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US told Pakistan to get out of areas occupied during Kargil war: Former Pak envoy to US

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Well according to your own sources, Pakistan still occupies all the strategic peaks hence i am at a loss as what did you exactly achieved..... and you are right that India lost far more number of soldiers than Pakistan did.
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dear .. war is own when you achieve your objective,,,
our objective was to defend OUR territory by being insinde LOC
which we did ..
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if you claim you have strategic peak .. good for you..
if its inside LOC then its our weakness that we could not get it..
if its beyond LOC .. it was never our aim to get that..
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india lost more soldires than pak.. i dont have concrete figure .. so cant comment..
but we own pride of army..
we never said "those are not our soldires and let thier body in enemy zone" and then india proved all those pak soldies of north light infantacty .
we won that...
we gave burial as per relgious sentiment to those who killed my bro on field..
its needs more than courage to do taht..
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you also aware who took strategic postion.
from top it was cake walk for you to aim with ample time ..
but still you lose..
shame..

They didn't accepted the dead bodies of their soldiers...what to say
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they were not soldires for them just guinea pigs...
- i recolet amitab bachhan dialog on laksh as major joshi
"kaisi army hogi jo appne fauji yoki ijjat na kar sake"
not exact words but close.
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note: respect for all soldiers indian and pak who laid their life for country
 
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Talk about the live ones as Indians weren't willing to receive their shot down pilot, Kambhampati Nachiketa in front of the press.
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in front of the press.
we never deined his body like PA desrted their own soldiers ..
you know why..
you made that soul torture so much..and mutilated body
that it could erupt indian public in anger if it was gone in front of press.
we are professional army ..
we dont play with emotion .. and when it come for soldiers .. his honour is supreme
 
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in front of the press.
we never deined his body like PA desrted their own soldiers ..
you know why..
you made that soul torture so much..and mutilated body
that it could erupt indian public in anger if it was gone in front of press.
we are professional army ..
we dont play with emotion .. and when it come for soldiers .. his honour is supreme
Obviously you are not as well informed as you are trying to prove.
My dear, better do your home work before indulging into a debate hence let me enlighten you that Kambhampati Nachiketa was the pilot captured alive after his MiG-27 was shot down. The dead pilot was S/L Ajay Ahuja.
Any ways, these topics have been discussed to the bone repeatedly, the OP and you are both new hence enjoy the excitement.
 
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Obviously you are not as well informed as you are trying to prove.
My dear, better do your home work before indulging into a debate hence let me enlighten you that Kambhampati Nachiketa was the pilot captured alive after his MiG-27 was shot down. The dead pilot was S/L Ajay Ahuja.
Any ways, these topics have been discussed to the bone repeatedly, the OP and you are both new hence enjoy the excitement.
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Sorry .. accepted..
i mistaken betwen two..
released later ..
i never said i am fully infomred.. even you cant claim that dear ..
will not accept your army mutilated body of captain kalia.?
point dicussed to length accepted .. i just puting my view
if i went wrong you are welcome to correct me :-)
i lean that way only
 
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Well according to your own sources, Pakistan still occupies all the strategic peaks hence i am at a loss as what did you exactly achieved..... and you are right that India lost far more number of soldiers than Pakistan did.

Your forces gained only one peak,not peaks overlooking a very limited portion of NH 1D - the point 5353.It's not that big an advantage....at least not any more.Had it been so,then I wonder what stops the Pakistanis to harrass the Indian Army convoys going through that part??The reality is they can't do it anymore since Indian Army has forward observation posts atop three 5200+ meter peaks adjacent to point 5353 and can bring down artillery and MBRL fire on the 5353 if they try to get smart.They know it too.


Anyway,Indian supply route to Leh
was never in danger.. because there already exists a
secondary route via HP ..Leh-
Manali highway.

http://i28.tinypic.com/1r66c7.jpg

Besides Indian Army lost ~650 soldiers in Operation Vijay where as Pakistani Army lost some ~557 soldiers in the conflict.It doesn't equals to "far greater" loses for Indian Army.And blinded by your frustration and hatred for the Indians,you guys tend to forget that Indian soldiers were fighting an uphill battle,into the open with virtually no cover from Pakistani arty or HMG fire or any way to mask their movements.On the other hand,Pakistanis were fighting a defensive battle from well entrenched and heavily fortified defensive strong points and that too sitting atop the peaks!!All the advantages that one can have in a battle was with you guys and our forces were suffering from all the disadvantage one could possibly get into!!
Given the sheer amount of difficulties Indian soldiers had to face,and the advantages you guys enjoyed,it was indeed a great feat on IA's part that they were able to dislodge the intruders.

And just to remind you how difficult it is to dislodge well entrenched and determined opponents from high altitude mountain peaks,you don't have to look any farther than your very own Pakistani Army.Does Siachen ring any bells??The Indian troopers had set their feet on Saltoro,Sia La,Bilafond La,Gyong La and some other strategically important locations just about a week before Pakistani soldiers reached and the Indians didn't get enough time to construct defensive fortifications - yet your armymen couldn't dislodge them.
Since April '84,Pakistan Army launched numerous assaults on those regions.What happened??What could they achieve other than mounting casualties on their own??

In 1987,a massive number of your so called elite SSG troopers attacked Indian positions on Bilafond La commanded by none other than General Musharraf - what happened??It's continue to remain at our grip till this day.Infact in retaliation,Indian troops from 8 JAK LI assaulted and captured the Bana post situated at a hopping 6500 meter altitude ASL!!Although 8 JAK LI took very heavy losses with 30+ KIA in the initial attacks (they tried same old frontal assaults) but it was worth it. Surprise Surprise!!

So you see,your own army's performance on the mountains hasn't been that great while trying to dislodge its opponents from the peaks.At least we our forces were able to regain their lost grounds.

And apparently,Pakistan Army didn't fare much better in defensive battles too.Had they been able to defend their high grounds in '71,Indian Army wouldn't have been in possession of Kargil,Dras and Batalik sectors at the first place!!As before '71,these sectors were under Pakistani Army's occupation but they lost them to Indian Army and they never returned it due to the strategic importance of the region,especially to secure the NH 1D which back then was the only motorable road link between the valley and Ladakh.
 
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Book Name: Engaging India – Purpose of writing this book was to show the new bonds being created between India and USA at the turn of Millenium. The book promotes India's stance and was written to promote US-India Friendship.


Author: Strobe Talbott – who was US Deputy Secretary of Defence at the time of Kargil War. He was also part of Bill Clinton's team that negotiated with Nawaz Sharif during the those days. He was a personal friend of Jaswant Singh who at various times worked as Defence, Finance and External Affairs Minister of India.

The excerpts, that I present here, indicate that Pakistanis were in no hurry to withdrawal. Nawaz Sharif was afraid – not of India Army's victories or Pakistani casualties – but of the response of Pakistani Army. He was more concerned of his political survival and went to Washington with his whole family – in case he would need a political asylum. He also played the fundamentalist army takeover card with Clinton.

During the whole talks, not once did Nawaz Sharif said anything about Indian advances or casualties of Pakistani Army as is quoted by Indians; He wanted US to mediate the Kashmir Issue.

The main point is that: during whole talks; Clinton stressed a Pakistani withdrawal as a pre-requisite to help Nawaz Sharif.


Overall impression is that Pakistan Army was well dug-in and was in no hurry to leave the Kargil heights. It was Clinton's pressure to which Nawaz gave in.

Here are the excerpts:

Indian efforts to dislodge the infiltrators prompted Pakistani shelling that hit an ammunition dump in Kargil. Many residents fled, and Pakistan used the ensuing pandemonium to send in reinforcements. By the end of the month, the town had to be evacuated, and the initial skirmishing had grown into a full-fledged border conflict involving infantry assaults, artillery barrages, and aerial operations including attacks on ground positions by helicopter gunships. The Pakistanis shot down two Indian MiGs and moved regular army troops into the Kargil area to construct bunkers on the Indian side of the line.

During the first week in June, Clinton turned his own attention to India and Pakistan. In letters to Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee, Clinton made Pakistan’s withdrawal a precondition for a settlement and the price it must pay for the U.S. diplomatic involvement it had long sought. Clinton followed up with phone calls to the two leaders in mid- June.

The exchanges bet ween Indian and Pakistani officials sputtered through June while the fighting between military units intensified along a widening front. Indian forces were suffering terrible losses as they tried to fight their way up steep mountainsides against well-dug-in Pakistani positions. Mid-month, the Indians upped the ante by firing on targets on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control.

American experts following the war were more worried than ever that the Indians would attempt an end run, punching through the line at one or more points where they would have the advantage of terrain and supply lines. India’s restraint in not exercising this option almost certainly cost it additional casualties around Kargil. (i.e Indians were afraid to increase the area of conflict or they simply did not have capacity. Consider this, that they were short of Bofors spare parts and had to get them from guns spread all over the India.) - My Commentary

In late June Clinton sent Tony Zinni, the Marine general in charge of the U.S. Central Command. Tony warned Musharraf that India would cross the Line of Control itself if Pakistan did not pull back. Musharraf professed to be unimpressed.

Back in Washington, the administration let it be known that if Sharif did not order a pullback, we would hold up a $100 million International Monetary Fund loan that Pakistan sorely needed.

Through our ambassador in Islamabad, Bill Milam, who had replaced Tom Simons, Sharif begged Clinton to come to his rescue with a plan that would stop the fighting and set the stage for a U.S.-brokered solution to Kashmir.

On Friday, July 2, Sharif phoned Clinton and pleaded for his personal intervention in South Asia. Clinton replied that he would consider it only if it was understood up-front that Pakistani withdrawal would have to be immediate and unconditional.

The next day Sharif called Clinton to say that he was packing his bags and getting ready to fly immediately to Washington—never mind that he had not been invited. He warned Sharif not to come unless he was prepared to announce unconditional withdrawal; otherwise, his trip would make a bad situation worse.

During that hectic day, we got word that Sharif did not have time— or perhaps did not have enough support from the Pakistani military—to arrange for an aircraft to bring him to Washington. He boarded a Pakistan International flight that normally flew from Karachi to New York but would make a special stop at Dulles Airport to drop off Sharif and his retinue. In addition to his advisers he was bringing his wife and children with him. That news caused us to wonder whether he was coming to seek an end to the crisis or political asylum.

It was not hard to anticipate what Sharif would ask for. His opening proposal would be a cease-fire to be followed by negotiations under American auspices. His fallback would make Pakistani withdrawal conditional on Indian agreement to direct negotiations sponsored and probably mediated by the United States. Either way, he would be able to claim that the incursion had forced India, under American pressure, to accept Pakistani terms.

We would put before him two press statements and let Sharif decide which would be released at the end of the Blair House talks. The first would hail him as a peacemaker for retreating—or, as we would put it euphemistically, “restoring and respecting the sanctity of the Line of Control.” The second would blame him for starting the crisis and for the escalation sure to follow his failed mission to Washington.

Sandy and Bruce arranged for Bandar bin Sultan, a member of the Saudi royal family and the kingdom’s ambassador in Washington, to pick Sharif up at the airport. Bandar, the dean of the diplomatic corps, was a wily, well-connected power broker throughout the Greater Middle East and the Islamic world. He would use the car ride into town to soften up Sharif for the president’s message. After dropping Sharif at Blair House, Bandar told us that we should be prepared to deal with a man who was not just distraught about the crisis but terrified of the reaction from Musharraf and the military if he gave in to American pressure.

The overriding objective was to induce Pakistani withdrawal. But another, probably incompatible, goal was to increase the chances of Sharif ’s political survival. Rick Inderfurth and I had two other pieces of advice for the president, based on our own experience with the Pakistanis. First, the more Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz and Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad participated in the meeting, the less productive it would be.

Bruce added that if Clinton chose to tell Sharif that we knew his military was already taking steps toward deployment of nuclear weaponry, it was particularly important that Shamshad not be within earshot, since he was known to have close ties to the Pakistani military and the intelligence services.

Clinton pulled out an editorial cartoon by Jeff MacNelly from that day’s Chicago Tribune. It showed Indian and Pakistani soldiers waging a ferocious artillery battle at close quarters from atop two giant nuclear bombs.

I had the impression that Sharif was paying little attention, since he already knew what he was going to say—and we had all heard it before: if Clinton would just devote one percent of the time and energy he had put into the Middle East, there would be no crisis.

“I’m a moderate and forward-looking person,” said Sharif, in a tone more pleading than boasting. He needed Clinton’s help in getting India to move from its uncompromising position. Otherwise, he would be pushed aside and Islamic hard-liners.

“If you want me to be able to do anything with the Indians, I’ve got to have some leverage. Only withdrawal will bring this crisis to an end.”

Instead of relenting, Sharif made the matter worse: “I’m prepared to help resolve the current crisis in Kargil, but India must commit to resolve the larger issue in a specific time frame”—that is, negotiate a settlement on Kashmir under the pressure of a Pakistani-imposed, U.S.-sanctioned deadline.

“You had the Lahore process under way. That was great. But if I’m going to do any good for you, I’ve got to have a restoration of the integrity of your position”—that is, a return of Pakistani forces to their side of the line, and a return of Sharif to the Lahore process.

Sharif, just as we had expected, asked for a one-on-one. Once the rest of us were out of the room, Sharif reviewed what he portrayed as his unstinting effort over the past month to work out a deal with Vajpayee that would feature the trade-off between Pakistani withdrawal and a timetable for resolution of Kashmir. His version of events was neither coherent nor, insofar as we could reconstruct and check it afterward, consistent with what we understood to be the facts. The point, however, was clear enough: he had to have something to show for his trip to Washington beyond unconditional surrender over Kargil. Without some sort of face-saver, the army, egged on by fundamentalists back home, would overthrow him.

Adding to the danger was evidence that Sharif neither knew everything his military high command was doing nor had complete control over it. When Clinton asked him if he understood how far along his military was in preparing nuclear-armed missiles for possible use in a war against India, Sharif acted as though he was genuinely surprised.

Clinton had a statement ready to release to the press in time for the evening news shows that would lay all the blame for the crisis on Pakistan. Sharif went ashen. Sharif seemed beaten, physically and emotionally. He denied he had given any orders with regard to nuclear weaponry and said he was worried for his life.

Now that he had made maximum use of the “bad statement” we had prepared in advance, Clinton said, it was time to deploy the good one. But the key sentence in the new document was ours, not his, and it would nail the one thing we had to get out of the talks: “The prime minister has agreed to take concrete and immediate steps for the restoration of the Line of Control. The paper called for a cease-fire but only after the Pakistanis were back on their side of the line. It reaffirmed Clinton’s long- standing plan to visit South Asia.

Clinton gave the statement to Sharif, who read it over carefully several times, asked to review it with his team, and finally accepted it with the request for one addition: a promise that Clinton would take a personal interest in encouraging an expeditious resumption and intensification of the bilateral efforts (that is, the Lahore process) once the sanctity of the Line of Control had been fully restored.

The meeting came quickly to a happy and friendly end, at least on Clinton’s part. He heaped praise on Sharif for passing the test to which they had subjected their personal relationship. As the president and his advisers were leaving Blair House, Shamshad Ahmad scurried after Sandy with alterations he wanted in the text. Sandy kept walking and said briskly over his shoulder, “Your boss says it’s okay as is.”

Before Bruce and Rick briefed the press on the statement, Clinton called Vajpayee to preview the statement. Once again, it was nearly a one- way conversation.

“That guy’s from Missouri big-time,” said Clinton afterward. “He wants to see those boys get off that mountain before he’s going to believe any of this.”*

*Missourians are known for their skepticism, and Missouri is often called the Show-Me State.

Any neutral person can conclude - by reading the above excerpts - that it was Indian (and their US friends) who were desperate for a Pakistani withdrawal. Pakistani - on the other hand - were in no hurry, becuase, their position on Kargil heights was well secured.
 
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Absolutely correct. You're just missing one point here.

Hari Singh chose J&K to be an independent state initially, which was not revolted by the J&K population. It was only after Pashtun tribesmen from Pakistan invaded Jammu and Kashmir with the help of Pakistan's government, that he appealed to India for help.

It was Pakistan who, with it's assistance to the tribesmen, played a role in invasion of J&K. We had accepted J&K's decision to remain an independent state.

Dog Ra was committing genocide of innocent Kashmiris who were revolting against his rule. At that time Kashmiris need help & so Pakistan order it's military to launch an offensive in order to stop DogRa's genocide but Pakistani military chief(ethnic English) refused. Pushtuns from FATA/Waziristan took action on their own & stormed into Kashmir to help Kashmiris. Pakistan never help anyone. Pakistani military only entered after Indian Army tried to occupy the already liberated parts of Kashmir.
 
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UN res requires every Pakistani to leave the territory of J&K including GB( which you now call your 5th province) ie Not even a single Pakistani army unit/ISI/govt official should be in territory of Kashmir..have you done that??
While India is allowed to maintain a minimum number of troops in J&K, AJK, GB to ensure an impartial plebiscite.

There is no Pakistani from other provinces residing in AJK. Very few Pakistani troops are present there in AJK on request of AJK govt. Most troops are ethnic Kashmiri & belongs to Azad Kashmir Regiment & Northern Light Infantary.

And why would Pakistan allow India to keep it's troops during plebiscite? So that they do their dirty work? Only UN officials & troops should be present for clean & fair referendum.

There is a certain thing called 'common sense' which Pakistani leaders need to exercise before making historic blunders.
Junagarh, Hyderabad are deep with in Indian territory,surrounded by India on all sides. There is nothing Pakistan could have done even if it wanted to, whereas Kashmir was a border state to both India and Pakistan..where Indians could have done a lot.

Even Bangladesh was surrounded by India from all sides...whats your point there? Junagarh/Manvadar have sea borders like Bangladesh. Pakistan went quiet after you guys held referendum in those areas but Indian leaders prove themselves to be hypocrites when they didn't apply the same in IOK/Maqbooza Kashmir...even after several promises.

So instead of negotiating with the Raja, 'making him an offer he could not refuse', you decide to invade his country, no wonder he acceded to India, how stupid were you leaders?

You mean while DogRa was committing genocide of innocent Kashmiris, Pakistan should've offer him something.:crazy:

Lest you forget Pakistan invaded Kashmir eons before India invaded any of the other place. ie it was India following Pakistani suit and not otherwise, the only difference is where Pakistan had failed, we suceeded.

Pakistan never invaded any place in whole subcontinent. Even in Kashmir Pakistan only went to save the liberated part & keep invading Indian forces out of it.

The term is called adverse control. As per UN resolution Saksham valley is recognized as part of Kashmir which the Chinese seized in 1962 war.
China not being party to dispute or the subsequent UN res , is not legally entitled to any Kashmiri territory.

Pakistan signed a treaty with China saying the area belongs to Chinese in exchange for a token piece of land, who gave you the authority to do that..since Kashmir was still an ongoing dispute b/w India and Pakistan..and not yours to barter with

You are so concerned about Kashmiri opinion now, did you bother to ask Kashmiri opinion before bartering their territory ?

You need to brush up your history...don't enforce IA propaganda in your brain...

Negotiations between the nations officially began on October 13, 1962 and resulted in an agreement being signed on 2 March 1963 by foreign ministers Chen Yi of China and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan.

The agreement resulted in China withdrawing from about 750 square miles of territory, and Pakistan withdrawing its claim to about 2,050 square miles of territory that, in practice, it neither occupied or administered.
Trans-Karakoram Tract - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

So the truth that you do not know(or don't wanna know) is that after that agreement Pakistan gained 750 sq miles of territory from China whereas Pakistan backed off from it's claims on the lands that it never had controlled. Agreement only won Pakistan 750 sq miles of additional land & Pakistan did not "gifted" any land to anyone. Kindly STFU with your nonsense propaganda & habitual lies.:disagree:
 
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Pakistan never help anyone.

Despite Pak's military chief refusing to send troops into Kashmir, Op Gulmarg was conceived in Pakistan Army headquarters, which aimed at assisting the tribesmen in their invasion into Kashmir. It required every Pathan tribe to enlist at least one Lashkar of 1000 tribesmen. Each Lashkar was supported by a Major, a Captain and ten JCOs of the regular Pakistan Army.
 
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Despite Pak's military chief refusing to send troops into Kashmir, Op Gulmarg was conceived in Pakistan Army headquarters, which aimed at assisting the tribesmen in their invasion into Kashmir. It required every Pathan tribe to enlist at least one Lashkar of 1000 tribesmen. Each Lashkar was supported by a Major, a Captain and ten JCOs of the regular Pakistan Army.

Where is the proof of it? We don't wanna hear IA propaganda fairy tales.

P.S Individuals from PA might have helped as Kashmiris are blood brothers of PaKistan & Pakistanis from north to south feels for their brothers in IOK/Maqbooza Kashmir.
 
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Where is the proof of it? We don't wanna hear IA propaganda fairy tales.

http://www.princeton.edu/~jns/publications/Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy.pdf

You could just search '1947' using Ctrl+F and with the paragraph that initiates with the second 1947, you're set to read. And if you want to claim 'propaganda' on the author's part, whose credentials are well established, do not bother to quote me.

I mean your own President (and ambassador to US too?) has admitted Pakistan's assistance to terror groups so as to fight strategic battles, what more 'proof' do you need?!
 
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http://www.princeton.edu/~jns/publications/Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy.pdf

You could just search '1947' using Ctrl+F and with the paragraph that initiates with the second 1947, you're set to read.

And if you want to claim 'propaganda' on the author's part, whose credentials are well established, do not bother to quote me.

I asked you for proof not some fairy tale. You give me the link of some unknown person's self opinion...same old BS with keywords Pakistan, Islamists, Militancy, etc & whole thing revolving around it. I already told you that it may be possible that few individuals from Army supported those FATA/Waziristan Lashkars(as Kashmiris are PaKistanis by blood relations) but it has nothing to do with Pakistan or PA. PA only went in to stop Indian invading forces entering liberated part of Kashmir.
 
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I asked you for proof not some fairy tale.

Okay, as you seem to justify your quoting of the excerpts of the book 'Engaging India' by someone who witnessed the operations on the ground, I guess I'm free to return the favor.

Prof. Niranjan Nath Raina, the founder of the communist movement in Kashmir, in his book 'Kashmir Politics and Imperialist manoeuvres' writes:

By far the direct and comprehensive evidence about the Pakistani attack came from Major Onkar Singh Kalkot on 19th October i.e. more than two days prior to invasion.

Kalkat was under watch of Pakistani intelligence, a junior Lieutenant was watching his movements. Besides Kalkat there were other few non-Muslim military personnel stationed at Bannu brigade outpost.

Messenger packet used to come on every Monday. The duty officer brought the packet, Kalkat as Brigade Major signed for it. The packet marked 'personal/top secret' was meant for Brig. Murray. It was an official communication from Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army. Major OS Kalkat was on the horns of a dilemma. As Brigade Major it was his duty to relay the message by radio to his Brigadier. At the same time becoming privy to what was supposed to be secret communication to his boss would put his life in danger. For a moment Kalkat hesitated. Then he opened the packet, which included a letter addressed to Brig. Murray. It was signed personally by General Sir Frank of Messervy, C in C. Kalkat on reading the contents of the letter got nervous and felt excited. He bolted the door of his room to study the details in secrecy.

The letter and the accompanying briefing note detailed the plan for an Army offensive named 'Operation Gulmarg'. The invasion was planned by Pak Army Headquarters meticulously with considerable strategic and tactical insight. The 'Operation Gulmarg' was to be an invasion of the Kashmir valley by tribal warriors of the northern frontier areas, which were to be armed and led by Pak army officers wearing tribal dress. The headquarters of 'Operation Gulmarg' was to be in the building that housed General Messervy.

C
laiming this to be another propaganda would be making a fool out of yourself. I hope you are wise enough for that.
 
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