Phuong Nguyen -- High ambitions, tall orders for Vietnam's military
http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/V...ons-tall-orders-for-Vietnam-s-military?page=1
The Vietnam People's Army is undergoing quiet yet formative changes, as it takes on a growing strategic role in the country's defense and foreign policy. © AP
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte's recent moves toward rapprochement with Beijing will likely make Vietnam -- and its fast-growing military -- a more important actor in geopolitics in the South China Sea. Yet Hanoi's push to quickly modernize the Vietnam People's Army in the face of China's expansionism in the South China Sea has been too rapidly equated with a number of big-ticket arms purchases made over the past decade. This simplistic view, however, risks overlooking the quiet yet formative changes taking place inside Vietnam's military, and playing down the VPA's growing strategic role in defense and foreign policymaking.
Until the early 2000s, the VPA remained a land-based force still adjusting to peacetime duties, following the decade-long Cambodia conflict -- which officially ended in October 1991 -- and amid Vietnam's economic opening. In the intervening years, faced with rising tensions in the South China Sea over maritime territorial disputes with China, the VPA embarked on a mission to remake itself from scratch into a professional and modern force able to field a credible deterrent in the maritime realm. This effort rests on three important pillars, which in turn inform the military actions Vietnam has taken and will take in the future, especially in the South China Sea.
Combat ready
The first is an ongoing project officially called "Adjustments to the VPA's organization until 2020." The objective is to turn the Vietnamese military into a "compact, powerful, mobile, and flexible" fighting force. Under this pillar, the priorities are to fully modernize the Vietnamese navy, air force, and coast guard, and to conduct technological research in the areas of communications, electronic combat, and technical reconnaissance. Hanoi's purchases from Russia of Kilo-class submarines, Gepard-class frigates, and Su-30 MK2 fighter jets; the procurement of new patrol vessels for the coast guard; and upgrade of its coastal air defense missile system in recent years have helped significantly to strengthen the VPA.
At the same time, Hanoi has focused increasingly on improving the quality of military education and training. When the new Chief of General Staff and Deputy Defense Minister Lt. Gen Phan Van Giang addressed military officers in August, he reiterated that building a "compact, powerful, mobile, and flexible" military required a transformation in both equipment and personnel.
Vietnam's nine military regions -- geographically divided -- have been steadily stepping up the pace of their exercises, training courses, and contingency planning to reflect real-life combat conditions. Under the modernization push, commanding officers and political commissars alike are expected to stay abreast of the evolving regional security outlook, study the defense and security strategies of major countries, and help adjust Vietnam's own strategy accordingly.
Meanwhile, the leadership of the ruling communist party is paying close attention to monitoring the Ministry of National Defense's "Campaign 50," a program to ensure that rank-and-file soldiers fully master newly acquired weapons and technology.
It is a formidable challenge for the fast-modernizing military, and as a result, the VPA has gained greater confidence in operating in the maritime domain. Vietnam put its first Kilo-class submarine on patrol runs along its coast last year and its new submarine fleet will be fully operational by the end of 2017. The navy's infantry force earlier this year conducted an exercise simulating the recapture of an outcrop in the South China Sea, amid persisting anxiety in Hanoi over what China might do once it has completed construction of facilities in the disputed Spratly Islands.
Of particular note is the live-fire air defense exercise conducted in northern Vietnam in October by units from three of the nine military regions, under the auspices of the army and the navy. The combined exercise was an early indicator of the VPA's plan to eventually operate under a future joint command system. Reports in August that Vietnam has deployed mobile rocket launchers to five of its outposts in the Spratly Islands, capable of striking nearby Chinese-built runways, signal that the defense establishment is now playing a decisive role in Hanoi to help manage the South China Sea situation.
Industry investment
The second pillar of military modernization is the implementation of the Politburo's 2011 resolution on "Building and Developing Defense Industry to 2020 and Beyond," the goal of which is to gradually build an "independent, self-reliant, and modern defense industry." According to government data, 80% of weapons and equipment supplied by the domestic defense industry are the products of indigenous research, implying that the remainder comes through licensed co-production with or assistance from foreign partners.
Vietnam's nascent defense industry has experienced a number of milestones in recent years. The country last year launched its largest indigenous unmanned aerial vehicle, which will soon begin flight tests over the South China Sea. UAV research and development continues to be an area of high priority, as Hanoi looks urgently to fill gaps in its maritime domain awareness.
Shipbuilding is another area in which Hanoi has invested significantly. Over the past seven years, local shipyards have produced Molniya-class fast-attack missile ships and TT-400TP gunboats for the navy based on Russian designs, alongside tugboats and multi-mission patrol vessels for the coast guard with licensing and supervision from Netherlands-based Damen Group.
Given that Russia remains Vietnam's largest arms provider, and as Moscow seems to periodically tilt toward Beijing's position on the South China Sea dispute, Vietnam's military increasingly wants to develop local maintenance capabilities for its seagoing assets. The country's air force, known officially as the Air Defence-Air Force, in 2013 launched a local maintenance line for the Russian-made Su-30 and Su-27 fighter aircraft, demonstrating a desire to rely more on the local defense industry for maintenance and repairs.
There are also signs of Hanoi's eagerness to diversify its sources of outside procurement, particularly after the full normalization of relations with the U.S. earlier this year. For example, in October, the Vietnamese coast guard launched a ship maintenance facility in central Vietnam that was built with U.S. support, in a ceremony attended by U.S. Pacific Command Chief Adm. Harry Harris.
Regional ties
Finally, the Vietnam's military has gained a mandate by the ruling Communist Party to use defense diplomacy in ways that serve the country's national interests and enhance the other two pillars. India has been a particularly trusted partner in this effort. The two defense establishments last year launched an information technology training center for the VPA's signal arm, and will begin work on a software development park for the VPA soon. New Delhi has reportedly agreed to help Hanoi build a satellite tracking and data reception center in southern Vietnam that will give the latter access to Indian satellite imagery, including over parts of coastal China and the South China Sea.
Vietnam has also tapped into cooperation with other like-minded strategic partners, including the U.S. and Japan, to address security challenges in the South China Sea. The U.S., for instance, is working on delivering six high-speed patrol boats to the Vietnamese coast guard as part of an $18 million maritime security assistance package. From this year, Washington began helping Vietnam to develop its unmanned maritime capabilities, mainly through training, while joint exercises between the two navies and air forces have grown in scope and complexity with every passing year. Hanoi and Washington last year signed a joint vision statement on defense relations that committed both sides to future coproduction of military equipment, a development that could prove transformational in the long run.
Vietnam has indicated it has no desire to engage in an armed conflict with China. Yet it also needs to fully modernize its military, given the wide asymmetry in military capabilities between the two uneasy neighbors. Vietnamese military officers have been emphasizing with greater frequency the need to maintain "combat readiness" across all units, military regions, and service branches. Anyone familiar with Vietnamese history and nationalism knows that such calls are not mere rhetoric.
As Hanoi continues to invest in this endeavor -- the defense budget is expected to reach $5 billion this year, or 2.6% of gross domestic product, and exceed $6 billion by 2020 -- the VPA will look drastically different over the coming decades. One challenge, though, will remain constant: China's ever-growing military sophistication and confidence at sea.
Phuong Nguyen is a WSD-Handa fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS and adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.