Your plan resemble the one Ariel Sharon used during the October War for the breakthrough of Sinai
Well, your plan is sound, but I am afraid it would not work in this case.
If I understand your plan exactly, you are calling for a frontal spearhead attack into the salient toward Kursk and directly move outward to capture or destroy the Soviet supply route and cut off the reinforcement. Meanwhile using both Flanks (Orel and Belgorod) to prevent a spill.
The problem I can see is Germany would need a swift victory on Kursk to disperse the reinforcement, the swiftness is within 1 or 2 days. Which I don't think it's possible. Look at this map.
Soviet have 11 Infantry Corp inside the salient. in 3 defensive lines, before even touching the reserve. That's about 900,000 people in there. (with another 1 million reserve) And for the soviet, they do not need to win the battle too, the only thing they are require to do is to hold the ground and grind off the Germany attacks.
The strategic depth of Soviet defense would eat away the German attacking force to either bleed them or simply absorb the attacks, and while the German being grinded away, the German command will need to funnel the troop from the battle line into the central breakout, and that would present a good chance for the soviet to make a Stalingrad style envelopment once again. It would be not wise to attack the Soviet from inside the salient, that is where their troop were most concentrated. (11 crops on the lines vs 4 crops on each flanks)
Then take a look at this map.
This map lay out the static defense in and around Kursk, as you can see the front of the Kursk Salient is heavily defense with trenches and minefield, Even the original Battle of Kursk insertion point did not have that much of defense on it. Any frontal attack I am afraid will only proof suicidal.
The original plan was to penetrate both side toward Kursk and close the road thru it so nothing can reach Kursk and then a grinding war would trap and eliminated the salient. by closing the door on both flanks, they would also close the flushing supply into Kursk. And that aimed at diminishing the supply day by day during the attack, by closing the gap and eventually cut off the whole salient
Your plan would have an open road to Kursk (Unchanged supply rate) until the point Kursk is liberated and the supply route is either destroyed or captured. That mean an uninterrupted reinforcement and supply during the whole campaign. To which the rear would keep constant logistic flow toward the most concentrated part of the line.
I would say the original plan of Kursk would have < 50% chance of success if the German attack on April/May, less than 30% when doing so in July. Your plan would have about the same chance of success if the German attack on April/May but would have less than the original plan when the attack is carried out in July.
I could be wrong, this is just my simple opinion.