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Viets getting ready for freedom!

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Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Do you know where that is?

No, he is right. There was actually a Vietnamese Democratic party that got absorbed into the VCP. A real democratic party, not just by name like the PDRK . See here:

Democratic Party of Vietnam - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Democratic Party of Vietnam (Đảng Dân chủ Việt Nam) was a political party in North Vietnam and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. It was founded on 30 July 1944 to unite petty bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. It joined Vietminh. From 1954 to 1975, it was active in North Vietnam and from 1975 to 1988 in the re-unified Vietnam. It supported the line of the Communist Party of Vietnamand became in effect its satellite party. It was a member of the Vietnamese Fatherland Frontand was represented in the Vietnamese parliament and government, its leader wasNghiem Xuan Yem. The party (along with the other 'non-communist' party in Vietnam, theSocialist Party) was disbanded in 1988.

In 2006, a dissident organization with the same name – Democratic Party of Vietnam – was established. Hoang Minh Chinh, a member of the old party, was involved in its founding.

See that part about the former member Hoang Minh Chinh? He want a multi-party democratic system, so they are a real democratic party and not just by name only.

So I recommend you to write to your govt to lobby them to send a $100 billion aid package to the VCP marxist-leninist faction otherwise the Socialist or Democratic faction is going to take over!! Tell your friends too.
 
So I recommend you to write to your govt to lobby them to send a $100 billion aid package to the VCP marxist-leninist faction otherwise the Socialist or Democratic faction is going to take over!! Tell your friends too.


lol
 
As you can see in this thread, Chinese friends seem to care about the VCP, so I just want to let them know and recommend them on how to save the pro-China Marxist-Leninist faction of the VCP. $100 billion aid package and some long range ballistic missiles too.

Why stop at $100 Billion, they can afford to give $200 Billion, you know China has nearly $4 Trillion in forex reserves. What's 200 billion? ;)

Okay, gotta get going, I have a date this afternoon.

See you later, buddy.
 
I wonder if you can access ytpak.com here...
I can, but speed of opening the website is very slow
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Why stop at $100 Billion, they can afford to give $200 Billion, you know China has nearly $4 Trillion in forex reserves. What's 200 billion? ;)

Okay, gotta get going, I have a date this afternoon.

See you later, buddy.
No way ... it means China to grow up a rival for free, there's no more free lunch.
 
No way ... it means China to grow up a rival for free, there's no more free lunch.

Fair enough, bro. I just want to end this by saying that Vietnam is a vital trade partner for all the major players.

Let me refer to nominal economic terms:
  1. Vietnam-China bilateral trade in 2014: $65 Billion
  2. Vietnam-USA bilateral trade in 2014: $37 Billion
  3. Vietnam-Japan bilateral trade in 2014: $25 Billion

Everything is growing, my man. Growing. This is only going to continue.
 
Ok, we got this article, maybe "evil Westerner are planning it long time", :victory::victory::victory:

Vietnam already has several democratic features. Sovereignty resides with the people and the Constitution provides for human rights and elections. The major problem is that these key elements of democracy are not properly practiced because the CPV has excessive power. The CPV itself can fix these problems, wrote one such dissident in 2008, by ‘initiating a transfer of political power to the people’. By doing so, the CPV will enhance its flagging prestige, therefore saving itself, and prevent grave national hardship and turmoil.

The second approach stresses organised confrontation with the regime. Its advocates argue that the CPV will never champion real democracy. As one major advocatefor this approach stated in 2006, the present system is ‘incapable of being renovated’ and should be ‘completely replaced’.

These critics insist that a multiparty political system that protects free speech and other elements of democracy must come first; only afterwards can Vietnam develop. And the only way to achieve this is to directly and openly demand democracy. This requires vigorous organisations, including political parties, to challenge the CPV. Those organisations will also facilitate a more sustained democratisation movement that can withstand the imprisonment of individual activists.

Rather than demanding fundamental political change, the third approach advocates remaking the system by actively engaging it. The most urgent task, they argue, is neither to remove the CPV nor to create a multiparty political system, but to stop policies and actions that hurt people and the nation’s development. This should be done by arguing with authorities at all levels, opposing harmful programs and officials, and promoting better ones. Democratisation, they contend, is about improving people’s lives. As that happens, democratic processes will emerge. There is no need, said one dissident, ‘to be political or carry a flag for democracy’. This may even lead authorities to be unresponsive.

This is one reason the engagement approach eschews organisations, demonstrations and petitions against the government. Its advocates also argue that low-key struggles for better living conditions have already brought improvements. For example, they claim the CPV had to endorse family farming in the 1980s because of unorganised but persistent peasant discontent with collective farming. Widening dissatisfaction also forced the CPV to replace its centrally planned economic system with a market economy.

A fourth approach links expanding civil society to democratisation. It agrees with engagement advocates that democracy is far more than a multiparty electoral system. Both engagement and civil society approaches also see a role for the CPV in Vietnam’s democratisation — not as its leader, but as one of many participants.Civil societyadvocates urge people to use lawful means to criticise bad policies and officials, and to push for improvements.

But the civil society approach does not prioritise engaging government authorities. Rather, it emphasises encouraging citizens to create civil society organisations.Democratic governance, argue civil society advocates, doesn’t emerge on its own. People must struggle for it, albeit peacefully and without upending society and the economy. Central to that struggle are civil society organisations making their case and interacting with others with whom they agree and disagree. Civil society advocates contend that democracy also requires citizens knowing how to express themselves, listen to others, negotiate, and compromise. By participating in civil society organisations people learn these practices.

Several dissidents in each approach have been harassed, detained and interrogated by security police and other government authorities. Some have been imprisoned for spreading propaganda against the state, abusing laws governing speech and association, and other offenses. But repression has not halted, and at times may even have aided, the growth ofVietnam’s democratisation movement. How this movement will play out remains to be seen.

The oversea dispora that hope America "will help them throw" their homeland dictatorship government should read this:
How a reviled African ruler survived a coup hatched in the United States - The Washington Post


Interesting article about contrast in democracy government around the world, recommended read it:partay::partay:
The Puzzle of Liberal Democracy
  • PRINCETON – Nearly two decades ago, the political commentator Fareed Zakaria wrote a prophetic article called “The Rise of the Illiberal Democracy,” in which he worried about the rise of popular autocrats with little regard for the rule of law and civil liberties. Governments may be elected in free and fair elections, he wrote, and yet routinely violate their citizens’ basic rights.

    Since Zakaria’s piece, illiberal democracies have become more the norm than the exception. By Freedom House’s count, more than 60% of the world’s countries are electoral democracies – regimes in which political parties compete and come to power in regularly scheduled elections – up from around 40% in the late 1980s. But the majority of these democracies fail to provide equal protection under the law.

    Typically, it is minority groups (ethnic, religious, linguistic, or regional) that bear the brunt of illiberal policies and practices. But government opponents of all stripes run the risk of censorship, persecution, or wrongful imprisonment.

    Liberal democracy rests on three distinct sets of rights: property rights, political rights, and civil rights. The first set of rights protects owners and investors from expropriation. The second ensures that groups that win electoral contests can assume power and choose policies to their liking – provided these policies do not violate the other two sets of rights. Finally, civil rights guarantee equal treatment before the law and equal access to public services such as education.

    Property rights and political rights both have powerful beneficiaries. Property rights are of interest primarily to the elite – owners and investors. They may be comparatively few in number, but they can mobilize material resources if they do not get their way. They can take their money elsewhere, or choose not to invest – imposing substantial costs on the rest of society.

    Political rights are of interest primarily to the organized masses – the working class or ethnic majority, depending on the structure and cleavages in society. Members of the majority may be comparatively poor, but they have numbers on their side. They can threaten the elite with uprisings and expropriation.

    The main beneficiaries of civil rights, by contrast, are typically minorities that possess neither wealth nor numbers. Turkey’s Kurds, Hungary’s Roma, Russia’s liberals, or Mexico’s indigenous population ordinarily command little power within their countries. Their demands for equal rights therefore do not have the potency that demands for property and political rights have.

    Theories that purport to explain the historical origins of democracy have overlooked this asymmetry among claimants for different types of rights. These theories revolve largely around a bargain between the propertied elite and the working classes: faced with the threat of revolt, the elites expand the franchise and allow the masses to vote. In return, the masses – or their representatives – agree not to expropriate the elite.

    Of course, the elite prefer an autocracy in which they rule alone and protect their own rights but no one else’s. Throughout most of human history, they had their way.

    A democratic bargain becomes feasible only when the masses are able to organize and mobilize around common interests. This makes credible both their threat of insurrection before the bargain and their promise to protect property rights afterwards. Historically, such mobilizations have been the product of industrialization and urbanization, wars, or anti-colonial struggles.

    But these bargains, by their very nature, produce electoral democracies rather than liberal democracies. The dispossessed minorities who have the strongest stake in civil rights play no role during the democratic transition for the simple reason that they cannot normally bring anything to the bargaining table. So the democratic bargain yields property and political rights, but only rarely civil rights as well.

    Viewed from this perspective, the puzzle is not why democracy so often turns out to be illiberal. It is that liberal democracy can ever emerge.

    One set of circumstances that favors liberal democracy is the absence of clear-cut ethnic or other identity cleavages among the non-elites. Cultural and social homogeneity means that there is no identifiable minority against which the majority can discriminate. Scandinavian countries historically, and Japan and South Korea more recently, approximate this prototype.

    A different situation that produces a similar outcome is the presence of multiple and overlapping cleavages. If there is no clear-cut majority-minority distinction, each group in power may be willing to recognize the rights of others for fear that it may face a period out of power in the future. This is the kind of precarious balance on which, for example, Lebanon’s “consociational” democracy rested – until differential population growth and external intervention undid it.

    A third possibility is that society’s most distinctive ethnic or racial cleavage aligns with the divide that separates the masses from the propertied elite. In South Africa, for example, whites were both the elite and the racial minority. When the apartheid government negotiated with the African National Congress prior to the 1994 democratic transition, it demanded (and received) property and civil rights for the white minority in exchange for political rights for the black majority. The bargain has survived remarkably well, despite the tough times that South African democracy has experienced since then.

    Alternatively, perhaps liberal democracy has little to do with the balance of power among social groups and their strategic motivations. Maybe it requires instead, the development over time of a culture of tolerance and civil liberties. Or maybe both are needed to sustain institutions that uphold property, political, and civil rights in the long term.

    Whatever the reason for the emergence of liberal democracy, we should not be surprised by how uncommon it is in practice. Only rarely do political forces align to produce a sustainable version of it.


    Read more at The Puzzle of Liberal Democracy by Dani Rodrik and Sharun Mukand - Project Syndicate

Lastly,majority of people still want stable government and pressure it to improve over time rather than do revolution:no:. Economic growth and the "War" also boost CPV legitimate. Revolution can hardly happen till next or 2 decade, mb after that yeah:lol::lol::lol:
 
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Lastly,majority of people still want stable government and pressure it to improve over time rather than do revolution:no:. Economic growth and the "War" also boost CPV legitimate. Revolution can hardly happen till next or 2 decade, mb after that yeah:lol::lol::lol:


OT: Buddy, so you're working in Kuwait? How do you like living there? :)
 
No, he is right. There was actually a Vietnamese Democratic party that got absorbed into the VCP. A real democratic party, not just by name like the PDRK . See here:



See that part about the former member Hoang Minh Chinh? He want a multi-party democratic system, so they are a real democratic party and not just by name only.

So I recommend you to write to your govt to lobby them to send a $100 billion aid package to the VCP marxist-leninist faction otherwise the Socialist or Democratic faction is going to take over!! Tell your friends too.
Interesting..Are they fully absorbed by VCP or still keep some independence?especially in regard of their funding?

Do you think they can play an active role in the coming democratization process?
 
Interesting..Are they fully absorbed by VCP or still keep some independence?especially in regard of their funding?

Do you think they can play an active role in the coming democratization process?

The only way I can answer your question is to read their mind, but I dont know how to do that.

For former member like that Hoang Minh Chinh man, obviously he still held on to his old democratic party view until his death and was never fully absorbed into the communist ideology.
 
The only way I can answer your question is to read their mind, but I dont know how to do that.

For former member like that Hoang Minh Chinh guy, obviously he still hold on to his old democratic party view until his death and was never fully absorbed into the communist ideology.
Then why did he join theVCP?Sounds like a betrayal to his ideology and only the name left just like north Korea,I was hoping the VCP was a loose coalition but it seems the alliance formed a longtime ago,but there are still power struggle between factions like @Viet said


Lastly,majority of people still want stable government and pressure it to improve over time rather than do revolution:no:. Economic growth and the "War" also boost CPV legitimate. Revolution can hardly happen till next or 2 decade, mb after that yeah:lol::lol::lol:

Of course they do,and a revolution doesn’t have to be violent,not all color revolution ended in bloodbath,a peaceful gathering and protesting maybe the best way for your “pressure it to improve” approach.

Economic down turn can happen very soon later this year when US Fed hike up the interest,is Vietnam prepared enough?
 
Then why did he join theVCP?Sounds like a betrayal to his ideology and only the name left just like north Korea,I was hoping the VCP was a loose coalition but it seems the alliance formed a longtime ago,but there are still power struggle between factions like @Viet said

He eventually left or got kick out. As for the other former members that got absorbed, I dont know if they still held on to their old views or got fully absorbed. I can only answer if I can read their mind.

If you want the pro-China faction to stay strong, it is better for your govt to send a big aid package. Like you said, if an economic downturn happens, who knows what is going to happen. So we need something like a $400 billion aid package to prevent that from happening.

OK i gotta go.
 
He eventually left or got kick out. As for the other former members that got absorbed, I dont know if they still held on to their old views or got fully absorbed. I can only answer if I can read their mind.

If you want the pro-China faction to stay strong, it is better for your govt to send a big aid package. Like you said, if an economic downturn happens, who knows what is going to happen. So we need something like a $400 billion aid package to prevent that from happening.

OK i gotta go.
I wouldn‘t mind giving money to VCP..but the VCP should beg for it, when shit hits the fan in Vietnam and they are desperately trying to stayin power

In that case,I would assume the Spratly will be on a silver platter,haha
 
OT: Buddy, so you're working in Kuwait? How do you like living there? :)
Boring life, nothing to spend or do but very pleasure, no pressure life except recently some crazy Saudi dude do the suicide bombing. Actually, my father was invited to work here, i just follow. I'm not working yet, still study
 
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