Carlosa
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Oh thank you, probably at least $80-90 million today.
I have not being able to find the price of the Smart-S MK2 yet.
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Oh thank you, probably at least $80-90 million today.
I have not being able to find the price of the Smart-S MK2 yet.
Viet
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well, at least Xi has sense for humour while this dude pher notHostile? How could that be possible? Mr. Xi said that chinese don't have the genes for aggression!
Viet
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@Carlosa
I believed you asked the question. according to this news, VN has NOT signed the contract for additional 4 Molnyia yet. that says the Director General of Vympel shipyard at Interpolitex 2014 exhibition. I guess the navy wants to spend the money on bigger, more advanced warships instead.
Nga thử nghiệm cặp tàu tên lửa Molnyia để chuẩn bị giao cho Việt Nam | Thủ Tướng Nguyễn Tấn Dũng
I believed you asked the question. according to this news, VN has NOT signed the contract for additional 4 Molnyia yet. that says the Director General of Vympel shipyard at Interpolitex 2014 exhibition. I guess the navy wants to spend the money on bigger, more advanced warships instead.
Nga thử nghiệm cặp tàu tên lửa Molnyia để chuẩn bị giao cho Việt Nam | Thủ Tướng Nguyễn Tấn Dũng
Viet
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the analyze lacks of one important piece of information: Vietnam coastal artillery such as Yakhonts and the likes. the artillery threatens all enemy warships within 300km.
Vietnamese surface warships and surveillance aircraft are protected by this missile shield when on patrol or combat situation. However, it is too bad (but not shocking) to hear that, in terms of jet fighters, warships and submarines, our forces have even less than half of those in the Guangzhou Military Region. the imbalance of power is huge, but that is not a breaking news for us. but more than military hardware, we have one important asset in the inventory: our warfare.
Is Vietnam in denial on military strategy? | East Asia Forum
30 October 2014
Author: Shang-su Wu, RSIS
Vietnam’s recent, and significant, investment in military hardware is aimed at coping with a changing strategic environment. But will it make any significant difference in balancing against China’s military might in the South China Sea?
Over the last ten years, Vietnam has been especially focusing defence investment in its air and naval capability. This has included the purchase of Su-30MK2 fighter bombers, Project 636 submarines, as well as several types of surface vessels and missiles. These purchases may reveal Vietnam’s inclination towards an anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategy aimed at preventing foreign access or activities in its territorial waters. But in the face of the superior Chinese military power, Vietnam’s military procurements appear inadequate for pursuing an A2/AD strategy and may not achieve their intended goal.
First, as surveillance is the key for a ‘denial’ strategy, Vietnam’s existing platforms for maritime surveillance are potentially vulnerable. Hanoi has introduced three types of maritime surveillance aircraft (DHC-6-400, M-28P and C-212) for its air force and coast guard. But these slow propeller-powered aircraft are easy prey for Chinese fighters’ beyond-vision-range missiles, and even surface vessels’ long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
Although Hanoi has launched a remote sensing satellite using French technology and management, its function for denial operation could be limited. The remote sensing satellite is to scrutinise geographic and geologic information rather than real time intelligence on the location of Chinese vessels. Additionally, the French management of the satellite may not cooperate with Hanoi’s military demands due to pressure from Beijing’s. If those aerial surveillance platforms are unable to search maritime targets during warfare, most Vietnamese strike units would need to find their own targets, and an optimal distribution of fire power would be less likely.
Second, Vietnam has a smaller number of sophisticated weapon systems than China. In terms of the third and fourth generation fighters, surface vessels and submarines, Vietnamese forces have even less than half of those in the Guangzhou Military Region. This leaves the Vietnamese military with a smaller margin for loss, presenting a disadvantage in attrition war. Vietnamese submarines may overcome certain asymmetrical disadvantages in the short term but would struggle in the long term. The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) South Sea Fleet could also deploy submarines outside major Vietnamese naval bases, such as Cam Ranh Bay, to monitor their operation.
Third, both Hanoi and Beijing procured several similar Russian weapon systems, such as the Su-30MK2, Project 636 submarines and S-300 PMU-1 SAMs. Due to the earlier purchase and China’s famous reverse engineering, the Chinese forces can already grasp the complete performance and characteristics of these weapon systems — Vietnam can’t. As a result, Hanoi may lose some tactical surprises which are supposed to compensate for their quantitative inferiority. In sum, Vietnam’s military modernisation may not achieve an A2AD strategic goal.
Finally, domestic budget constraints also suggest that another wave of massive military hardware procurement is unlikely. As such, it is unlikely that Vietnam will possess substantial capabilities in the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, although Hanoi’s effort on defence may not effectively check Beijing’s massive military power, it does provide some strategic value. First, Vietnam is able to deter China much better than before. Compared to the end of the last century, the disincentives for Beijing using force against Vietnam are much greater. In order to ensure a successful outcome, the PLA would have to deploy more units to counter its Vietnamese counterparts. But more units would decrease strategic surprises and leave a more aggressive impression of China among the international community. As the Philippines — another ‘frontline’ state facing China’s strategic pressure — strengthens its defence through the Enhance Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the United States, Vietnam’s considerable investment in defence could make it harder prey for China’s expansion or assertiveness.
Second, Hanoi’s military modernisation may serve as a bargain chip in negotiation with other powers for security cooperation. Vietnam’s investment in defence could lower the cost of intervention and ensure its commitment to defence rather than overall dependence. This would increase the possibility of extended deterrence or external intervention from a third party. And it would improve the military balance between Vietnam and China. But in view of Beijing’s increasing economic and military capability, a third party power may hesitate to support Hanoi in fear of the high costs of confrontation.
Overall, Hanoi’s military modernisation has not dramatically changed its attitude toward Beijing. Despite tension over conflicting territorial claims, Vietnamese decision makers still contact their Chinese counterparts through party-to-party and other channels. Considering the bilateral economic ties and inferior military capability, Hanoi may continue with a cautious tone in its relations with Beijing.
Dr Wu Shang-Su is Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
Vietnamese surface warships and surveillance aircraft are protected by this missile shield when on patrol or combat situation. However, it is too bad (but not shocking) to hear that, in terms of jet fighters, warships and submarines, our forces have even less than half of those in the Guangzhou Military Region. the imbalance of power is huge, but that is not a breaking news for us. but more than military hardware, we have one important asset in the inventory: our warfare.
Is Vietnam in denial on military strategy? | East Asia Forum
30 October 2014
Author: Shang-su Wu, RSIS
Vietnam’s recent, and significant, investment in military hardware is aimed at coping with a changing strategic environment. But will it make any significant difference in balancing against China’s military might in the South China Sea?
Over the last ten years, Vietnam has been especially focusing defence investment in its air and naval capability. This has included the purchase of Su-30MK2 fighter bombers, Project 636 submarines, as well as several types of surface vessels and missiles. These purchases may reveal Vietnam’s inclination towards an anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategy aimed at preventing foreign access or activities in its territorial waters. But in the face of the superior Chinese military power, Vietnam’s military procurements appear inadequate for pursuing an A2/AD strategy and may not achieve their intended goal.
First, as surveillance is the key for a ‘denial’ strategy, Vietnam’s existing platforms for maritime surveillance are potentially vulnerable. Hanoi has introduced three types of maritime surveillance aircraft (DHC-6-400, M-28P and C-212) for its air force and coast guard. But these slow propeller-powered aircraft are easy prey for Chinese fighters’ beyond-vision-range missiles, and even surface vessels’ long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
Although Hanoi has launched a remote sensing satellite using French technology and management, its function for denial operation could be limited. The remote sensing satellite is to scrutinise geographic and geologic information rather than real time intelligence on the location of Chinese vessels. Additionally, the French management of the satellite may not cooperate with Hanoi’s military demands due to pressure from Beijing’s. If those aerial surveillance platforms are unable to search maritime targets during warfare, most Vietnamese strike units would need to find their own targets, and an optimal distribution of fire power would be less likely.
Second, Vietnam has a smaller number of sophisticated weapon systems than China. In terms of the third and fourth generation fighters, surface vessels and submarines, Vietnamese forces have even less than half of those in the Guangzhou Military Region. This leaves the Vietnamese military with a smaller margin for loss, presenting a disadvantage in attrition war. Vietnamese submarines may overcome certain asymmetrical disadvantages in the short term but would struggle in the long term. The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) South Sea Fleet could also deploy submarines outside major Vietnamese naval bases, such as Cam Ranh Bay, to monitor their operation.
Third, both Hanoi and Beijing procured several similar Russian weapon systems, such as the Su-30MK2, Project 636 submarines and S-300 PMU-1 SAMs. Due to the earlier purchase and China’s famous reverse engineering, the Chinese forces can already grasp the complete performance and characteristics of these weapon systems — Vietnam can’t. As a result, Hanoi may lose some tactical surprises which are supposed to compensate for their quantitative inferiority. In sum, Vietnam’s military modernisation may not achieve an A2AD strategic goal.
Finally, domestic budget constraints also suggest that another wave of massive military hardware procurement is unlikely. As such, it is unlikely that Vietnam will possess substantial capabilities in the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, although Hanoi’s effort on defence may not effectively check Beijing’s massive military power, it does provide some strategic value. First, Vietnam is able to deter China much better than before. Compared to the end of the last century, the disincentives for Beijing using force against Vietnam are much greater. In order to ensure a successful outcome, the PLA would have to deploy more units to counter its Vietnamese counterparts. But more units would decrease strategic surprises and leave a more aggressive impression of China among the international community. As the Philippines — another ‘frontline’ state facing China’s strategic pressure — strengthens its defence through the Enhance Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the United States, Vietnam’s considerable investment in defence could make it harder prey for China’s expansion or assertiveness.
Second, Hanoi’s military modernisation may serve as a bargain chip in negotiation with other powers for security cooperation. Vietnam’s investment in defence could lower the cost of intervention and ensure its commitment to defence rather than overall dependence. This would increase the possibility of extended deterrence or external intervention from a third party. And it would improve the military balance between Vietnam and China. But in view of Beijing’s increasing economic and military capability, a third party power may hesitate to support Hanoi in fear of the high costs of confrontation.
Overall, Hanoi’s military modernisation has not dramatically changed its attitude toward Beijing. Despite tension over conflicting territorial claims, Vietnamese decision makers still contact their Chinese counterparts through party-to-party and other channels. Considering the bilateral economic ties and inferior military capability, Hanoi may continue with a cautious tone in its relations with Beijing.
Dr Wu Shang-Su is Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
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Carlosa
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Thank you for the info, that makes a lot of sense and is consistent with what my Navy source told me before.
Actually, as of early this year, he had told me that the Navy does not want the extra ships since they prefer larger ships with more up to date technology, but I thought that after the oil rig thing, they were maybe going to get them in order to build up the vessel quantity faster, but I guess not.
Another interesting thing, I contacted Alexander Huang by email, the Taiwanese man that took the satellite pictures of Vietnam's reclamation work as quoted in that article. He told me that the Satellite Survey Center in Taiwan has the pictures, he doesn't have access to them, he referred me to their website, but they only show a phone number, I think it will not be easy to get those pics. I just replied to him asking him some questions, lets see if he gives me more info.
the analyze lacks of one important piece of information: Vietnam coastal artillery such as Yakhonts and the likes. the artillery threatens all enemy warships within 300km.
Vietnamese surface warships and surveillance aircraft are protected by this missile shield when on patrol or combat situation. However, it is too bad (but not shocking) to hear that, in terms of jet fighters, warships and submarines, our forces have even less than half of those in the Guangzhou Military Region. the imbalance of power is huge, but that is not a breaking news for us.
Is Vietnam in denial on military strategy? | East Asia Forum
30 October 2014
Author: Shang-su Wu, RSIS
Vietnam’s recent, and significant, investment in military hardware is aimed at coping with a changing strategic environment. But will it make any significant difference in balancing against China’s military might in the South China Sea?
Over the last ten years, Vietnam has been especially focusing defence investment in its air and naval capability. This has included the purchase of Su-30MK2 fighter bombers, Project 636 submarines, as well as several types of surface vessels and missiles. These purchases may reveal Vietnam’s inclination towards an anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategy aimed at preventing foreign access or activities in its territorial waters. But in the face of the superior Chinese military power, Vietnam’s military procurements appear inadequate for pursuing an A2/AD strategy and may not achieve their intended goal.
First, as surveillance is the key for a ‘denial’ strategy, Vietnam’s existing platforms for maritime surveillance are potentially vulnerable. Hanoi has introduced three types of maritime surveillance aircraft (DHC-6-400, M-28P and C-212) for its air force and coast guard. But these slow propeller-powered aircraft are easy prey for Chinese fighters’ beyond-vision-range missiles, and even surface vessels’ long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
Although Hanoi has launched a remote sensing satellite using French technology and management, its function for denial operation could be limited. The remote sensing satellite is to scrutinise geographic and geologic information rather than real time intelligence on the location of Chinese vessels. Additionally, the French management of the satellite may not cooperate with Hanoi’s military demands due to pressure from Beijing’s. If those aerial surveillance platforms are unable to search maritime targets during warfare, most Vietnamese strike units would need to find their own targets, and an optimal distribution of fire power would be less likely.
Second, Vietnam has a smaller number of sophisticated weapon systems than China. In terms of the third and fourth generation fighters, surface vessels and submarines, Vietnamese forces have even less than half of those in the Guangzhou Military Region. This leaves the Vietnamese military with a smaller margin for loss, presenting a disadvantage in attrition war. Vietnamese submarines may overcome certain asymmetrical disadvantages in the short term but would struggle in the long term. The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) South Sea Fleet could also deploy submarines outside major Vietnamese naval bases, such as Cam Ranh Bay, to monitor their operation.
Third, both Hanoi and Beijing procured several similar Russian weapon systems, such as the Su-30MK2, Project 636 submarines and S-300 PMU-1 SAMs. Due to the earlier purchase and China’s famous reverse engineering, the Chinese forces can already grasp the complete performance and characteristics of these weapon systems — Vietnam can’t. As a result, Hanoi may lose some tactical surprises which are supposed to compensate for their quantitative inferiority. In sum, Vietnam’s military modernisation may not achieve an A2AD strategic goal.
Finally, domestic budget constraints also suggest that another wave of massive military hardware procurement is unlikely. As such, it is unlikely that Vietnam will possess substantial capabilities in the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, although Hanoi’s effort on defence may not effectively check Beijing’s massive military power, it does provide some strategic value. First, Vietnam is able to deter China much better than before. Compared to the end of the last century, the disincentives for Beijing using force against Vietnam are much greater. In order to ensure a successful outcome, the PLA would have to deploy more units to counter its Vietnamese counterparts. But more units would decrease strategic surprises and leave a more aggressive impression of China among the international community. As the Philippines — another ‘frontline’ state facing China’s strategic pressure — strengthens its defence through the Enhance Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the United States, Vietnam’s considerable investment in defence could make it harder prey for China’s expansion or assertiveness.
Second, Hanoi’s military modernisation may serve as a bargain chip in negotiation with other powers for security cooperation. Vietnam’s investment in defence could lower the cost of intervention and ensure its commitment to defence rather than overall dependence. This would increase the possibility of extended deterrence or external intervention from a third party. And it would improve the military balance between Vietnam and China. But in view of Beijing’s increasing economic and military capability, a third party power may hesitate to support Hanoi in fear of the high costs of confrontation.
Overall, Hanoi’s military modernisation has not dramatically changed its attitude toward Beijing. Despite tension over conflicting territorial claims, Vietnamese decision makers still contact their Chinese counterparts through party-to-party and other channels. Considering the bilateral economic ties and inferior military capability, Hanoi may continue with a cautious tone in its relations with Beijing.
Dr Wu Shang-Su is Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
I had read that article yesterday, its pretty much correct and is also consistent with what the chinese military says about Vietnam, they have a lot of respect for the vietnamese military, but they say that Vietnam's weaknesses are surveillance, targeting and battle management. That's why I always say that before getting destroyers, etc, need to finish building up the ecosystem that needs to go along with that and surveillance satellites are the main thing missing right now (particularly radar satellites).
One thing that is not quite correct in the article is that they don't seem to be aware that Vietnam is also doing fully domestic satellites now and they will be locally controlled, so the situation is actually getting better.
Last edited:
Viet
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Oh that is pretty nice, pls post here the pics when available. I read we are doing land reclamations since years, but only on small scale. but the news of large scale construction surprises me as well, if true, that our works exceed those of chinese.
the army should hurry a bit. we are quite late to the party.
India to transfer four patrol ships to Vietnam｜Politics｜News｜WantChinaTimes.com
Indian prime minister Narendra Modi announced a major military transfer to Vietnam on Tuesday to help modernize the country's military forces, reports the nationalistic Beijing Times.
Modi announced that India will sell four offshore patrol vessels to Vietnam and approve a US$100 million line of credit to the country as soon as possible to help Vietnam obtain the vessels. This comes after a meeting with Vietnamese prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung, who visited India from Oct 27-28.
The Indian leader said defense cooperation with Vietnam is extremely important to India and pledged to continue helping with efforts to modernize Vietnamese national defense and security forces, which will include expansion of training programs, joint military drills and collaboration in defense equipment.
The transfer was first reported by Reuters but Chinese reporting on the agreement omitted saying that India and Vietnam made the deal out of mutual interest, to increase their own military strengths against China's increasingly assertive claims in the South China Sea and the Himalayas, where India and Vietnam have clashed with their large neighbor over territorial claims.
Indian prime minister Narendra Modi announced a major military transfer to Vietnam on Tuesday to help modernize the country's military forces, reports the nationalistic Beijing Times.
Modi announced that India will sell four offshore patrol vessels to Vietnam and approve a US$100 million line of credit to the country as soon as possible to help Vietnam obtain the vessels. This comes after a meeting with Vietnamese prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung, who visited India from Oct 27-28.
The Indian leader said defense cooperation with Vietnam is extremely important to India and pledged to continue helping with efforts to modernize Vietnamese national defense and security forces, which will include expansion of training programs, joint military drills and collaboration in defense equipment.
The transfer was first reported by Reuters but Chinese reporting on the agreement omitted saying that India and Vietnam made the deal out of mutual interest, to increase their own military strengths against China's increasingly assertive claims in the South China Sea and the Himalayas, where India and Vietnam have clashed with their large neighbor over territorial claims.
GR!FF!N
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so,these two are different...I thought they're going to but patrol ships using this credit.good for Vietnam.
Not only just China piss off.
But also Taiwan, Philippine and Malaysia too!
Not Philippines.GRSE is in the race to build new frigates for them.
StarCraft_ZT
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Good, Viet Nam is wasting their money to buy garbage.
Razia Sultana
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Gritty Viets have survived US and China without any help from outside. But modern day wars are not in the battlefield but in the minds. India-Vietnam military co-operation is already psyching China.
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