Vietnam vice minister apologizes to Japan for “$2 Billion loan” gaffe

[Aepsilons]

Then why u took all faults to u, instead of demand VN Govt. to put some officials in jail ??

We took faults because as the one FUNDING THE ENTIRE PROJECT, we felt it necessary to take accountability and responsibility of the FAILURE of Vietnamese Engineers. That is what you call accountable and transparency in mature organizations. Now instead of hurling your unfounded and unwarranted blaming, realize that JAPAN had done everything to ensure the successful building of the bridge. As you notice, which was also duly noted by Civil Engineering peer reviewed journal (The New Civil Engineer), that Japanese firms had recommended construction points, yet it was not taken into consideration by Vietnamese Civil Engineers.

 

[NarThoD]

Except for in this thread, @NiceGuy has raised a viable viewpoint. Other Chinese and UK members have agreed with him. He's been saying what other scholars and economists have argued: Foreign "aid" like Japanese style ODA is harming developing countries like VietNam.

No ! Don't use the bridge that My country funded. You can take a barge, or better yet, take an airplane.

Please.

please don't be mad bro. some people are just hard to say "thank you"

 

[Aepsilons]

please don't be mad bro. some people are just hard to say "thank you"

View attachment 152664

You're right bro, need to log off PDF and sip some green tea. God forbid i might be dreaming of @NiceGuy tonight.

 

[NarThoD]

You're right bro, need to log off PDF and sip some green coffee. God forbid i might be dreaming of @NiceGuy tonight.

green coffee? what is that? you mean green tea?

yes green tea can reflexes your nervers after debate

 

[Aepsilons]

green coffee? what is that? you mean green tea?

yes green tea can reflexes your nervers after debate

buahaha! good point, bro.

 

[Rechoice]

So, do we have to pay back the loan for Can Tho bridge that lead to the death of 50 workers or the bad quality high way like Mai Dich-Trung Hoa ??

I don't think that there is a reason for that we will not pay back such debt. there is unexpected accident. it should been happent every where in the world on construction project sites, like corruption, the Japanese consultant company has paid borbey momey for corrupted officials in many countries, not to Vietnamese only.

Economically, I think ODA Loan is benefited for us, with low interest rate ( about 1 % or little more or less ) and grace lending time (20 - 25 year no interest ) it has a big advantage in comparison with the government bond issuance on international finance market.

I have been worked in short time for one project in Hanoi, as sub-contractor. I would like to repeat here the answer of one PMU director he told to me that: " when you r donor a loan to your relatives in rural area 100 million VND, after 25 year they will pay back you at sight 100 million VND. Who is a loser in this business ".

Ok, for relax ........ how about your daily trading on stock market recently ? thks for god, I won.

 

[William Hung]

please don't be mad bro. some people are just hard to say "thank you"

View attachment 152664

Nope read from page 6, NiceGuy has raised a very good point. Many other members have also unmasked this ODA trick. Many scholars and economists also agree with NiceGuy's viewpoint. Just have a quick search on Google scholar for yourself.

 

[NarThoD]

Nope read from page 6, NiceGuy has raised a very good point. Many other members have also unmasked this ODA trick. Many scholars and economists also agree with NiceGuy's viewpoint. Just have a quick search on Google scholar for yourself.

yes i've seen it. Accepting foreign Aid are like two-tip blade. no one can stand up and tall by itselves. Indonesia too is also received lot of aid from Japan, Aussie and USA. and that helped us a lot to build infrastructures. and it does make us become stronger, not weaker.

I agree about some of NiceGuy's point. but in my personal opinion, it's up to government's efforts to make every aid worthy instead of wasting it.

good luck with Vietnam's development.

 

[William Hung]

yes i've seen it. Accepting foreign Aid are like two-tip blade. no one can stand up and tall by itselves. Indonesia too is also received lot of aid from Japan, Aussie and USA. and that helped us a lot to build infrastructures. and it does make us become stronger, not weaker.

I agree about some of NiceGuy's point. but in my personal opinion, it's up to government's efforts to make every aid worthy instead of wasting it.

good luck with Vietnam's development.

I'm afraid you haven't fully understood the anti-Aid/ODA perspective. It's not about whether the recipient govt can make the most out of the aid or not. But it's the idea that giving non-emergency aid (or ODA), in itself, is inherently flawed.

Take for example the Japanese ODA mechanism. There are no real public tender for contractors to compete in for a project. The rule is that a Japanese company must win the contracts. Negotiation is done through govt-to-govt and govt-to-contractors behind closed doors. The contractors are awarded without any form of transparency. This mechanism is ripe for corruption and only encourages corrupted officials to do what they do best, take bribes. It is also a good mechanism for Japanese officials to carry out their agenda.

The Japanese blames the problem on corrupted Vietnamese officials, but why don't the Japanese change their ODA policy? Why not force the VietNam govt to issue a real transparent public tender for contractors to make their bid?

All their talk about dealing with ODA corruption has only been cheap talk. The show will go on.

 

[Aepsilons]

I'm afraid you haven't fully understood the anti-Aid/ODA perspective. It's not about whether the recipient govt can make the most out of the aid or not. But it's the idea that giving non-emergency aid (or ODA), in itself, is inherently flawed.

Take for example the Japanese ODA mechanism. There are no real public tender for contractors to compete in for a project. The rule is that a Japanese company must win the contracts. Negotiation is done through govt-to-govt and govt-to-contractors behind closed doors. The contractors are awarded without any form of transparency. This mechanism is ripe for corruption and only encourages corrupted officials to do what they do best, take bribes. It is also a good mechanism for Japanese officials to carry out their agenda.

The Japanese blames the problem on corrupted Vietnamese officials, but why don't the Japanese change their ODA policy? Why not force the VietNam govt to issue a real transparent public tender for contractors to make their bid?

All their talk about dealing with ODA corruption has only been cheap talk. The show will go on.

Wrong on all parts.

----------------

For all projects, JICA’s evaluation is conducted based on the PDCA cycle, regardless of the scheme of assistance*. Considering the characteristics of the scheme of assistance, such as the assistance period and timeframe for expected results, JICA conducts the evaluation within a consistent framework at each stage of the project (planning, implementation, post-implementation and feedback). By conducting the evaluation at each stage of the PDCA cycle, it aims to improve the development results of the project.

Coherent methodologies and criteria for three schemes of assistance

JICA adopts an evaluation system that uses cross-sectoral methodologies and criteria applicable to all schemes of assistance. For Technical Cooperation, ODA Loans, and Grant Aid projects, respectively, JICA aims to conduct the evaluation and to utilize the findings based on a consistent philosophy and a standard evaluation framework, while taking into consideration the differences in characteristics among each assistance scheme.

Specifically, an evaluation framework that reflects:

• 1) Project level evaluation based on the PDCA cycle.
• 2) Evaluation applying the Five DAC Criteria for evaluating development assistance that is laid out by the OECD-DAC (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee) and is internationally accepted as an ODA evaluation method .

Cross-sectoral and comprehensive evaluation through a thematic evaluation
JICA conducts thematic evaluations to analyze a group of projects comprehensively and cross-sectorally. The aim of this evaluation is to derive recommendations and lessons learned which can be utilized across projects. Thematic evaluation is conducted by selecting projects based on a specified theme and analyzing them from a different angle than in an individual project evaluation.


Ensuring objectivity and transparency
JICA has incorporated external evaluations according to project size in the ex-post evaluations which require an objective verification of project implementation results for all three schemes of assistance, and the findings are made available on the JICA website. JICA will continue its efforts for increasing objectivity and transparency in its operations evaluations.


Emphasizing use of evaluation results
JICA's operations evaluations are not merely evaluations. Evaluation results also serve as a feedback function for improving the quality of the "Action" phase of the PDCA cycle. This feedback is utilized as recommendations for improving the project and lessons learned for ongoing and future similar projects. JICA intends to further strengthen the feedback function for reflecting the evaluation results into JICA's fundamental strategies for cooperation and the JICA Thematic Guidelines.

At the same time, JICA makes efforts to reflect the evaluation results into development policies, sector programs, and respective projects of the recipient governments by feeding back the evaluation findings. Conducting joint evaluations with the recipient government is also a way of feeding back the evaluation findings.

 

[Aepsilons]

I'm afraid you haven't fully understood the anti-Aid/ODA perspective. It's not about whether the recipient govt can make the most out of the aid or not. But it's the idea that giving non-emergency aid (or ODA), in itself, is inherently flawed.

Take for example the Japanese ODA mechanism. There are no real public tender for contractors to compete in for a project. The rule is that a Japanese company must win the contracts. Negotiation is done through govt-to-govt and govt-to-contractors behind closed doors. The contractors are awarded without any form of transparency. This mechanism is ripe for corruption and only encourages corrupted officials to do what they do best, take bribes. It is also a good mechanism for Japanese officials to carry out their agenda.

The Japanese blames the problem on corrupted Vietnamese officials, but why don't the Japanese change their ODA policy? Why not force the VietNam govt to issue a real transparent public tender for contractors to make their bid?

All their talk about dealing with ODA corruption has only been cheap talk. The show will go on.

Again, to correct you on your error on all parts:
---------------------------------



Enhancing Transparency and Efficiency at Every Stage of ODA Projects

1. Transparency is being enhanced through the publication of a list of yen loan candidate projects (the "long list") and the holding of meetings of the Committee for Grant Aid.
2. JBIC has formulated and published the JBIC Guidelines for Confirmation of Environmental and Social Considerations, while JICA has begun work on revising its environmental guidelines.
3. Efforts are also being strengthened through various measures relating to procurement, auditing, and evaluation.

Increasing Transparency in Project Selection and Procurement

Efforts are being made to ensure transparency at every stage of individual ODA projects, from the initial project cycle (project selection) to completion (ex-post evaluation), and to make sure that these procedures are conducted in a fair manner.

Efforts at the project selection stage include the publication of a list of yen loan candidate projects (the "long list") and the holding of meetings of the Committee for Grant Aid. Yen loan candidate project lists had already been announced for four countries (China, Morocco, Tunisia, and Viet Nam) when in November 2002 a list for India was also published. Each list cites candidate projects over a period of several years. Inclusion on the list does not automatically mean a yen loan will be provided; in principle, after the compilation of the list, formal loan requests can be made each fiscal year for projects that are on the list, and loans are extended to selected projects. From a medium- to long-term perspective, the compilation and publication of such lists is expected to enable the identification and formulation of more effective and efficient yen loan projects and to promote collaboration with other donor countries and international organizations.

The environmental and social impact of ODA projects must be subject to adequate checks before the projects are carried out. After conducting public hearings and taking note of a broad range of views from experts, NGOs, and others, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) in April 2002 integrated its environmental guidelines for the provision of overseas economic cooperation (consisting of ODA) and international financing (consisting of other official flows [OOF]) and compiled and published new JBIC Guidelines for Confirmation of Environmental and Social Considerations. The new guidelines stipulate that JBIC should consider not only environmental factors but also social ones, such as the displacement of residents and the impact on aboriginal groups and women. These guidelines will go into full effect on October 1, 2003. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), meanwhile, is also in the process of revising its environmental guidelines, which so far have been compiled separately for each sector, in accordance with the Action Program for Foreign Ministry Reform and with reference to JBIC's new environmental guidelines and the views of a broad segment of the general public, including NGOs.

Measures have also been taken to ensure transparency during the procurement stage of ODA, including grant aid, loans, and technical cooperation, in accordance with JICA and JBIC procurement guidelines. Bidding, in principle, is conducted by developing countries, JICA and JBIC verify the results, and both the names and amounts of the winning tenders are announced. In case improprieties are discovered, a setup has been established whereby firms that commit improprieties are disqualified from bidding for or receiving contracts for ODA projects for certain periods. In one exceptional case, these rules were applied to the greatest extent possible to three Japanese companies whose employees were arrested in 2002 on charges of committing fraud in the four Northern Islands, even though the project was financed with contributions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) budget, rather than being part of ODA.



Strengthening ODA Auditing

Measures like these are taken to ensure transparency at each stage of ODA projects. Special emphasis and various recommendations, though, were given to auditing--the function of which is to confirm the appropriateness of fund flows in ODA projects--in the final report of the Second Consultative Committee on ODA Reform, the "Ten Reform Principles to Ensure an Open Foreign Ministry," and the final report of MOFA's Reform Advisory Board, which offered various recommendations.

In line with these proposals, MOFA has adopted the following concrete measures based on the three pillars of "more extensive audits," "spot-checks without prior notice," and "establishment of a system to adopt improvement measures."

To carry out more extensive audits of loans, MOFA plans to gradually expand the number of countries subject to a review of yen loan procurement procedures by external experts from November 2002 and to systematize the submission of audited financial statements for projects using special expenditure methods. In the case of grant aid, MOFA has introduced third-party audits for general project grants and made external auditing obligatory, in principle, from September 2002 for grant assistance for grassroots projects totaling ¥3 million or more (as opposed to the previous figure of ¥20 million or more). As for technical cooperation, JICA introduced external auditing for its accounting records in October 2002.

Regarding the implementation of spot-checks without prior notice for loans, MOFA plans to introduce a system of external auditing for yen loan procurement procedures using a sampling of projects that were agreed upon at the government level, in principle, in and after fiscal year 2002. In the case of grant aid, consideration is being given to introducing external audits for a sampling of verified contracts. As for technical cooperation, spot-checks will be implemented when the above-mentioned external auditing is introduced.

Regarding the establishment of a system of effecting improvements, existing mechanisms by which the relevant departments of implementing organizations follow up on auditing results for loan and technical cooperation will be expanded. In the case of grant aid, a mechanism will be set up by which auditing results are reported to the Committee for Grant Aid and reflected in actual operations.


Enhancing ODA Evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation are playing increasingly important roles in making development assistance more results-based, effective, and efficient in the international community. In Japan as well, efforts are being made to strengthen and expand evaluation in line with the "Fifteen Specific Measures for ODA Reform" and the Action Program for the Reform of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ODA evaluation has three objectives: (1) to support the management of aid implementation by verifying that ODA is being implemented effectively and efficiently; (2) to contribute to raising the quality of ODA by providing feedback of the evaluation results and having these results reflected in the formulation and implementation of future ODA policy; and (3) to ensure accountability by disclosing evaluation results, thereby enhancing the transparency of assistance and promoting public understanding. Strengthening ODA evaluation is key to improving the efficiency and transparency of ODA. There are three stages to ODA evaluation: implementing evaluation, providing feedback of the evaluation results, and publicly announcing and disclosing these results. Efforts are currently being made to bolster evaluation at each of these stages.

Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

 

[William Hung]

Again, to correct you on your error on all parts:
---------------------------------



Enhancing Transparency and Efficiency at Every Stage of ODA Projects

1. Transparency is being enhanced through the publication of a list of yen loan candidate projects (the "long list") and the holding of meetings of the Committee for Grant Aid.
2. JBIC has formulated and published the JBIC Guidelines for Confirmation of Environmental and Social Considerations, while JICA has begun work on revising its environmental guidelines.
3. Efforts are also being strengthened through various measures relating to procurement, auditing, and evaluation.

Increasing Transparency in Project Selection and Procurement

Efforts are being made to ensure transparency at every stage of individual ODA projects, from the initial project cycle (project selection) to completion (ex-post evaluation), and to make sure that these procedures are conducted in a fair manner.

Efforts at the project selection stage include the publication of a list of yen loan candidate projects (the "long list") and the holding of meetings of the Committee for Grant Aid. Yen loan candidate project lists had already been announced for four countries (China, Morocco, Tunisia, and Viet Nam) when in November 2002 a list for India was also published. Each list cites candidate projects over a period of several years. Inclusion on the list does not automatically mean a yen loan will be provided; in principle, after the compilation of the list, formal loan requests can be made each fiscal year for projects that are on the list, and loans are extended to selected projects. From a medium- to long-term perspective, the compilation and publication of such lists is expected to enable the identification and formulation of more effective and efficient yen loan projects and to promote collaboration with other donor countries and international organizations.

The environmental and social impact of ODA projects must be subject to adequate checks before the projects are carried out. After conducting public hearings and taking note of a broad range of views from experts, NGOs, and others, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) in April 2002 integrated its environmental guidelines for the provision of overseas economic cooperation (consisting of ODA) and international financing (consisting of other official flows [OOF]) and compiled and published new JBIC Guidelines for Confirmation of Environmental and Social Considerations. The new guidelines stipulate that JBIC should consider not only environmental factors but also social ones, such as the displacement of residents and the impact on aboriginal groups and women. These guidelines will go into full effect on October 1, 2003. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), meanwhile, is also in the process of revising its environmental guidelines, which so far have been compiled separately for each sector, in accordance with the Action Program for Foreign Ministry Reform and with reference to JBIC's new environmental guidelines and the views of a broad segment of the general public, including NGOs.

Measures have also been taken to ensure transparency during the procurement stage of ODA, including grant aid, loans, and technical cooperation, in accordance with JICA and JBIC procurement guidelines. Bidding, in principle, is conducted by developing countries, JICA and JBIC verify the results, and both the names and amounts of the winning tenders are announced. In case improprieties are discovered, a setup has been established whereby firms that commit improprieties are disqualified from bidding for or receiving contracts for ODA projects for certain periods. In one exceptional case, these rules were applied to the greatest extent possible to three Japanese companies whose employees were arrested in 2002 on charges of committing fraud in the four Northern Islands, even though the project was financed with contributions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) budget, rather than being part of ODA.



Strengthening ODA Auditing

Measures like these are taken to ensure transparency at each stage of ODA projects. Special emphasis and various recommendations, though, were given to auditing--the function of which is to confirm the appropriateness of fund flows in ODA projects--in the final report of the Second Consultative Committee on ODA Reform, the "Ten Reform Principles to Ensure an Open Foreign Ministry," and the final report of MOFA's Reform Advisory Board, which offered various recommendations.

In line with these proposals, MOFA has adopted the following concrete measures based on the three pillars of "more extensive audits," "spot-checks without prior notice," and "establishment of a system to adopt improvement measures."

To carry out more extensive audits of loans, MOFA plans to gradually expand the number of countries subject to a review of yen loan procurement procedures by external experts from November 2002 and to systematize the submission of audited financial statements for projects using special expenditure methods. In the case of grant aid, MOFA has introduced third-party audits for general project grants and made external auditing obligatory, in principle, from September 2002 for grant assistance for grassroots projects totaling ¥3 million or more (as opposed to the previous figure of ¥20 million or more). As for technical cooperation, JICA introduced external auditing for its accounting records in October 2002.

Regarding the implementation of spot-checks without prior notice for loans, MOFA plans to introduce a system of external auditing for yen loan procurement procedures using a sampling of projects that were agreed upon at the government level, in principle, in and after fiscal year 2002. In the case of grant aid, consideration is being given to introducing external audits for a sampling of verified contracts. As for technical cooperation, spot-checks will be implemented when the above-mentioned external auditing is introduced.

Regarding the establishment of a system of effecting improvements, existing mechanisms by which the relevant departments of implementing organizations follow up on auditing results for loan and technical cooperation will be expanded. In the case of grant aid, a mechanism will be set up by which auditing results are reported to the Committee for Grant Aid and reflected in actual operations.


Enhancing ODA Evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation are playing increasingly important roles in making development assistance more results-based, effective, and efficient in the international community. In Japan as well, efforts are being made to strengthen and expand evaluation in line with the "Fifteen Specific Measures for ODA Reform" and the Action Program for the Reform of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ODA evaluation has three objectives: (1) to support the management of aid implementation by verifying that ODA is being implemented effectively and efficiently; (2) to contribute to raising the quality of ODA by providing feedback of the evaluation results and having these results reflected in the formulation and implementation of future ODA policy; and (3) to ensure accountability by disclosing evaluation results, thereby enhancing the transparency of assistance and promoting public understanding. Strengthening ODA evaluation is key to improving the efficiency and transparency of ODA. There are three stages to ODA evaluation: implementing evaluation, providing feedback of the evaluation results, and publicly announcing and disclosing these results. Efforts are currently being made to bolster evaluation at each of these stages.

View attachment 152699





Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

Very nice diagrams and sweet words... but is JICA a VietNamese govt agency or Japanese? All the contractors and projects funded by Japanese ODA are evaluated by them.

How can the VietNamese public be assured about their transparency and that no shady deal has been accepted behind closed doors? Do the Vietnamese people just take their words for it? read their website and blindly accept it?

Jica can write as much flowery words as they want, but the result speaks for itself (e.g. Can Tho bridge, etc).

 

[Aepsilons]

Very nice diagrams and sweet words... but is JICA a VietNamese govt agency or Japanese? All the contractors and projects funded by Japanese ODA are evaluated by them.

How can the VietNamese public be assured about their transparency and that no shady deal has been accepted behind closed doors? Do the Vietnamese people just take their words for it? read their website and blindly accept it?

They can write as much flowery words as they want, but the result speaks for itself (e.g. Can Tho bridge, etc).

The results of the Can Tho bridge was a failure in operational management (tier 1 level Vietnamese engineering supervisors). Your insipid reference to a problem that has already proven to be a failure on Vietnamese engineers' part to follow Japanese Architectural provisions and recommendations -- renders me to assume you have not read the entirety of my postings in this thread. Do so.

Lastly, JICA and ODA follow post implementation evaluations after each project, and objective external and internal auditing renders any instance of corruption nill. Of course we have collaborated with the Vietnamese Government in their own need to tackle issues requiring internal auditing in certain sectors. Fortunately for us, we are glad to see the Vietnamese Government heed our constructive recommendation:

http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/vietnam/oda-related0902.pdf

Nhandan Newspaper - Vietnam, Japan seek anti-corruption measures for ODA projects

 

[William Hung]

The results of the Can Tho bridge was a failure in operational management (tier 1 level Vietnamese engineering supervisors). Your insipid reference to a problem that has already proven to be a failure on Vietnamese engineers' part to follow Japanese Architectural provisions and recommendations -- renders me to assume you have not read the entirety of my postings in this thread. Do so.

And who appointed those tier 1 level operational management? Am I right that the consultants and Contractors supervising the whole project were Japanese?

Stop beating around the bush. The contractor overseeing the whole project was Japanese. There is a reason why Japanese officials and company reps had to formally apologise to the Vietnamese victim. Simply, they were in charge of the whole project, including appointing those Vietnamese engineers.

Lastly, JICA and ODA follow post implementation evaluations after each project, and objective external and internal auditing renders any instance of corruption nill. Of course we have collaborated with the Vietnamese Government in their own need to tackle issues requiring internal auditing in certain sectors. Fortunately for us, we are glad to see the Vietnamese Government heed our constructive recommendation:

http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/vietnam/oda-related0902.pdf

Nhandan Newspaper - Vietnam, Japan seek anti-corruption measures for ODA projects

Again, nice flowery words. But it's completely different in reality. I'm sure @NiceGuy can give you some other example of ODA projects where the results is substandard and corners cut. Of course, you will blame it on the Vietnamese workers. Which begs the question, are the evaluations performed by JICA of any value if the results fail to meet expectation?

 

[Aepsilons]

The point of the matter is that Vietnamese Engineers , since Can Tho, have been required to abide by Japanese recommendations in regards to projects. The unfortunate instance in Can Tho could have been prevented had the Vietnamese Engineers heeded Japanese recommendations , which they outright failed to implement in regards to scaffolding requirements, and improper calculation of specified variables. But in the spirit of responsibility and understanding, Japan absorbed full responsibility (economic, legal). Anyways, one bad incident should not be used as judge, afterall, over 1,900 Japanese-led / funded projects have proven successful. An incident in 1 out of 1900 is not that bad. Meta-analytically speaking, of course.