From the last IAEA report (Nov 2011):
G. Possible Military Dimensions
38. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible
military dimensions to Irans nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these.
Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed
nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the
development of a nuclear payload for a missile, about which the Agency has regularly received new
information.
39. The Board of Governors has called on Iran on a number of occasions to engage with the Agency on
the resolution of all outstanding issues in order to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to
Irans nuclear programme. In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council reaffirmed Irans obligations
to take the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82,
and to cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to
concerns about the possible military dimensions to Irans nuclear programme, including by providing
access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency.
Since August 2008, Iran has not engaged with the Agency in any substantive way on this matter.
40. The Director General, in his opening remarks to the Board of Governors on 12 September 2011,
stated that in the near future he hoped to set out in greater detail the basis for the Agency's concerns so that
all Member States would be kept fully informed. In line with that statement, the Annex to this report
provides a detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency to date which has given rise to
concerns about possible military dimensions to Irans nuclear programme.
41. The analysis itself is based on a structured and systematic approach to information analysis which the
Agency uses in its evaluation of safeguards implementation in all States with comprehensive safeguards
agreements in force. This approach involves, inter alia, the identification of indicators of the existence or
development of the processes associated with nuclear-related activities, including weaponization.
42. The information which serves as the basis for the Agencys analysis and concerns, as identified in the
Annex, is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible. The information comes from a wide variety of
independent sources, including from a number of Member States, from the Agencys own efforts and from
information provided by Iran itself. It is consistent in terms of technical content, individuals and
organizations involved, and time frames.
43. The information indicates that Iran has carried out the following activities that are relevant to the
development of a nuclear explosive device:
Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and materials by
military related individuals and entities (Annex, Sections C.1 and C.2);
Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material (Annex,
Section C.3);
The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a
clandestine nuclear supply network (Annex, Section C.4); and
Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of
components (Annex, Sections C.5C.12).
44. While some of the activities identified in the Annex have civilian as well as military applications,
others are specific to nuclear weapons.
45. The information indicates that prior to the end of 2003 the above activities took place under a
structured programme. There are also indications that some activities relevant to the development of a
nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing.
Of course, this is only the tip of the iceberg, the report includes an annex of much more information.
Moreover, Iran admitted it did have a clandestine nuclear programme between 1980's and 2002 which was only reported by Iran following to the programme exposure by an Iranian opposition group. If this programme is only for civilian purposes then why conceal it for so many years without any international inspection?
In addition Iran received clandestine assistance from Pakistan through AQ Khan, why it did not report it? According to member in AQ Khan's network Iran negotiated with Pakistan on buying fissile materials for developing nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, Iran's "peaceful nuclear programme" is under the control of the Ministry of Defence (via the IAEO)... Enclosed is a picture of Iran's former Defence Minister accompany Ahmadenijad to a visit in Natanz (the centrifuge is between him and the Iranian President). Please explain what a Defence Minister has to do with a nuclear programme aimed only for civilian uses?
