Turkey bought a lot of weapons from Israel, we can arrange this again: Erdoğan aide

[dani191]

Turkey bought a lot of weapons from Israel, we can arrange this again: Erdoğan aide
President Erdoğan's adviser Mesut Hakkı Caşın has said that Turkey bought a lot of weapons from Israel and that it can be arranged again. "Turkey's and Israel's defense industries can go ahead together," Caşın said.
Wednesday December 23 2020 04:59 pm

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (L) and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Duvar English
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's adviser Mesut Hakkı Caşın has said that Turkey bought a lot of weapons from Israel, arguing that Israel has a lot to gain from normalization between the two countries.
"Turkey bought a lot of weapons from Israel. We can arrange this again. Turkey's and Israel's defense industries can go ahead together," Caşın told Voice of America in an interview on Dec. 21, while also confirming that bilateral talks and full diplomatic relations could be restored by March.
Relations between the once close allies all but collapsed with Turkey withdrawing its ambassador in 2017, amid escalating tensions.
"If Israel comes one step, Turkey maybe can come two steps," Caşın said in reference to ongoing talks with Israel.
"If we see a green light, Turkey will open the embassy again and return our ambassador. Maybe in March, we can restore full diplomatic relations again. Why not."

Mesut Hakkı Caşın.
"Establishing peace and security is very important to Israel and Turkey. After Mavi Marmara, we don't want another accident with Israel," added Caşın.
The Mavi Marmara was the largest of six vessels in a Gaza-bound flotilla carrying humanitarian aid for Palestinians back in 2010. Pro-Palestinian activists seeking to break Israel's economic blockade of the Gaza Strip were on board when Israeli forces stormed the vessel, killing nine Turkish nationals.
Since then, Turkish-Israeli relations have never fully recovered despite intense mediating efforts by the United States to rebuild ties between its two key regional allies.
U.S. President Donald Trump's decision to recognize Jerusalem as the Israeli capital and Israeli security forces' crackdown on Palestinian protests saw Turkey and Israel withdrawing their ambassadors.
Caşın acknowledged the election of Joe Biden to the U.S. presidency as a boost to efforts to repair ties. “There are new perspectives with Biden; a lot of things will change," he said.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan enjoyed a close relationship with Trump, but a Biden presidency is predicted to be more challenging for Ankara.
Turkey and Israel did find recent common ground in the recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, the disputed mainly ethnic Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan. Israeli and Turkish drones and reported intelligence support from the two countries proved pivotal in Azerbaijan's victory over Armenian forces backed by Iran.
'The biggest market is Turkey'
Caşın said that Turkey can be the biggest market for Israel's oil and gas.
"Secondly, energy resources, They [Israel] discover oil and gas. OK, Israel is 8 million people. Where can they sell this oil and gas? The biggest market is Turkey, and Turkey will be via a pipeline, the corridor to the European Union market."
A significant repercussion from Israeli and Turkish tensions is Israel allying itself with Turkey’s regional rivals, Egypt and Greece. The three countries are developing cooperation based on energy and defense, a move that observers say is a reaction to Turkey's increasingly robust stance in the region.
Analysts suggest Israel will likely be careful not to jeopardize its recent deepening ties with Egypt and Greece. A potentially more significant stumbling block to Israeli-Turkish rapprochement is Ankara's backing of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.
Erdoğan, who likes to present himself as a defender of global Muslim rights, remains in the forefront of opposing Israel's diplomatic efforts to secure Jerusalem's international recognition as its capital. At the same time, Ankara's support of the Muslim Brotherhood is a central plank of Turkish diplomacy in the region.
Both Erdoğan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu routinely exchange insults, which observers say plays well with their electoral bases. With Israel likely set for new elections, analysts say it is unlikely there will be an announcement of any breakthrough before the expected poll outcome.

Turkey bought a lot of weapons from Israel, we can arrange this again: Erdoğan aide

President Erdoğan's adviser Mesut Hakkı Caşın has said that Turkey bought a lot of weapons from Israel and that it can be arranged again. "Turkey's and Israel's defense industries can go ahead together," Caşın said.

www.duvarenglish.com

 

[Attila the Hun]

Erdoğan, who likes to present himself as a defender of global Muslim rights

I keep reading this all the time. When/where has Erdogan ever said "I will defend all the Muslim world"

Anyone willing to show me this, i will deeply appreciate it.

 

[SD 10]

Erdogan got his software updated

 

[dani191]

The Rift Between Turkey and Israel Continues to Deepen
By Jon Hoffman
Friday, July 9, 2021, 9:46 AM

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Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Libyan National Unity Government Prime Minister Dbeibeh hold a joint press conference in Ankara, Turkey, on April 12, 2021. Photo credit: Office of the President of Turkey, Directorate of Communications

Tensions are rising in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s sparring with Israel is combining with its conflicts with Saudi Arabia and its partners, and is increasingly drawing in other countries—from Libya to Greece, and maybe soon the United States. Just a few months ago, there appeared to be signs of rapprochement between Turkey and Israel, but that now seems unlikely. The considerable rise of conservative ethnic and religious nationalism in both Israel and Turkey over the past couple decades is often cited to help explain this tension, and nationalist sentiment is associated with aggressive foreign policies. But this emphasis misses a strategic dimension of critical importance. Ankara and Tel Aviv are on opposing sides of a broader struggle for regional hegemony that is remaking the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean corridor.
Despite being one of the first Muslim nations to recognize Israel—doing so in 1949, only one year after the formal creation of the state—Turkey has increasingly found itself at odds with Tel Aviv over their respective struggles for regional influence, particularly following the 2011 Arab uprisings. Israel, on the basis of its shared enmity with Iran, has increasingly aligned itself with the “Counterrevolutionary Bloc” (CRB), which comprises Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and post-2013 Egypt, all of which have sought to crush the wave of mass mobilization that emerged in 2011 and maintain the regional geopolitical status quo. The CRB is opposed to the other two primary ad-hoc regional alliances: the bloc represented by Qatar and Turkey, both of which have sought greater independence in their foreign policies by supporting certain elements of the uprisings, and that of Iran and its regional partners.
For Turkey, the more assertive approach it has assumed in the Middle East is a reflection of the country’s more general “turn to the east.” As Kadir Yildirim explains, this shift is due to several factors, including the repeated rebuffs by the European Union to grant Turkey membership, the desire of the ruling Justice and Development Party to strengthen domestic support, as well as its desire to assert Turkey as a strong actor in its own neighborhood. The uprisings presented Turkey with the opportunity to apply a more proactive regional policy to potentially tip the balance of power in Ankara’s favor.
Turkey quickly emerged as a major regional power broker in the post-2011 context and has found itself in direct competition with the CRB. Ankara has directly engaged in Syria, Libya and Iraq; has provided extensive support to the Muslim Brotherhood and its regional offshoots, granting several of its leaders asylum in Turkey; stood firmly with Qatar amid the land, air and naval blockade launched by the Saudi axis; has maintained good working relations with Hamas in Gaza; and remains engaged in intense competition with the CRB in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, viewing the recent normalizations between Israel and several Arab states as a way to more formally solidify the CRB and isolate Turkey, Ankara has increasingly sought to present itself as the “champion” of the Palestinian cause by blasting the Arab states of the CRB and calling for all Muslim countries to take a clear position.
Israel has stood firm with the Arab states of the CRB in concomitantly denouncing Turkey’s behavior in the region as “imperialist.” Israeli officials have also repeatedly accused Turkey of allowing Hamas to recruit in and plan attacks from Turkish territory, and have lobbied the United States to sanction Turkey as it has Iran for allegedly supporting terrorism in the region. This culminated in the Israeli military formally labeling Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s regional policies as a direct challenge to Israeli interests for the first time ever in its 2020 annual intelligence report.
Perhaps more than anything else, what concerns Turkey the most about this competition is its rapid expansion to Turkey’s strategic underbelly: the eastern Mediterranean corridor. Diplomatic, economic and military relations between Greece, Israel and the Arab states of the CRB have grown exponentially as part of the broader struggle to shape the post-2011 regional order.
In response to Ankara’s ratification of a maritime agreement with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) designed to create an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) from Turkey’s southern Mediterranean border to Libya’s northern coast—a zone that passes directly through waters claimed by the government of Greece—Egypt and Greece signed their own agreement on an EEZ passing through the eastern Mediterranean that severs Turkey’s proposed zone with the GNA. Following the signing, Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias claimed that the Turkish deal is now where it belongs, “in the trash can.” Egypt has also dramatically expanded its military ties with Greece, with both countries regularly conducting joint air and naval exercises in the eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea. In April 2021, Egypt, Greece and Cyprus signed a tripartite cooperation deal to further strengthen their military ties, with retired Egyptian Army General Nasr Salem stating that “this growing cooperation mainly aims to rein in the Turks and trim their violations in the region.”
Likewise, Saudi Arabia and Greece have embraced one another, with Riyadh demonstrating support for Athens in their eastern Mediterranean disputes with Turkey. Saudi Arabia and Greece conduct joint air exercises in the Mediterranean, and in 2019, Riyadh formally declared Saudi support for Cypriot sovereignty “against claims of autonomy from the Ankara-backed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.” In April 2021, Greece and Saudi Arabia signed a deal whereby Athens would provide Riyadh with a U.S.-built Patriot air defense system in order to “protect critical energy facilities.” The UAE has similarly expanded its relations with Greece considerably, signing a strategic partnership agreement in 2020 that includes the provision that each country come to the aid of the other “in the event that their territorial integrity is threatened.” The agreement also establishes cooperation on defense and foreign policy more broadly. Greece hailed the agreement as one of the most significant pacts it has entered since the end of World War II. Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE has also acknowledged the Greek Cypriot government as the rightful authority over the island (as opposed to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), and in August 2020, the UAE deployed several F-16 fighter jets to Crete amid growing tensions between Greece and Turkey. The Emirates have also participated in several Greek-led military exercises in the Mediterranean, often alongside the militaries of Egypt and Saudi Arabia in a show of strength directed toward Turkey.
As relations between Greece and the Arab states of the CRB have grown, so too have the ties between Athens and Israel. In April 2021, Israel and Greece signed a record defense deal between the two nations, which includes a $1.65 billion contract for the establishment and operation of a training center for the Hellenic Air Force. This followed a meeting earlier that month in Cyprus between the foreign ministers of Greece, Israel, the UAE and Cyprus, at which all agreed to deepen their cooperation in the eastern Mediterranean. Israel has also participated directly in the air and naval exercises hosted by Greece, and the two nations recently agreed to further increase military cooperation. Moreover, following the most recent escalation in violence in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories, Athens stood firmly with Israel by condemning the “firing of thousands of rockets by Hamas against Israel” and asserted that “Israel has the right to self-defense.”
Particularly alarming for Ankara is the eastern Mediterranean pipeline project, or EastMed. The project is an agreement signed by Greece, Cyprus and Israel to transport gas from Israel’s Leviathan gas field to Greece and mainland Europe, passing through Cyprus. Designed to circumvent Turkey and undermine its efforts to become an energy hub linking Europe and Asia, EastMed has also been endorsed by Egypt and the UAE, with the latter investing in the project.
As Harun Karcic argues, Ankara sees these actions as “a common front designed to confine it to its own shores geopolitically and militarily.” Despite talk of “rapprochement” or the “mending of ties,” Turkey and Israel remain on opposite sides of the broader struggle to reshape the regional order. As this competition for regional dominance continues to expand to the eastern Mediterranean, it will continue to entrench divisions between Turkey and Greece.
Turkey and Greece are both NATO members, and Israel and the Arab CRB states are also close U.S. defense partners, so although U.S. officials have expressed their desire to scale back in the region and pivot to Asia, these tensions risk dragging Washington into these squabbles. Some policymakers are already taking sides. U.S. Sens. Marco Rubio and Robert Menendez recently proposed a bill designed to cast Washington’s support firmly behind Israel, Greece and Cyprus. The bill states, among other things, that “the United States should support the sale of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to Greece to include those produced for but never delivered to Turkey as a result of Turkey’s exclusion from the program due to its purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system.” Moreover, it appears that the bill intends for Israel, Greece and Cyprus to serve as a bulwark against increased Russian and Chinese presence in the Middle East, stating that the United States should cooperate against these countries in areas of “maritime security, defense cooperation, energy initiatives, and countering malign influence efforts by the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation.” However, the bill fails to recognize how states in the region are increasingly manipulating the return of great power competition to the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean corridor to advance their own agendas. Initiatives like the proposed legislation are counterproductive in the sense that they exacerbate regional geopolitical struggles while further entangling the United States in the region.
The United States should be trying to use its position to tamp down tensions, not promote them. The challenge moving forward will be to discourage further escalation and promote freedom of navigation in the eastern Mediterranean corridor while simultaneously abstaining from assuming a more direct role in the conflict. As a start, it can refrain from openly taking sides in the conflict. U.S. interests are best advanced by assuming a hands-off policy that discourages further escalation while simultaneously preventing regional states from dragging Washington into their geopolitical struggles. Washington should strive to distance itself from the broader struggle for regional dominance as it seeks to pivot away from the Middle East. This way it can impede further escalation while keeping the conflict at arm’s length.

The Rift Between Turkey and Israel Continues to Deepen

Despite signs of rapprochement, new faultlines are emerging over freedom of navigation in the eastern Mediterranean.

www.lawfareblog.com

 

[Big Tank]

Pakistani Erdogan Fanboys: You don't know bro! This is a tactics by Hazrat Erdogan to know Yahudi secrets for the rise of Great Ottoman Sultanat again!

 

[Attila the Hun]

I've said this many times on here.

Israel and Saudi Arabia are one nation. Turkey is nothing to come between them. LOL

Arabs and Israelis are Semitic people. There's a cultural bond between the two.

 

[Trench Broom]

You know that girlfriend that dumped you for what she thought was a better man, but ended up without a man, friends or money?

Then she texts you and wants to rekindle the romance.

STAY AWAY Israel. Turkey is a returning girlfriend who is desperate.

 

[Attila the Hun]

You know that girlfriend that dumped you for what she thought was a better man, but ended up without a man, friends or money?

Then she texts you and wants to rekindle the romance.

STAY AWAY Israel. Turkey is a returning girlfriend who is desperate.

Desperate for?? Israel has no friends. lol

 

[Lincoln]

I keep reading this all the time. When/where has Erdogan ever said "I will defend all the Muslim world"

Anyone willing to show me this, i will deeply appreciate it.

He talks like this, and tries to produce this image. His puppet media TRT pushes his international Islamist propaganda.

But right now, his Government has made the economy go to shit, so he can no longer do these optics. He knows Israel is a great trade partner, he knows USA has a lot of money to offer for Kabul airport, and so on. He's trying to find shortcuts to better the situation because he can't fix the broken economy in two years before the elections.

 

[Muhammed45]

I've said this many times on here.

Israel and Saudi Arabia are one nation. Turkey is nothing to come between them. LOL

Arabs and Israelis are Semitic people. There's a cultural bond between the two.

Saud family surely is what you said but Muslims of peninsula are not what you claimed. People of Turkey are ok with Israeli embassy and they don't give a hoot about Palestine by a considerable majority, on the other hand, Al-Saud family unlike UAE is afraid of its Muslim masses hence hiding cordial relations with Israel.
Let us keep our hope in our Muslim brothers and sisters in Arabian peninsula. I hear they help Yemen in their fight against Saud family. Money cannot buy true followers of prophet, no matter Shia or Sunni.

 

[MMM-E]

MESUT HAKKI CASIN is nobody


Led by ERDOGAN Turkey never will buy anything from Israel ... even what can İsrael give to Turkey ? Engines ? NO
Turkey create its own defense Industry
and Turkey has far more military projects than İsrael


btw Turkey didnt buy a lot of weapons from İsrael ... only POPEYE Cruise Missile , HERON UAV and HARPY kamikaze Drone
now Turkey has its own Cruise Missiles ,UAV-UCAVs and kamikaze Drones even better than İsraeli ones

 

[Meliodas]

What's the problem in buying from Israel, if it's good business it's good business.

 

[tesla]

turkey have alot of bought weapons from israel in 90's in that times turkey had good relationship with israel as i remembered it in erdoğan era just we bought heron uav to fight pkk terror . maybe a few curuise misile against greece . posibility mesut hakkı caşın were mentioning these weapons . by the way these herons uavs were breakdowing consistently .so turkey launched own uav program'S first anka later selçuk bayraktar designd own uav program .
the reason is that erdoğan want to good relationship with israel complateley is energy issue(gas ,oil , pipeline projects.) in east mediterranian sea. if turkey have oil and gas then turkey solve all of these economic problems . erdogan just want to it.
beside Erdogan rule to turkey . not stupid mullahs or imam chi cin ping or other clowns .