US & Pakistan Dispute and Tensions over Haqqani group

[Solomon2]

In Pakistan the President is a figurehead, similar to the monarch in Britain - the real power lies with the Prime Minister.

Understand that if a head-of-state denies a group's connection to his country and that group is then attacked and destroyed by a foreign power, than that state cannot complain about it afterwards. If a head-of-government did the same, the state could at least complain that they were a respected non-governmental organization.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Understand that if a head-of-state denies a group's connection to his country and that group is then attacked and destroyed by a foreign power, than that state cannot complain about it afterwards. If a head-of-government did the same, the state could at least complain that they were a respected non-governmental organization.

If the group could be destroyed through 'attacks' the incessant drone campaign in North Waziristan would have already done it.

'Destroying' the Haqqani network, if it exists in NW, will require tens of thousands of troops deployed for a very long time, and not just a few air raids here and there.

 

[karan.1970]

If the group could be destroyed through 'attacks' the incessant drone campaign in North Waziristan would have already done it.

'Destroying' the Haqqani network, if it exists in NW, will require tens of thousands of troops deployed for a very long time, and not just a few air raids here and there.

This argument is an eyewash.. A couple strikes a week is hardly an incessant drone campaign in the face of the enemy that even Pakistani Army is afraid to take head on..

Actually your next point says the same..

 

[Solomon2]

'Destroying' the Haqqani network, if it exists in NW, will require tens of thousands of troops deployed for a very long time, and not just a few air raids here and there.

I suppose many P.A. officers are uneasy by the prospect. It's not like an officer's advancement in the P.A. has much to do with performance as much as politics, yes? Actually supporting and leading troops in sustained conflict is a different skill set, very risky to one's career.

Still, I'd expect that the American-trained ones will be able to do it. Or do you think that this yet another objection to doing so?

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

This argument is an eyewash.. A couple strikes a week is hardly an incessant drone campaign in the face of the enemy that even Pakistani Army is afraid to take head on..

Over the course of several years those 'couple of strikes a week' add up to a significant amount of attacks, and if the Haqqani network had all these 'bases and training camps' these strikes could have at the least taken all of them out, leaving behind a very limited group.

And if airstrikes alone could defeat insurgent groups, the US would not need a 'surge' in Afghanistan nor the various ground based operations it has carried out. You are deluding yourself into thinking that the US 'standoff weapons capability' is some sort of magical COIN weapon that will destroy the Haqqanis if only allowed to be unleashed, when the fact is that the weapon has not even done much on its own in Afghanistan itself.

And even if your argument was accurate, and the US was to carry out massive air attacks, the Haqqanis would simply relocate to other surrounding agencies, or even Pakistan proper, and recruit even more fighters. There simply is no alternative to a long term presence of ground troops. Effective air support and the drones help tremendously, but if they worked on their own, the US would not have a 100,000 troops in Afghanistan.

 

[muse]

Let me get this straight - is the US suggesting that having contacts with the haqqani is a problem or is the US alleging that Pakistan helped the haqqani plan and execute operations?

If the former, then yes, sure, - After all US negotiates with any number of talib and has and maintains contacts with them, if the latter is the problem fir the US, then no amount of denying it by Pakistan will suffice.

What I think the US really wants with this dog and pony show of Haqqani herring is to have Pakistan withdraw the very idea that Pakistan have or even can have, interests in Afghanistan that the US does not grant it -- Is this a realistic stance by the US policy makers, the nerves of pakistani policy makers will have to decide that for the US policy makers.




Sorry for the edit - Freudian slip

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

I suppose many P.A. officers are uneasy by the prospect. It's not like an officer's advancement in the P.A. has much to do with performance as much as politics, yes? Actually supporting and leading troops in sustained conflict is a different skill set, very risky to one's career.

Still, I'd expect that the American-trained ones will be able to do it. Or do you think that this yet another objection to doing so?

Before the 'career' questions, the impact on the country in terms of the costs of an operation, lives lost, maimed, widows, orphans, displaced, Taliban groups joining hands, military overstretched - all of that must be answered, and I would say that the answer clearly is that Pakistan is not well placed to conduct any military operation in NW at any time in the foreseeable future.

---------- Post added at 01:33 AM ---------- Previous post was at 01:31 AM ----------

If at first you don’t succeed, blame Haqqani​

By Khalid Munir
Published: September 24, 2011

Finally, matters between the US and Pakistan have reached boiling point and the year in which the American troops were supposed to withdraw with victory trumpets seems to have become one of embarrassment. The events of the last two months have shattered America’s dream of a peaceful withdrawal from Afghanistan. The last thing Americans would like to see is the repetition of the events of Saigon. A spectacular attack by the Taliban on the US Embassy, in which half a dozen attackers held US and Isaf forces for almost 20 hours, has demoralised the Americans. As if all this was not enough, the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani has put the seal on the fledgling peace efforts.

Rabbanis’s peace council was a ray of hope for the Afghans, though it had failed to get the support of the Pashtuns because of its composition. The latter, perhaps under the influence and fear of the Taliban, thought it would be an instrument of suppression by the shumalis (the non-Pashtun northerners). These apprehensions were voiced by the Pashtun members of the council, during a meeting with senators from Pakistan in March this year. The council had come up with a formula to negotiate with the Taliban, but Rabbani’s death has put the peace process in cold storage.

As for America, announcing the withdrawal schedule over a year before the actual withdrawal was a sign of weakness. For the anti-Taliban elements, this came as a surprise and the support they were providing, in whatever way, was withdrawn due to fear. Then US President Barack Obama went on to announce a reduction of 30,000 troops this year, against the recommendations of the Pentagon.

Militarily, it has been a badly-fought war without much planning. The general responsible for fighting the war was sitting in Florida and came to Afghanistan only after Kabul’s fall. The latest outburst of blaming everything on the Haqqani network is the result of the frustration being felt in the power corridors of Washington because of lack of success in Afghanistan.

Yes, no one can deny that Haqqani is fighting in Afghanistan. No one will also deny that the presence of his fighters in North Waziristan is not a secret — however, blaming his network for all the ills that America is facing seems far-fetched and unfair. Pakistan is being forced to take military action against the Haqqanis in North Waziristan, something that may not necessarily solve matters in Afghanistan. Besides, the Americans need to ask themselves: is Haqqani so strong that his men can travel from North Waziristan all the way to Herat, Kunduz and Helmand with no one to check their movement? It should also be clear now that Isaf does not control the Pashtun-dominated provinces. For instance in Kunar, training centres have been set up to produce jihadis and FM radios run by the Taliban can be heard in Bajaur and Dir inside Pakistan. Nuristan was vacated by Isaf after attacks by the Taliban, almost two years ago, and is now used by militants to stage attacks into Pakistan.

The fact of the matter is that Isaf and Nato forces have failed to create favourable conditions on the ground which can then be used during negotiations. Now that they have been made to assess the situation, the field commanders are trying to find a scapegoat for their failure. That is what is happening in the present case. Should Pakistan pay for Nato’s failures?

Perhaps for the first time in its history, Pakistan has come into direct confrontation with the US. How we resolve this will be the test of the statesmanship of our civil and military leaders. It is time to evolve a policy which can best serve the interests of Pakistan and this should not be done by the military only. The government should take all leading politicians into confidence and with their consent evolve a strategy that helps us cope with what is clearly the most serious challenge to our sovereignty.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 25th, 2011.
If at first you don

 

[SHkhan]

WELL I DN FINK SO USA CAN DO NYThN CZ USA IS IN NO POSITION TO ATTACK PAKISTAN>>>PLUS ATTACKING PAKISTAN COULD hIGLY DANGEROUS AS IT COULD LEAD US TOWARDS WW>>>>
so i dn fink so ny thnk z goin to hapn
just peace!!!

 

[Solomon2]

Before the 'career' questions, the impact on the country in terms of the costs of an operation, lives lost, maimed, widows, orphans, displaced, Taliban groups joining hands, military overstretched - all of that must be answered, and I would say that the answer clearly is that Pakistan is not well placed to conduct any military operation in NW at any time in the foreseeable future.

Equally, a denial of a connection by a head-of-state could be interpreted as justification by the state's own military commanders - division, not corps commanders - to begin operations against the rogue group.

 

[muse]

OK - lets change tact - lets examine other more compelling arguments - yesterday we examined what all forum readers will agree was pretty much a consensus by the editorial boards of various papers in Pakistan - I disagreed with the positions taken by the DT and Tribune boards especially, but that does not mean their arguments do not carry weight or that they are not more compelling -- DT has today yet another editorial, this one more forceful than yesterdays -- The statements of Pakistani officials today, have started out suggesting the US and Nato are responsible for their own protection and then calling for greater engagement with the US
lets now examine the new DT Editorial, I'm sure we'll have fun looking it over:


EDITORIAL: Sleeping with the enemy


The spate of mutually irritating exchanges between Pakistan and the US in recent days is reaching fever pitch. Stung by forthright accusations of harbouring the Afghan Taliban and especially the Haqqani network in safe havens on Pakistani soil and supporting their attacks on US/Nato/Afghan forces across the border, the government and the military have hit back with equally provocative rejoinders. Prime Minister Gilani advises the US not to send ‘wrong messages’, Foreign Minister Khar warns of the loss of an ally, COAS General Kayani rejects Mullen’s charges. All three nevertheless end on a ‘constructive engagement’ note.

In Pakistan, there has been a lot of noise and fury, full of hollow slogans and chest thumping about our ‘sovereignty’ and how the 180 million people of Pakistan are prepared to defend it against any US-led ‘boots on the ground’ inside Pakistani territory. Sceptics view this chorus as delusionary, misplaced nationalism. Soberer minds recognise that the game is one of brinkmanship, not taking on the world’s sole superpower which, despite its economic troubles, packs the most powerful and overwhelming military punch in the world. Both sides are pushing the envelope to the maximum. The risk is that given the polarisation between public opinion in the two countries, this brinkmanship can spill over into actual confrontation if care is not exercised.

There are those amongst us who think we have the US over a barrel and therefore whatever the bluster out of Washington, as the prime minister put it, the US “cannot live with us and cannot live without us”. There may be truth in that assertion, although how far this can be pushed must be a cause for concern. Two points need noting here. Arguably, if we continue to nettle the Americans through our support to extremists who are giving them a bloody nose every so often, the US will, if it is not already, explore options that reduce its logistical dependence on Pakistan. A by-product of this will be immediate and perhaps long term strictures on the political, economic and diplomatic front, which will hurt Pakistan gravely. When and if the US’s hands are freed from the Afghan quagmire, it will not look kindly on our shenanigans. Retribution is the leitmotif of empires. Two, even if the US finds ways to live without us, the question remains, can we live without the US (goodwill)? This is not a time for emotional froth, it is a time for sober reflection where Pakistan’s interests lie and whether these are compatible any longer with the dual policy adopted after 9/11, in which the blood lust in American eyes was sought to be assuaged by cracking down on and delivering al Qaeda, while preserving the Afghan Taliban for a protracted campaign of guerrilla and asymmetrical warfare that has been the hallmark of all resistance movements to foreign occupiers in Afghan history.

As the withdrawal date looms, domestic politics and the exigencies of seeking re-election could tie Obama’s hands to adhere to the declared course. However, a question mark has arisen over the feasibility of the withdrawal plan as announced. In some ways it is natural that in the phase of withdrawal, the Taliban and Haqqani network are stepping up their attacks to strengthen their position in post-withdrawal Afghanistan. The bypassing of the ISI by the US and the Afghan government in negotiations with the insurgents may also be a contributory factor in the escalating seriousness of the ‘state of siege’, particularly in Kabul, which the Afghan government and its allies would like to portray as their secure base. The more that myth is shattered by bold attacks on the US embassy, Nato headquarters and other ostensibly secure establishments, the more the withdrawal plan begins to look unrealistic. The coming vacuum of power has not, and does not seem likely to in the foreseeable future, been filled by the Afghan security forces. Withdrawal of foreign forces may be the harbinger therefore of either a long civil war or the quick running over of the anti-Taliban alliance. Potentially, a Taliban government in Kabul this time will spell trouble for Pakistan in the shape of the Pakistani Taliban. We are crafting the tools of our own destruction unthinkingly





So, enjoy

 

[karan.1970]

Over the course of several years those 'couple of strikes a week' add up to a significant amount of attacks, and if the Haqqani network had all these 'bases and training camps' these strikes could have at the least taken all of them out, leaving behind a very limited group.

And if airstrikes alone could defeat insurgent groups, the US would not need a 'surge' in Afghanistan nor the various ground based operations it has carried out. You are deluding yourself into thinking that the US 'standoff weapons capability' is some sort of magical COIN weapon that will destroy the Haqqanis if only allowed to be unleashed, when the fact is that the weapon has not even done much on its own in Afghanistan itself.

And even if your argument was accurate, and the US was to carry out massive air attacks, the Haqqanis would simply relocate to other surrounding agencies, or even Pakistan proper, and recruit even more fighters. There simply is no alternative to a long term presence of ground troops. Effective air support and the drones help tremendously, but if they worked on their own, the US would not have a 100,000 troops in Afghanistan.

Firstly, in such cases, cumulative number of attacks have no meaning since it gives enough time in between to the terrorists to regroup etc. hence even if this is on from last 10 years, a couple strikes a week if merely a reminder to the targets that USAF is around.. Nothing more..

And again, I dont think I have advocated stand off weapons by them selves.. A punitive expedition doesnt need to be only airborne. The deal in Afghanistan is that USA does not want Taliban or similar terror supporting groups back in absolute power as they were before 2001 and hence they need to have continuous boots on the ground. Eliminating Haqquanis from NW will not require the same presence as if and when US forces start the locate and destroy ops in that area, Pakistan army will need to abandon the fence its been sitting on for last 10 years and take a side (like Musharraf had to in 2001). And PA going either way will make the job easier than what it is now. If PA goes after Haqqanis, then it will end up doing the dirty work for USA with USA continuing its air support via drones. If PA fights against USA, then for USA, it will become a visible and conventional enemy instead of today's hidden one and apart from jingoistic chest thumping aside, it wont take US military more than 3-4 weeks to decimate the Pakistani armed forces in a toe to toe fight.

 

[RKhan]

It makes no sense to not take action on the Haqqanis no sense at all. I believe we should use soft power and our common culture to be able to influence Afghanistan. I'm not saying we support them but allowing them to use our territory to launch attacks and then not take action against them or allow anyone else to is just plain wrong.

 

[Martian]

Haqqanis dont have independent structure and organization because they are part of Taliban. Siraj Haqqani is simply one of the commanders of Mullah Omar.

If there were no Haqqanis then American would have coined some other imaginative organization/personality.

Previously, sources of all troubles faced by US/NATO was Al Qaida/OBL, now these have been replaced by Haqqanis.

Americans believe that by instigating mayhem in Pakistan, they would be able to export all trouble-makers to Pakistan. This will relieve pressure on US in Afghanistan and secure their permanent bases over there.

 

[iPhone]

Let me get this straight - is the US suggesting that having contacts with the haqqani is a problem or is the US alleging that Pakistan helped the haqqani plan and execute operations?

If the former, then yes, sure, - After all US negotiates with any number of talib and has and maintains contacts with them, if the latter is the problem fir the US, then no amount of denying it by Pakistan will suffice.

What I think the US really wants with this dog and pony show of Haqqani herring is to have Pakistan withdraw the very idea that Pakistan have or even can have, interests in Afghanistan that the US does not grant it -- Is this a realistic stance by the US policy makers, the nerves of pakistani policy makers will have to decide that for the US policy makers.






Sorry for the edit - Freudian slip

Nicely put. Thanks. That's exactly what it appears like when along with the allegation of attack, a demand follows, end all contacts with the Haqanis. Meaning there is no room for you in the afghan policy whatsoever, we don't want it.

It's a very tough road ahead for Pak military and political establishment ahead. Go toe to toe with the US - not happening - settle for something, diplomatically, that favors Pak in the least bit.

 

[53fd]

Mike Mullen recently said the Haqqani network acts as a veritable arm of the ISI. A pretty 'striking' response came from General Kayani, who did not deny that the ISI were in contact with the Haqqanis (or the only ones in contact with them), but that didn't mean they authorized the attack on the US embassy in Kabul. This statement was followed up by General Abbas on CNN, who acknowledged that the ISI maintained contacts with the Haqqani network, but said that didn’t mean it supported it.

This is what he said to the CNN:

“Any intelligence agency would like to maintain contact with whatever opposition group, whatever terrorist organisation … for some positive outcome.”

For now, I doubt the US has anything that can directly implicate the ISI in the Kabul embassy attacks, they will however try to weaken the ISI & pressure the Army to take action against the Haqqanis. It is pretty clear that the US is trying to cause divisions within the ISI, & trying to exploit these. Pakistan fully knows that, & will hit the US back with everything it's got.

Very interesting times ahead, for better or for worse.