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War Strategy: The collapse of Cold Start
The Government of India has told US authorities that it did not 'directly endorse, support or advocate' Cold Start, the army's battle plan for a swift multi-pronged ground retaliatory assault against Pakistan. In a secret US cable 'Cold Start, myth and reality' sent by US Ambassador Timothy J. Roemer on February 16, the ambassador cites his talks with then National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan.
The cable, put out by Wikileaks, was despatched to Washington within less than 72 hours of the February 13 bomb attack on Pune's German Bakery that killed 17 persons. For India to trigger Cold Start would be "to roll the nuclear dice", Roemer said. While the principal objective of Cold Start appeared to be punish Pakistan without provoking a nuclear response, Indian leaders were not quite sure whether their Pakistan counterparts would refrain from such a response. The cables point to diplomatic pressure being applied by the US, allegedly at Pakistan's behest.
The US ambassador also explains how the opacity of strategic decision-making in India could adversely impact a speedy response. "The precise function of the Cabinet Committee on Security in ratifying decisions to take military action, the character of the military's advisory responsibilities to the Cabinet, the possible ad hoc nature of decision-making in the upper levels of the Indian government and the role of Congress Party figures like Sonia Gandhi in this process are not clearly understood."
Assessments made by the US embassy predict mixed results for the doctrine owing to logistical problems, slow reinforcement, ammunition supply and heavily populated areas in Sindh and Pakistani Punjab.
Cold Start was born out of the failure of Operation Parakram in 2002 when a 10-month deployment by the army after the December 13, 2001 Parliament attack was called off. Unveiled at the army commanders' conference in 2004, the new doctrine called for 'shallow thrusts' by integrated battle groups using speed and heavy firepower across the international border in Punjab and Rajasthan.
The shallow thrusts were to avoid nuclear escalation by Pakistan. During Parakram, the army took over a month to mobilise, giving the international community a huge window to pressure New Delhi against retaliation. The new doctrine envisaged mobilising and attacking within 72 hours of a major terrorist incident or provocation by Pakistan.
The existence of the doctrine was first confirmed by then army chief General Deepak Kapoor in 2008. However, since then, the army seems to have developed cold feet. Present army chief General V.K. Singh has flatly denied its existence. "There is nothing called Cold Start. Our basic military posture is defensive," he said. The doctrine was not even on the agenda while the Government contemplated a response to the 26/11 Mumbai attacks.
Yet the doctrine has been on top of the US agenda at least since the beginning of President Barack Obama's ****** campaign. Pakistan frequently cited Cold Start as a reason for not sending troops into operations on the Afghan border.
Roemer questions both Pakistan's fears and India's ability to deter using the doctrine. "It calls into question the degree of sincerity of fear over Cold Start as expressed by Pakistani military leaders to US government officials." This is because despite knowing about Cold Start since 2004, Pakistan hasn't acted to prevent terror attacks against India.
The ambassador uses the aftermath of the 26/11 Pakistan-linked terror attack in Mumbai to show how Cold Start may not be India's only or preferred option after a terrorist attack. "Depending on the nature, location, lethality, public response, and timing of a terrorist attack, India might not respond at all or could pursue one of several other possible options," Roemer says.
The existence of the plan reassures the Indian public and may provide some limited deterrent effect on Pakistan.
Army officials confirm that the search is on for a new limited war doctrine that envisages a swift response without the army having to cross borders. It is likely to be 'airpower start', with air force jets joined by naval strikes and artillery assaults across the border.
"Cold Start looks very good in theory but in the Indian military context, no operation that has 'cold started' or begun with zero-warning has been a success," says military analyst Major General (Retd) G.D. Bakshi. The Forward Policy of 1962 ended with the rout of the army in the Himalayas and the 1965 war with Pakistan ended in a stalemate. Only the 1971 war succeeded because the government delayed the operation by nine months.
Planners say another reason Cold Start was flawed from birth was because it gave the political leadership very little wiggle-room. "If you give the risk-averse political leadership a choice of 'all or nothing', they will prefer nothing," says a senior army official. The lack of induction of firepower-centric platforms like heavy artillery and the yet unresolved night-blindness of Indian tanks were, no doubt, factored in by Roemer.
Nearly a decade after the army dug in to eyeball Pakistan, it has only received T90 battle tanks and Smerch multiple rocket launchers from Russia. Cold Start may have been doomed from birth.
not banging india in an all out war, but definitely if they try cold start...
