Part -2
At the other extreme, the long, severe case is not necessarily
the upper limit of what war could entail and cost. The United States
and China are the world’s strongest nations, with the largest economies,
two of the three biggest populations, vast human and natural
resources, and unsurpassed war-making capacity. While the two countries
have important convergent peacetime interests, there is also considerable
“strategic distrust” between them.21 Should they go to war,
distrust could turn to deep antagonism, and the logic of conflict could
make possible levels of violence, duration, and cost that might appear
unjustifiable in times of peace. In modern history, wars involving great
and more or less evenly matched powers have sucked in numerous
third parties (not just prewar allies), lasted years, metastasized to other
regions, and forced belligerents to shift their economies to a war footing
and their societies to a war psyche. Whole populations suspend
19 Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi’s quoted in John Pomfret, “U.S. Takes a Tougher
Tone with China,” The Washington Post, July 30, 2010.
20 In their bilateral security consultations, the Japanese and Americans have identified
Chinese “gray area” aggression as contingencies that require heightened attention and joint
planning.
21 The apt term strategic distrust was coined in Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing
U.S.-Chinese Strategic Distrust, Washington, D.C.: John L. Thornton China Center, Brookings
Institution, 2012.
28 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
normal life; large fractions of them are prepared or forced to throw
their weight behind their nation’s fight. Not just states but opposing
ideologies, worldviews, and political systems might be pitted against
each other. Whatever their initial causes, such wars’ outcomes might
determine which great powers and their blocs survive as such. Prewar
international systems collapse or are transformed to serve the victors’
interests. Thus, the costs of failing outweigh those of fighting.
Consider how the Napoleonic wars engulfed all of Europe, how
World War I destroyed several empires and enlarged others, and how
allied goals in World War II became the complete destruction of
German fascism and Japanese militarism, rather than merely stopping
their aggression. In such cases, war aims and acts of destruction might
exceed belligerents’ early intentions by a wide margin. Regimes of the
losing side usually vanish. The threshold of tolerable costs might rise as
fighting persists and the penalty for losing increases. There have been
exceptions: Prussia’s victories in the three wars of German unification
and the American victory over Spain come to mind. But these were
one-sided affairs between mismatched powers ending quickly and decisively,
without spreading or drawing in other powers.
Would a war between China and the United States resemble the
great-power wars of modern history—expansive, systemic, desperate?
Would hostilities erase all residue of mutual interest in an international
order that has served both countries well? Would the escalating costs
of conflict seem tolerable compared with those of losing? Would the
enemy be demonized? Would populations become targets?
The only honest answer to such questions is that no one knows.
As we will see, the increasing probability of inconclusive hostilities
between China and the United States might suggest a bias toward a
long, severe, bitter war. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that such a
Sino-U.S. war could develop characteristics of the two great-power
wars that became “world wars”: drawing in others, engulfing and spilling
beyond the region, locking the two political systems and populations
into a fight to finish, ending in unconditional surrender, dictated
peace, occupation, regime extinction, and domination.
At the same time, the expansion and immense destructiveness of
modern great-power wars have resulted mainly from large and ferocious
Analytic Framework 29
land campaigns and strategic bombing, aimed at conquest. Although
one cannot rule it out, such war aims and fighting seem unlikely in
even a major Sino-U.S. war unless it stemmed from miscalculations
during a conflict on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, the United States
would restrain, if not avoid, strategic bombing of China lest it precipitate
nuclear war. Having said this, it could be that the long, severe case
offered here for analytic purposes might not set the upper limit of a
possible war between China and the United States.
The possibility of a long and severe war, in which willingness to
accept hardship and to inflict harm grows as fighting lasts, returns us
to the question of whether such a war might result in the use of nuclear
weapons. We assess the probability of that to be very low and so do
not include the effects of nuclear warfare in our analysis of losses and
costs.22 The general reason for this is that mutual deterrence prevails in
the Sino-U.S. strategic-nuclear relationship.23
Nonetheless, it is worth examining the circumstances in which
the risk of nuclear war, however low, could be at its highest. In a prolonged
and severe conflict, it is conceivable that Chinese military leaders
would propose and Chinese political leaders would consider using
nuclear weapons in the following circumstances:
• Chinese forces are at risk of being totally destroyed.
• The Chinese homeland has been rendered defenseless against U.S.
conventional attacks; such attacks are extensive and go beyond
military targets, perhaps to include political leadership.
• Domestic economic and political conditions are growing so dire
that the state itself could collapse.
• U.S. conventional strikes include or are perceived to include capabilities
that are critical to China’s strategic deterrent—notably
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs), ballistic missile sub-
22 Obviously, losses and costs to both countries in the event of nuclear war could be at least
an order of magnitude greater than the worst of the conventional-war cases examined here.
23 The stability of the Sino-U.S. nuclear relationship is explained in Chapter Four of David
C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders, The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint
in an Age of Vulnerability, Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Chinese Military
Affairs, National Defense University, 2011.
30 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
marines (SSBNs), strategic C2—which the Chinese interpret as
preparation for a U.S. first strike or intended to leave China vulnerable
to U.S. nuclear coercion.
Thus, it cannot be entirely excluded that the Chinese leadership
would decide that only the use of nuclear weapons would prevent total
defeat and the state’s destruction. However, even under such desperate
conditions, the resort to nuclear weapons would not be China’s only
option: It could instead accept defeat. Indeed, because U.S. nuclear
retaliation would make the destruction of the state and collapse of the
country all the more certain, accepting defeat would be a better option
(depending on the severity of U.S. terms) than nuclear escalation. This
logic, along with China’s ingrained no-first-use policy, suggests that
Chinese first use is most improbable.24
At the same time, if Chinese leaders faced such a dire situation
and also had reason to think that the United States was preparing to
launch a first strike to disable China’s deterrent, they might consider
the first use of nuclear weapons (even though, objectively, it might not
be rational). But this also seems like an extremely remote possibility for
the simple reason that the United States would have no reason to resort
to nuclear weapons if it were already on the verge of conventional victory
over China.
Even so, it is important for the United States to be aware of potentially
dangerous ambiguities involved in attacks on targets that the
Chinese could regard as strategic: attacks on missile launchers, even
if intended only to degrade China’s theater-range missile capabilities;
attacks on high-level military C2, even if intended only to degrade
China’s conventional-operational capabilities; cyberwarfare attacks on
strategic systems; attacks on Beijing (whatever the reason); and heightened
U.S. ballistic missile defense operations that could be seen as
intended to degrade Chinese strategic retaliation. Keep in mind, as
well, that the Chinese might perceive U.S. conventional capabilities
24 As a corollary, if China were to use nuclear weapons first, it could be a “warning shot”—a
relatively harmless detonation in a remote area—as opposed to nuclear attack on U.S. forces,
territory, or allies.
Analytic Framework 31
(e.g., global strike, cyberwarfare, ASAT) as potentially aimed at disabling
China’s strategic deterrent.
As low as the probability of Chinese first use is, even in the most
desperate circumstances of a prolonged and severe war, the United
States could make it lower still by exercising great care with regard to
the extensiveness of homeland attacks and by avoiding altogether targets
that the Chinese could interpret as critical to their deterrent.
As for U.S. initiation of nuclear war with China, this seems even
more far-fetched. Unlike circumstances in which the Soviet Union
could not be stopped from defeating NATO and dominating all of
Europe unless the United States resorted to battlefield nuclear weapons,
the stakes of a Sino-U.S. war would not justify the incalculable
harm to the United States from Chinese retaliation. More bluntly put,
the Soviet threat to NATO was deemed existential, whereas as the Chinese
threat to U.S. allies and interests in East Asia is not. In line with
this, current U.S. declaratory policy concerning use of nuclear weapons
makes no allowance for first-use in the event of war with China, even
were it going badly.25
In sum, it seems unlikely that war between China and the United
States would “go global,” or “go nuclear.” In either case, the losses,
costs, and other consequences for both and the world would dwarf
those estimated for a severe and prolonged conventional conflict in the
Western Pacific. Still, the possibility of a true cataclysm is all the more
reason to think through carefully the paths and risks of war.
25 U.S. policy reserves the option of nuclear first use mainly in retaliation for a biological
attack.
33
CHAPTER THREE
Weighing the Costs: Military, Economic, Political,
and International
With the understanding that the consequences of world war and
of nuclear war fall outside our scope, we can now examine possible
effects, losses, costs, constraints, pressures, and responses that could
occur during Sino-U.S. war, depending on its severity and duration.
Military Losses
Calculating expected military losses in a Sino-U.S. armed conflict is
exceedingly difficult. For purposes of understanding the major issues
surrounding whether and how such a conflict might be fought, it is
sufficient to estimate indicatively the nature and seriousness of losses
of each side, how they might compare, how they might vary according
to the severity and duration of the conflict, and how they might affect
decisionmaking on both sides. Accordingly, the method used here is
to meld the broad judgments of several analysts.1 Of interest are losses
relative to prewar capabilities, losses of each side compared with the
other, and residual warfighting capabilities, all of which would bear on
both the ability and will to continue fighting.
1 The judgments here are informed by the Sino-U.S. conflict scenarios from RAND Arroyo
Center research by Terrence K. Kelly, David C. Gompert, and Duncan Long, which will be
presented in Smarter Power, Stronger Partners: Exploiting U.S. Advantages to Prevent Aggression,
Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1359-A, forthcoming.
34 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
Severe cases for both 2015 and 2025 are considered, anticipating
Chinese A2AD improvements.2 Losses in brief conflicts (up to T1) are
among forces engaged and targetable from the outset. Additional losses
in prolonged conflicts (from T1 to T2) could include reinforcements—
perhaps nearly all extant Chinese air and naval forces and those U.S.
air and naval forces not deemed indispensable for missions elsewhere
(e.g., in Europe or the Middle East).
Prospective losses in forces during a severe Sino-U.S. conflict
would depend on the counterforce capabilities and operations of the
two sides, of course. To expand on an earlier observation, advances
in information technology and other targeting systems—sensors, onboard
and off-board precision weapon guidance, global positioning,
and data networking and processing—are making weapon platforms,
such as surface ships and manned aircraft, increasingly vulnerable at
greater distances. In addition to increasing the reward of attacking first
and the penalty of not doing so, these capabilities point to the potential
for heavier, faster losses among vulnerable forces than at any time in
modern conventional warfare.3
The assessments that follow try to capture this dynamic. They
include broad-brush narratives of the cases and graphs that illustratively
depict losses. The categories covered include combat aircraft,
surface naval vessels, submarines, missiles and missile launchers of
all types (land, sea, and air), and C4ISR. Aircraft losses could result
from loss or degradation of air bases and aircraft carriers, as well as air
combat and air defense. Surface ship losses could result from attacks by
other surface ships, submarines, air, or missile attacks. Submarines are
vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare (ASW), including opposing submarines,
and strikes on bases. Losses in missile launchers could occur
from air or missile strikes or destroyed platforms (e.g., ships), as well
as from missiles expended. Mobile land-based missile launchers, which
Chinese forces possess in greater abundance than U.S. forces, might
2 U.S. force improvements are assumed to be those provided for in the exiting long-range
U.S. defense program.
3 This counterforce phenomenon does not apply to cyberwarfare or ASAT warfare, in
which attacks do not diminish the other side’s capability to attack.
Weighing the Costs: Military, Economic, Political, and International 35
be less vulnerable. C4ISR losses could result from cyberwar or ASAT
attacks. Cyberwar and ASAT attacks could also compound losses of
forces that depend on C4ISR for their effectiveness. Additional details
are in Appendix A.
An important consideration in estimating U.S. losses and comparing
them with Chinese losses is the share of total (global) U.S.
forces engaged. The greater that share, the better the United States
would do militarily. However, committing more U.S. forces to the theater
would also increase those that are targetable and vulnerable to
Chinese A2AD. Very broadly speaking, more U.S. forces would mean
a larger and more violent war, with higher losses on both sides but
higher expectations of U.S. victory. The share of U.S. forces committed
would be determined by trading off the demands of the war against the
effect on security in other regions of diverting U.S. forces. The latter,
in turn, could be affected by the extent to which U.S. allies, notably
NATO, could “cover” for the diversion of U.S. forces elsewhere. Our
main interest is in naval, air, land-based missile, air-defense, and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, since Sino-
U.S. war presumably would not involve large land combat. The U.S.
Department of Defense has said that 60 percent of U.S. air and naval
forces will be based in the Pacific by 2020.4 Accordingly, the assumption
here is that in the course of a prolonged war with China, the
United States would commit 60 percent of its global capabilities; U.S.
military losses are estimated relative to that. If the figure were higher
in the event, losses on both sides could increase.
Table 3.1 provides estimates of military losses for cases of severe
fighting for one year, more or less. It is assumed that cases of tightly
restricted fighting would involve minor and roughly equivalent military
losses.
Estimated losses can be presented graphically, similar to the earlier
graphs of hypothetical losses in 2015 and 2025. Figure 3.1 shows
aggregate cumulative losses, with graphs for each of the force categories
discussed in Appendix A. Losses are shown from top to bottom, start-
4 Robert Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense, statement to the Council of Foreign Relations,
January 20, 2015.
36 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
Table 3.1
Estimated Military Losses, Severe Case, 2015
Capability U.S. Losses Chinese Losses
Air forces Some possibility of early loss of
a carrier to Chinese submarines
or missiles and of use of
regional air bases to missiles.
Significant aircraft losses to
Chinese surface-to-air missiles
until suppressed.
Sharp loss of air power
from U.S. air strikes, air
intercept, and air defense.
Reinforcements are less capable
and more vulnerable. China can
keep some aircraft hidden but
out of use.
Surface naval
forces
Significant early losses of
forward fleet because of
submarine and missile attacks.
Losses can be limited by
keeping fleet out of range, or
out of effective use. Strikes
on Chinese anti-naval forces
reduce U.S. losses in time.
Heavy initial and sustained
fleet losses because of U.S. air
power and submarines. Naval
bases vulnerable. Chinese
shipbuilding capacity only takes
effect in the long term (post-T2)
and is vulnerable.
Submarines Largely invulnerable to poor
and quickly depleted Chinese
ASW capability.
Older submarines vulnerable
to U.S. ASW. A few advanced
ones survive and threaten U.S.
surface forces.
Missile launchers
(land, surface,
submarine, air)
and missile
inventories
Surface ship-launch and shortrange
air-launch platforms
suffer attrition. Submarinelaunch
and long-range
air-launch survive. Major
expenditure of missiles.
Land launchers survive if mobile
or hidden. U.S. air power and
missiles eventually wear down
Chinese missile launchers. Also
susceptible to degraded C4ISR.
Large fraction of modern
missiles expended early, leaving
older, less accurate shorterrange
ones.
C4ISR (computer
systems and
satellites)
Some loss because of Chinese
cyberwar and ASAT, which are
difficult to suppress.
Some loss because of U.S.
cyberwar and ASAT capabilities.
Also, untested C2 processes
could unravel under pressure
of war.
Aggregate Chinese counterforce
capabilities take a major early
toll on the United States but
then have less of an effect as
they are degraded by superior
U.S. counterforce.
U.S. counterforce capabilities
take a major toll early and
throughout as Chinese A2AD is
degraded.
Weighing the Costs: Military, Economic, Political, and International 37
ing with full capabilities when the war begins. The green band signifies
modest losses; yellow, significant losses; orange, heavy losses; and red,
very heavy losses.5
Illustratively, each band might be thought of as roughly a tenth
or so of effective capabilities committed. These estimates are based on
raw judgments of several analysts, rather than on calculations predicated
on detailed war games or computer simulations. The width of the
curves signifies uncertainty, which increases the longer fighting lasts.
Note that China would suffer significantly greater losses than the
United States by T1, as its weapons are expended and its platforms and
bases are struck. Thereafter, as more U.S. strike power is committed
and Chinese defenses are degraded, the differential in losses contin-
5 Depending on the category, decline in effective capabilities could be measured in ships
or aircraft lost, in missiles used or destroyed, or in the degradation of C4ISR performance
because of loss of space assets or networks.
Figure 3.1
Estimated Aggregate Loss in Military Capability, Severe Case, 2015
NOTES: Losses are shown from top to bottom, starting with full capabilities when the
war begins. The green band signifies modest losses; yellow, significant losses; orange,
heavy losses; and red, very heavy losses.
RAND RR1140-3.1
T0 T1 T2
Time
United
States
China
Aggregate loss
38 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
ues or expands. Though large, this gap has been reduced by Chinese
deployment of advanced A2AD capabilities, prompting the U.S. military
to consider striking those capabilities, which are mainly on Chinese
territory.
At present, if the United States were to discount the risk of escalation
and unleash its strike power at the stroke of T0, Chinese losses at
T1 and beyond could be even greater than shown in the figure. Likewise,
China might be able to reduce the gap in losses at T1 and beyond
by attacking U.S. strike forces preemptively. The potential difference in
losses depending on which side strikes first (though not shown graphically)
underscores the instability inherent in counterforce capabilities
and concepts on both sides.
Presumably, China would be as aware as the United States that
the gap in losses at T1 would keep growing in a prolonged war (as
shown). Using our scale, the decline in Chinese capabilities (as defined
earlier) by T2 could be extremely heavy, whereas U.S. losses could be
significant but less heavy. Apart from a preemptive attack on U.S.
forces, China’s best chance, though perhaps not a very good one, is to
seek a quick end to severe fighting. The wide gap in losses from outset
to finish suggests that Chinese planning for a short war is wishful,
perhaps based on a belief that the United States would not have the
stomach to fight after suffering significant losses (which would be a
misreading of the history of U.S. war making).6
By 2025, China will likely have more, better, and longer-range
ballistic missiles and cruise missiles; advanced air defenses; latestgeneration
aircraft; quieter submarines; more and better sensors; and
the digital communications, processing power, and C2 necessary to
operate an integrated kill chain. The United States, it is assumed here,
will have modernized versions of the platform-centric force-projection
capabilities on which it has relied for some decades, despite their growing
vulnerability to Chinese A2AD. Prospective losses in a severe war
would change accordingly, as shown in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2.
6 Think of World War II (after Pearl Harbor), the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the
recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Weighing the Costs: Military, Economic, Political, and International 39
Improved Chinese A2AD would increase losses of U.S. strike
forces, which in turn might lower Chinese losses. Note especially that
while the United States would still have an advantage at T1, it could be
less pronounced. Because actual losses at T1 and expected losses thereafter
do not indicate a clear winner, there could be a greater inclination
on both sides to continue hostilities. If so, the gap between U.S. and
Chinese losses could be smaller in 2025 than in 2015, and could even
Table 3.2
Estimated Military Losses, Severe Case, 2025
Capability U.S. Losses Chinese Losses
Air forces Early and subsequent loss of
carriers to submarines and
missiles. Degraded use of
regional air bases because
of missile attack. Aircraft
losses to improved Chinese air
defense and air force.
U.S. air power losses improve
survivability of Chinese air
power. China has moreadvanced
aircraft and improved
refueling. Losses are still
substantial.
Surface naval
forces
Major losses early and
throughout from improved
Chinese submarines, missiles,
and air power. Somewhat
mitigated by increased
weapon ranges.
Marginally less vulnerable
because of degraded U.S. sea
and air power. U.S. submarines
cause major losses.
Submarines Somewhat more vulnerable to
improved Chinese ASW.
More-advanced submarines are
less vulnerable to ASW than
older ones.
Missile launchers
(land, surface,
submarine, air)
and missile
inventories
Increased vulnerability of
surface-naval and air-launch
platforms. Large missile
expenditures starting early
and throughout.
Reduced vulnerability of
launchers to U.S. air and
missile attacks. Increased
numbers and sophistication.
Large expenditures early and
throughout.
C4ISR (computer
systems and
satellites)
Sharp initial and sustained
degradation from improved
Chinese cyberwar and ASAT
capabilities.
Sharp initial and sustained
degradation from improved U.S.
cyberwar and ASAT capabilities.
Aggregate Improved and less vulnerable
Chinese A2AD produces
increased U.S. losses early and
throughout.
Increased loss of U.S. strike
forces could reduce losses of
Chinese forces, though still
greater than U.S. losses early
and throughout.
40 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
shrink after T1. The overlap of the loss curves by T2 indicates that the
United States might not be able to gain a decisive military-operational
advantage in 2025 even with the prolongation of fighting.
Apart from the gap between them, note that U.S. and Chinese
military losses in a long, severe 2025 war would both be very heavy—
U.S. losses because of China’s improved A2AD, and China’s losses
despite its improved A2AD. By T2, Chinese losses could remain very
heavy, whereas U.S. losses in the region could be heavy (notably, heavier
than in 2015). This implies a sizable depletion in overall U.S. military
capabilities and an even larger depletion in overall Chinese military
capabilities, with implications for postwar security in this and other
regions. Yet with no clear winner, neither side able to gain control, and
heavy losses causing deep anger on both sides, prospects for agreement
to foreshorten the war could be lower than they are now.
Figure 3.2
Estimated Aggregate Loss in Military Capability, Severe Case, 2025
NOTES: Losses are shown from top to bottom, starting with full capabilities when the
war begins. The green band signifies modest losses; yellow, significant losses;
orange, heavy losses; and red, very heavy losses.
RAND RR1140-3.2
T0 T1 T2
Time
United
States
China
Aggregate loss
}overlap
Weighing the Costs: Military, Economic, Political, and International 41
Economic Costs
Owing to the size, interdependence, and global integration of the U.S.
and Chinese economies, a Sino-U.S. war could be immensely costly
for the belligerents, East Asia, and the world. These vulnerabilities are
a major reason why war, at least a premeditated one, is so unlikely, even
though the two states are and likely will remain at odds over a number
of regional disputes. Should a war nevertheless occur (perhaps from a
mismanaged crisis), the scale of economic costs would depend on its
severity and duration. In contrast to military losses, even a mild level of
hostilities, if prolonged, could inflict serious economic harm. But the
focus here is on the economic effects of severe hostilities.
Estimating economic costs of a Sino-U.S. war is, if anything,
more difficult than estimating military losses, for such costs depend
not only on military developments but also on the response of sundry
economic actors and markets with limited degrees of state control: government
policy responses, possible economic warfare, the fate of industrial
enterprises, the effect on and reactions of consumers and workers,
international financial institutions, debt and equity markets, and third
parties (i.e., trading partners). Accordingly, the analysis that follows is
meant not to be definitive but instead illustrative of the sorts and scale
of costs in the different cases.
To summarize current economic conditions:
• China’s GDP is about $9 trillion and has been growing at 7 percent
annually, although many economists believe that growth will
slow, and some argue that growth rates are exaggerated.7
7 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2014. For
more information about projections of future growth and the accuracy of reported growth
rates, see Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Long-Term Growth Rates: Can
China Maintain Its Current Growth?” Washington, D.C., October 2009; Bob Davis,
“China Growth Seen Slowing Sharply over Decade,” The Wall Street Journal, October 20,
2014; Yukon Huang, “China’s Misleading Economic Indicators,” Financial Times, August
29, 2014; and Derek Scissors, “China’s Real GDP [Growth] Is Slower Than Official Figures
Show,” Financial Times, January 20, 2015.
42 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
• U.S. GDP is about $17 trillion and is growing at 2 percent
annually.8
• China’s exports to the United States were about $440 billion in
2013—roughly 20 percent of U.S. imports, 20 percent of Chinese
exports, and 5 percent of China’s GDP.9
• China’s imports from the United States were about $122 billion
in 2013—roughly 6 percent of Chinese imports, 8 percent of
U.S. exports, and under 1 percent of U.S. GDP.10
• China holds about $1.7 trillion in U.S. securities, including
about $1.3 trillion in U.S. Treasury bonds—about 25 percent of
all U.S. Treasury debt held by foreign countries.11
• Total Chinese direct investment in the U.S. is roughly $8 billion,
compared with total U.S. direct investment in China of over
$60 billion.12
• International trade is about 45 percent of China’s GDP and
25 percent of U.S. GDP.
• Chinese consumption is one-third of GDP (and climbing); U.S.
consumption is two-thirds of GDP.13
Key asymmetries include China’s greater reliance on international
trade in general (especially with regard to energy supplies), reliance on
exports to the United States in particular, and holdings of U.S. debt;
U.S. reliance on imports from China; U.S. direct investment in China;
and higher U.S. consumption as share of GDP. In considering the eco-
8 International Monetary Fund, 2014.
9 U.S. Census Bureau, “2013: U.S. Trade in Goods with China,” 2013; World Trade Organization,
“China,” trade profile, September 2014.
10 U.S. Census Bureau, 2013.
11 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities, April 2014.
12 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Position
Data (U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on a Historical-Cost Basis and Foreign Direct
Investment Position in the United States on a Historical-Cost Basis),” n.d.
13 World Bank, “Household Final Consumption Expenditure, etc. (% of GDP),” World
Development Indicators, 2014b.
Weighing the Costs: Military, Economic, Political, and International 43
nomic costs of war, perhaps the most significant asymmetry is that
intensive and extensive combat in the Western Pacific would disrupt
nearly all Chinese trade (95 percent of it being seaborne), whereas the
United States would mainly suffer the loss of bilateral trade with China
and, to a much lesser extent than China, trade with the rest of East
Asia.14 This might be thought of as the war-zone effect on trade.
This particular asymmetry between China and the United States
is depicted in concentric circles in Figure 3.3. The center circles represent
bilateral (Sino-U.S.) trade, the middle circles represent other
regional trade, and the outer circles represent other global trade. The
percentages shown in each circle indicate the share of that country’s
global trade. The depiction is intended as impressionistic, not to exact
14 China’s access to the rest of East Asia would be affected much more than would U.S.
access.
Figure 3.3
Illustrative War-Zone Effect on Trade
China United States
NOTES: The center circles represent bilateral (Sino-U.S.) trade, the middle circles
represent other regional trade, and the outer circles represent other global trade.
The percentages shown in each circle indicate the share of that country’s global
trade. The difference in size represents China’s greater dependence on trade. Red
indicates extreme vulnerability of trade in the event of a major war; yellow,
signicant vulnerability; and green, minor vulnerability.
RAND RR1140-3.3
10%
40%
50%
15%
10%
75%
44 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
scale. The difference in size represents China’s greater dependence on
trade than the United States.
The figure also shows the potential vulnerability of trade in the
event of war. Red indicates the extreme vulnerability of trade in the
event of a major war; yellow, significant vulnerability; and green, minor
vulnerability.
Thus, China’s bilateral trade with the United States and other
regional trade could be extremely vulnerable, whereas for the United
States, only trade with China would be greatly affected. Overall, most
of China’s trade (except for the small overland fraction) is vulnerable
to disruptions in seaborne trade in the Western Pacific, whereas most
U.S. trade is not.15 This, as we will see, has asymmetric effects on GDP
in the event of war.
The vulnerability of Chinese trade begs a further question: Would
the United States forcibly blockade nonmilitary sea and air transport
to and from China? Keep in mind that both sides have large arrays of
capabilities to destroy ships and aircraft—anti-surface and anti-air missiles,
air strike power, submarines, and surface-naval strike power, not
to mention cyberwar—as well as incentives to use them. Also, while
the United States has sophisticated sensors to distinguish military from
nonmilitary targets, during war it will focus on finding and tracking
the former; moreover, Chinese ISR is less sophisticated and discriminating,
especially at a distance. This suggests very hazardous airspace
and sea space, perhaps ranging from the Yellow Sea to the South China
Sea. Assuming that non-Chinese commercial enterprises would rather
lose revenue than ships or planes, the United States would not need to
use force to stop trade to and from China.16 China would lose a substantial
amount of trade that would be required to transit the war zone.
The United States expressly threatening commercial shipping would be
15 China could expand its overland trade during a war, especially with Russia. But that
would hardly make a dent in China’s loss of access to the rest of the world for markets, capital
goods, and materials.
16 The United States could inflict significant damage on Chinese shipping, as it has done
in previous severe conflicts against other countries. For example, U.S. submarines exacted
tremendous losses on Japanese shipping vessels in World War II; these losses were arguably
critical to Japan’s economic collapse during the war.
Weighing the Costs: Military, Economic, Political, and International 45
provocative, hazardous, and largely unnecessary. So we posit no U.S.
blockade, as such.
The analysis that follows assumes severe fighting, the duration of
which (from T0 to T1 to T2) would determine the magnitude of economic
effects. Rough costs are estimated in terms of effect on GDP
from disruptions of three economic functions: trade, consumption,
and income from overseas investments. The effects of energy-supply
disruption to China are considered as a component of the contraction
in trade, because most natural gas and crude oil consumed by China
are imported. It is assumed that the current conditions, importance,
and relationships of the U.S. and Chinese economies will not change
in character by 2025 (unlike expected changes in military capabilities
over that time).17
Only direct GDP losses are considered; no attempt has been made
to estimate the effect of war on the regional and global economies and,
in turn, the rebound impacts on the U.S. and Chinese economies.
Also not included are costs with little immediate effect on GDP per se
(e.g., damaged infrastructure, lost military systems, prompt and longterm
care for casualties, seized assets), though any of these costs could
be enormous.
Neither have we quantified a factor that could make China’s
losses substantially worse than those indicated below: the deepening
integration of the East Asian economy. The economies of China and its
neighbors (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and, increasingly, Southeast
Asia) are highly interdependent, owing to production value networks.
Much of East Asian trade is composed of intermediate goods and components:
Inputs produced in one country are shipped to another country
to be married with parts made elsewhere and assembled into a final
product before being fed into market distribution systems. While such
integration has contributed to the efficiency and productivity that have
enabled China and its neighbors to prosper, it also heightens East Asian
economies’ vulnerability to disruption, more so than traditional end-
17 Consummation of new East Asian or transpacific trade pacts will, if anything, deepen
economic integration and trade expansion in the coming decade.
46 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
product trade would. China could reduce its dependence on such interlocking
regional production only with great difficulty and cost.
The primary effect on GDP is from loss of trade. We are most
confident in the estimated collapse of Sino-U.S. bilateral trade, which
empirically falls to virtually zero between belligerents in the course of
war. But it is important also to take account of China’s loss of regional
and other global trade, given the war-zone effect. As shown in Figures
3.4 and 3.5, whether losses are confined to bilateral trade or may
include all trade makes a big difference in China’s GDP loss. Figure 3.4
shows the GDP impact from losses in trade, consumption, and income
from investment, albeit with only bilateral Sino-U.S. trade affected.
Figure 3.5 shows the GDP impact from losses in trade, consumption,
and income from investment, with Chinese trade with the United
Figure 3.4
Estimated Aggregate Effect on GDP from Losses in Bilateral Trade,
Consumption, and Income from Investment
NOTES: This graph illustrates the percentage by which GDP may decrease during war
as a result of losses in bilateral trade, consumption, and income from investment. The
upper limit of the y-axis indicates GDP at the start of war; as the war continues, GDP
at each point in time is given as a percentage of GDP at the start of war. The widths
of the curves suggest uncertainty.
RAND RR1140-3.4
T0 T1 T2
Time
United
States
China
GDP (%)
100
80
60
Weighing the Costs: Military, Economic, Political, and International 47
States, the region, and the rest of the world affected. The widths of the
curves suggest uncertainty. As with military losses, T2 is posited to be
one year.
Now, consider what could happen to GDP if China’s non-U.S.
regional and global trade, nearly all of it seaborne, were also affected
by widespread fighting in the Western Pacific. We assume that China’s
regional trade drops by 80 percent and its other global trade drops by
50 percent. (One reason regional and global trade do not drop even
more is that Chinese shippers might be ordered by the state to continue
operating.)
Indicative estimates of U.S. and Chinese economic costs of a prolonged
severe war are summarized in Table 3.3, the analysis and sourcing
for which can be found in Appendix B.
Figure 3.5
Estimated Aggregate Effect on GDP from Losses in Overall Trade,
Consumption, and Income from Investment
NOTES: This graph illustrates the percentage by which GDP may decrease during war
as a result of losses in overall (bilateral, regional, and global) trade, consumption,
and income from investment. The upper limit of the y-axis indicates GDP at the start
of war; as the war continues, GDP at each point in time is given as a percentage of
GDP at the start of war. The widths of the curves suggest uncertainty.
RAND RR1140-3.5
T0 T1 T2
Time
United
States
China
GDP (%)
100
80
60
48 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
The estimated decline in China’s GDP can be compared with
Germany’s 29 percent decline in real GDP during World War I, when
Germany itself was spared heavy damage, as well as Germany’s 64 percent
GDP decline and Japan’s 52 percent GDP decline during World
War II, when both were heavily attacked.18 Of course, to suggest that
the Chinese would be unwilling or unable to fight on despite such costs
is to ignore that the Germans and Japanese withstood much greater
costs, along with widespread destruction, and did not surrender until
left with no choice. Moreover, the Chinese state would presumably
work to limit the impact on consumption, as we have estimated. Still,
the effects on China and its citizens of a one-third reduction in GDP
would obviously be grave and lasting. In contrast, the effects of a protracted
and severe conflict on the United States and its citizens, while
severe, would also be the equivalent of a serious recession.
In a restricted and mild conflict, economic costs from lost trade,
consumption, and income from overseas holdings would be similar in
kind, substantially less in magnitude, and asymmetrically harmful to
China.
In a more speculative vein, both China and the United States
would be vulnerable to economic costs in the event that cyberwar,
18 Robert J. Barro, “Rare Disasters and Asset Markets in the Twentieth Century,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 121, No. 3, August 2006.
Table 3.3
Estimated Economic Costs After One Year of Severe War
Category U.S. Costs Chinese Costs
Trade 90 percent decline in
bilateral trade
90 percent decline in bilateral trade
80 percent decline in regional trade
50 percent decline in global trade
Consumption 4 percent decline 4 percent decline
Income from
foreign direct
investment (asset
loss excluded)
$9 billion loss $500 million loss
Effects on GDP Could decline by
5–10 percent
Could decline by 25–35 percent
Weighing the Costs: Military, Economic, Political, and International 49
which is likely to occur in a severe conflict, leapt from the military
domain to civilian domains. While each nation would have a strong
aversion to “general” cyberwar and so might be mutually deterred
from attacking the other’s nonmilitary computer networks, the ability
to contain cyberwar, once begun, is unknown—if not unknowable.19
Certain network infrastructure supports multiple computer systems,
and certain computer systems that support military operations are also
used for commercial or other civilian purposes. As an example, the
supply of U.S. forces in a major armed conflict might depend on logistics
firms, which rely mainly on open data systems, perhaps Internetbased,
to manage and move material. Would China refrain from trying
to degrade such systems in the event of war? Would the United States
refrain from attacking, say, systems that support the transport of Chinese
troops? Would both countries not be tempted to crash telecommunications
or air-traffic control or energy-distribution systems that
support fighting, or interfere with government-service networks? In
short, the “firebreak” separating military-operational cyberwar from
national-economic cyber could prove weak; once crossed, cyberwar
could spin out of control, affecting all sorts of critical information
infrastructure, the Internet, and commercial systems.
Very roughly speaking, China and the United States are equally
vulnerable to the harm such civilian cyberwar could cause, because
both economies and societies rely heavily on computer networks. Estimates
of the economic damage from a series of large-scale cyberattacks
on the United States range from $70 billion to $900 billion.20
With at least 200 million more Internet users than the United States,
China might have just as much to lose from targeting civilian cyber
infrastructure as does the United States. China’s economy has become
very integrated internally and with the rest of the world, and that integration
is enabled by potentially vulnerable data networking. Disrup-
19 For analysis of the potential and possible paths of cyberwar escalation, see Lawrence
Cavaiola, David Gompert, and Martin Libicki, “Cyber House Rules: On War, Retaliation
and Escalation,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 57, No. 1, February–March 2015.
20 Scott Borg, “How Cyber Attacks Will Be Used in International Conflict,” paper presented
at the USENIX Security Technology Symposium, Washington, D.C., 2010.
50 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
tion of both internal and external commerce resulting from cyberattacks
could aggravate China’s economic costs of war. Both countries
are capable of patching, working around, and otherwise containing
the effects of cyber attacks; however, the cumulative effects of multiple
shocks in different sectors could cause appreciable reductions in production,
commerce, and consumption. While we offer no estimate of
the possible costs of escalating cyberwar, it is evident that they could
be very large on both sides in the event of a severe and protracted Sino-
U.S. conflict.
In sum, the economic harm caused by a Sino-U.S. war, unless
brief or mild, would be substantially greater to China than to the
United States, an asymmetry likely to persist if not grow by 2025.
Unlike the military balance, there is little China can do, given its need
for global markets and resources, to mitigate the economic risks of a
war with the United States.21 The economic integration that has made
China’s development possible exposes China to the risk that war could
bring that development to a screeching halt. While this should darken
any encouragement that China’s military might feel or convey about a
brightening military picture, it does not mean that the Chinese would
be unwilling or unable to bear such a price. Losing great powers have
endured much worse.
21 Because China is currently a large net importer of food, the question arises whether its
population is vulnerable to hunger in the event a war severely constricts seaborne trade. In
fact, China keeps large grain reserves in the event of catastrophic events, such as crop failures
or, in this case, war. In addition, in normal years, China remains domestically self-sufficient
in rice and wheat, the most important staples in the Chinese diet. As a result, according to
the World Bank, China’s food self-sufficiency will remain above 90 percent through and
beyond 2030. China could easily reduce consumption of meat and other agricultural products
that depend on imported feeds and still provide sufficient food for all its citizens in the
event of a conflict. See World Bank, China Economic Update: Special Topic—Changing Food
Consumption Patterns in China; Implications for Domestic Supply and International Trade,
Beijing, June 2014a, p. 26.
Weighing the Costs: Military, Economic, Political, and International 51
Political Effects
Domestic political responses effects of war would differ considerably
between China and the United States because their political conditions
are so different. We assume that those conditions would basically be
the same in 2025 as in 2015. The nature, scale, and timing of political
effects are, if anything, even harder to predict than military losses and
economic costs. Whether those effects described below would occur
during or after a conflict of one year (the period posited for a long war)
is unknowable, but it is nonetheless worth considering.
China is a single-party authoritarian state with, at present, a powerful
chief executive.22 That leader is working to strengthen civilian
control over the military.23 Divisions among top civilian officials or
between them and military chiefs or economic elites are slight or well
masked. Public opinion, though an important source of pressure and
potential cradle of dissent, is not critical to the regime’s survival: The
middle class is mainly patriotic in sentiment, the rural poor are voiceless,
migrant factory workers are formless, and dissidents are a small
minority and more concerned with political or religious freedom than
foreign policy. Debate and protest are at the sufferance of the state.
Access to information can be controlled, up to a point, given widespread
Internet access. The state and its internal security apparatus
have ample means to suppress opposition and the will to use those
means. However, Beijing’s commitment to domestic order reflects its
fear of the sort of instability that China has experienced in the past
and that could again engulf the country, threaten the regime, and leave
China weak and vulnerable.
U.S. domestic politics are nearly the inverse of China’s. At present,
U.S. politics are polarized and the government is divided. Virtually
any issue, even war and peace, can bring on criticism, partisan squab-
22 See Elizabeth C. Economy, “China’s Imperial President: Xi Jinping Tightens His Grip,”
Foreign Affairs, November–December 2014.
23 There have been grounds for doubt that recent Chinese civilian leaders have as much
control over the PLA as earlier leaders. However, Xi Jinping has taken steps to regain such
control, without indications of PLA resistance.
52 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
bling, and partial paralysis.24 The ability of the president to be an effective
commander-in-chief could be impaired by politicization; opposition
could come from peace factions, war factions, or both. Unless the
country’s security is directly threatened, the wholehearted support of
the general public and the elite cannot be assumed, especially after
costly wars with disappointing results in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S.
administrations persist in unpopular wars at their own peril. Neither
patience nor continuity can be assumed, especially with elections every
two years. At the same time, there is no doubt about the state’s survival
in the event of a war with huge losses and costs, as there might be in
China’s case.
Political responses, constraints, and consequences in the two
countries could be strongly influenced by perceptions of the stakes of
war. Matters concerning Chinese territorial claims, historical injustices,
and sovereign rights would have strong purchase among Chinese
elites and the public. Yet many Americans could regard such matters as
peripheral to U.S. vital interests and not worth a costly war, unless unified
leadership could convince them otherwise. As fighting lasts, these
original interests could be altered by how the war is going in terms of
casualties, economic impact, attacks on civilians, and popular anger or
revulsion, making internal politics volatile and unpredictable.
The U.S. government could experience acute “tactical” political
problems (e.g., partisan and popular polarization) throughout a conflict,
whereas the Chinese government would have few such problems
and the muscle to manage them. But China could face “strategic”
political problems that the regime would have to confront in the event
of a long and severe conflict. China’s “rally round the flag” impulse
could be stronger at first but then give way to instabilities that the
United States does not face.
The president of the United States could be criticized from the
outset for involving the country in a war over less-than-vital interests.
Such criticism could be intensified by significant losses, especially
24 As this is being written, the polarization along partisan lines that has dogged U.S.
attempts to negotiate a nuclear-enrichment deal with Iran suggests erosion of the principle
that politics end at the water’s edge.
Weighing the Costs: Military, Economic, Political, and International 53
casualties, in severe fighting. On the other hand, the president could
be criticized for timidity if he or she held back the U.S. military to
limit hostilities and losses. Although civilian control of the military
would not be in doubt, strains could appear over presidential micromanagement,
driven by concern with costs. While it is possible that
mounting casualties could rally public support, especially if injected
with anti-Chinese sentiment, it is also possible that opposition to war
would grow. Depending on the stakes and reactions to losses, a long
and severe war could divide the United States and aggravate problems
of uncompromising partisanship and dysfunctional government.
While U.S. military advantages have until now offered the chance
to win a war swiftly and so avoid such political pressures and pitfalls,
this might be less likely in the future. The commander-in-chief could
be in a vise between war-winning military logic and cost-containing
political-economic logic. Whether its internal politics would permit the
United States to fight a long, costly, and possibly inconclusive war with
China would depend in part on the war’s origin and the U.S. stake in its
outcome. History suggests—and China should not overlook—that the
United States is capable of considerable political stamina during war.
Political support, state control, and stability in both countries
could also be subject to the effects of cyberwar, were it to escalate into
civilian domains. Here, too, China could be more vulnerable insofar as
the Chinese government relies more on influencing popular sentiment
through media, the Internet, and other communications channels than
does, or can, the U.S. government. If Beijing’s ability to manipulate
information, maintain support, and avert disorder is degraded, spontaneous
and opposing opinions could roil segments of the population.
Expectations of how U.S. domestic politics would affect and be
affected by war, depending on intensity and duration, are summarized
in Table 3.4.
Strains on China’s political system and cohesion would probably
be manageable in the event of mild hostilities. Social networking
could empower opposition to some extent, though the regime’s ability
to restrict and manipulate information and to contain dissent should
prevail. A choice by the regime to limit hostilities to avoid major losses,
attacks on China, and escalation could produce military grumbling
54 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
but not outright defiance. Assuming that Chinese leaders and elites feel
strongly about the conflict’s stakes (e.g., matters of national sovereignty
and honor), any opposition among the populace would not compel the
regime to cease fighting.
However, severe hostilities, if prolonged, could generate domestic
political turbulence and centrifugal forces. The danger of unrest
derives from the dependence of the regime’s legitimacy on economic
well-being and patriotic pride; to the extent both are fractured by war
losses and costs, segments of the society (e.g., elites, middle class, workers,
and peasants) could sour on the leadership. Not just capital but
also capitalists might flee the country. While domestic turmoil might
not imperil the regime, it could force it to crack down on large swaths
of an angry public, further undermining its legitimacy. The danger
of separatism lies in the opportunity separatists in Tibet or Xinjiang
might see if the state were preoccupied with a damaging and demanding
war with the United States. Because significant PLA ground forces
and other internal-security forces would presumably remain available
even in the event of a major conflict with the United States, the regime
would be able to crush separatists, but at a cost of resources and of
domestic and international legitimacy at a time when both could be in
short supply.
Table 3.4
Potential Effects on U.S. Domestic Politics in the Four Cases
Brief Long
Mild
Pressure from opponents of
war could cause tight control
over fighting (assuming China
is also in that mode). But a brief
and restricted conflict with an
ambiguous outcome could lead
to strong criticism from pro-war
quarters.
Pro-war opponents could claim that
politicians are tying the military’s
hands.
Severe
Pro-peace opposition could be too
weak to prevent strong U.S. military
action. However, pro-war support
could constrain the U.S. ability to
agree to terms for early cessation.
Mounting losses and economic
damage could divide the country,
impair prosecution of war, and
make continuity of effort hostage to
political change (e.g., elections).
Weighing the Costs: Military, Economic, Political, and International 55
Expectations of how Chinese domestic politics would affect and
be affected by war, depending on intensity and duration, are summarized
in Table 3.5.
Juxtaposing possible U.S. and Chinese political effects, it seems
that Chinese leaders would face little internal opposition in a brief conflict,
regardless of its intensity, whereas U.S. leaders could face vehement
opposition, partisanship, and polarization from the outset.25 Moreover,
Chinese leaders are able and willing to suppress domestic opposition.
While patriotic support can be expected in both cases, it could be more
fervent in China, especially if most Chinese feel more strongly than
most Americans do about the national interests at stake in the conflict.
However, in the event of a prolonged and costly conflict, China could
25 Whether domestic political opposition impairs a U.S. administration’s ability to wage
war is mainly a function of the degree of congressional-executive disharmony, which might
reflect public disharmony or opposition. It was not until well after a majority of Americans
soured on the Vietnam War that Congress began implementing serious roadblocks against
the U.S. war effort. The U.S. effort in Iraq, toward which the public became disenthralled,
continued without effective congressional opposition. Having said this, a U.S. administration
might be self-restrained if a war encounters major public opposition and exacts a major
political cost.
Table 3.5
Potential Effects on Chinese Domestic Politics in the Four Cases
Brief Long
Mild
Little elite or public opposition
would arise. Separatists might
see greater opportunity, but the
regime’s security apparatus could
neutralize.
Elite, public, and perhaps military
impatience could grow but not threaten
the regime. Separatists might exploit
conditions but not to the point of
actually separating. The regime could
increase oppression and lose some
legitimacy, but not be in danger.
Severe
Elite and public support can be
expected. However, Chinese
heavy losses, poor prospects, and
domestic turmoil might increase
pressure to end the conflict, even
on unfavorable terms, before
instability flares. By 2025, the
country might be unified in
supporting war.
Mounting military losses and economic
damage could weaken state legitimacy
and increase dissent and unrest.
Separatist activities could intensify and
lead to greater repression. Internal
strains could tax the state’s resources and
legitimacy at a time of costly war.
56 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
face more-serious domestic upheaval than the United States would,
which could motivate Beijing to seek peace.
International Effects
International effects of Sino-U.S. war can be thought of as concentric
circles: general world opinion is outermost and least consequential; in
the next circle, responses of major nonregional actors, including allies
of either side; in the center and most important, East Asian states.
Irrespective of their positions on the causes, merits, and favored side
in a conflict, countries, institutions, and enterprises worldwide, fearful
of economic harm, would appeal for an immediate end to Sino-U.S.
combat. But such views are unlikely to sway either belligerent.
Of more significance than world opinion would be reactions of
other powers, notably Russia, India, and European (NATO) states.
India and Russia, China’s most powerful land neighbors, are likely to
be sympathetic to the United States and China, respectively. Although
India would want to refrain from direct military intervention, it might
increase readiness of its force along the frontier, especially if it felt its
vital interests could be affected. This could cause China to do likewise
with PLA ground forces (which would in any case not be heavily used
against U.S. forces).
Russia is more of a wild card. While it lacks capabilities to conduct
effective military operations in the Western Pacific, it could exploit
U.S. preoccupation in the Pacific to increase threats to former Soviet
states in Eastern Europe (e.g., Ukraine) and the Caucasus (e.g., Georgia),
and even try to intimidate its Baltic neighbors despite their NATO
membership. Another possibility—less likely but with very different
significance—is that Russia could seize the opportunity of a Sino-U.S.
war to strengthen its position in central Asia and Siberia at China’s
expense. Geopolitics aside, Russia would be eager to help China make
up for lost oil and gas supplies, though not for free. In addition, Russian
arms could make up somewhat for Chinese military losses and
expenditures (e.g., aircraft and air defense), though it would take time
for them to be operationalized, and most would fare badly against U.S.
Weighing the Costs: Military, Economic, Political, and International 57
forces. Overall, though, Russia’s economic weakness, military limitations,
and dangers on or within its own frontiers reduce the importance
of its support for China and the likelihood or significance of its
intervention.
Assuming that its European allies see the United States as justified,
they would likely back it politically, while urging that the conflict,
end lest it escalate or ruin the world economy. Short of direct combat
involvement, NATO itself might pledge support for U.S. efforts to
oppose Chinese aggression. One of the most important European contributions
would be to preempt or respond to any increased Russian
pressure on Eastern Europe. In the course of a lengthy conflict, Europe
might be willing to join in an embargo of export to China of any
goods, technologies, and services that could aid its war effort.
As for other Chinese “allies,” North Korea is even more unpredictable
than Russia. Although North Korea no longer has the conventional
military capability to invade and defeat South Korea, it could use
missiles against South Korea or Japan; although Seoul would almost
certainly not enter a war against China in any case, Tokyo’s options
would be complicated by North Korean belligerence.
A conflict between China and the United States could disturb
the greater Middle East by providing an opening for heightened violence
from Islamist-extremist and anti-Israel groups (ISIS, al Qaeda,
Hamas, and Hezbollah). Middle East difficulties could place additional
demands on U.S. naval and air forces at a moment when more of them
are needed in the Western Pacific. Conversely, a shift of significant
U.S. forces from U.S. Central Command to U.S. Pacific Command
could add to the potential for instability in the Middle East. Increased
violence, extremism, and instability in the Middle East could also be
damaging to China, which gets much of its oil from there (though
most oil would not ship through the war zone anyway).
East Asian states would have the most to lose from a Sino-U.S.
war: Much of the region could be a war zone; its trade-intensive economy
could go into depression; China might emerge either dominant
or unstable; the region’s extraordinary gains in security and prosperity
could be threatened. Most East Asian states would want to see war end
swiftly in military victory for the United States, but with China intact.
58 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
Most of China’s neighbors have edged toward closer security relations
with the United States. This drift could be accentuated in a conflict
perceived to result from Chinese bellicosity.
The most critical state is Japan, with its growing military strength,
its antagonistic relationship with China, and the strong possibility that
China would attack U.S. air bases on Japanese territory. Recent reinterpretation
of Japan’s constitution, at the initiative of the Abe government,
effectively legalizes military support for the United States
in a war with China.26 Of course, the probability of significant Japanese
involvement in the war would be greater if Japan was involved
in the issue or confrontation that triggered conflict (e.g., in the East
China Sea). Japanese military participation would be virtually assured
if China were to attack Japan, including U.S. bases in Japan, or Japanese
forces. While China has the option of not attacking U.S. bases
on Japanese territory, such a decision would involve major operational
drawbacks.
As for capabilities, Japanese submarines, surface combatants,
combat aircraft, strike weapons, and ISR could make a material difference
in a severe war by 2025. The longer a Sino-U.S. conflict lasted,
the greater the potential effect of Japanese military contributions on
the U.S. side. In a long, severe war, China would find it difficult to
contend with combined U.S. and Japanese forces, as the latter made
up for the former’s attrition. Moreover, Japanese involvement would
reduce the need for the United States to strip its forces from elsewhere
for reinforcement.
Overall, Japanese combat involvement could increase Chinese
losses and offset or even reduce U.S. losses in a long, severe conflict.
Because Japan’s forces are being steadily improved, its entry could widen
the gap between U.S. and Chinese losses in 2025 that was depicted
above. This possibility reinforces the observation already made that
even with improved Chinese A2AD and reduced U.S. military superi-
26 This assumes adequate domestic political support for Japanese intervention. Notwithstanding
the reinterpretation of the constitution, polls suggest that a majority of Japanese
continue to oppose involvement in wars other than in self-defense. See, e.g., Kamiya Matake,
“Japanese Public Opinions About the Exercise of the Right of Collective Self-Defense,” Discuss
Japan, September 25, 2014.
Weighing the Costs: Military, Economic, Political, and International 59
ority, China cannot be confident of winning a long, severe war. At the
same time, Japanese intervention would enrage the Chinese and could
enflame, extend, or expand the conflict. It might cause China to fight
longer and endure greater costs than it would otherwise. China might
widen attacks on Japan, though at the price of diverting forces already
under heavy attack and stress.
Depending on the cause and locus of the conflict, other East Asian
states would mostly side with the United States in varying degrees:
from support ranging from permission to use bases to the possible
commitment of forces (e.g., Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines),
to cautious support for the United States among countries with strong
ties to China (notably, South Korea) or significant Chinese populations
(e.g., Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand), to support for China
(only North Korea). The participation of Australian forces, because of
their quality, could have military significance despite their small size.
Apart from military contributions, the longer and more severe the conflict,
the more and perhaps more permanently China could become
isolated from the very region it aspires to lead. This, in turn, could
strengthen pro-peace voices in Beijing (e.g., in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs).27
Prognostications about the reaction of third parties are fraught
with uncertainty even now, let alone ten years from now. Much would
depend on the cause of war: For example, a Chinese move to gain
control of the East or South China Seas flagrant enough to force U.S.
armed intervention would be more likely to produce a significant anti-
China international response than would a conflict over Taiwan, especially
if it appeared that the Chinese were provoked. It is conceivable
that many U.S. friends, near and far, would lay low or that Russia or
North Korea would act in ways that added to U.S. military risks and
burdens. Yet another possibility, touched on in the earlier discussion of
“upper limits” of war, is that many states would be dragged in or enter
27 In terms of sheer mass, the combined GDP (approximately $10 trillion) of Asian states
that would favor the United States is roughly equivalent to China’s, and the combined
defense spending of those states (approximately $150 billion) is nearly as great as China’s
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2014: Armaments, Disarmament
and International Security, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014).
60 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
opportunistically, leading to a quasi–world war. However, we think
the more likely international reaction would be for regional states with
direct and critical interests, such as Japan, to get involved, mainly to
the disadvantage of China.
In sum, world public opinion would favor the immediate cessation
of fighting. Russia might growl, posture, and exploit a Sino-U.S. conflict
by taking initiatives elsewhere, whether or not in sync with China.
Some East Asian states, in varying degrees, would line up behind the
United States. Japan’s involvement could make a long, severe conflict
more costly for China but could also increase the dangers of escalation.
These international effects would be amplified, to the advantage
of the United States, the longer a severe war persisted. Possible international
responses are summarized in Table 3.6.
The Four Cases and Their Effects
Each category of effects is important in its own right and in its implications
for other effects:
• Military losses can affect the ability, especially of China, to keep
trade going, prevent destruction of infrastructure, and maintain
access to energy supplies.
Table 3.6
Possible International Responses in the Four Cases
Brief Long
Mild
Regional and global pressure on
both sides to end conflict.
NATO support would enable the United
States to concentrate more forces in the
Western Pacific.
Severe
International shock and
pressure on both sides to end
conflict. Warnings and military
preparations by Japan and other
East Asian states. Russia provides
indirect support for China, as
NATO does for United States.
Japanese and other East Asian entry in
support of the United States. India could
exploit the frontier to the disadvantage
of China. NATO could limit exploitation
by Russia.
Weighing the Costs: Military, Economic, Political, and International 61
• New domains of warfare—cyberspace and space—can have
both a military and economic effect, given that dual-use systems
(e.g., communications, logistics networks, GPS) could be disabled.
• Cyberwar, if not confined to military networks, could hinder
political responses to war, affect third parties, and compound
economic disruptions.
• Economic costs, whether from hostilities or from disruption of
commerce, would affect the ability of combatants to make up for
military losses in a severe and protracted conflict.
• Economic hardship, such as reduced consumption of and access
to essentials, could affect political support, stability, and cohesion,
and thus the ability and resolve of each side to continue fighting
at a high intensity.
• Adverse world public opinion directed at one or both parties
would make little difference in their ability and will to fight, at
least in the short term. However, the reactions of important third
parties could eventually help one side or the other in major ways:
direct combat, war supplies, trade, energy access, and, in the case
of the United States, support in other theaters that enables concentration
of forces.
Table 3.7 integrates the four categories of effects on both states
in the four conflict cases. (The “Military” column includes 2015 and
2025 cases to reflect the effects of improvements in Chinese A2AD.)
The “General” column and row summarize the four cases and the four
sorts of effects, respectively, providing a very rough sense of the impact
on and relative advantage of the sides.
Overall, the decline in U.S. warfighting advantages does not
mean China can win a war that the United States is willing to fight. By
2025, a war could be a military standoff, with major weapon-platform
losses on both sides, in addition to losses in cyberspace and space. Yet
neither side would fare so much worse than the other that it would
feel compelled to concede, raising the probability that a war would
be both severe and long. Such a war could be decided by economic
costs, domestic political effects, and international responses. Japan’s
62 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
Table 3.7
Possible Effects on the United States and China in the Four Cases and Overall
Military Economic Political International General
Brief, mild
Minor losses on both sides. China: Broad but
brief disruption of
trade, consumption,
and energy.
United States: Brief
disruption of trade
with China.
China: Little elite or public
opposition. The PLA favors
intensified attacks but
does not openly challenge
the regime. Separatists
see greater opportunity,
but the regime and its
internal security apparatus
neutralize it.
United States: Pressure
from both sides: doves
demanding cessation,
and hawks demanding
stepped-up strikes.
Regional and
global pressure
on both sides
to end conflict.
Brief but serious
economic
disruption,
asymmetrically
harming China.
Brief, severe
2015
China: U.S. counterforce capabilities
take a major toll early and
throughout.
United States: Chinese A2AD takes
a major early toll but then less as
degraded by U.S. strikes.
2025
China: Increased U.S. losses reduce strike
threat to Chinese forces.
United States: Improved and less
vulnerable Chinese A2AD produces
increased U.S. losses.
China: Shock to
global trade,
with aftershocks
to consumption,
energy supply.
Difficult recovery.
United States:
Brief economic
disruption, confined
to trade with
and investment
in China. Quick
recovery.
China: Elite and public
supportive. The PLA is
satisfied. Early support
is stronger in 2025 with
better military results.
United States: Doves too
weak to prevent strong
U.S. military action. Hawks
constrain U.S. ability to
agree to terms for early
cessation.
Regional and
global shock.
Pressure on
both sides to
end conflict.
Warnings
and military
preparations
by Japan and
other
East Asian
states. Russia
voices support
for China and
NATO for the
United States.
Major military
losses and
economic costs
for both, but
asymmetrically
harming China.
Gap in expected
losses less
unfavorable to
China in 2025
than in 2015.
Weighing the Costs: Military, Economic, Political, and International 63
Military Economic Political International General
Long, mild
Modest losses of aircraft or ships on
both sides.
China: Serious
compounding
damage
to trade,
consumption, and
energy supply.
Slow and difficult
recovery.
United States:
Significant economic
harm from disrupted
trade with and
investment in China.
Slow recovery.
China: Elite, public, and
PLA impatience grow
but do not threaten the
regime. Separatists try
to exploit conditions.
The regime becomes
more oppressive and less
legitimate, but not in
danger.
United States: Hawks claim
that politicians are tying
the military’s hands.
NATO support
elsewhere
enables
the United
States to
concentrate
more forces
in Western
Pacific.
Economic
costs more
harmful to
China. Domestic
dissatisfaction
grows in
both states.
International
responses favor
the United
States.
Long, severe
2015
China: U.S. strike capabilities, though
somewhat degraded by A2AD, take a
major toll on Chinese forces. Extensive
damage to war-related infrastructure.
Computer and satellite degradation.
United States: Chinese A2AD takes a
major toll on U.S. forces early but less
as degraded by U.S. strikes.
2025
China: Improved A2AD reduces losses
somewhat, though still greater than
U.S. losses. Increased cyber and satellite
losses.
United States: Improved and less
vulnerable Chinese A2AD produces
increased U.S. losses early and throughout.
Increased cyber and satellite losses.
U.S. GDP falls by
5–10 percent in
one year. China’s
GDP falls by 25–
35 percent in one
year. Escalating
cyberwar aggravates
turmoil in both
economies.
China: Mounting military
losses and economic damage
weaken state legitimacy
and increase dissent
and unrest. Separatist
activities intensify and
lead to greater repression.
While internal strains do
not imperil the state, they
tax it severely at a time of
costly war.
United States: Mounting
losses and economic costs
divide the country, impair
prosecution of war, and
make continuity of effort
hostage to political
change.
Japanese
and other
East Asian
countries
enter in
support of the
United States.
China is
concerned
that India
could
exploit the
situation on
the frontier.
NATO limits
Russia
exploitation.
Major losses.
Reduction in
the military
capabilities
of both sides.
Asymmetrically
severe
economic costs
(including cyber
and space), for
China. Possible
Chinese
domestic
instability.
International
response favors
the United
States.
Table 3.7—Continued
64 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
Military Economic Political International General
General
As U.S. military advantages decline
by 2025, U.S. losses increase, Chinese
losses decrease, and the prospect of
outright U.S. military victory declines.
Growing cyber and satellite losses on
both sides.
China is far more
vulnerable than the
United States to
broad, deep, and
lasting economic
harm.
China is better equipped
than the United States to
contain the political effects
of a short war, but China
faces challenges in a long
one.
U.S. East
Asian allies
provide
significant
support in
a persisting
conflict.
Japan’s
entry has a
significant
military effect
by 2025.
NATO allies
and India are
be indirectly
helpful to the
United States,
as Russia is to
China.
Table 3.7—Continued
Weighing the Costs: Military, Economic, Political, and International 65
entry could offset the decline of U.S. military superiority, especially in
a prolonged conflict. All these factors, taken together, would strongly
favor the United States.
Recall the earlier observation that war between China and the
United States could be worse than the long, severe case, as described
here. In the 20th century, two great-power wars became world wars,
and a third could have followed the same course, or even worse. The
possibility of a Sino-U.S. war drawing in other powers and many states
cannot be excluded: In addition to Japan, perhaps India, Vietnam, and
NATO would be on the U.S. side; Russia and North Korea would be
on China’s side. Fighting could spread beyond the region. War aims
could expand, and as they did, so would the costs of losing. Even if
nuclear weapons were not used, China might find other ways to attack
the United States proper. Use of space and cyberspace could be severely
curtailed. As long as fighting remained inclusive, destruction and hardship
could fuel determination and further mobilization. In sum, both
the duration and severity of war could exceed the upper case used here
for purposes of analysis. If so, losses and costs would be even greater for
both sides and the world, and the outcome would be no more favorable
for China, despite the expansion of its power.
67
CHAPTER FOUR
Findings, Recommendations, and Concluding
Observations
Findings
Unless both U.S. and Chinese political leaders decline to authorize
their militaries to carry out their counterforce strategies, the ability of
either state to control the ensuing conflict would be greatly impaired.
Both would suffer large military losses from the outset and throughout
a severe conflict: In 2015, U.S. losses could be a relatively small fraction
of forces committed, but still significant; Chinese losses could be
much heavier than U.S. losses and a substantial fraction of forces committed.
This gap in losses will shrink as Chinese A2AD improves: By
2025, U.S. losses could range from significant to heavy; Chinese losses,
while still very heavy, could be somewhat less than in 2015, owing to
increased degradation of U.S. strike capabilities. A severe and lengthy
conflict would leave both with substantially reduced total military
capacity and thus vulnerable to other threats.
China’s A2AD will make it increasingly difficult for the United
States to gain military-operational dominance and victory, even in a
long war. However, provided the United States is nonetheless willing to
fight, China cannot expect to win militarily. Thus, the two could face
the prospect of an extremely costly military standoff.
This outcome implies that a conflict could be decided by domestic
political, international, and, especially, economic factors, all of which
would favor the United States in a long, severe war:
• Although a war would harm both economies, damage to China’s
would be far worse (perhaps 25–35 percent of GDP after
68 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
one year). Because much of the Western Pacific would become a
war zone, China’s trade with the region and the rest of the world
would decline substantially. China’s loss of seaborne energy supplies
would be especially damaging. Although consumption is a
smaller share of the Chinese economy than the U.S. economy, it
is expected to grow, leaving the Chinese economy vulnerable to
further contraction in the event of war.
• Politically, a long conflict, especially if militarily severe and economically
punishing, could expose China to internal division—
taxing and testing the state.
• The entry of Japan and, to a lesser extent, other U.S. partners in
the region could have a considerable influence on military operations.
The responses of Russia, India, and NATO are less important.
However, NATO efforts to preserve security in other regions
(at least Europe, if not also the Middle East) would permit greater,
or less risky, commitment of U.S. forces to war with China. Such
a combination of international responses could increase Chinese
losses in a long, severe conflict, despite improved A2AD.
In a nutshell, despite military trends that favor it, China could not
win, and might lose, a severe war with the United States in 2025, especially
if prolonged. Moreover, the economic costs and political dangers
of such a war could imperil China’s stability, end its development, and
undermine the legitimacy of the state.
Yet in the event of war, the military capabilities, motivations, and
plans of both sides make a severe, prolonged, and exceedingly costly
conflict a distinct possibility. Of the many reasons the United States
should not want such a war, the most important are the immense military
losses and economic costs to itself and the implications, for the
country, the region, and the world, of devastating harm to China.
Such prospects underscore the importance of both the United States
and China contemplating how to control and restrict fighting should a
crisis turn violent, which shines the spotlight on principles and procedures
for political control and communication.
Findings, Recommendations, and Concluding Observations 69
Recommendations
The findings confirm what is widely thought: A Sino-U.S. war would be
so harmful that both sides should place a very high priority on avoiding
one. While such prospects make premeditated war highly improbable,
they also dictate effective individual and bilateral crisis management,
as well as other measures to avoid misperceptions and mistakes.
Because the United States might be unable to control, win, or
avoid major losses and costs of a severe conflict, it must guard against
automaticity in implementing immediate attacks on Chinese A2AD
and should have plans and means to prevent hostilities from becoming
severe. Establishing “fail safe” arrangements will guarantee definitive,
informed political approval for military operations.
Likewise, China has much to lose from a severe conflict, and even
more from a prolonged, severe one. Notwithstanding favorable military
trends, China has as much reason as the United States to avoid
automatic execution of military plans for a sharp and immediate counterforce
exchange, including a parallel requirement for unambiguous
political control. Again, if either state executes its military plans to
strike the forces of the other, a severe war would likely ensue.
Thus, it is necessary but not sufficient for the United States to
be able to refrain from full execution of military plans once fighting
begins, for it could not hesitate to strike hard if China does or is about
to do so. Given the extreme penalty for allowing one’s forces to be
struck before they strike, creating mutual forbearance at the outset of
hostilities could be as difficult as it is critical. It requires an ability to
cooperate at a moment of intense pressure to attack, which in turn
makes clear, direct, and prompt political communication as important
after as it is before hostilities begin. Together with ensuring that U.S.
and Chinese political leaders alike have military options other than immediate
strikes to destroy opposing forces, having the means to confer and
contain a conflict before it gets out of hand is the most important recommendation
coming out of this analysis.
Along with measures to prevent crises from becoming violent and
violence from becoming severe, the United States should try to reduce
the effect of Chinese A2AD in the coming years. Work at RAND and
70 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
elsewhere increasingly stresses the need to invest in more-survivable
force platforms (e.g., submarines) and in counter-A2AD (e.g., theater
missiles). Such efforts would buttress deterrence, help prevent increased
China’s confidence of prevailing in a severe conflict, and improve stability
in crises, as well as in the critical initial stage of a conflict. But the
efforts would not dramatically reduce U.S. military losses or economic
costs of a severe conflict.
Even as China’s military capabilities improve, it would suffer huge
losses in a long, severe conflict. Moreover, the economic, domestic, and
international effects of a long, severe conflict work against China. The
United States needs to be sure that the Chinese are specifically aware of
the potential for catastrophic results even if a war is not lost militarily.
While not losing sight of the grave harm to the United States of
a lengthy and severe conflict, prudent U.S. preparations for one would
help disabuse the Chinese of expecting victory at acceptable cost. However,
a heavy dose of common sense is needed in contemplating such
preparations. As stressed from the outset of this study, war with China
is improbable, in part because both sides know that the costs would outweigh
the gains, even for the winner—if indeed there is one. Moreover,
the costs of being completely prepared are prohibitive—undoubtedly
greater than the costs of war when discounted by the low probability
of one.
With this in mind, U.S. preparations fall into several categories:
• Improving the ability to sustain severely intense military operations:
The Department of Defense should analyze critical “consumables”
(weapons and provisions) that could run out and tip
the balance in the event a protracted war.
• Shifting toward more-survivable platforms: The Pentagon should
not increase stocks of vulnerable platforms (surface ships and
manned aircraft) that are expected to take significant losses,
because of China’s A2AD. Rather, the Pentagon should undertake
a purposeful long-term program to substitute more-survivable systems,
at least for this region.
• Improving U.S. and allied warfighting capabilities: In addition
to improve survivability, U.S. and allied forces should exploit
Findings, Recommendations, and Concluding Observations 71
more strategically the technologies that China is exploiting in
its A2AD, including targeting, theater-range missiles, advanced
extend-range air defense, and submarines.
• Conducting contingency planning with key allies: Japan is the
most important but also the most controversial ally; however,
existing low-profile U.S.-Japanese military planning is an established
framework (well known to the Chinese) that could begin to
touch on issues regarding low-probability and high-consequence
conflict with China. Similar planning with other East Asia allies
is encouraged. NATO planning should be stretched in the direction
of how European allies would respond to a Russian threat if
the United States were in a major war with China. Again, this is
a delicate matter and best done with no fanfare.
• Undertaking measures to mitigate the interruption of critical
products from China: Here again, sound judgment must prevail.
For the United States to slash Chinese imports in the off chance
of a war would be to harm its own economy in anticipation of
an unlikely event, which, though economically painful, would
not be catastrophic. It would suffice for the United States government
to identify alternative domestic and foreign sources of only
the most critical products and parts made in China. This could
include stockpiling especially vital materials.
• Developing options to deny China access to war-critical commodities
and technologies in the event of war: Although a general
U.S. blockade would not be needed to harm the Chinese economy,
the United States could take measures that would make it
difficult for China to sustain long and severe combat. Cutting off
Chinese access to seaborne supplies of oil and liquefied natural
gas would have the most dramatic effect. Although Russia would
probably be eager and able to supply China with military hardware
during a war, Chinese access to more-sophisticated Western
systems could be stopped.
Such U.S. measures could reinforce Chinese perceptions that the
United States is determined to encircle and isolate China, as well as
create perceptions that the United States would seek to devastate China
72 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
and destroy its state in the event of war. The distinction worth making
is that the United States does not seek to isolate China unless war
requires it to do so. The risk of harm to Sino-U.S. relations can be mitigated,
though to only some extent, by patient and persistent efforts by
the United States to engage Chinese political and military counterparts
in discussion of cooperation and crisis management.
The U.S. Army, as a Title X service and in its joint responsibilities,
has important roles to play in many aspects of such preparations.
It should do the following:
• Invest in land-based A2AD capabilities (e.g., mobile theater-range
missiles and advanced air defenses) to contribute to high Chinese
military losses.
• Encourage and enable East Asian partners to mount strong
defense, including missiles and air defense.
• Improve interoperability with partners, especially Japan.
• Contribute to the expansion and deepening of Sino-U.S. militaryto-
military understanding and cooperation to reduce dangers of
misperception and miscalculation.
Because a Sino-U.S. war, in the construct used here, would not
include a major ground combat, the U.S. Army’s expected losses would
be proportionately less than those of the Navy and Air Force. Therefore,
this analysis does not change current planning factors concerning
overall end-strength or mobilization requirements—albeit with important
investments in technology and platforms and shifts in force structure
to enhance long-range fires and air defense, as noted. However, a
major conflict on the Korean peninsula would alter this presumption.
Concluding Observations
As China’s military improvements neutralize the military advantages
of the United States, and because technology favors conventional counterforce,
war between the two countries could be intense, last a year
or more, have no winner, and inflict huge losses and costs on both
Findings, Recommendations, and Concluding Observations 73
sides. The longer such a war continued, the more significant economic,
domestic political, and international effects would become. While such
nonmilitary effects would hit China hardest, they could also greatly
harm the U.S. economy and the U.S. ability to meet security challenges
worldwide. The United States should make prudent preparations
to be able to wage a long and intense war with China. Of no less
importance is the ability of the United States to limit the scope, intensity,
and duration of a war with China through its planning, its system
of civilian control, and its ability to communicate with China in peace,
crisis, and war.
Likewise for China, political control and good wartime top-level
communications are imperative. True, Chinese military improvements
have lessened the danger of losing decisively to the United States. Yet
China cannot count on a short war, and a long one could leave China
weak, unstable, insecure, and impoverished.
To paraphrase Frederick the Great, evenly matched well-armed
powers considering war will want to weigh whether possible gains
would even “pay the interest” on probable costs. As the United States
and China become more equal in their ability to destroy each other’s
forces, neither can be confident of winning at an acceptable price.
Should a confrontation or incident nonetheless lead to hostilities, it
would be better if both sides had thought through how to limit the
harm, not just how to win.
75
APPENDIX A
Military Losses
Mild Case
Brief, Mild
• The conflict trigger event results in immediate losses for both
sides.
• China suffers slightly more losses as a result of its lower levels
of modern combat experience and less capable systems and platforms.
Long, Mild
• Protracted hostilities result in additional but relatively infrequent
losses over the length of the conflict.
• China suffers slightly more losses because of less modern combat
experience and less capable systems and platforms.
Severe Case, 2015
Table A.1 displays the expected military losses in the severe case for
2015.
76 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
Aircraft
U.S. Losses
• No specific judgment is made here about whether China would
damage or sink a U.S. aircraft carrier with an accompanying air
wing.
• The United States would likely lose substantial forces initially in
the region because of Chinese missile forces more so than Chinese
aircraft. China has relatively few modern aircraft, and the newest
generation would not yet be deployed.
• U.S. regional air bases would also come under attack, but China
has limited aerial refueling to sustain operations against regional
bases.
• The United States would have the edge in air-to-air combat.
• U.S. aircraft carriers would be vulnerable to Chinese submarines.
China’s Losses
• Once China’s most modern aircraft are incapacitated, China
would be heavily dependent on outdated and aging airframes
that have limited data relay capabilities. This means that Chinese
Table A.1
Military Losses in the Severe Case, 2015
System Type U.S. T1 U.S. T2 China T1 China T2
Aircraft
Surface ships
Submarines
Missiles
C4ISR
NOTES: Green signifies modest losses; yellow, significant losses; orange, heavy
losses; and red, very heavy losses. A mix of two colors in one cell indicates a range
(e.g., green/yellow means we expect there would be modest to significant losses).
T1 = a hypothetical moment, within days of the start of the conflict, when the sides
decide whether to continue fighting; T2 = one year.
Military Losses 77
aircraft would become increasingly vulnerable to U.S. aircraft
during a conflict.
• However, China has a lot of places to hide aircraft, such as inland
bases and tunnel facilities, and might choose to do so rather than
have them shot down.
• China also has no modern experience sustaining air operations
over long periods of time and has limited aerial refueling capabilities,
which would affect sortie rates.
Surface Ships
U.S. Losses
• No specific judgment is made here about whether China would
damage or sink a U.S. aircraft carrier with an accompanying air
wing.
• The United States is likely to lose substantial forces initially in
the region because of missile forces and, possibly, swarming techniques
by PLA Navy (PLAN) and nonmilitary ships.
• Regional naval bases would also be under attack.
• U.S. ships could hide out far from the conflict in the deep Pacific.
China’s Losses
• Chinese ships would be vulnerable to attack by U.S. submarines,
particularly given Chinese weakness in ASW, as well as U.S. surface
ships, planes, and so on.
• Chinese naval bases would be vulnerable as well, given that all are
relatively near the potential theater of conflict, and Chinese ships
would have nowhere to hide where they could also resupply.
• Although China has huge numbers of shipbuilding facilities and
would likely be able to ramp up production as losses accumulated,
no new ships would come online in time to affect the conflict.
78 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
Submarines
U.S. Losses
• U.S. submarines are relatively quiet and difficult for China to
find.
• China has noted weaknesses in conducting ASW.
• U.S. submarine-launched missiles have a longer range than Chinese
submarine-launched missiles, so the United States could participate
farther from the fight.
China’s Losses
• Even the newest Chinese submarines are still relatively noisy and
easy to find. They would survive “well” (only in a comparative
sense), but after they were incapacitated, the older, noisier ones
would be easier to hunt down and destroy.
• The depletion of the Chinese submarine capability would make
the U.S. submarine force even more survivable.
Missiles
U.S. Losses and Use of Missile Inventories
• The United States has large quantities of a variety of missiles, as
well as a relatively diverse set of platforms from which to launch
them.
• Some U.S. missile launchers (e.g., surface ships) are increasingly
vulnerable. Air-to-surface missiles are only as survivable as the
platforms that carry them.
• U.S. land-based missiles between 500 km and 5,500 km are prohibited
by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty,
whereas the Chinese missiles are not, giving China a significant
advantage.
• Chinese long-range multiple launch rocket systems (MLRSs)
have ranges that approximate those of U.S. land-based missiles.
U.S. MLRSs do not have ranges that would make them useful.
Military Losses 79
China’s Losses and Use of Missile Inventories
• China would use many missiles in initial waves and would eventually
have to rely on older missiles with shorter ranges and morelimited
capability.
• However, launchers would be relatively survivable given Second
Artillery’s extensive tunneling system.
• China might also hide some launchers to prevent the United
States from targeting them and later deploy them in short bursts.
C4ISR
Both countries have some cyberwar and ASAT capabilities. However,
China’s capabilities are less tested and rugged and would likely wear
down faster.
U.S. Losses
• China would be able to disable some U.S. satellites and broader
C4ISR capabilities.
• However, the U.S. C4ISR capability is more robust and redundant
than China’s, so the United States would suffer lower degradation
of capability after it survived the first wave.
China’s Losses
• China depends less on C4ISR than the United States, but China
would also have a much less robust capability once initial C4ISR
capabilities were knocked out.
• The United States would focus attacks on Chinese sensors.
• The United States would also be able to knock out a lot of Chinese
satellites in initial waves, and China would be hard-pressed
to defend its remaining satellites.
• On the organizational side, China already suffers from command
issues because of its stultified military organizational structure
80 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
and hierarchical command authority, both of which would likely
exacerbate problems in wartime.1
Severe Case, 2025
Table A.2 displays the expected military losses in the severe case for
2025.
Aircraft
U.S. Losses
• Fifth-generation Chinese aircraft would be coming online and
would represent a bigger threat to the United States, along with
larger Chinese missile inventories.
1 For more information on organizational weaknesses within the PLA, see Michael S.
Chase, Jeffrey G. Engstrom, Tai Ming Cheung, Kristen Gunness, Scott Warren Harold,
Susan Puska, and Samuel K. Berkowitz, China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing
the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation,
RR-893-USCC, 2015.
Table A.2
Military Losses in the Severe Case, 2025
System Type U.S. T1 U.S. T2 China T1 China T2
Aircraft
Surface ships
Submarines
Missiles
C4ISR
NOTES: Green signifies modest losses; yellow, significant losses; orange, heavy
losses; and red, very heavy losses. A mix of two colors in one cell indicates a range
(e.g., green/yellow means we expect there would be modest to significant losses).
T1 = a hypothetical moment, within days of the start of the conflict, when the sides
decide whether to continue fighting; T2 = one year. In the categories where the
assessments appear similar for both countries (aircraft for both T1 and T2 and C4ISR
for T1), we assess that Chinese attrition would be relatively greater than that of
committed U.S. forces.
Military Losses 81
• China would be more likely to damage or sink a U.S. aircraft carrier
(or multiple carriers) and any accompanying air wings.
• The United States would likely lose a lot of forces initially in
region, though still as a result of missile forces more so than Chinese
aircraft.
• U.S. regional air bases would come under attack given that China
would have a robust aerial refueling capability.
• The United States is still likely to have a qualitative edge in air-toair
combat but would have to fight a larger number of relatively
new Chinese planes.
• U.S. fourth-generation aircraft would be in significant danger
from Chinese fifth-generation aircraft.
China’s Losses
• U.S. next-generation aircraft would be online.
• Newer Chinese planes would be equipped with data links and
networked, improving information sharing and likely reducing
losses.
• Depending on production rates of new aircraft, China would
likely have a deeper bench of new aircraft than in 2015 and would
therefore depend less on outdated and aging airframes.
• China would likely still lack modern experience sustaining air
operations over long periods of time.
• However, China would also still have many places to hide aircraft,
such as inland bases and tunnel facilities, and might choose
to do so rather than have them shot down; or China might rotate
them in and out of well-defended interior areas. By 2025, China
would have two to three aircraft carriers and accompanying air
wings that could be disabled or destroyed.
82 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
Surface Ships
U.S. Losses
• China is more likely to damage or sink a U.S. aircraft carrier (or
multiple carriers).
• The United States is likely to lose substantial forces initially in
region as a result of attacks by Chinese aircraft, missile forces,
and, possibly, swarming techniques by PLAN and nonmilitary
ships.
• U.S. regional naval bases would also be attacked.
China’s Losses
• The United States is still likely to sink Chinese aircraft carriers.
• China has likely dealt with at least some ASW weaknesses, so
Chinese surface ships would be less vulnerable to U.S. submarines.
• Chinese naval bases would still be vulnerable, given that all are
relatively near the potential conflict theater, but ships might be
able to resupply at foreign ports.
• However, the United States might be able to knock out Chinese
ships in third-party locations, given its superior global military
posture.
• China would be even better equipped to ramp up shipbuilding
production, but few new ships would come online in time to
affect a conflict.
Submarines
U.S. Losses
• U.S. submarines are quiet and difficult for China to target, despite
improved ASW.
Military Losses 83
China’s Losses
• The newest Chinese submarine classes would be much quieter,
but there would be only a few of each class, and older submarines
would still be detectable.
• Missile ranges on the new submarine-class missile will be longer,
so these submarines will be able to participate in a conflict farther
from the fight. The newest Chinese submarines would survive
well, but the older ones would still be easy to hunt down and
incapacitate.
Missiles
U.S. Losses and Use of Missile Inventories
• The United States would still have large quantities of a variety of
different missiles, as well as a relatively more diverse set of platforms
from which to launch missiles, with the exception of landbased
missiles.
• However, the United States would face more-severe initial and
protracted losses as a result of attacks on regional U.S. bases.
• The United States would not be able to bring enough tactical
strike power or ISR to find and take down Chinese launchers,
and U.S. survivability would be a problem.
• U.S. land-based missiles from 500 km to 5,500 km are prohibited
by the INF treaty, whereas the Chinese missiles are not, giving
China a significant advantage.
• Chinese long-range MLRSs have ranges that approximate those
of U.S. land-based missiles. U.S. MLRSs do not have ranges that
would make them useful.
China’s Losses and Use of Missile Inventories
• China would have significantly more missiles and launchers in
2025.
84 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
• China’s missile inventories would last longer, but China would
still eventually have to rely on older missiles with shorter ranges
and more-limited capability. Chinese launchers would be even
more survivable and difficult to disable when hiding in the tunnels
but would still largely be viable targets during above-ground
launches.
C4ISR
Compared with 2015, C4ISR losses in 2025 could be worse for both
sides, because both could take down C4ISR with systems that are relatively
invulnerable.
U.S. Losses
• The United States would lose a lot more general C4ISR capability
initially than in the 2015 scenario. China would also likely be
better in 2025 than in 2015 at incapacitating U.S. satellites, and
with improved sensing and long-range fires, China could do significant
damage to ground components of the C4ISR networks.
• After the initial onslaught, China would have more-robust surviving
capability to continue attacking U.S. C4ISR than in 2015,
so the degradation of U.S. capabilities would continue.
China’s Losses
• China would still depend less than the United States on C4ISR,
but China’s capability would also be more robust and networked
than in 2015, so C4ISR losses would affect Chinese combat capability
more. China is also likely to have many more satellites in
2025.
• Some reforms would likely have been made to the PLA’s organizational
structure and hierarchical command authority, but weaknesses
in these areas would likely continue, especially if the PLA
has not gained any recent combat experience.
85
APPENDIX B
Economic Effects in the Severe Case, 2015
Trade
• Glick and Taylor found that, on average, there is an 80 percent
immediate drop in trade between adversaries when war commences.
1
• There was a 96 percent drop in trade in World War I and a 97 percent
decline in trade in World War II; trade between adversaries
in these wars was “almost totally destroyed.”2
• Therefore, we assume a 90 percent drop in bilateral trade (between
the United States and China) after one year of severe conflict.
• Every 1 percent increase in trade, divided by GDP, equals a
1.97 percent increase in GDP per capita.3
U.S. Losses
• Total bilateral trade in 2013 equaled $562 billion.
• U.S. GDP in 2014 equaled $17.4 trillion.
• For the United States, a 90 percent loss in bilateral trade equals
a 3 percent decrease in trade, divided by GDP, which leads to a
1 Reuven Glick and Alan M. Taylor, “Collateral Damage: Trade Disruption and the Economic
Impact of War,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 92, No. 1, February 2010,
p. 108.
2 Glick and Taylor, 2010, p. 109.
3 Jeffrey A. Frankel and David Romer, “Does Trade Cause Growth?” American Economic
Review, Vol. 89, No. 3, June 1999, p. 385.
86 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
6 percent decrease in GDP per capita (per year). (See Figures B.1
and B.2.)
• The United States would suffer a 6 percent decrease in GDP after
one year as a result of a 90 percent bilateral trade loss.
China’s Losses
• Total bilateral trade in 2013 equaled $562 billion.
• China’s GDP in 2014 equaled $9.2 trillion.
• For China, a 90 percent loss in bilateral trade equals a 5 percent
decrease in trade, divided by GDP, which leads to a 10 percent
decrease in GDP per capita (per year). (See Figures B.1 and B.2.)
• China would suffer a 10 percent decrease in GDP after one year
as a result of a 90 percent bilateral trade loss.
Figure B.1
Estimated Effect on GDP of Bilateral Trade Losses Because of War
NOTES: This graph illustrates the percentage by which GDP may decrease during war
as a result of bilateral trade losses. The upper limit of the y-axis indicates GDP at the
start of war; as the war continues, GDP at each point in time is given as a percentage
of GDP at the start of war.
RAND RR1140-B.1
T0 T1 T2
Time
United
States
China
GDP (%)
100
80
60
Economic Effects in the Severe Case, 2015 87
• China would suffer a 30 percent decrease in GDP after one
year as a result of a 90 percent bilateral trade loss, an 80 percent
East Asian regional trade loss, and a 50 percent global trade loss
(because of the postulated “war zone” effect on seaborne trade in
the Western Pacific).
Consumption
• Because the trade effects described above take account of some
of the consumption effects, this analysis of consumption effects
presents an upper bound.
Figure B.2
Estimated Effect on GDP of Overall Trade Losses Because of War
NOTES: This graph illustrates the percentage by which GDP may decrease during war
as a result of overall (bilateral, regional, and global) trade losses. The upper limit of
the y-axis indicates GDP at the start of war; as the war continues, GDP at each point
in time is given as a percentage of GDP at the start of war.
RAND RR1140-B.2
T0 T1 T2
Time
United
States
China
GDP (%)
100
80
60
88 War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable
U.S. Losses
• Hess found that there is a 4 percent decline in consumption
because of war away from home.4
• U.S. consumption in 2013 equaled 68 percent of GDP.
• The United States could suffer a 3 percent decrease in GDP after
one year as a result of a decline in consumption.
China’s Losses
• Hess found that there is a 4.4 percent loss in consumption because
of war at home.5
• China’s consumption in 2013 equaled 34 percent of GDP.
• China could suffer a 2 percent decrease in GDP after one year as
a result of a decline in consumption.
• With a higher consumption share (60 percent of GDP), there
would be a 3 percent decrease in GDP after one year because of
consumption loss.
4 Gregory D. Hess, “The Economic Welfare Cost of Conflict: An Empirical Assessment,”
Working Paper No. 852, Munich, Germany: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute
for Economic Research, February 2003, p. 12.
5 Hess, 2003, p. 12.
89
Abbreviations
A2AD anti-access and area denial
ASAT anti-satellite
ASW anti-submarine warfare
C2 command and control
C4ISR command, control, communications,
computing, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
GDP gross domestic product
INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
MLRS multiple launch rocket system
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy
91
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ARROYO CENTER
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Premeditated war between the United States and China is very unlikely, but the
danger that a mishandled crisis could trigger hostilities cannot be ignored. Thus,
while neither state wants war, both states’ militaries have plans to fight one. As
Chinese anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) capabilities improve, the United
States can no longer be so certain that war would follow its plan and lead to
decisive victory. This analysis illuminates various paths a war with China could
take and their possible consequences.
Technological advances in the ability to target opposing forces are creating
conditions of conventional counterforce, whereby each side has the means
to strike and degrade the other’s forces and, therefore, an incentive to do so
promptly, if not first. This implies fierce early exchanges, with steep military
losses on both sides, until one gains control. At present, Chinese losses would
greatly exceed U.S. losses, and the gap would only grow as fighting persisted.
But, by 2025, that gap could be much smaller. Even then, however, China could
not be confident of gaining military advantage, which suggests the possibility
of a prolonged and destructive, yet inconclusive, war. In that event, nonmilitary
factors—economic costs, internal political effects, and international reactions—
could become more important.
Political leaders on both sides could limit the severity of war by ordering their
respective militaries to refrain from swift and massive conventional counterforce
attacks. The resulting restricted, sporadic fighting could substantially reduce
military losses and economic harm. This possibility underscores the importance
of firm civilian control over wartime decisionmaking and of communication
between capitals. At the same time, the United States can prepare for a long
and severe war by reducing its vulnerability to Chinese A2AD forces and
developing plans to ensure that economic and international consequences
would work to its advantage.
@antonius123 Please do indicate where in this RAND report it said this
"Both belligerents have anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) that are nearly invulnerable to attack, meaning that both countries will be able to destroy a substantial portion of each other’s satellites. The destruction of the American satellite constellation would be especially problematic for the rest of the world since nearly all GPS units connect to American satellites."
The original RAND report didn't even mention US will lose like the title of the article you quote.
Please do not quote fake article and claim it is from RAND
