Vietnam Defence Forum

[AViet]

I am glad if Vietnam actually bought C212 from Indonesia, not Spain. We should buy from each other, provided that products meet our requirements, not falling into stupid thinking "because they are made in EU/Japan/the US, their quality must be superior". Alas, this stupidity is still prevalent in many high-rank government officials in Vietnam.

Together with "equipment from G7" (G7 here mean Group of Seven rich countries) regulation which set forth in many government bidding, few people understand that it will entail G7 spare parts, G7 maintenance cost, G7 price for specialists called from the US or EU, all of which will accumulate into operating cost of any enterprise and can make them paralyzed.

In addition, nowadays, equipment from G7 no longer mean reliable. In my experiences, they can break down any time, just like equipment from Korea, Taiwan or China (one of the reasons is that G7 countries possibly no longer actually make these equipment, but outsourced to Southern European, East European etc. where the labour cost is much lower).

 

[Indos]

I am glad if Vietnam actually bought C212 from Indonesia, not Spain. We should buy from each other, provided that products meet our requirements, not falling into stupid thinking "because they are made in EU/Japan/the US, their quality must be superior". Alas, this stupidity is still prevalent in many high-rank government officials in Vietnam.

Together with "equipment from G7" (G7 here mean Group of Seven rich countries) regulation which set forth in many government bidding, few people understand that it will entail G7 spare parts, G7 maintenance cost, G7 price for specialists called from the US or EU, all of which will accumulate into operating cost of any enterprise and can make them paralyzed.

In addition, nowadays, equipment from G7 no longer mean reliable. In my experiences, they can break down any time, just like equipment from Korea, Taiwan or China (one of the reasons is that G7 countries possibly no longer actually make these equipment, but outsourced to Southern European, East European etc. where the labour cost is much lower).

Thanks for this comment,

Yup, true, even South Korea bough CN 235 from us, and this also might be one of the reasons of why South Korea chooses Indonesia as their partner in KFX program beside our design capabilities and experience, and other factors.

 

[Viet]

2 thông tin bất ngờ về phi đội C-212 của Cảnh sát biển Việt Nam | Quân sự | soha.vn

ok, from the website. according to canhsatbien.vn (11/2015), the Prime Minister has approved a 5 year plan to strengthen the Coast Guard by various types of vessels including:

- DN-4000 (4,000 tons), DN-2000 (2,000 tons), TT-1500 (1,500 tons), TT-400 (400 tons), replenishment tanker 1,000 tons, search-and-rescue ships (SAR)
- 3 more aircraft C-212-400 ordered at PT Dirgantara Indonesia (PTDI). same configuration as the first three aircraft ordered in Spain. Bringing the total number of aircraft to 6.

 

[Carlosa]

ok, from the website. according to canhsatbien.vn (11/2015), the Prime Minister has approved a 5 year plan to strengthen the Coast Guard by various types of vessels including:

- DN-4000 (4,000 tons), DN-2000 (2,000 tons), TT-1500 (1,500 tons), TT-400 (400 tons), replenishment tanker 1,000 tons, search-and-rescue ships (SAR)
- 3 more aircraft C-212-400 ordered at PT Dirgantara Indonesia (PTDI). same configuration as the first three aircraft ordered in Spain. Bringing the total number of aircraft to 6.

Is there any details about the TT-1500 (1,500 tons)?

 

[Carlosa]

A treat for you guys, the Carlosa Special Report about the C-212 marine patrol bird of Vietnam, you are not going to find this article anywhere, I put it together myself from a variety of sources:

The Casa 212-400 aircraft is the latest version of the C212 model manufactured by Airbus. The plane accommodates a crew of three and can be used for long patrol journeys. The aircraft can transport 24 soldiers or a cabin load of 2.7 tons, in addition, it is also equipped with two hard points, can carry guided missiles and unguided rockets, for a total weapons payload of 500 kg.

A Casa 212-400 is 16.1 meters long, 6.5 meters tall, and has a wingspan of 20.2 meters. The plane can fly at a maximum speed of 370 kph, with a range of 1,800 km.

The plane is also equipped with a MSS-6000 airborne maritime surveillance system which is made in Sweden.

The core of the MSS-6000 is a mission management system that links all available information together and presents a situation overview to the operator for interpretation and further action. The mission management system is based on GIS (Geographical Information System) technology, and the available information is presented against a backdrop of a digital nautical chart.

These aircraft in the service to Vietnam will not only enhance the surveillance capabilities of the sea, it will have a certain airborne early warning capability.

The Casa-212 can operate during the day and at night and in all weather conditions. It can take off and land at makeshift airports with short, narrow runways.

Equipped with two propeller turbine engines, the aircraft can fly at very low altitude, making it ideal for patrolling and identifying vessels at sea, spotting oil spills, and con- ducting rescue missions.

MSS 6000 Maritime surveillance system to support oil spill, rescue operations in Vietnamese waters

The Vietnamese contract comes from the Vietnam Marine Police, which has ordered systems for installation on three new CASA C212-400 aircraft – a project that takes three years to complete. The contract has an extensive scope, including installation and testing of the systems in the aircraft, establishment of a ground station and mission command center, and operational and technical training of personnel.

SSC will supply a fully integrated MSS 6000 system, including SLAR (side-looking airborne radar), still and video cameras, airborne AIS (automatic identification system for ships), an IR/UV (infra-red/ultra-violet) line scanner, an FLIR (forward-looking infra-red) scanner, and communications via high-speed satellite data-link and HF (high frequency) radio.

The customer will use the equipment for patrolling Vietnamese waters, detecting and responding to oil spills and illegal fishing activities, protecting the economic zone, and participating in search-and-rescue operations.

The MSS 6000 provides an effective means to monitor activities in national waters and to detect unwanted or illegal events, such as oil pollution, whether accidental or deliberate, and unauthorized fishing. The technology can also be applied to monitoring movement of ice, likely to become increasingly important as offshore oil and gas operations spread to arctic regions.

Data from the different sensors is processed, integrated, and presented in one integrated view to the operator. All recordings are annotated with GPS data and digitally stored in an on-board geographical database. Data and digital images are presented integrated with an electronic nautical chart data base and also correlated with the mission report, all at the operator’s finger-tips. All information from the mission is saved and can be compiled in mission reports and sent via the satellite data-link to a command center and/or cooperating units.

Since the technology was first launched in the 1970s, its capabilities have continually expanded. “With the MSS 5000, which we launched in the 1990s, we were able to do things we could only dream of in the 1970s,” says Colliander, from the manufacturing company. “The MSS 6000 does things we didn’t even dream of.

“We can safely say that we give a better performance than military surveillance systems at a fraction of the cost. We’re now exploring what the advent of broadband communications enables us to do. We’ve put a lot of effort into developing software for the man/machine interface. We have kept the system user-friendly and intuitive: one operator can handle it all.”

One of the MSS 6000’s capabilities is to read a ship’s name at a distance of 10 nautical miles in the middle of the night. This makes it an important weapon in combating illegal fishing – cheating occurs frequently with the transponders on fishing vessels, so being able covertly to read ships’ names provides an important means of checking their true identity.

FEATURES

Search radar

A search radar can be added to the system for general surveillance. The MSS 6000 is designed to interface to a forward looking or 360 degrees search radar for importing target tracks into the tactical map database.

SLAR

The Side Looking Airborne Radar

The main sensor of the MSS is the Side-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR): a mapping radar for surveillance of large sea surfaces.

The forward motion of the aircraft is utilized by the radar to scan the sea surface perpendicular to the flight track

Whereas a traditional radar typically obtains less than twenty echoes per radar scan from each target, the SLAR obtains up to a thousand. This gives a very high capacity for detecting small targets as well as for showing sea surface properties. Oil floating on the sea surface has a dampening effect on the sea clutter (capillary waves) resulting in less radar return to the aircraft from an oil slick than from the surrounding, undisturbed water surface, and this contrast is clearly visible in the SLAR image.

Objects with higher reflectivity to radar pulses than the sea surface will instead give a more intense radar return, and the resulting image will therefore show not only oil spills but also ships, boats and other small objects against a background picture of the sea surface.

Thus the SLAR is the ideal sensor for large area surveillance for both oils pollution and very small vessels, target types that are difficult at best, and often impossible, to detect with traditional radar technology.

The SLAR is a day and night sensor. It can be operated under all weather conditions.

MSS 6000 provides for GPS accuracy in positioning the SLAR image and will present the image either superimposed on a backdrop digital chart or display it as a traditional "scrolling waterfall".

IR/UV SCANNER

The Infrared/Ultraviolet (IR/UV) Line Scanner is used to obtain high resolution imagery of ship wakes, accident sites etc. It is ideal for mapping oil spills and other types of pollution, as well as other types of hydrological phenomena such as upwelling warmer/colder water .



The Infrared/Ultraviolet (IR/UV) Line Scanner is used to obtain high resolution imagery of accident sites etc. It is capable of observing minute temperature differences on the water surface and is ideal for mapping oil spills and other types of pollution, as well as other types of hydrological phenomena such as upwelling warmer/colder water .

The IR/UV scanner, operating in the 8.5-12.5µm region (IR) and in the 0.32-0.38 µm region (UV), provides high resolution imagery of oil spills and other features on the surface. IR data can be obtained both day and night providing information on the spreading of oil and also indicating the relative oil thickness within the oil slick. Usually 80% of the oil is concentrated within less than 20% of the visual oil slick. By using the IR information, the efficiency of clean-up operations can be greatly improved.

UV data is obtained during daylight conditions, and is primarily used to map the entire extent of an oil slick, irrespective of thickness. The UV data adds confidence to the IR registration by distinguishing between natural thermal phenomena, such as cold upwelling water, from suspected oil pollution. It also assists an on-scene commander in determining the location of the thicker parts an oil spill, thus adding to the efficiency of the clean-up operation.

The MSS 6000 will infterface to any IR/UV line scanner on the market.

MSS 6000 provides for GPS accuracy and the capability to either superimpose the IR and UV images on a backdrop digital chart or to display the images as a traditional "scrolling waterfall".

The information from the aircraft can be used as input to oil drift modelling, thus further enhancing the aircraft as an asset in your oil spill contingency planning.

SSC CAMERA AND VIDEO CAMERA

The MSS 6000 still and video cameras provide digital imagery and video documentation. Each frame is annotated with relevant mission information for future, tamper-free reference. The built-in DGPS system provides accurate and consistent annotation of all MSS 6000 observations.

The MSS 6000 assists the operator in keeping track of all exposures made with the still camera and video sequence registered with the video camera by logging the time and position of each exposure and displaying this information in a selectable digital map overlay. Imagery and other information are linked to the geographical position and to the operator's comment, thus creating a comprehensive folder of data to document an observed activity on the sea surface.

Video recordings can be made from the FLIR(Forward Looking Infrared) as well as from the handheld video camera to allow close-up documentation of activities on the sea surface. The video is stored digitally and can be reviewed either in the aircraft or on the ground. Video sequences or selected frames can also be transmitted over the data link.

AIS - AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM

A (normally silent) airborne AIS transponder is integrated with the MSS 6000 system.

The AIS receives identity information from all transponder equipped ships with VHF distance in the patrol area. Live AIS information is displayed on the MSS 6000 map display and logged in the built-in target database. The possibility for the operator to immediatly compare AIS information with target information acquired from other sensors, will greatly facilitate the control of all sea surface activities within the patrol area.

AIS contacts plotted on a patrol of the St. Lawrence inlet (Courtesy Transport Canada)

FLIR /EO-SENSOR

Forward Looking Infrared-/Electro-Optical Sensor

A FLIR is an indispensable supplementary sensor for most mission profiles. It will add day and night identification and documentation capability to complement the information gathered from other on-board or external sources.

The FLIR is integrated into the surveillance system. Imagery from the FLIR is annotated and stored together with the all other mission data. The FLIR can also be slaved to any target position or geographical reference in the MSS 6000 database as selected by the operator, thus facilitating the sorting and identification of targets detected by other means.
Most FLIRs in the market can be integrated to the MSS 6000 system. The pictures show the Wescam MX-16 gyro estabilised sensor,the FLIR systems, the EuroFLIR 350 and the Star Q sensor.

MWR - THE MICROWAVE RADIOMETER

If oil pollution control is one of your main missions, the Microwave Radiometer may provide valuable information to assist in the combating effort.

The SLAR will map the area of the oil slick. Once the slick is detected, the extension and distribution of the oil within the slick is assessed with the IR/UV scanner.Examples of Infrared and Microwave Radiometer registrations
of an oil spill.

LFS - LASER FLOUROSENSOR

If pollution control is one of your main missions, the Laser Fluorosensor System may provide valuable information to assist in the combating effort.

The SLAR will detect and map the extent of an oil spill on the sea surface. Once the slick is detected, the extension and distribution of the oil within the slick is assessed with the IR/UV scanner. The Microwave Radiometer will measure the thickness and thusgive a better estimate of the volume of the spill.The Laser Fluorosensor can be said to take a "finger print" of some of the properties of the surface beneath the aircraft

A deeper analysis of the oil pollution is achieved from the Laser Fluorosensor. Its sensitivity to very thin oil films on the water surface, makes this sensor an interesting addition to the sensor package. Apart from the pollution related applications this instrument can also be used for hydrographical measurements and for algae monitoring.

The LFS-light can assist the operator in distinguishing between oil and other substances and to analyze the optical signature of different oil types which has been assembled from a catalogue of the optical properties of different oils from laboratory investigations.

On request a laser fluorosensor can be integrated into the MSS 6000 system.

ATCOM - SATELLITE COMMUNICATION

For real-time in-flight data communication a SATCOM system is integrated with the MSS. With a high-speed SATCOM link the mission report with images and tactical map snapshots captured during the mission can be delivered while in the air or by e-mail or mobile phone after landing. With a low-speed SATCOM link only short messages with information of position and properties of observed activities on the sea surface will be delivered while in the air and mission report and pictures will follow by e-mail or mobile phone data transferred after landing. The recorded mission can also be replayed after landing in the aircraft or on a ground station.

High-speed satellite communications is integrated in the MSS 6000 system for real-time information to other units in the surveillance operation.

VMS - VESSEL MONITORING SYSTEM

The integrated Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) functionality provides a possibility to upload information on fishing vessels from the national fisheries authority to be accessed together with other mission data.

DF - DIRECTION FINDER

The Direction Finder (DF) functionality provides direction information on radio transmitters, including the 406 MHz emergency frequency and decoding of COSPAS/SARSAT data.

MSS 6000 OPERATOR WORK STATION

The MSS 6000 operator workstation is innovatibly and ergonomically designed; from his or her seat, the operator has access to all system functionality.

The MSS design allows for more than one operator workstation on board the aircraft, each with configurable functionality. Thus the work distribution between the operators may be configured to maximize mission effectiveness, according to the requirements of the customer organization.

MISSION COMMAND CENTRE - MCC

With the Mission Command Centre SSC has developed a new addition to its maritime surveillance concept.

he MCC in command mode showing the tactical map.

The first complete MCC will be delivered together with three MSS 6000 equipped aircraft to the Vietnam Marine Police.

The MCC provides an exquisite tool for the Mission Command to plan, follow, analyze and archive the missions of all flying units.

In the MCC the mission is prepared before flight and followed and managed from the ground in real time during the flight.

The MCC displays the flight track of all flying units on the tactical map. It receives data from the aircraft including position, updates, incident reports, AIS and target information, images and streaming video. The incoming data is shown on a digital map in the MCC to give an overview of the situation. From the MCC further instructions can be issued to the aircraft in real time on how to proceed with the mission.

All mission information is stored in a database from where it can be analyzed processed. Using the filter functions and background databases, important information about ship movements and the identity and activity of observed vessels can be easily visualized on the screen.

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Actually, with the 3 C-212 planes (soon to be 6) and the 3 DH-6 planes of the marine patrol version, VN has a basic, but decent marine patrol capability. Its not like the big marine patrol / ASW planes but its quite decent and cheap to operate, specially for coast guard needs. Those planes are small but they pack some serious hardware, particularly the C-212 with the MSS system which is very sophisticated and for many applications is as good as the big marine patrol planes, even better in some aspects and it also provides a basic AWACS capability.

Obviously the next step would be the C-295 MPA / ASW version (or the P-3C Orion), hopefully soon.

 

[Viet]

Is there any details about the TT-1500 (1,500 tons)?

can´t find the number. here is the full article on the website of the Vietnam Coast Guard. I could make a brief translation later.

Cảnh sát biển Việt Nam

Phát triển, hiện đại hóa trang bị cho Cảnh sát biển, đáp ứng yêu cầu nhiệm vụ trong tình hình mới

17:12 | 09/11/2015
(Canhsatbien.vn) - Là một trong những lực lượng được xác định xây dựng tiến thẳng lên hiện đại, Cảnh sát biển Việt Nam đã, đang và sẽ tiếp tục được đầu tư để phát triển toàn diện, đặc biệt là về phương tiện, vũ khí trang bị kỹ thuật nhằm tăng cường khả năng hoạt động xa bờ, đáp ứng yêu cầu quản lý vùng biển nhanh chóng, chính xác, hiệu quả trong tình hình mới.

Colonel Nguyen Van Hung

Thực hiện Nghị quyết Đại hội Đảng bộ Quân đội lần thứ IX về xây dựng Quân đội từng bước tiến lên hiện đại, trong đó có một số lực lượng tiến thẳng lên hiện đại, những năm vừa qua, cùng với một số lực lượng khác trong Quân đội, Cảnh sát biển đã được Đảng, Nhà nước, Quân ủy Trung ương, BQP quan tâm, đầu tư mua sắm, đưa vào biên chế nhiều phương tiện tàu thuyền, máy bay, xe, máy, vũ khí trang bị kỹ thuật (VKTBKT) mới, hiện đại, có giá trị lớn. Hiện, toàn lực lượng đã có trên 70 tàu xuồng các loại, 03 máy bay tuần thám, hơn 100 xe ô tô cùng VKTBKT và các trang thiết bị phục vụ chuyên ngành trinh sát, phòng chống tội phạm ma túy khác. Đặc biệt, gần đây được trang bị thêm một số tàu hiện đại, có lượng giãn nước lớn, đủ sức hoạt động ở các vùng biển xa như tàu DN-2000, tàu TK-3500CV,…

Thủ trưởng Bộ Quốc phòng, BTL Cảnh sát biển tham quan hệ thống điều khiển hiện đại tadu CSB 8002. (ảnh: Liên Nhâm)

Tuy nhiên, xuất phát từ chức năng, nhiệm vụ của Lực lượng CSB: Là nòng cốt trong bảo vệ chủ quyền, thực thi pháp luật, TKCN trên tất cả các vùng biển, thềm lục địa của Tổ quốc; Xuất phát từ diễn biến ngày càng phức tạp trên biển, đặt ra yêu cầu, nhiệm vụ ngày càng nặng nề hơn, đa dạng hơn cho Lực lượng CSB.

Mặc dù đã được đầu tư phát triển mạnh mẽ trong thời gian vừa qua, song số lượng tàu thuyền, xe - máy, VKTBKT của Lực lượng CSB hiện nay vẫn chưa đủ để đáp ứng yêu cầu nhiệm vụ. Tình hình trên biển lại luôn diễn biến phức tạp cả về vấn đề an ninh truyền thống và an ninh phi truyền thống với những nguyên nhân khác nhau. Từ thực tiễn thực hiện nhiệm vụ trên biển và đấu tranh bảo vệ chủ quyền trên vùng biển Hoàng Sa của Việt Nam năm 2014 cho thấy, Lực lượng CSB VN rất cần thiết phải có nhiều tàu lớn có sức cơ động cao với trang bị vũ khí, hệ thống tiếp nhận và xử lý thông tin tiên tiến, hiện đại, có tích hợp điện tử và tự động hóa cao.

Cùng với đó, năm 2014, Thủ tướng Chính phủ đã phê duyệt Đề án xây dựng Lực lượng CSB VN đến năm 2020 và những năm tiếp theo với mục tiêu: “Xây dựng Lực lượng CSB hiện đại chuyên nghiệp, tổ chức biên chế hợp lý, tinh gọn, trang bị đồng bộ đáp ứng yêu cầu nhiệm vụ bảo vệ chủ quyền, thực thi pháp luật trên biển và hợp tác quốc tế; làm cơ sở để xây dựng hoàn chỉnh Lực lượng CSB VN trong những năm tiếp theo”. Nghị quyết Đại hội Đảng bộ Quân đội lần thứ X, nhiệm kỳ 2015-2020 cũng đã xác định chủ trương xây dựng Lực lượng Cảnh sát biển tiến thẳng lên hiện đại nhằm đáp ứng yêu cầu quản lý, bảo vệ vùng biển trong tình hình mới.

Mặt khác, hiện nay chúng ta đang thực hiện chủ trương xây dựng các Lực lượng Hải quân, Phòng không - không quân, Thông tin, Tác chiến điện tử tiến thẳng lên hiện đại. Đây là các lực lượng mà khi có tình huống cao thì Lực lượng CSB hoặc phải phối thuộc, hoặc phải phối hợp hiệp đồng. Do vậy, nếu CSB không hiện đại thì khả năng hiệp đồng sẽ không đảm bảo được tính đồng bộ và hiệu quả; Sự chuyển hóa từ nhiệm vụ thực thi pháp luật trong thời bình sang nhiệm vụ tác chiến trong thời chiến sẽ không đảm bảo được tính kịp thời, nhanh chóng và chính xác.

Từ những yêu cầu thực tiễn trên cho thấy sự cần thiết phải nhanh chóng hiện đại hóa Lực lượng CSB, trong đó hiện đại hóa trang bị là nội dung cơ bản. Chỉ có hiện đại hóa trang bị, phương tiện mới có đủ khả năng vươn khơi xa và dài ngày để thực hiện tốt chức năng, nhiệm vụ được giao.

Phương hướng hiện đại hóa trang bị cho Lực lượng CSB VN

Để xây dựng Lực lượng CSB tiến thẳng lên hiện đại trong tình hình hiện nay, Đảng ủy, Thủ trưởng Bộ Tư lệnh cũng như Thủ trưởng Cục Kỹ thuật nhận thức rõ: hiện đại phải quán triệt tinh thần 3 khâu đột phá, đó là: đột phá hiện đại về mặt tổ chức, tinh gọn và cân đối; đột phá hiện đại về mặt con người: làm chủ được trang bị hiện đại; hiện đại để phòng thủ, bảo vệ Tổ quốc và kịp thời xử lý hiệu quả các tình huống chứ không để phô trương hay chạy đua vũ trang. Khi hiện đại hóa trang bị phải coi trọng việc đồng bộ theo chủng loại giữa các lực lượng được hiện đại; nhất là các trang bị liên quan đến thông tin, trinh sát, chỉ thị mục tiêu, sử dụng trong chiến thuật tác chiến… có như vậy mới phát huy được hiệu quả của trang bị hiện đại và sức mạnh của VKTBKT trong hiệp đồng tác chiến quân binh chủng; bảo đảm khoa học và tiết kiệm.

Hiện đại hóa trang bị phải được tiến hành song song với xây dựng ngành Kỹ thuật chính quy; phát huy tính tích cực chủ động, sáng tạo, tự lực, tự cường, làm chủ VKTBKT và công nghệ. Ngoài việc giữ gìn, bảo quản, cải tiến có chọn lọc phương tiện, VKTBKT hiện có, cần thiết phải đầu tư đóng mới, mua sắm tàu thuyền, VKTBKT hiện đại, đó là:

- Tăng cường đóng mới tàu thuyền có lượng giãn nước lớn, có hàm lượng công nghệ và sức cơ động cao, có khả năng hoạt động dài ngày trên biển trong điều kiện thời tiết phức tạp và trước nguy cơ thường xuyên bị đâm húc của các tàu lớn nước ngoài khi đấu tranh bảo vệ chủ quyền); tính chất hoạt động đa năng (vừa tuần tra kiểm soát vừa có thể tham gia TKCN, bảo vệ môi trường biển…); có sàn đỗ máy bay,...

- Vũ khí, trang thiết bị: từ hệ thống động lực, thiết bị điều khiển, trang thiết bị khí tài điện tử, vũ khí đến các thiết bị thông tin, ghi hình, truyền dữ liệu… đưa vào lắp đặt trên tàu phải hiện đại, đồng thời đáp ứng các yêu cầu gọn nhẹ, khả năng cơ động cao, trình độ tự động và độ chính xác cao, chuyển hóa linh hoạt trong tác chiến, có uy lực lớn, có nhiều hàm lượng KH-CN, bảo đảm hoạt động trong mọi điều kiện.

- Bảo đảm các hoạt động chỉ huy, chỉ đạo, tác chiến, trinh sát được thống nhất, đồng bộ, nhanh chóng, liên tục, bí mật, an toàn, ổn định, vững chắc trong mọi tình huống. Bảo đảm hoạt động đồng bộ bờ - tàu, tàu - tàu, tàu - máy bay, làm cơ sở để chỉ đạo từ Sở chỉ huy đến các lực lượng; bảo đảm công tác phối hợp hiệp đồng giữa các đơn vị hiệp đồng, các phương tiện xe - máy và đảm bảo việc thu thập dữ liệu làm bằng chứng trong đấu tranh chống vi phạm tội phạm trên biển cũng như đấu tranh pháp lý, chính trị, ngoại giao để bảo vệ chủ quyền biển đảo.

- Đầu tư mua sắm trang thiết bị hiện đại phục vụ cho các hoạt động nghiệp vụ CSB (trinh sát, phòng chống tội phạm, vi phạm), các thiết bị phân tích, đánh giá chất lượng hàng hóa để bảo đảm cho hoạt động nghiệp vụ hiệu quả và phục vụ công tác điều tra, chống buôn lậu.

Theo Đề án Xây dựng Lực lượng CSB VN đã được Thủ tướng Chính phủ phê duyệt năm 2014, từ nay đến năm 2020, Lực lượng CSB sẽ được đầu tư đóng mới thêm hàng chục tàu thuyền các loại, trong đó có tàu DN-4000, DN-2000, TT-1500, TT-400, tàu dầu 1000 tấn, tàu tìm kiếm cứu nạn xa bờ (tàu SAR)…Về mua sắm trang bị, sắp tới tiếp tục mua thêm máy bay CASA-212, máy bay trực thăng cùng nhiều trang thiết bị chuyên ngành khác của các khối Tham mưu, Chính trị, Hậu cần, Kỹ thuật, Nghiệp vụ, Quan hệ quốc tế…

Với số lượng phương tiện, tàu thuyền, máy bay, VKTBKT hiện đại được đầu tư, mua sắm, trang bị theo đúng yêu cầu chỉ tiêu, tiến độ của Đề án sẽ đảm bảo cho Lực lượng CSB hoàn thành tốt hơn nữa nhiệm vụ được giao, nâng cao hiệu quả quản lý vùng biển thuộc chủ quyền của đất nước.

Hạ thủy tàu CSB 9004. (ảnh: Anh Tuấn)

Một số nội dung cần thiết để thực hiện hiện đại hóa Lực lượng CSB

Trên cơ sở phát triển, hiện đại hóa về phương tiện trang bị cho CSB theo Đề án Xây dựng LL CSB VN đến năm 2020 và những năm tiếp theo, để có được những bước đi vững chắc nhằm hiện đại hóa lực lượng cả về con người và trang bị, cần song song triển khai thực hiện một số nội dung, yêu cầu sau:

Một là, làm tốt công tác quy hoạch trang bị, đóng mới, mua sắm tàu thuyền, máy bay, VKTBKT hiện đại. Lựa chọn đối tác đóng tàu đủ năng lực cung cấp các trang thiết bị hiện đại, phù hợp, đáp ứng yêu cầu đóng tàu về cả chất lượng, tiến độ. Song song với việc lựa chọn các trang bị kỹ thuật hiện đại là chuyển giao công nghệ để nâng cao khả năng làm chủ (sửa chữa, khôi phục, cải tiến, cải hoán,...) VKTBKT.

Hai là, quan tâm xây dựng nguồn nhân lực, con người hiện đại: có đủ bản lĩnh; đủ năng lực chỉ huy, chỉ đạo và trình độ chuyên môn nghiệp vụ vững vàng để quản lý, khai thác, làm chủ các loại VKTBKT hiện đại, đáp ứng yêu cầu nhiệm vụ trong mọi tình huống. Quan tâm đến công tác tuyển chọn đội ngũ cán bộ, nhân viên kỹ thuật: có đủ số lượng, đủ cơ cấu ngành nghề. Quan tâm đến công tác đào tạo, huấn luyện, bồi dưỡng đội ngũ cán bộ, nhân viên kỹ thuật: Cả trình độ chỉ huy, quản lý, trình độ chuyên môn nghiệp vụ; tăng cường đột phá vào công tác huấn luyện, chuyển giao công nghệ từ khi triển khai đóng mới tàu hay tiếp nhận trang bị mới; trong đó trọng tâm là đội ngũ cán bộ, nhân viên trực tiếp khai thác, sử dụng VKTBKT; tăng cường các hội thi, hội thao thực sự có chất lượng, hiệu quả, nhằm thúc đẩy phong trào huấn luyện tại đơn vị, phấn đấu làm chủ VKTBKT trong cả tình huống khó khăn phức tạp nhất.

Ba là, đầu tư xây dựng cơ sở bảo đảm kỹ thuật hiện đại và tạo nguồn vật tư dự trữ đầy đủ. Đầu tư xây dựng các trạm sửa chữa tổng hợp hiện đại tại các BTL Vùng CSB và các Hải đội đóng quân độc lập (có đủ trang thiết bị công nghệ, quy trình công nghệ, chuyên gia kỹ thuật, vật tư phụ tùng dự phòng thay thế) nhằm nâng cao năng lực tự bảo đảm cho các đơn vị, đáp ứng yêu cầu bảo quản, bảo dưỡng và sửa chữa cấp hàng hải. Xây dựng kho kỹ thuật tại cơ quan, đơn vị có khả năng cất chứa đa dạng chủng loại vật tư, số lượng lớn, bảo đảm kịp thời. Tạo nguồn vật tư kỹ thuật; ZIP dự trữ tàu, bờ bảo đảm cho thực hiện nhiệm vụ thường xuyên và các tình huống cao, đột xuất, đòi hỏi lượng vật tư thay thế lớn. Trong đó có cả lượng vật tư dự trữ quốc gia, vật tư dự trữ cấp chiến lược (của BTL CSB bố trí tại các đơn vị) và vật tư dự trữ thường xuyên.

Bốn là, đẩy mạnh hoạt động khoa học công nghệ, các đề tài nghiên cứu, sáng kiến cải tiến kỹ thuật sâu rộng trong toàn lực lượng, tạo ra nhiều sản phẩm thiết thực, ứng dụng có hiệu quả trong công tác bảo đảm kỹ thuật và ứng dụng mạnh mẽ CNTT trong công tác quản lý, chỉ đạo, điều hành các hoạt động CTKT.

Năm là, thực hiện mạnh mẽ, có chiều sâu về “Xây dựng nền nếp chính quy kỹ thuật và làm chủ VKTBKT”.

Sáu là, phát huy nội lực, đồng thời tăng cường các mối quan hệ tạo cơ chế phối hợp, hiệp đồng với các lực lượng có liên quan, các nhà máy, xí nghiệp sửa chữa, các hãng cung cấp thiết bị để kịp thời bảo đảm vật tư kỹ thuật, sửa chữa VKTBKT trong thời gian ngắn nhất, hiệu quả nhất, bảo đảm phương tiện tàu thuyền luôn sẵn sàng thực hiện nhiệm vụ trong mọi tình huống.

Bảy là, tăng cường công tác dự báo tình huống nhằm nâng cao khả năng xử lý, xử trí các tình huống, đồng thời đảm bảo công tác chuẩn bị mọi mặt đầy đủ (về tạo nguồn vật tư dự trữ, phương thức bảo đảm,... ) để không bị động bất ngờ, không gián đoạn công tác bảo đảm trong bất kỳ tình huống nào.

Tóm lại, để đáp ứng yêu cầu nhiệm vụ trong tình hình mới, thì việc hiện đại hóa phương tiện, trang bị cho Cảnh sát biển là đòi hỏi khách quan và tất yếu. Hiện đại hóa phương tiện, trang bị không chỉ đầu tư phát triển trang bị hiện đại mà cùng với đó là đầu tư phát triển nguồn lực con người, cơ sở vật chất bảo đảm và cơ chế hoạt động phù hợp mới đáp ứng được yêu cầu khai thác, làm chủ VKTBKT, góp phần hoàn thành chức năng, nhiệm vụ được giao trong mọi tình huống.

 

[Aqsuperman]

Su 30 with missiles , probably a R-27 variant

 

[Viet]

Type 53/65 torp with 530mm warhead

when the last sub is delivered this year, the Navy should buy the complete production line of the Kilo from Russia (given, they sell it), so we can self assemble as many as submarines as we want.

 

[yugocrosrb95]

 

[Aqsuperman]

when the last sub is delivered this year, the Navy should buy the complete production line of the Kilo from Russia (given, they sell it), so we can self assemble as many as submarines as we want.

Hopeful but highly unlikely We lack both the capacity and the quality workforce to do that , not to mention the investment required to put up the line then the time to produce ones with inexperienced worker that usuallys only deal with surface boat and alike . The Molniya class and even the TT 400 TP that we currently produce still need considerble Russia assistance , imagine what would happen with submarine . For the technology transfer i prefer the P-800 and missiles technology , of course we should also get as many as we can about boat technology but to complete a submarine is a bit hard and uneconomical in this "urgent time"

More coming :3

 

[Viet]

I think, it´s a well written report from Stratfor, analyzing the internal debate within the leadership of Vietnam and how the country responses to the actual geopolical challenges. some points are wellknown, written and published in other media. however I notice one major point in the article that was not known before: "Most alarming to China is Vietnam's growing acceptance of the resurgent Japanese navy, with Hanoi agreeing in November 2015 to construct new port facilities ahead of a Japanese port call, foreshadowing long-term cooperation." our japanese friend @Nihonjin1051 may be interested of the news.



Vietnam: Cautious, but Unpredictable in a Crisis

January 12, 2016 | 09:31 GMT
Stratfor


Vietnamese leaders, including Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, President Truong Tan Sang and Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, on Oct. 20, 2015. (STR/AFP/Getty Images)


Forecast

• Vietnam will continue to integrate with the global economy and pursue security cooperation with Russia, India and its Southeast Asian neighbors.
• The country's imperatives, aligned with those of the Communist Party, will prevent a wholehearted embrace of the United States.
• Divisions within the party will limit Vietnam's ties with China, risking indecision during any short, sharp crises in the South China Sea.

Analysis

The past two decades brought about sweeping changes in Southeast Asia — no country knows this better than Vietnam. Much like China, a strongly centralized Communist Party rules Vietnam, and from Jan. 20 to Jan. 28 the party will gather for its national congress. Held every five years, this Communist assembly will select a new general secretary, Politburo and Central Committee. But rather than being progressive, in many ways, this leadership transition will simply solidify the country's existing strategic configuration.

The party intent is to publicly display a consensus on Vietnam's path over the next five years. However, the plenum will serve to showcase the enduring rifts that exist between competing factions, divided when it comes to Vietnam's future. One of the main disagreements centers on Hanoi's contentious but indispensable relationship with Beijing. Such divisions have prevented an orderly succession plan from taking shape ahead of the plenum and point to a longer-term breakdown in unity if matters cannot be resolved. Geopolitically speaking, Vietnam's imperatives — coupled with the Communist Party's own internal logic — mean the country will not become dramatically more antagonistic toward China: But neither will it wholeheartedly embrace the United States.


Vietnam's Geographic Challenge

Hanoi's core strategy is one of balance. Internally, the party needs to achieve harmony among its competing political factions. Externally, it seeks to avoid an overreliance on any single foreign power. This strategic outlook is shaped by Vietnam's history of conflict, not only with Asian countries such as China but with Western powers as well. There are also two distinctly modern factors at play. First, the Vietnamese Communist Party is attempting to maintain its power during a time of rapid economic liberalization and social change, and it fears reopening the historical regional fractures that split the country in the past century. Second, Vietnam is embroiled in a regional dispute with China over the South China Sea. Hanoi's involvement in the maritime quarrel is complicated: It does not want to concede territory, but Vietnam's military is comparatively weaker, and its economy is heavily reliant on Chinese trade and investment. These factors feed into one another — the country's lack of external balance threatens the party's internal equilibrium, risking policy incoherence and paralysis.


The East-West Divide

After the United States pulled its troops out of Vietnam in 1975, diplomatic relations between the two countries have been inconsistent. With the West out of the picture, Vietnam went on to repeatedly clash with China in the decade following the U.S. withdrawal. Hanoi's forces fought against Chinese Khmer Rouge proxies in Cambodia in 1979, though a direct confrontation did not occur until 1988, when a naval skirmish in the South China Sea ended badly for the Vietnamese. This recent history still colors Hanoi's outlook today. When Soviet aid dried up in the final days of the Cold War, Vietnam recognized the need to integrate with international markets and the importance of attracting foreign investment. Hanoi was divided when it came to accepting its Cold War foes.

With a U.S. trade embargo in place, normalization with China came first in 1991, empowering the Vietnamese Communist Party's mostly northern conservative blocs, which favored continued hostility toward the West. Despite this, Washington and Hanoi eventually normalized relations in 1995. Beijing's repeated efforts to insert oil rigs into contested waters have given U.S.-Vietnamese relations an unexpected boost.

However, the country has never been one for unanimity. Today, Vietnam's senior leadership can be roughly divided into three broad camps: pro-West reformists, led by the powerful Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung; pro-China conservatives, led by current Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong; and a relatively moderate wing of improvers led by President Truong Tan Sang. For much of Prime Minister Dung's 10 years in office, the clout of the reformist wing has surged, bolstered by the economic heft of the south. And its emphasis on statecraft over socialist ideology is believed to match the prevailing mood in the party's 175-person Central Committee.

During Vietnam's 2014 oil rig standoff with China, the charismatic prime minister took a more nationalist stance than many of his counterparts, which appealed to the public. Dung also emerged relatively unscathed following two attempts to remove him from office with a no confidence vote in the Central Committee (engineered by the pro-China camp, first in 2012 and again last January). Dung also gained substantial support from the conservative military elite through his military modernization drive, which led Vietnam to develop one of Southeast Asia's strongest maritime and missile capabilities, thanks to help from Russia. Though the 66-year-old is technically required to retire if he plans to pursue the general secretary post, Dung is expected to seek an exemption similar to the one granted to Trong in 2011. The pro-China camp has no comparably strong candidate.


Vietnam's Embrace of the West

If Dung or one of his reformist allies takes the top spot at the head of the party, it would further confirm Vietnam's ongoing shift to the West. However, Vietnam's strategic direction over the next five years will not significantly hinge on individuals. For example, the party's draft Political Report and Socio-Economic Plan for 2016-2020 — composed by party reformists and conservatives alike and expected to be ratified at the upcoming congress — makes Western integration a major priority.

Even under Trong's guidance as general secretary, the Vietnamese Communist Party has signed off on a number of significant measures, including World Trade Organization accession in 2007. Trong himself made a landmark visit to Washington last summer and Hanoi's willingness to stay the course through contentious negotiations over the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership speaks volumes. Vietnam is positioned to benefit greatly from the 12-nation trade pact, but the deal, along with the free trade agreement it signed with the European Union last month, is not without risk for Hanoi. Implementation requires the party to relinquish some degree of control over the country's delicate economic liberalization process.

This could lead to contentious regulatory overhauls and labor reforms. Some of these measures, in addition to opening Vietnamese industries to global competition, will threaten the direct interests of the country's dominant and largely autonomous state-owned enterprises, whose influence is interwoven with party patronage networks. Yet, Hanoi would not have stuck through the negotiations if it were not relatively united on the overriding imperative to diversify away from Chinese investors.

Meanwhile, China's push into the South China Sea has compelled Vietnam to strengthen defense ties with a range of other partners. Most alarming to China is Vietnam's growing acceptance of the resurgent Japanese navy, with Hanoi agreeing in November 2015 to construct new port facilities ahead of a Japanese port call, foreshadowing long-term cooperation. International economic integration, along with greater security cooperation with outside powers such as Japan, India and the United States, will be a core focus for Vietnam's future leaders, regardless of who is in charge.


Caution and Consensus

Nonetheless, in military matters and in trade, Hanoi will move carefully to keep its strategic options open and avoid an overreliance on any single outside power. Greater economic integration with the rest of the world will not fully offset Vietnam's heavy dependence on the Chinese economy, and the Communist Party will not risk provoking a breakdown in relations with China that disrupts its economic trajectory, thereby fomenting popular discontent.

Militarily, Vietnam needs outside help. Hanoi will accept assistance, too, but it remains wary of serving as a battleground for great competing powers — lingering memories of the Cold War run deep. In a 2014 speech, Dung himself lambasted U.S. imperialism. Japan and South Korea's recent deal over the treatment of wartime "comfort women" more than 70 years ago highlights how long such issues can remain politically volatile. Regardless of how Hanoi views China's pursuit of its territorial claims, Vietnam will avoid provoking a prolonged military standoff with the Chinese — or provide the United States a base from which to do the same. In fact, Hanoi will prefer to look beyond the United States and China for support, bolstering existing partnerships with countries that do not carry the threat of domination, namely India, Russia and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Ultimately, though, only the United States is capable of maintaining the status quo in the South China Sea and of ensuring Vietnamese territorial integrity.

Caution is reflected in the party leadership's emphasis on internal factional balance, which best serves its desire for geopolitical flexibility — and its mandate to maintain rule in a fractious country. And the party has proved capable of navigating internal competition without breaking apart. A win by the reformist camp is therefore unlikely to bring about purges, as is often the way in single-party states.

Vietnam's curious dynamics limit the potential of an escalation in simmering hostility between Hanoi and Beijing, giving both sides space to defuse relatively common incidents such as last month's sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat, allegedly by a Chinese military vessel. But there is also the problem of political incoherence and paralysis, making Vietnam somewhat unpredictable in a future crisis and limiting its ability to forge a coherent policy on China in advance. This adds further uncertainty to the increasingly militarized environment in the South China Sea. Hanoi's main impulse today may be caution and consensus, but it is unclear how the party would maintain its internal balance in the face of intense nationalistic pressure — or how Hanoi would keep its options open if a great power conflict ever unfolds just off its shores.


Vietnam: Cautious, but Unpredictable in a Crisis

 

[Carlosa]

I think, it´s a well written report from Strator, analyzing the internal debate within the leadership of Vietnam and how the country responses to the actual geopolical challenges. some points are wellknown, written and published in other media. however I notice one major point in the article that was not known before: "Most alarming to China is Vietnam's growing acceptance of the resurgent Japanese navy, with Hanoi agreeing in November 2015 to construct new port facilities ahead of a Japanese port call, foreshadowing long-term cooperation." our japanese friend @Nihonjin1051 may be interested of the news.



Vietnam: Cautious, but Unpredictable in a Crisis

January 12, 2016 | 09:31 GMT
Stratfor


Vietnamese leaders, including Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, President Truong Tan Sang and Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, on Oct. 20, 2015. (STR/AFP/Getty Images)


Forecast

• Vietnam will continue to integrate with the global economy and pursue security cooperation with Russia, India and its Southeast Asian neighbors.
• The country's imperatives, aligned with those of the Communist Party, will prevent a wholehearted embrace of the United States.
• Divisions within the party will limit Vietnam's ties with China, risking indecision during any short, sharp crises in the South China Sea.

Analysis

The past two decades brought about sweeping changes in Southeast Asia — no country knows this better than Vietnam. Much like China, a strongly centralized Communist Party rules Vietnam, and from Jan. 20 to Jan. 28 the party will gather for its national congress. Held every five years, this Communist assembly will select a new general secretary, Politburo and Central Committee. But rather than being progressive, in many ways, this leadership transition will simply solidify the country's existing strategic configuration.

The party intent is to publicly display a consensus on Vietnam's path over the next five years. However, the plenum will serve to showcase the enduring rifts that exist between competing factions, divided when it comes to Vietnam's future. One of the main disagreements centers on Hanoi's contentious but indispensable relationship with Beijing. Such divisions have prevented an orderly succession plan from taking shape ahead of the plenum and point to a longer-term breakdown in unity if matters cannot be resolved. Geopolitically speaking, Vietnam's imperatives — coupled with the Communist Party's own internal logic — mean the country will not become dramatically more antagonistic toward China: But neither will it wholeheartedly embrace the United States.


Vietnam's Geographic Challenge

Hanoi's core strategy is one of balance. Internally, the party needs to achieve harmony among its competing political factions. Externally, it seeks to avoid an overreliance on any single foreign power. This strategic outlook is shaped by Vietnam's history of conflict, not only with Asian countries such as China but with Western powers as well. There are also two distinctly modern factors at play. First, the Vietnamese Communist Party is attempting to maintain its power during a time of rapid economic liberalization and social change, and it fears reopening the historical regional fractures that split the country in the past century. Second, Vietnam is embroiled in a regional dispute with China over the South China Sea. Hanoi's involvement in the maritime quarrel is complicated: It does not want to concede territory, but Vietnam's military is comparatively weaker, and its economy is heavily reliant on Chinese trade and investment. These factors feed into one another — the country's lack of external balance threatens the party's internal equilibrium, risking policy incoherence and paralysis.


The East-West Divide

After the United States pulled its troops out of Vietnam in 1975, diplomatic relations between the two countries have been inconsistent. With the West out of the picture, Vietnam went on to repeatedly clash with China in the decade following the U.S. withdrawal. Hanoi's forces fought against Chinese Khmer Rouge proxies in Cambodia in 1979, though a direct confrontation did not occur until 1988, when a naval skirmish in the South China Sea ended badly for the Vietnamese. This recent history still colors Hanoi's outlook today. When Soviet aid dried up in the final days of the Cold War, Vietnam recognized the need to integrate with international markets and the importance of attracting foreign investment. Hanoi was divided when it came to accepting its Cold War foes.

With a U.S. trade embargo in place, normalization with China came first in 1991, empowering the Vietnamese Communist Party's mostly northern conservative blocs, which favored continued hostility toward the West. Despite this, Washington and Hanoi eventually normalized relations in 1995. Beijing's repeated efforts to insert oil rigs into contested waters have given U.S.-Vietnamese relations an unexpected boost.

However, the country has never been one for unanimity. Today, Vietnam's senior leadership can be roughly divided into three broad camps: pro-West reformists, led by the powerful Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung; pro-China conservatives, led by current Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong; and a relatively moderate wing of improvers led by President Truong Tan Sang. For much of Prime Minister Dung's 10 years in office, the clout of the reformist wing has surged, bolstered by the economic heft of the south. And its emphasis on statecraft over socialist ideology is believed to match the prevailing mood in the party's 175-person Central Committee.

During Vietnam's 2014 oil rig standoff with China, the charismatic prime minister took a more nationalist stance than many of his counterparts, which appealed to the public. Dung also emerged relatively unscathed following two attempts to remove him from office with a no confidence vote in the Central Committee (engineered by the pro-China camp, first in 2012 and again last January). Dung also gained substantial support from the conservative military elite through his military modernization drive, which led Vietnam to develop one of Southeast Asia's strongest maritime and missile capabilities, thanks to help from Russia. Though the 66-year-old is technically required to retire if he plans to pursue the general secretary post, Dung is expected to seek an exemption similar to the one granted to Trong in 2011. The pro-China camp has no comparably strong candidate.


Vietnam's Embrace of the West

If Dung or one of his reformist allies takes the top spot at the head of the party, it would further confirm Vietnam's ongoing shift to the West. However, Vietnam's strategic direction over the next five years will not significantly hinge on individuals. For example, the party's draft Political Report and Socio-Economic Plan for 2016-2020 — composed by party reformists and conservatives alike and expected to be ratified at the upcoming congress — makes Western integration a major priority.

Even under Trong's guidance as general secretary, the Vietnamese Communist Party has signed off on a number of significant measures, including World Trade Organization accession in 2007. Trong himself made a landmark visit to Washington last summer and Hanoi's willingness to stay the course through contentious negotiations over the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership speaks volumes. Vietnam is positioned to benefit greatly from the 12-nation trade pact, but the deal, along with the free trade agreement it signed with the European Union last month, is not without risk for Hanoi. Implementation requires the party to relinquish some degree of control over the country's delicate economic liberalization process.

This could lead to contentious regulatory overhauls and labor reforms. Some of these measures, in addition to opening Vietnamese industries to global competition, will threaten the direct interests of the country's dominant and largely autonomous state-owned enterprises, whose influence is interwoven with party patronage networks. Yet, Hanoi would not have stuck through the negotiations if it were not relatively united on the overriding imperative to diversify away from Chinese investors.

Meanwhile, China's push into the South China Sea has compelled Vietnam to strengthen defense ties with a range of other partners. Most alarming to China is Vietnam's growing acceptance of the resurgent Japanese navy, with Hanoi agreeing in November 2015 to construct new port facilities ahead of a Japanese port call, foreshadowing long-term cooperation. International economic integration, along with greater security cooperation with outside powers such as Japan, India and the United States, will be a core focus for Vietnam's future leaders, regardless of who is in charge.


Caution and Consensus

Nonetheless, in military matters and in trade, Hanoi will move carefully to keep its strategic options open and avoid an overreliance on any single outside power. Greater economic integration with the rest of the world will not fully offset Vietnam's heavy dependence on the Chinese economy, and the Communist Party will not risk provoking a breakdown in relations with China that disrupts its economic trajectory, thereby fomenting popular discontent.

Militarily, Vietnam needs outside help. Hanoi will accept assistance, too, but it remains wary of serving as a battleground for great competing powers — lingering memories of the Cold War run deep. In a 2014 speech, Dung himself lambasted U.S. imperialism. Japan and South Korea's recent deal over the treatment of wartime "comfort women" more than 70 years ago highlights how long such issues can remain politically volatile. Regardless of how Hanoi views China's pursuit of its territorial claims, Vietnam will avoid provoking a prolonged military standoff with the Chinese — or provide the United States a base from which to do the same. In fact, Hanoi will prefer to look beyond the United States and China for support, bolstering existing partnerships with countries that do not carry the threat of domination, namely India, Russia and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Ultimately, though, only the United States is capable of maintaining the status quo in the South China Sea and of ensuring Vietnamese territorial integrity.

Caution is reflected in the party leadership's emphasis on internal factional balance, which best serves its desire for geopolitical flexibility — and its mandate to maintain rule in a fractious country. And the party has proved capable of navigating internal competition without breaking apart. A win by the reformist camp is therefore unlikely to bring about purges, as is often the way in single-party states.

Vietnam's curious dynamics limit the potential of an escalation in simmering hostility between Hanoi and Beijing, giving both sides space to defuse relatively common incidents such as last month's sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat, allegedly by a Chinese military vessel. But there is also the problem of political incoherence and paralysis, making Vietnam somewhat unpredictable in a future crisis and limiting its ability to forge a coherent policy on China in advance. This adds further uncertainty to the increasingly militarized environment in the South China Sea. Hanoi's main impulse today may be caution and consensus, but it is unclear how the party would maintain its internal balance in the face of intense nationalistic pressure — or how Hanoi would keep its options open if a great power conflict ever unfolds just off its shores.


Vietnam: Cautious, but Unpredictable in a Crisis

Good article. In about one week's time we'll know what faction has the upper hand for the top government positions and the politburo. The picture will become more clear at that point.

 

[Viet]

some more details of Vietnam first long range drone HS-6L:

it has a high resolution 2.38 million pixels camera on board, rotating 5-axis/5-sensor, auto zooming, capable identifying an object at a distance of 16.6 km, person identification at a distance of 9.7 km, face recognition of a distance of 1.5 km. besides, object distance measurement via laser beams, object details at a distance of 6.4 km.

navigation system Comin D/F

thermal sensor, real time images

no info about max flight altitude, but previous drones can reach altitude of 3,000 m, so we can expect this HS-6L model can reach more.

later models of the drones may be larger, having hard points to carry weapons.

 

[Viet]

on the way: the 5th Kilo sub recently surpassing South Africa, heading to the Indian Ocean before entering the SC Sea, with final destination: the cam ranh bay.

apropos cam ranh bay, japanese patrol aircraft (P-3C), returning from somalia mission, are expected to land taking fuel before flying home. from the news, new facilities at the bay will be built to accommodate japanese navy and airforce.

 

[Carlosa]

Vietnam's Plan to Deter China With Western Jets

Dave Majumdar
January 13, 2016

Vietnam's Plan to Deter China With Western Jets | The National Interest Blog

Vietnam is negotiating with American and European manufacturers to purchase new warplanes—including fighters, maritime patrol aircraft and unmanned aircraft. The move comes as part of Hanoi’s strategy to lessen its dependence on Russian hardware and to counter China’s growing power.

According to Reuter’s Siva Govindasamy, Vietnam has been in talks with contractors who build the Saab JAS-39E/F Gripen NG, Eurofighter Typhoon, Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon and the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. It’s also taken a hard look at Korea’s F/A-50 lightweight fighter—which was developed in cooperation with Lockheed.

Assuming Hanoi can reach a deal, Vietnam could buy up to a hundred combat aircraft to replace its antiquated fleet of 144 Mikoyan MiG-21 Fishbeds and thirty-eight Sukhoi Su-22 Fitter strike aircraft. The new aircraft would supplement Vietnam’s existing fleet of Russian-made Flanker air superiority fighters. Hanoi operates about a dozen original model Sukhoi Su-27 Flankers and thirty-two more modern Su-30MK2 Flankers with four more on order.

While Washington and Hanoi have been on better terms in recent years, with the U.S. defense secretary visiting the nation as recently as last June, buying an American combat aircraft might still be a bridge too far for Vietnam. The memories of the Vietnam War—which was much more devastating for Vietnam than for the United States—might mean that Hanoi will have reservations about dealing with American contractors. As such, a European warplane might have an edge. Indeed, Vietnam is known to have held fairly advanced discussions to buy the Typhoon, according to Reuters.

But Hanoi needs more than just fighters. Given its maritime disputes with Beijing, Vietnam needs maritime patrol aircraft and surveillance capabilities. The country has been talking to the Swedes about maritime patrol and airborne early warning variants of the Saab 340 or 2000 twin-engine turboprops, according to Reuters.

Vietnam has also discussed purchasing a maritime patrol version of the Airbus C-295, Lockheed’s Sea Hercules variant of the C-130 transport and a Boeing offering of a business jet fitted with much of the surveillance suite from the P-8 Poseidon. The Boeing offering would not include anti-submarine warfare capabilities however.

Hanoi is also looking for unmanned surveillance aircraft to help patrol its vast shoreline. However, no details are available on exactly what aircraft the country wants to buy. But as tensions with China look to continue unabated, Hanoi is almost certain to explore is options and, in doing so, start moving closer to Washington.

Dave Majumdar is the defense editor for the National Interest. You can follow him on Twitter: @davemajumdar.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/Tim Felce (Airwolfhound).