Operation Citadel (Unternehmen Zitadelle) was the German code name for the thrust by Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Center) to take Kursk in July, 1943. This was the last German strategic offensive on the Eastern Front. Pitting 912000 men of the best of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS, Germany hoped to deal a crushing blow to the Soviet Red Army, thereby wresting initiative from them. In the end, the battle ended in a stalemate, which ultimately paved the way for total domination of the Red Army on the Ost Front.
Legend - GA - Guards Army., Abt - Abteilung, PzA - PanzerArmee, AK - Armeekorps
After participating in several juvenile threads, here I welcome you to discuss and analyze over the following points vis a vis the battles involved.
1. Was Hitler and the OKH(Oberkommando Der Heer) correct in beginning such a high stake offensive?
2. Did Zitadelle have a substantial chance of success?
3. Would a successful Zitadelle have changed the situation in Germany's favor in a major way?
4. Was Manstein correct in his evaluation of the scenario - that victory was close?
5. Was Hitler correct in withdrawing the Panzer divisions especially the entire II SS Panzer Korps was detached from the OOB(Order of Battle) and sent to Italy(to prepare for Achse, the planned occupation and possible fight in post surrender Italy)?
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Please feel free to invite others for a fruitful discussion 
1.Yes and no.In a grand strategic sense germany understood that it had a very limited time frame before the western powers brought their land forces into mainland europe.They needed SOMETHING to deal enough of a blow to soviet so as to regain the initiative on the eastern front lost after stalingrad and to prop up sagging morale off axis partners.German strategists knew once allied land forces were in europe never again would they be able to focus such large percentage of the wehrmacht on the eastern front.
However they didn't have manpower for an offensive,the whole key to the german position in the east in 1943 were the 11 panzer divisions of army group centre and south.These were what were keeping the red army in check and under manstein had crushed the soviet advance after stalingrad at 3rd kharkov.To accomplish the first objective germany would have to jeopardize its whole position completely,if the offensive failed and its armoured reserves were squandered nothing would be left to halt a soviet counterblow.Guderian advised hitler to rest and requip the panzerwaffe throughout 1943 with panthers and stay on the defensive,then resume the offensive in 1944.But hitler had other plans,the plan was not wholly unjustified.
2.Yes it did.Provided hitler had listened to manstein and attacked in april -may.Once the massive soviet fortifications were completed there was no chance.Giving soviets so much build up time in exchange for few untried panthers and fewer still tigers was not worth the trade off.
3.No,it would only have delayed the inevitable.Germany lost the war before moscow in 1941.Stalingrad ended germany's last chance at any settlement in russia.
4.No.Zitadelle failed once model's projected pincer was stopped cold.The encirclement scheme was finished.The southern advance became merely about attriting soviet armoured reserves ,which the panzers did but at a much higher cost than germany could afford.
5.No.Italy is mountanous area unsuited to armoured warfare,kesselring showed in 1944-45 it could be held fine without large scale use of armour.A main principle of war is selection and maintainence of aim.German high command consistently blundered at this point.Once during battle of britain when RAF was being ground down and in serious trouble with its bases being wiped out around the kent region,switched focus to bombing london and lost the initiative forever.
Again after initial barbarossa success total confusion and contradiction in high command between subsequent aim,moscow or ukraine?Again in fall blau 1942 after original goal of taking caucasus midway hitler decides to split forces,half to take symbolic objective stalingrad half on the original objective the oilfields.Result none of the detatchments are strong enough to perform their mission.
Actually the Germans were much closer to clinching victory at Kursk. They were still far, but their performance was superb. Facing almost a 6 to 1 superiority, Manstein's stroke brought the panzers to Prokhorovka.
This Prokhorovka was incidentally the place where the 5th Guards was being committed. Here began one of the most intense armored battles of warfare. Even here the 5th Guards was decimated.
Battle of Prokhorovka - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In the fierce engagement the Waffen SS's ferocity was proved. They lost 43 AFVs while total Sowjet losses were almost 770 AFVs. The reason for such a heavy loss was that the Soviet's were unprepared and the tanks were committed piecemeal into action. For the Germans it was almost a duck shoot. It ended as a tactical victory for the Germans!
Why did the Soviets commit such huge reserves in such haste?
A - To gain time for bringing more reserves, especially their Shock Armies(actually second grade troops as compared to Guards). More importantly this little town of Prokhorovka was the last line of defence for Kursk. Which meant, a successful advance would have cut of the lines of supply for the entire Russian pocket. The Soviets then would either have to beat back the German pincer or withdraw from the North.
Why the North?
Because Busse's pincer in the North had faltered and pretty much remained grounded. It would have been a dangerous maneuver though.
A second factor was also crucial and often neglected.
Operation Kutuzov, a hastily organized offensive was designed at STAVKA. The attack went on the left flank of Busse's 9th Armee. Busse was already almost stopped. This attack not only forced him to commit his reserves to prevent a breatkthrough, but also withdraw troops from the pincer to meet the advance. Also while the Germans destroyed the 5th Guards Army and 4 other Russian Corps in Prokhorovka on 12 July, the Allies had landed in Sicily around 9th. So time was running out.
It was then that Hitler summoned Manstein to Wolfschanze(Rastenburg) and asked if the operation should be stopped. Manstein opposed and so the 54th PanzerKorps still remained. But after 48 hours the Russians had also attacked in the South and these reserves were taken out of the Kursk battle zone and committed South. A new directive ordered the offensive to cease.
U are quoting figures from german sources only,not declassified soviet archives.Germans lost over 150-200 armoured vehicles at prokhorovka,sure they cost much more soviet losses ,BUT the battlefield remained in soviet hands so none of the damaged german tanks could be recovered while soviets could recover theirs.And many of the soviet tanks were older model light tanks.Majority were t-34s,but no is-2 tanks were present only a handful isu-152 tank destroyers being employed in defensive belts.Prokhorovka WAS the last defenisve line,but germans didn't possess the strength to hold it and keep the pocket closed.As bulk of soviet armour reserves were still intact and northern pincer required for a true envelopment operation had failed.
