Vietnam Defence Forum

[Viet]

But of course......



Talking about Steve Bannon, here is a very interesting article and very relevant to Vietnam:

Steve Bannon: 'We're going to war in the South China Sea ... no doubt'
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news...non-donald-trump-war-south-china-sea-no-doubt

Only months ago Donald Trump’s chief strategist predicted military involvement in east Asia and the Middle East in Breitbart radio shows

Steve Bannon: ‘We’re going to war in the South China Sea in five to 10 years. There’s no doubt about that.’ Photograph: Evan Vucci/AP

Benjamin Haas in Hong Kong

Thursday 2 February 2017 03.55 GMTLast modified on Thursday 2 February 2017 05.09 GMT

The United States and China will fight a war within the next 10 years over islands in the South China Sea, and “there’s no doubt about that”. At the same time, the US will be in another “major” war in the Middle East.

Those are the views – nine months ago at least – of one of the most powerful men in Donald Trump’s administration, Steve Bannon, the former head of far-right news website Breitbart who is now chief strategist at the White House.

In the first weeks of Trump’s presidency, Bannon has emerged as a central figure. He was appointed to the “principals committee” of the National Security Council in a highly unusual move and was influential in the recent travel ban on citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries, overruling Department of Homeland Security officials who felt the order did not apply to green card holders.

While many in Trump’s team are outspoken critics of China, in radio shows Bannon hosted for Breitbart he makes plain the two largest threats to America: China and Islam.

“We’re going to war in the South China Sea in five to 10 years,” he said in March 2016. “There’s no doubt about that. They’re taking their sandbars and making basically stationary aircraft carriers and putting missiles on those. They come here to the United States in front of our face – and you understand how important face is – and say it’s an ancient territorial sea.”

China says nearly the entire South China Sea falls within its territory, with half a dozen other countries maintaining partially overlapping claims. China has built a series of artificial islands on reefs and rocks in attempt to bolster its position, complete with military-length airstrips and anti-aircraft weapons.

Bannon’s sentiments and his position in Trump’s inner circle add to fears of a military confrontation with China, after secretary of state Rex Tillerson said that the US would deny China access to the seven artificial islands. Experts warned any blockade would lead to war.

Bannon is clearly wary of China’s growing clout in Asia and beyond, framing the relationship as entirely adversarial, predicting a global culture clash in the coming years.

“You have an expansionist Islam and you have an expansionist China. Right? They are motivated. They’re arrogant. They’re on the march. And they think the Judeo-Christian west is on the retreat,” Bannon said during a February 2016 radio show.

On the day Trump was inaugurated, China’s military warned that war between the two countries was a real possibility.

“A ‘war within the president’s term’ or ‘war breaking out tonight’ are not just slogans, they are becoming a practical reality,” an official wrote on the website of the People’s Liberation Army.

Aside from conflict between armies, Bannon repeatedly focused on his perception that Christianity around the world is under threat.

In one radio show, used to promote an article incorrectly claiming that a mosque had been built at the North Pole, Bannon focused heavily on China’s oppression of Christian groups.

“The one thing the Chinese fear more than America … they fear Christianity more than anything,” he said.

But China is not the only hotspot Bannon sees, and forecasts another ground war for American troops in the Middle East.

“Some of these situations may get a little unpleasant,” Bannon said in November 2015. “But you know what, we’re in a war. We’re clearly going into, I think, a major shooting war in the Middle East again.”

He also branded Islam as “the most radical” religion in the world, and moved swiftly since entering the White House to enact policies hostile to Muslims. Some have called Trump’s central doctrine a “war on Islam”.



If anything, the last 6 months have shown that the mainstream media, particularly in USA is all a big charade.

Autsch! that is a sharp rhetoric by Bannon, unthinkable under Obama administration. Some in America may have finally realized that appeasement policy has led to nowhere.

Have you heard the news?

Our friend Rex Tillerson has received Senat approval. I think, both Bannon and Tillerson will become best friends in the White House.

 

[Carlosa]

Vietnam and China: contingent cooperation, not capitulation
2 February 2017

Author: Andrew Chubb, UWA

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/02/02/vietnam-and-china-contingent-cooperation-not-capitulation/

On 12 January, Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong arrived in China for a lavish, well publicised four-day official visit.

Nguyen’s trip symbolised the significant improvement in Sino–Vietnamese relations since their nadir during the HYSY-981 oil rig confrontations in mid-2014. Hanoi’s subsequent suppression of nationalist protests marking the 19 January anniversary of China’s eviction of South Vietnamese forces from the Paracel Islands in 1974 has since confirmed the relative health of ties between the two party-states.

But linking Nguyen’s trip into a narrative of alleged Southeast Asian countries acquiescingto Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea would be misleading. Rather than a Vietnamese tilt towards China, the visit was a continuation of recurring features of the bilateral relationship, amid improving ties underpinned by the moderation of some of China’s policies.

Over the past few years, official visits by party and state leaders have been a regular feature of Sino–Vietnamese relations at all but the worst of times. Each trip has concluded with detailed bilateral statement, so a basic idea of the significance of the 2017 visit can be gleaned by comparing the joint communique it produced against earlier documents of this type.

One salient change was the ‘close and friendly’ atmosphere that the communique said prevailed through Nguyen’s meetings. By comparison, it has usually been ‘friendly and candid’ since 2007–2008, when China’s policy in the South China Sea became more assertive. This implies the general state of relations is now equivalent to that which prevailed in the early to mid-2000s when the description was often used.

Secretary Nguyen’s trip did not mark any major change or softening in Vietnam’s position on the South China Sea issue. It did, however, continue the revival of maritime crisis management and confidence-building initiatives — such as Coast Guard exchanges and a fisheries incident hotline — whose progress appears to have stalled after the HYSY-981 incident.

While the joint statements from leaders’ visits in 2011 and 2013 included a call for ‘calmness and restraint’, this language has been absent from more recent documents. This suggests the two party-states consider the present level of tension in the disputed area to be lower. It also implies a mutual recognition of each other’s policy status quo as basically rational.

A further sign of the reduced tensions on the water is that the most recent communiques have called for implementation of the 2003 Declaration of Conduct for the South China Sea, and pursuit of a Code of Conduct before affirming the need for ‘control of maritime disputes’. Previous documents back to 2013 had placed this before the multilateral agreements — the 2011 did not even mention them.

Hanoi’s symbolic declarations of cooperation with China have often been accompanied by substantive cooperative initiatives with China’s rivals, and the 2017 meeting was no exception.

While the Vietnamese Communist Party’s General Secretary received red-carpet treatment in Beijing, then-US secretary of state John Kerry was in Hanoi, witnessing the 13 January signing of two heads of agreement between ExxonMobil and Vietnam’s state oil company PetroVietnam over a major undersea gasfield straddling the PRC’s nine-dash line. Beijing has previously issued warnings to Exxon over its participation in the project, which is now estimated to contain 5.3 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The latest plan will see the US multinational build an 88-kilometre undersea pipeline, carrying gas to the Vietnamese mainland by 2021.

The day after Nguyen concluded his China trip, Vietnam welcomed Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to Hanoi. Standing beside Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, Abe announced Japan would provide six new patrol vessels on low-interest development loans to ‘strongly support Vietnam’s enhancing its maritime law enforcement capability’. These white-hulled capabilities have been central to China’s advances in the disputed areas in recent years, so it was an announcement with both symbolism and substance.

Similarly, when now-Premier Nguyen Xuan Phuc was in Beijing in September 2015, General Secretary Nguyen was in Tokyo securing secondhand maritime patrol boats, along with Japanese criticism of land reclamation in the South China Sea. This pattern has been apparent since at least 2011. During General Secretary Nguyen’s October 2011 trip, Chairman Truong Tan Sang was visiting India, strengthening military training exchanges, confirming Indian access to the Nha Trang port, and negotiating to purchase BrahMos cruise missiles. Indian and Vietnamese state oil companies also signed deals covering disputed areas of the South China Sea.

Vietnam’s highly conspicuous hedging appears designed to signal to Beijing that its cooperation does not imply acquiescence, but is rather contingent on China’s own conduct.

Indeed, Chinese policy in the South China Sea is probably the most important determinant of the state of bilateral ties. Since 2000 at least, the frequency and warmth of the leaders’ communiqués has tended to correlate – negatively – with the pace of China’s assertive advances in the disputed area. Consistent with this pattern, China has moderated its conduct in some important ways in recent months.

Some adjustments to Chinese policy have, for the time being at least, brought Beijing into partial compliance with the 2016 ruling of the UNCLOS-mandated arbitral tribunal. Despite its surface-level bluster rejecting the process, the PRC has, for example, eased its harassment of Philippine fishers at Scarborough Shoal, allowing them access to the fishing grounds within the atoll’s lagoon.

One of the key sources of Sino–Vietnamese maritime tensions since 2007 has been the PRC’s assertions — verbal and at times physical — of oil and gas rights across the area within the nine-dash line. This was another of the key elements of China’s policy that was deemed unlawful by the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal.

But shortly after the ruling, a new and detailed interpretation of the nine-dash line, published in the military’s official newspaper, appeared to decouple the line from claims to energy resources. That Beijing has so far refrained from publicly criticising the above-mentioned Exxon–PetroVietnam offshore gas project further suggests China may have pulled back from its pursuit of particular claims that have no basis in international law.

The removal of this major driver of Sino–Vietnamese tensions offers the most compelling, but also easily overlooked, explanation for the recent warming of bilateral ties.

Andrew Chubb is a PhD Candidate at the University of Western Australia. You can follow him on Twitter at @zhubochubo.

 

[Carlosa]

Vietnam’s Area Denial Strategy and the South China Sea Dispute
https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/vietnams-area-denial-strategy-and-the-south-china-sea-dispute/

In October 2016, U.S. Admiral John Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations, advocated in a ground-breaking article the demise of A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) as a stand-alone term. According to him, the term became so widely used that it had lost any kind of empiricist accuracy. Not only have international observers become more shy in using the acronym since then, but one could also argue that A2/AD does not fit the evolving security situation in the South China Sea (SCS) anymore, where it was extensively used in the first place.

Vietnam used to be a flagship of area denial strategy in practice. With maritime claims clashing directly with China’s ones in the South China Sea, most notably in the Paracel and Spratley islands, Vietnam became a major East Asian security flashpoint over the past few years. The equation is simple, but its solution difficult: China is a bigger, richer, and more populous country, whose challenging behaviors threaten Vietnam’s interests. Consequently, Vietnam chose to balance against its neighbor. In 2013, some observers boldly announced Vietnam’s adoption of A2/AD strategy when the first of a six-strong fleet of Kilo-class attack submarines was delivered to Hanoi. Four years later, as the sixth and last submarine recently arrived at Cam Ranh harbor, what can be said of Vietnam’s conventional deterrence strategy?

From a national defense perspective, area denial should be divided into two different slices: conventional and non-conventional threats. The Vietnam People’s Navy’s capabilities were boosted by the acquisition of six Kilo submarines. The Russian-manufactured model, with its midship positioned sonars and anti-detection tiles, is designed to track and neutralize enemy-vessels. This costly $2 billion acquisition (SIPRI) is aimed at countering conventional threats at sea and, in case of conflict, compensating for at least a limited period of time the clear asymmetry between the Vietnamese and Chinese navies. In other words, Hanoi upgraded its conventional deterrence by severely raising the cost of conflict at sea for any potential opponent.

Such perspective is actually the most extreme and unlikely outcome. Military analysts are rather concerned by the emergence of more deceitful forms of warfare. The multiplication of so-called “blue-boats,” akin to militias at sea, short-circuits traditional interstate conflict management by intruding sovereign waters and harassing locals. China admittedly operates a fully-fledged fleet of blue-boats in order to, in its own words, “defend [its] sovereignty.” Blue-boats’ armament and training, though far below conventional navies, can sometimes reach significant levels, and their assumed ties to governments are frequently purposely unclear. Put more bluntly, blue-boats in the South China Sea dispute are aimed at spoiling one’s neighbor’s life by disturbing its fishing activities and shipping lines, redefining entirely the concept of conflict.

Vietnam’s answer to that threat is hidden in the details. It is only back in 2013 that Vietnam’s Marine Police was officially rebranded “Coast Guard” and started to play a bigger role in Hanoi’s security policy. An organizational overhaul, implementing regional commands, and steady investments were aimed at reinforcing Vietnam’s South China Sea monitoring capabilities and law-enforcement. Transnational threats such as piracy and smuggling conveniently justify the development of a Vietnamese coast-guard force, and broaden Hanoi’s military cooperation perspectives.

New political orientations participate in Vietnam’s balancing strategy by favoring interdependencies with regional and international partners. This issue might seem remote from area denial strategy, but both aspects are complementary. During his recent visit in Hanoi, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe agreed with his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Xuan Phuc on developing Japanese investments into Vietnam, increasing development aid loans, and supplying six brand-new patrol ships to the Vietnamese Coast Guard. This long-awaited delivery will help Vietnam to increase its monitoring capabilities in the South China Sea and to counter non-conventional threats.

No third country expects to change Vietnam into a buffer state against China. After all, the so-called “three-nos” policy still officially shape Vietnam’s strategy: no military alliance, no foreign bases, and no reliance on a third party. But A2/AD still makes sense in the minds of the United States, Japan, or India. Hence the recent pouring in defense cooperation agreements and arms supplies destined at reinforcing Vietnam’s territorial sovereignty. The Pentagon provides training to Vietnam through its Maritime Security Initiative, designed to increase Southeast Asian nations’ maritime awareness. India might deliver Akash sol-air missiles to Vietnam in a move openly aimed at containing China, after having agreed to train Hanoi’s fleet of Sukhoi-30s.

What lies ahead in the South China Sea dispute is still unclear. The July 2016 PCA arbitration on China’s claims in the SCS, triggered by the Philippines, was not the milestone expected by partisans of international law. The tribunal declared indeed that the Chinese claims had no legal ground, but Manila reversed its course when the pro-China Rodrigo Duterte won the presidential election in May 2016. Since then, Mr Duterte’s government has been very unclear regarding how to transform the arbitral award into political gains. Vietnamese leaders are resolutely silent about the award anyway, only mildly professing their wish to see international law respected.

The US presidential race and the victory of Donald Trump did nothing to simplify this ambiguous balance. Rex Tillerson, the hawkish secretary of state nominee, declared on January 11 that the United States will “make sure [to] defend international territories from being taken over by one country” in the South China Sea, provoking directly China’s position in the region. In contrast, Vietnam’s Communist Party Secretary General, Mr Nguyen Phu Trong, visited China on January 12-15, promising to President Xi Jinping a renewal of their bilateral relations, most notably, and strikingly, concerning the South China Sea dispute.

It is easy to accuse Vietnam to play smoke and mirrors in its maritime dispute with China. But it would be ignoring the situation’s inherent complexity. Hefty investments in naval and missile capabilities have ensured Vietnam’s A2/AD credibility. But these capabilities increasingly suffer from the same irrelevance as the term itself. With the passing of time, it becomes clear that Hanoi’s core interests reside in ensuring its fishing and shipping security, more than in preparing to counter a phantasmagoric all-out Chinese attack by sea.

The trick is, such threats to civilian activities are still emanating from state-actors, most notably China. Investing in surveillance and law-enforcement is therefore a convenient way to increase one’s presence at sea while skirting accusations of brinkmanship. It is why the future of Vietnam’s area-denial strategy is to be found in its ability to monitor and answer non-conventional threats as well as developing bilateral positive-sum relations with anyone having an interest in preserving the geopolitical balance in the South China Sea.

 

[Silent Knight]

Wooops.

 

[Viet]

Wooops.

medium range air launched Kh-31 antiship missile I guess? something special?

 

[Silent Knight]

medium range air launched Kh-31 antiship missile I guess? something special?

Well, rumors (again) have it that VPAF has acquired the extended range variants for both Kh-31A and Kh-31P.

Also, that second picture was taken by me, not sure how it ended up on Blogspot.

 

[Viet]

Well, rumors (again) have it that VPAF has acquired the extended range variants for both Kh-31A and Kh-31P.

Also, that second picture was taken by me, not sure how it ended up on Blogspot.

Come on bro, if there is anyone that spreads rumors here and there then it is me. I know of nothing. If an insider like you takes a close picture of the missile I would assume, you know more than you can tell

 

[Viet]

ok as the world talks on Donald Trump let continue with it

not a defence news, but more economy
@rocketfish

the Donald Trump administration is apparently determined to impose a 20% import tariffs across over the board, with some countries will even "enjoy" a 40% import tax. today the "Spiegel" posts a report who will suffer most by an escalating trade war, with an interesting graph showing the US´s 5 top trading nations and blocs. everyone sees it? How is it possible, a country as Canada with only 35 million people has a trade volumes of 583 billion in 2015? yes it has has something with Vietnam hence I make the post. some may argue that is nothing relating to VN but anyway opinions are opinions everyone is free to say everything.

good, we all know Canada has smart businesspeople, but others not?

there are sizeable vietnamese population in Canada, making considerable economic activities hence contributing a part to Canada economic success. the first vietnamese settled down Canada after the Fall of Saigon in 1975 and during the years of chaos in the 1979-1980 have refugee background, coming to the country with nothing. starting everything by Zero. but according to a income report of the year 2000, the vietnamese canadians had average income of $23,000, compared to $30,000 for all Canadians. I would guess, the gap is closed today. along with other Canadian politicians, the present day Prime Minister Justin Trudeau attended the Tet days, back in 2014.

 

[Silent Knight]

Come on bro, if there is anyone that spreads rumors here and there then it is me. I know of nothing. If an insider like you takes a close picture of the missile I would assume, you know more than you can tell

No no, my friend, I'm just an ordinary member, not an insider.

However, @Carlosa should be monitored for extracting information from "certain" sources.

 

[Aqsuperman]

Truck - based and tank - based engineering vehicles of the VPAF. Most of the time, their primary role are clearing obstacle and digging trench. But im pretty sure they can be used in towing duties are well.


This guy utilizes the T-72 chassis so the claim that Vietnam possesses T-72 is not entirely wrong.....in a sense :v

And this guy can be used both as a bulldozer and for digging trench.

 

[Viet]

No no, my friend, I'm just an ordinary member, not an insider.

However, @Carlosa should be monitored for extracting information from "certain" sources.

you are humble. I expected a guy that is allowed to make close pictures of military toys tends to brag, but you are not. oh you are right. Carlosa deserves a penalty. I read the King of Spain Felipe VI and his wife Queen Letizia will visit Vietnam. he should convince the Spaniards to come with la Armada Invencible .

 

[Carlosa]

you are humble. I expected a guy that is allowed to make close pictures of military toys tends to brag, but you are not. oh you are right. Carlosa deserves a penalty. I read the King of Spain Felipe VI and his wife Queen Letizia will visit Vietnam. he should convince the Spaniards to come with la Armada Invencible .

Hey, I'm just an innocent observer here, the fact that some members of the Vietnamese military happen to be personal friends of mine, it does not make any difference at all, I swear that they do not disclosed any classified information to me. If they were to do that, then they would it have to kill me afterwards and of course that's not good for my health, so definitely, I don't know anything, I didn't hear anything, I swear..... SK is simply spreading misinformation about me.

you are humble. I expected a guy that is allowed to make close pictures of military toys tends to brag, but you are not. oh you are right. Carlosa deserves a penalty. I read the King of Spain Felipe VI and his wife Queen Letizia will visit Vietnam. he should convince the Spaniards to come with la Armada Invencible .

La Armada Invencible has been underwater for some time, but we'll be happy to sell you corvettes, frigates, AEGIS destroyers and even small aircraft carriers. Low interest loans are available

 

[Silent Knight]

you are humble. I expected a guy that is allowed to make close pictures of military toys tends to brag, but you are not.

They always say "the less you know, the better", especially when you're dealing with sensitive military information.

So yeah, my personal motto is "I know nothing".

Hey, I'm just an innocent observer here, the fact that some members of the Vietnamese military happen to be personal friends of mine, it does not make any difference at all, I swear that they do not disclosed any classified information to me. If they were to do that, then they would it have to kill me afterwards and of course that's not good for my health, so definitely, I don't know anything, I didn't hear anything, I swear..... SK is simply spreading misinformation about me.



La Armada Invencible has been underwater for some time, but we'll be happy to sell you corvettes, frigates, AEGIS destroyers and even small aircraft carriers. Low interest loans are available

Send Barcelona and Real Madrid to Vietnam first, then we'll talk business.

Also, I'll report you to the authorities for trying to extract our military information. Not a good thing for a Spaniard in Vietnam

 

[Viet]

Comrade Vladmir Putin should listen to his economic advisers to increase investments in Vietnam, making the country to a base for producing all russian stuffs and export to other regions. many truck manufactures as Kamaz and others make great business with the Vietnamese armed forces. TPP is dead. that is the chance for Russia. Welcome

http://rbth.com/business/2017/01/31/tpp-failure-can-vietnam-become-russias-window-to-asia_692768

 

[Carlosa]

Send Barcelona and Real Madrid to Vietnam first, then we'll talk business.

Also, I'll report you to the authorities for trying to extract our military information. Not a good thing for a Spaniard in Vietnam

Oh now I understand why C2 invited me for green tea next Monday, it was you! But man, you have to understand, I have to make a living, Spanish intelligence pays me quite well for reporting on the Vietnamese military. But I will make it up to you, Barcelona and Real Madrid are coming to Hanoi in 2017, I promise