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Vietnam Defence Forum

If it just a toilet paper you can recommend your leader to take an exit door from ASEAN community and just don't try to talk with us when China and other countries trying to bullying you. Even when Myanmar joint ASEAN, Western Countries doesn't have any right to meddle in their junta business. ASEAN is not an defence organization or just an ordinary regional forum, ASEAN is a family organization which share the same goal to make harmonies and bring prosperities to ASEAN peoples.
Your tunnel vision with your false flagger can not recognize what going on around you? China wanted to take Vietnam and Japan first because the political geographic that china have to over come before taking the rest of Asian, Indonesia and other Asian nations are no that far away from china reach. Don't think what happen to Vietnam, Phillipines, and Japan doesn't effect you.
 
Kamov Ka-32T
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M1 Special Task Forces
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Molniya missile boat program
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Vietnam's South Chinese sea Garrison
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We will die for our country is to live
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Su-22M3 from the C21 Fighter Regiment.
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'Tank Buster' Over the Shoulder of Vietnam Navy


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Matador is a 90 mm (3.5 in) man-portable, disposable anti-armor weapon system (all photos : Phunu Today)

(PhunuToday) - Matador is a light anti-tank missiles in accordance with the task of protecting and occupying the island for the Vietnam Navy rating.

MATADOR was developed from the 2000s, to replace the outdated system ARMBRUST the Army payroll in the Republic of Singapore. After a series of memorandum and Development Cooperation light anti-tank weapons, the Republic of Singapore Army (SAF), Department of Science and Technology with 2 Singapore military defense industry corporations large Israeli Rafael and Dynamit have a project to develop a model rocket attacks shoulder to equip Guard Forces SAF and Israel.

MATADOR line of shoulder missiles kill light tank with bore sizes up to 90mm, using two types of warheads is HEAT standard attack and Hesh. This is a collaboration product from Singapore and Israel maintained military. The prototype of the missile system MATADOR shoulder of the Federal Republic of Germany ARMBRUST but is much improved and has made a remarkable mark in the anti-tank missile systems in the world shoulder.

MATADOR was developed from the 2000s, to replace the outdated system ARMBRUST the Army payroll in the Republic of Singapore. After a series of memorandum and Development Cooperation light anti-tank weapons, the Republic of Singapore Army (SAF), Department of Science and Technology with 2 Singapore military defense industry corporations large Israeli Rafael and Dynamit have a project to develop a model rocket attacks shoulder to equip Guard Forces SAF and Israel.

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In some types of anti-tank missiles and shoulder armor now, MATADOR small size, light weight yet loaded with ammunition is loaded is 8.9kg and 14.2kg while. However, not so soft that it was underestimated. MATADOR is considered nearly as strong shoulder missiles smart FMG-148 "Javelin" of the United States.

With 2 main types of warheads, MATADOR can break bunker, destroy the kind of medium tanks and tank main battle (MBT) today. In addition, it can also destroy armor and troop transport vehicles for amphibious operations against the enemy, and capable of urban warfare - one of the common characteristics of weapons to Israel increased range and power on every battlefield.

Defense capability against armored vehicles, MBT, as well as the ability to completely destroy armored vehicles carrying regular troops as the M113 or the other shielded MATADOR is rated as the best among anti-tank weapons shoulder today.

Despite intense firepower but MATADOR was safe to humans because it does not generate the fallout from the jet engines of the rocket as shoulder-fired missiles and other not affect the use of the name Fire was launched.

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With the ability to use high-pressure explosive warhead, dual shot mode passive target, MATADOR can use bullets to kill Hesh urban decay shoot any wall, whether it is permanent nowhere. After penetrating the wall, bullets explode inside creating a very strong destructive power. To break the bunker type, normally, people would use explosive anti-tank warhead HEAT. When the first bullet was lodged into the wall, the sensor system on the rocket will explode and destroy targets.

One other plus points of MATADOR is that it does not need a large space for the fuel to the rocket exhaust as many different types of shoulder-fired missiles that just a narrow space, may be shielded from the walls at a distance ly 5m was able to fire attacks.

Some improved version now allows to fire missiles from any location and any public space. This is one of the brightest features of urban warfare MATADOR, making it versatile attack but still achieve very high power.

To achieve this, the MATADOR tubes using special resin called SHP, is resistant to the excess fuel ejected from the rocket launchers behind. It will keep the dust and smoke from the engine and reduces low energy from the rear, to help ensure the safety of the troops and weapons, ammunition behind. In addition, SHP classes also ensure the safety of regional anti-tank rocket launchers and not discharged materials or toxic substances in the process of firing missiles.

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MATADOR is kind of viewfinder is very precise reflex viewfinder multidimensional combination with electronic devices to increase magnification. The version used in Vietnam using the viewfinder of NVD, equipped with Picatinny slot, typically used on heavy weapons. Viewfinder has the ability to change between the 3 modes and flexible in terms of daylight, at night with infrared aiming system and ultimately aiming system with thermal imaging. Heat aiming system proved very useful in night conditions and do not have a clear vision and can hit targets very accurately.

Used in the fighting in Gaza with Hamas forces, MATADOR has made repeated Hamas military Shedding for the HEAT rocket and Hesh when it destroyed a series of armored vehicles and fortifications in Gaza.

MATADOR family, variations MATADOR-WB is designed for specialized tasks destroyed walls, fortifications in the metropolitan area. MATADOR-AS variant is equipped with advanced warheads double-dose, high-explosive effect to destroy the fortifications and inner vitality, slow explosion effects to destroy armored vehicles.

The technical characteristics of light anti-tank missiles are very suitable for Vietnam troops that particular type of naval deployment to protect the island or coastal areas against attack landings enemy.

?N?i khi?p s? c?a xe t?ng? trên vai H?i quân VN - ?Noi khiep so cua xe tang? tren vai Hai quan VN - Ph? n? today
 
A good brief overview of the Sino-Vietnam relationship...and a look behind the fascade.


Vietnam: Playing with fire


Written by David Brown
SUNDAY, 07 JULY 2013


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The Trung sisters ran off the Chinese. Can Vietnam do it again?


Facing off against China

Follow America and save the country; follow China and save the party. This saying, heard everywhere in Vietnam, distills the geopolitical dilemma facing its ruling Communist Party.

Forty years after the last American troops left Vietnam, the party that won independence and unified the nation has lost much of its legitimacy. No amount of harking back to the virtues of Ho Chi Minh and his comrades can restore its élan nor, it seems, root out systemic corruption. The regime's biggest liability is its failure to right a faltering economy. But public opinion is also scornful of its inability to defend Vietnam's interests against China.

From the perspective of the man in the street in Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh City, Beijing has thrown off the cloak of "peaceful rise" and reverted to its historic role of regional bully. Its farcical claim to the marine and mineral resources of the entire South China Sea is only the most prominent example. China's construction of a cascade of dams on the upper Mekong in Yunnan province and support for a plan to build a further 11 dams downstream in Laos threaten to wipe out the annual flood surge that sustains the fertility of Vietnam's Mekong Delta region.

Chinese enterprises are also pursuing Laos' mineral and lumber resources, challenging Vietnamese hegemony in its backyard. In Vietnam itself, growing investment by Chinese engineering, construction and mining firms—notably Chinalco's multi-billion dollar bauxite project in the central highlands—has drawn heavy criticism. Cheap and often shoddy Chinese goods have flooded Vietnam's markets, crushing local manufacturers.

The man in the street wants to hit back. It doesn't occur to him that Vietnam's armed forces are no match for China's or that Vietnam is highly vulnerable to economic retaliation. Western analysts typically attribute Chinese "assertiveness" to surging popular nationalism and to over-zealous security agencies, but to ordinary Vietnamese it is obvious that Chinese aggression is coordinated in Beijing.

That is nothing new: the grand theme of the nation's history, everyone learns in school, is dogged and ultimately successful resistance against invaders. And most of the armies sweeping across Vietnam's borders for the past 2000 years have been Chinese. There is no reason why it should be different this time.

Prickly partnership

Vietnam and China share a 1,350-km border and much more. Both countries are Leninist states with a political culture shaped by neo-Confucian ideas of merit-based hierarchy and well-tended relationships. Their ruling Communist Parties have survived by shedding Marxist economics while nurturing a pervasive state-security apparatus. Their "socialist market economies" allow vibrant free markets to exist alongside thousands of state-owned enterprises, which dominate heavy industry.

Both Beijing and Hanoi are tormented by the lively criticism of internet-enabled dissidents. These shared cultural and political factors underpin a web of party-to-party and state-to-state consultations aimed at sustaining cooperation between the regimes.

Nonetheless, bilateral relations have normally been prickly. China's far greater geopolitical and economic weight means its relationship with Vietnam is fundamentally unequal. When Chinese people pay attention to Vietnam at all, they often regard it as a willful province that somehow slipped loose from its moorings.

Conversely, Vietnam's 90 million residents are always uncomfortably aware of their northern neighbors, who are 15 times more numerous and whose economy is 50 times larger. Yet the Vietnamese will not kowtow to Beijing when territorial integrity is at stake. Ho Chi Minh excepted, their greatest heroes are generals who forced dynasty after dynasty of Chinese invaders to withdraw. As recently as 1979, some 20,000 Chinese soldiers died when Deng Xiaoping sought to "teach Vietnam a lesson" for toppling Beijing's Maoist protégés in Cambodia and forging an alliance with the Soviet Union.

By the mid-1990s, China and Vietnam had slipped back into a relatively comfortable relationship. Both nations were preoccupied by internal economic reform, the Soviet Union had disintegrated, and China was advertising its "peaceful rise" to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), which now included Vietnam.

Bilateral trade was expanding, there was discussion of upgrading "trade corridors" from landlocked southwest China to Vietnamese ports, and negotiations to demarcate the land border were progressing well. Even the rival claims to ownership of the reefs, rocks and shoals of the South China Sea seemed under good management, if no closer to solution.

All that changed, however, in 2009. Whether by design or diplomatic mishap, China was no longer content to leave the overlapping claims on the shelf. In May that year, China presented a crude map at the United Nations claiming "indisputable sovereignty" over 80 percent of the South China Sea.

Tensions escalated sharply thereafter, drawing in non-regional nations—including the United States—and challenging Asean cohesion. Vietnam and the Philippines have borne the brunt of the Chinese drive to create "facts" that, although incompatible with international law, are difficult to rebut. Nationalist passions are boiling in all three nations, threatening armed skirmishes at sea. Hanoi's policy of deferring to China is in tatters.

Many of Vietnam's non-party elite, as well as some within the party itself, believe the solution is to seek a de facto economic and military alliance with the US. Yet senior members of the party remain highly skeptical of US intentions, viewing themselves as locked in an existential conflict with Western liberalism, capitalism and imperialism. They have yielded only grudgingly to reforms aimed at establishing the nation's global economic competitiveness and engaging the US as a counterbalance to China.

Party stalwarts gag on American demands that Vietnam allow greater democratic freedoms, fearing that Washington's true objective is to bring down the Communist regime. For all the recent frictions, they do not believe China's leaders will betray a ruling Communist Party so like their own.

Still waiting for a free lunch

In truth, China these days cares a lot less about helping its fellow Communists cling to power than it does about exploiting regional resources and extending its economic tentacles. With a sackful of export credits and eligibility for concessional loans from state-owned banks, Chinese firms have become major players in infrastructure development in Vietnam, particularly construction of thermal power plants.


By and large the Chinese firms are not squeezing out Vietnamese contractors, instead grabbing business from Japanese, South Korean, US or European competitors by entering bottom-dollar bids. But critics accuse Chinese enterprises of employing their own countrymen and producing work of low quality, with frequent missed deadlines and cost overruns. Vietnamese security hawks further assert that dependence on Chinese contractors in strategic sectors like energy undermines national security.

Another bone of contention is Vietnam's mounting trade deficit with China, its largest trading partner, which economist Tran Van Tho calls an "industrial tsunami." Vietnam's trade with the other nine Asean countries and with Japan is roughly balanced, and it has a huge surplus with the European Union and the US. But with China it ran a US$16.4 billion deficit in 2012, giving China a bilateral trade surplus of 40 percent.

The bulk of Chinese exports are intermediate goods for assembly in Vietnam's export processing plants: fabric, zippers, buttons, wires, circuit boards, and assorted widgets. But China also provides more expensive capital goods—machinery to equip Vietnam's factories and build infrastructure.

A third and very visible component is consumer goods, priced to undercut domestic competitors. Vietnamese newspapers regularly feature stories alleging that China dumps dangerous or shoddy goods, and provocative moves by Beijing in the South China Sea reflexively result in calls to boycott Chinese wares.

It wasn't meant to be this way. According to economists' predictions, Vietnam should be eating Guangdong's lunch by now. With its much lower labor costs, Vietnam was the logical destination for factories from China's export-processing center migrating to cheaper climes. The labor-intensive garment and footwear industries have long accounted for about 20 percent of Vietnam's exports; they got their start in the 1990s when China's garment and footwear exports were capped under EU and US quota schemes.

Yet labor productivity remains low, real wages rose at 10 percent a year in 2006-11, and Vietnam has largely failed to lure manufacturers from their bases in China. As labor costs continue to rise in both China and Vietnam, factories are migrating instead to Cambodia, Bangladesh and even Myanmar.

It is not all bad news. As the global economy slowly recovers, Vietnam's foreign-invested sector is growing once again. Rather than shifting factories from China, some multinationals and their contractors have diversified their manufacturing bases by opening additional plants in Vietnam. Anecdotal evidence suggests a pronounced trend toward higher quality investments, which can benefit from substantial tax breaks.

Firms establishing or expanding assembly plants include household names like Canon, Samsung, Intel and IBM, Hitachi, Panasonic and Nokia. Yet nearly all the inputs to Vietnam's manufactured exports are imported, some from China. All that is added in Vietnam, typically, is labor—something China can do more efficiently and on a much larger scale.

Comprehensive strategic blunder

In 2008, capping a warmer phase in relations, Chinese party chief Hu Jintao and his Vietnamese counterpart, Nong Duc Manh, declared a bilateral "comprehensive strategic cooperative relationship." And if China is truly interested in nurturing a special relationship with Vietnam - and thereby strengthening its diplomatic muscle in Southeast Asia - Beijing is in a position to help.

Although Vietnam's rulers admit to no anxiety over the bilateral trade imbalance, it is nevertheless a chronic political liability. China imports plenty of rubber, coal, oil, lumber and agricultural products, but is uninterested in Vietnam's industrial goods. Friendly moves to pump up industrial imports would cost China little and be very good news for Hanoi.

Above all, a sincere proposal for joint development of mineral resources and co-management of fish stocks in the disputed area of the South China Sea could be a game-changer—both for relations with Vietnam and with Asean.

Yet the reality is that the relationship between Beijing and Hanoi has become dangerously unstable since the agreement in 2008. Chinese pressure on political and strategic issues has boxed in Vietnam's leaders, arguably threatening their survival. Beijing has bolstered its standing among Chinese nationalists by flexing its muscle in the South China Sea, while Hanoi's ineffectual attempts to fend off Chinese provocations have steadily eroded its position among nationalists at home.

Short of armed conflict, it is hard to imagine what more China could do to hasten the downfall of its would-be friends and ideological allies in the world's only other "market socialist" regime. In all probability, this would bring in new leaders looking to cozy up to the US - an entirely self-defeating result.

More worrying, an armed conflict between is not out of the question. China has vastly more firepower than Vietnam, but Hanoi is ramping up its air and sea deterrent capabilities. If pressed against a wall, history suggests that the Vietnamese will hit back. A miscalculation by either side could result in a clash. This would be sharp and bloody, with unpredictable consequences. China can continue playing the bully - but it is playing with fire.

(David Brown is a retired diplomat and regular contributor to Asia Sentinel. He wrote this for the Hong Kong-based Gavekal Dragonomics' China Economic Quarterly.)


Asia Sentinel - Vietnam: Playing with fire
 
as per Russian shipyard Zelenodolsk, the next two Gepards will come in 2016 - 2017...hmm why so late?


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as per Russian shipyard Zelenodolsk, the next two Gepards will come in 2016 - 2017...hmm why so late?


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It's problem of money, I think so. Two new will be equipped with special facilities for sub-marine hunting, good idea.
 
as per Russian shipyard Zelenodolsk, the next two Gepards will come in 2016 - 2017...hmm why so late?
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Why? Because Viet Nam is stupid enough to consider Russia as a "friend" while Russia treats Viet Nam like a beggar whenever Viet Nam buys weapons from them. The Russian are notorious for their dishonesty when it's come to delivering warship on time. They always drag the project out while demanding more money from their customers. Even the Indian taste that bitterness, what makes you think Viet Nam is immuned from it?

Buying the first 2 Gepard is already a mistake but continue buying 2 more from the Russian is beyond stupid. Viet Nam has no one to blame for except herself. Only stupid and naive Vietnamese would consider the Russian as a "friend". Viet Nam is not a beggar, we paid a total of $800 millions including armaments for these 4 Gepards; the corrupted leaders of Viet Nam need act like Viet Nam is a customer and not a beggar infront of the Russian. As a Vietnamese nationalist, I would rather see the military spend $800 millions for Viettel R&D Institute then buying these 4 Gepard craps.
 
Why? Because Viet Nam is stupid enough to consider Russia as a "friend" while Russia treats Viet Nam like a beggar whenever Viet Nam buys weapons from them. The Russian are notorious for their dishonesty when it's come to delivering warship on time. They always drag the project out while demanding more money from their customers. Even the Indian taste that bitterness, what makes you think Viet Nam is immuned from it?

Buying the first 2 Gepard is already a mistake but continue buying 2 more from the Russian is beyond stupid. Viet Nam has no one to blame for except herself. Only stupid and naive Vietnamese would consider the Russian as a "friend". Viet Nam is not a beggar, we paid a total of $800 millions including armaments for these 4 Gepards; the corrupted leaders of Viet Nam need act like Viet Nam is a customer and not a beggar infront of the Russian. As a Vietnamese nationalist, I would rather see the military spend $800 millions for Viettel R&D Institute then buying these 4 Gepard craps.

to be cool bro. I don't think problem is so serious, when USA don't lift arm embargo against us now.
 

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