilisations for thousands of years, now test the capacity of two modern nuclear-armed nations to cooperate.

Hassaan F Khan
April 24, 2025

India has just announced that it will no longer abide by the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, placing the agreement in “abeyance” until Pakistan, it claims, credibly and irrevocably renounces cross-border terrorism. This is a potentially historic moment.

For over 60 years, through wars, near-conflict, and complete diplomatic breakdowns, the treaty endured. Water, unlike so much else in the India-Pakistan relationship, had remained predictable. That predictability is now in question more than it has ever been.

The decision potentially marks a turning point in how the two countries manage the most essential shared resource between them. There will be many other discussions in the days ahead that dwell on geopolitics. The goal for this article is simpler: to understand the implications for Pakistan’s rivers, crops, people, and policymakers.

What matters most in the days and months ahead is not the threat of a sudden cutoff, but the erosion of reliability of a water system that millions depend on every single day.

How the treaty works​

Before we get into what India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty might mean, it’s worth recalling what the treaty actually did. Signed in 1960 after years of negotiation, with the World Bank as broker, the Indus Waters Treaty has been one of the most durable transboundary water agreements in the world.

It divided the six rivers of the Indus Basin between the two countries. India received the three eastern rivers (the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej). Pakistan received the three western rivers (the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) which account for the majority (almost 80 per cent) of the shared basin’s water.

As part of the agreement, India retains the right to use the western rivers for non-consumptive purposes like hydropower, and for limited irrigation, but is not allowed to store or divert their flows in ways that harm downstream access. These constraints are deliberately specific and enforceable and include engineering design features and notification procedures. For Pakistan, this structure provides more than water. It provides the predictability needed to build an entire irrigation and water management system around.

The treaty also provides a standing mechanism for cooperation and conflict resolution. A Permanent Indus Commission exists, with one commissioner from each country, tasked with exchanging data, reviewing new projects, and meeting regularly.

Disagreements are resolved using a tiered process: technical questions go first to the commission, unresolved differences may be referred to a neutral expert, and legal disputes may be sent to an international Court of Arbitration, with the World Bank playing a role in both forums. This process has been used before to resolve disagreements over India’s Baglihar and Kishanganga dams — it is designed to prevent unilateral action. The treaty has no expiry date, and it includes no provision for suspension. Article XII makes clear that it can only be modified by mutual agreement. That has never happened.

The hydrologic reality​

One common question that arises in moments like this is whether India can simply “stop the flow” of water into Pakistan. In the immediate term, the short answer is no. Certainly not at the scale that would make a meaningful dent in flows during the high flow season.

The Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab are enormous rivers. Between May and September, as snow melts, these rivers carry tens of billions of cubic meters of water. India has some upstream infrastructure on these rivers, including the Baglihar and Kishanganga dams, but none of it is designed to hold back these kinds of volumes. These are run-of-the-river hydropower projects with very limited live storage. Even if India were to coordinate releases across all its existing dams, all it may be able to do is slightly shift the timing of flows.

The overall volumes in the western rivers during this high-flow period are far too large to meaningfully disrupt without flooding its own upstream regions. India already utilises most of the flow from the eastern rivers allocated to it under the treaty, so any new actions on those rivers would have a more limited downstream impact.

A more pressing concern is what happens in the dry season when the flows across the basin are lower, storage matters more, and timing becomes more critical. That is where the absence of treaty constraints could start to be felt more acutely.

Over the medium to longer term, the picture becomes more complicated. If India chooses to act outside the treaty framework, it opens the door to developing new infrastructure that would give it greater control over the timing and volume of flows into Pakistan. But even then, the path is far from straightforward. Any large-scale dam or diversion project would take years to build. The sites available in Indian-occupied Kashmir for significant water storage are limited and geologically challenging. The financial cost would be enormous. And the political risk would be even greater.

Pakistan has long said that any attempt by India to construct major new storage on the western rivers would be viewed as an act of war. In today’s age of satellites, these structures would not be invisible. They would be contested politically and possibly militarily.

There are also hydrological constraints. Holding back high flows on rivers like the Chenab or Jhelum risks flooding upstream regions in India itself. And the idea of diverting water out of the Indus Basin entirely, into other parts of India would require enormous infrastructure and energy costs that would be hard to justify, even in peacetime.

Beyond the basin, there are reputational and strategic risks. India is itself a downstream riparian on the Brahmaputra and other rivers that originate in China. This (often overlooked) reality has historically shaped India’s approach to respecting downstream rights. By suspending the treaty and acting unilaterally, it sets a precedent that could one day be used against it. This is not a cost-free move and could complicate its efforts to frame itself as a reliable partner in other international negotiations.

Possible Implications for Pakistan​

While the physical and political limits on disruptions by India are real, the erosion of treaty protections still matters. This is not because water will stop tomorrow, but because the system it supports was never built for uncertainty. The flows of the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab are the backbone of our agriculture, our cities, our energy system. At this moment, we simply do not have a substitute for these waters.

For Pakistan, the impact of India’s disruption (if manifested) could be far-reaching. Pakistan’s irrigation system is one of the largest in the world, and it depends almost entirely on the predictable timing of flows from the western rivers. Farmers plan their sowing around those flows. Canal schedules are designed based on assumptions that have held for decades. If that rhythm is even slightly disrupted, the water system will begin to fray.

The most immediate risk is to predictability. Even if the total volume of water coming into Pakistan does not change immediately, small changes in when that water arrives can cause real problems. A late-season delay during the wheat planting cycle, or an unexpected dip in flow during the dry winter months, can mean missed sowing windows, lower yields, and higher costs. The Indus Delta is already shrinking due to reduced freshwater outflows. Further uncertainty in upstream flows could accelerate that degradation, with consequences for coastal livelihoods and fisheries.

Any shortfall or shift in river timing will force the state to make hard choices about water allocation. This risks intensifying inter-provincial tensions, especially between Punjab and Sindh, where water-sharing debates are already politically charged.

Then there’s energy. A third of Pakistan’s electricity comes from hydropower, generated by water flowing through Tarbela, Mangla, and other reservoirs. If upstream flows are reduced or poorly timed, it could cut into generation capacity. None of this is speculative. Pakistan is already a water-scarce country, living close to the edge. A system that has long been run on thin margins now faces a new layer of uncertainty.

Historical context​

This week’s announcement did not come out of nowhere. While the Indus Waters Treaty has long been praised for its durability, the last decade tells a story of mounting strain.

In 2013, a Court of Arbitration ruled in Pakistan’s favour by requiring India to release minimum environmental flows downstream of the Kishanganga project (upstream on Jhelum), and reinforced limits on reservoir drawdown. This successful resolution was a continuation of the treaty’s ability to manage complex engineering disagreements.

But that pattern began to shift after the 2016 Uri attack. India suspended routine cooperation, began fast-tracking dam projects it had long delayed, and started linking water to broader security narratives. Even then, India said it would work “within the pact.”

That too began to change in 2023, when India formally invoked Article XII(3) (the provision that allows for treaty modification only by mutual consent) and requested renegotiation, citing climate change, national development needs, and Pakistani obstruction. Pakistan refused to renegotiate.

In the months that followed, both countries doubled down on competing legal strategies. India pursued a neutral expert to review technical dam design questions; Pakistan pushed ahead with a Court of Arbitration. By early 2025, both mechanisms were active in parallel; this is something the treaty never envisioned.

This most recent announcement that India would “suspend” its obligations under the treaty marks the culmination of a long, escalating trajectory. For the first time since 1960, one country has effectively stepped outside the treaty’s procedural and cooperative framework. Whether this is a negotiating tactic or a permanent break remains to be seen. What comes next will test not just bilateral diplomacy, but the resilience of Pakistan’s water system in a world where guarantees no longer hold.

The Indus Waters Treaty is not perfect. But it does something few agreements between adversaries manage to do. It keeps the rivers flowing and gives both countries a reason to keep talking, even when everything else has broken down. That framework is now under strain. Whether the treaty is reinstated in full, renegotiated, or left to fade in practice, what follows will be harder.

Without clear rules, even small projects can provoke mistrust. Every monsoon, every reservoir, every dry spell becomes a potential source of tension. At a time when climate change is already intensifying droughts and floods, and when both countries face rising domestic water stress, the last thing the region needs is another layer of uncertainty. Yet that is where we now find ourselves.

The western rivers are not just shared rivers. They are Pakistan’s primary source of water. In the long run, there may be reforms or alternatives. But in the here and now, there is no substitute. These rivers sustain lives, livelihoods, and landscapes across the country. Pakistan can simply not afford to let it become collateral in a political fight. Thus, the flows must continue. Not out of goodwill, but because the consequences of stopping them are too great for either country to bear.

The Indus and its tributaries that have sustained civilisations for thousands of years, now test the capacity of two modern nuclear-armed nations to cooperate. The coming months and years will reveal whether wiser heads prevail, or if the subcontinent will enter a new, uncertain era of unilateralism on its most precious resource: water.

 

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Bilateral, brokered and broken: Overview of agreements signed between India and Pakistan​

Dawn.com
April 24, 2025

Pakistan and India’s relations on most fronts, from diplomatic ties to cultural projects, have yo-yoed from on and off to on (then off) again since Partition. Bilateral agreements have been no exception.

Following a deadly attack in occupied Kashmir’s Pahalgam on April 22, New Delhi, while pointing the finger at Pakistan sans proof, suspended the India-Pakistan Indus Water Treaty with immediate effect along with other measures.

In retaliation, in its top security body meeting today, Pakistan decided that it would exercise the right to hold all bilateral agreements with India, including but not limited to the Simla Agreement, in abeyance. It also announced the closure of the Wagah border and suspension of all trade with New Delhi, among other measures.

The full text of the statement can be read here.


Here, Dawn.com overviews the major treaties and agreements reached between India and Pakistan since 1947 and their status.

The Nehru-Liaquat Agreement​

The agreement was reached between then-Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistan’s Liaquat Ali Khan during a meeting in New Delhi in April 1950. It declared that the neighbours and their governments would protect the interests of minorities in their respective countries.

Both governments would also be accountable to each other on the issue of the protection of minority rights, the agreement stated. The pact’s provisions also included freedom of movement, non-discrimination in employment and the formation of a minorities commission to oversee its implementation.

The pact was signed in the aftermath of the Partition when communal violence was widespread in both countries.

Indus Water Treaty​

Signed on September 19, 1960, the treaty was brokered by the World Bank. It fixed and delimited the rights and obligations of the neighbouring countries regarding the use of the waters of the Indus River. It was signed by Nehru and former president Ayub Khan after six years of talks.

The treaty gave the water of the western rivers — Indus, Jhelum and Chenab — to Pakistan and those of the eastern rivers — Ravi, Beas and Sutlej — to India. It also provided for the funding and construction of dams, link canals, barrages and tube wells, i.e. the Tarbela and Mangla dams. The treaty further required the creation of a Permanent Indus Commission, led by a commissioner from each country.

Numerous disputes were peacefully settled over the years through the Permanent Indus Commission. The treaty was in effect for nearly 65 years before it was suspended last night.

As highlighted by analysts, this could have far-reaching implications for Pakistan.

Simla Agreement​

The agreement was signed between Pakistan and India in the aftermath of the 1970 war; the signatories being Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Indira Gandhi. The agreement, inter alia, stipulated that neither party would take any action unilaterally, that the disputes between the two countries would be resolved bilaterally, and that the ceasefire line would become the Line of Control (LoC).

In connection with Kashmir, it stated that “the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedevilled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by peaceful means”. It also bound both countries to discuss the modalities and arrangements for lasting peace and normalisation.

However, Pakistan argues that India violated the Simla Accord in 2019 when it unilaterally revoked Article 370, altering the status of India-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. This further enabled outsiders to obtain domicile and purchase property in Kashmir to change the Muslim-majority demography of the valley, again termed as a violation of the agreement.

“The Modi government has now gone a step further. It rejects the very idea of talks. If driven to the table, it will not discuss the part of Kashmir on its side of the line of control. This explains the cancellation of the foreign secretaries’ talks in 2014 on petty grounds. By wrecking Kashmir and thumbing its nose at the UN, it seeks to declare ‘closure’ of the dispute,” wrote Indian lawyer A.G. Noorani in a Dawn op-ed in 2019.

Protocol on visits to religious shrines​

The protocol, a bilateral agreement, was signed in 1974. It is aimed at facilitating the visits of religious pilgrims from India and Pakistan to the shrines located in the respective countries. As of 2018, the agreement covers 15 such locations in Pakistan and five in India.

Shadani Darbar in Sindh’s Hyat Pitafi, Katasraj Dham in Chakwal, Gurudwaras of Nankana Sahib, and Gurudwara Panja Sahib are among the sites on this side of the fence. In India, Ajmer Sharif Dargah, Nizamuddin Dargah, and the tomb of Amir Khusro are the most-visited shrines.

Under the protocol, up to 3,000 Sikh pilgrims are permitted to visit Pakistan for any religious festival. However, the government issued a total of 6,751 visas this year, a record number. Earlier this year, India issued visas to only 100 Pakistani pilgrims for the annual Urs of Hazrat Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti in Ajmer Sharif, significantly below the allotted quota of 500.

Agreement on prohibition of attacks on nuclear installations and facilities​

The agreement was signed between Pakistan and India on December 31, 1988. It, inter alia, provided that both countries should inform each other of their nuclear installations and facilities within their definitions, on January 1 of each calendar year.

The treaty also stated that both countries should refrain from undertaking, encouraging or participating in, directly or indirectly, an action aimed at causing the destruction of or damage to any nuclear installation or facility in the other country.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the agreements went into effect on January 27, 1991, and the neighbours have been exchanging lists every year since 1992. As stipulated in the agreement, this year too India and Pakistan exchanged lists of nuclear facilities as well as civilian prisoners, including fishermen, on Jan 1 this year.

Agreement on prevention of airspace violations​

The agreement was signed between Pakistan and India on April 6, 1991, in New Delhi. It aimed to reduce the risk of accidental or unintentional airspace violations between the neighbouring countries and established rules for military aircraft to avoid flying within 10 kilometres of each other’s airspace, including the Air Defence Identification Zone — a defined area of airspace where a country requires aircraft to identify themselves for national security purposes.

It also stated that no aircraft from either country was allowed to enter the other’s airspace over territorial waters without prior permission.

This agreement has been largely respected notwithstanding occasional violations. In response to India’s aggressive measures following the Pahalgam attack, Pakistan today announced that it was closing its airspace with immediate effect for all Indian owned or Indian operated airlines.

The Lahore Declaration​

The declaration was signed by former Indian prime minister Vajpayee and his counterpart Nawaz Sharif during the former’s visit to Pakistan in February 1999.

In the agreement, India and Pakistan recognised that “an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that the resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose”. They also agreed to “intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir” through an accelerated process of their “composite and integrated dialogue”.

The two sides anticipated the complexity of the new responsibility that they were carrying after becoming “declared nuclear-weapon states” and decided to “engage in regular bilateral consultations on their respective security concepts and nuclear doctrines with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields aimed at avoidance of conflict”.

They also agreed to provide each other with advance information in respect of ballistic missile flight tests and undertook to conclude an agreement in this regard.

The process was disrupted by the Kargil crisis and resumed in 2004 when the two countries formed expert groups to discuss conventional and nuclear confidence-building measures. However, as highlighted by former foreign secretary Aizaz Ahmed Chaudhry in an op-ed for Dawn, neither Pakistan nor India created a mechanism to review the implementation of the agreement.

Agreement on pre-notification of flight testing of ballistic missiles​

The pact was signed between India and Pakistan in 2005. It stated that both countries should provide the other an advance notification — not less than a time period of three days — of the flight test that they intended to undertake, of any land or sea-launched, surface-to-surface ballistic missile.

“Each party shall ensure that the test launch site(s) do not fall within 40kms, and the planned impact area does not fall within 75kms, of the International Boundary or the Line of Control on the side of the party planning to flight test the ballistic missile,” it stated.

The agreement remains operational. However, last year, Pakistan accused India of not fully complying with the accord when India conducted its first successful test flight of a domestically developed missile capable of carrying multiple warheads.

Agreement on reducing risk from accidents relating to nuclear weapons​

The agreement on nuclear accidents came into effect on February 21, 2007, for an initial period of five years.

Under the pact, both countries committed to improving the security and safety of their nuclear arsenal; informing each other of any nuclear accident, and taking steps to minimise the radiological consequences of such an accident. Furthermore, each of the two countries, in the event of a nuclear accident, is bound to take steps to prevent its actions from being misinterpreted by the other.

In 2012 and 2017, the agreement was extended by five years each.

LOC ceasefire agreement​

In November 2003, Pakistan and India agreed to ceasefire along the Line of Control and the Working Boundary. The LOC is a de facto border that divides the disputed Kashmir Valley between the two countries, and the Working Boundary, which separates the two neighbours.

The agreement held for a few years, but regular violations were reported since 2008. A sharp spike in the truce breaches were, meanwhile, witnessed after 2014 when Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in India.

In 2021, both countries recommitted themselves to the agreement. According to a statement issued by Pakistan, the two sides had concurred on reviving the existing mechanisms — hotline contact and flag meetings — for dealing with “any unforeseen situation or misunderstanding”.